External Interventions and Conflicts in Africa after the end of the Cold War

Ricardo Real Pedrosa de Sousa

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Shaded countries in the map are the ones which had a civil war between 1989 and 2010.

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na het einde van de Koude Oorlog

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To my parents, Fernando and Margarida, for their love.

Para os meus pais, Fernando e Margarida, pelo seu amor.

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They are:

- Appendices 2 of Chapter 3: Comparison of Ricardo Sousa and Patrick Regan (Regan et al. 2009) datasets; and
- Appendices 3 of Chapter 5: Complement to the statistical analysis



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Acronyms

ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
AFRICOM - United States Africa Command
AKUF - Working Group for Research on the Causes of War
AMISOM - African Mission for Somalia
APSA – African Peace and Security Architecture
ARPCT - Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS/ICU - Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts
ASF –African Stand-by Forces
AU – African Union
AU PSC – African Union Peace and Security Council
CONIS - Conflict Information System
COW – Correlates of War
CSSDCA - Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DADM - Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management
DSA - Digil Salvation Army
EC – European Commission
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EDACS - Event Data on Conflict and Security
EU – European Union
GPI - Global Peace Index

HIIK - Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICU - Islamic Court Union
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO - International Government Organization
JVA - Jubba Valley Alliance
MPLA - Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSSP - Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD - South African New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU – Organization of African Unity
ODA - Overseas Development Assistance
ONLF - Ogaden National Liberation Front
OSSREA - Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa
PKO – Peace Keeping Operations
PRIO - Peace Research Institute Oslo
REC - Regional Economic Communities
RM - Regional Mechanisms
RO – Regional Organizations
RRA - Rahanweyn Resistance Army
SADC - Southern African Development Community
SCAD - Social Conflict in Africa Database
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIPRI MPOD - SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database
SNF - Somalia National Front
SNM - Somali National Movement
SPM - Somali Patriotic Movement
SRO – Sub-Regional Organizations
UCDP- Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UCDP GED - UCDP Georeference Event Dataset
UN – United Nations

UN SC – United Nations Security Council
UNITA - Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF - United Task Force
UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS - United Nations Political Office for Somalia
USC - United Somali Congress
USC/SNA – USC/Somali National Alliance
USC/SSA – USC/Somali Salvation Alliance
SRRC - Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF - Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG - Transitional Federal Government
TNA - Transitional National Assembly
TNC - Transitional National Charter
TNG - Transitional National Government

Chapters 1 to 6.

Acknowledgements

This PhD is the culmination of four years of research that is best characterized as Ubuntu, according to which "we are, therefore I am, and since I am, therefore we are" (Dzobo, 1992: 132)[1]. Viewed in this way, the PhD is, to the best of my current abilities, a contribution to what we are as a reflex of what we are in me, which means that my gratefulness extends beyond the acknowledgements I am able to express here.

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[1] Dzobo, N.K. (1992) 'The image of man in Africa', K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (eds.) Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series II, Africa, Volume 1, Library of Congress Washington DC, USA.

mission in 2012 Dr. Paulos Chanie hosted me again at OSSREA and I am grateful to him for his collaboration in organizing a seminar where the preliminary results were presented. My fieldwork would not have been the same without the support of Professor Mihyo and Dr. Chanie.

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Abstract

In light of the persistence of armed conflict within the context of extensive foreign interventions, this research investigates the effect of external interventions on state-based conflict intensity. The main study comprises four papers using a mixed method approach analysing conflict interventions in Africa from the end of the Cold War up to 2010. An additional paper focuses on the legality of institutional decisions over military interventions in Africa using a process tracing approach. In the main study the specification of the dependent variable is carried out through a comparative analysis of the validity and reliability of a series of datasets leading to the selection of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georeference events Dataset (UCDP-GED). For the conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2010 a new dataset on external interventions is coded with 576 entries, revising and adding to the dataset of Regan et al. (2009). A theoretical rational choice model of the balance of the parties' capabilities and how external interventions affect the utility of fighting is tested on a case study in Somalia and with an econometric analysis of the new dataset. Preliminary results validate expectations and other findings in the literature according to which partisan, military and economic interventions escalate conflict while neutral, diplomatic and UN missions de-escalate conflict. However, after controlling for the reverse causality on the relationship between conflict intensity and external interventions, only the escalatory effects remain significant, a plausible result considering some of the mechanisms identified in the case study. Furthermore these unexpected results are not dependent on the success or failure of diplomatic efforts, after controlling for reverse causality. In sum, the more robust effect is that partisan and military interventions increase conflict intensity, while the neutral and diplomatic effect requires further investigation. Building on these results, an additional fifth paper show that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), centered on the African Union

and based on the principle of subsidiarity, does not explicitly and fully safeguard United Nations Security Council (UN SC) primacy over decisions on military interventions. The way in which subsidiarity is implemented within the APSA and between the African Union and United Nations determines if UN SC primacy is a foundational principle of the security intervention architecture.

Externe interventies en conflicten in Afrika na het einde van de Koude Oorlog

Samenvatting

Gewapende conflicten blijven vaak voortbestaan ondanks buitenlandse interventies op uitgebreide schaal. Vanuit dit gegeven richt dit onderzoek zich op het effect van externe interventies op de intensiteit van gewapende conflicten binnen staten. Het hoofdonderzoek in dit proefschrift omvat vier artikelen. Dit onderzoek gaat over interventies bij gewapende conflicten in Afrika vanaf het einde van de Koude Oorlog tot 2010, en hierbij is gebruik gemaakt van een mixed-methodbenadering. Daarnaast is een artikel opgenomen dat onderzoek naar de wettigheid van institutionele beslissingen ten aanzien van militaire interventies in Afrika beschrijft. In dit onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van de kwalitatieve process-tracing methode.

In het hoofdonderzoek is de afhankelijke variabele gespecificeerd door middel van een vergelijkende analyse van de validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van een reeks datasets en op basis daarvan is de Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georeference events Dataset (UCDP-GED) gekozen (een onderzoeksproject van de Universiteit van Uppsala waarbij data verzameld worden over gewapende conflicten, gekoppeld aan de geografische locatie). Voor dit onderzoek is een nieuwe dataset gecodeerd van deze gewapende conflicten die plaatsvonden tussen 1989 en 2010 en waarbij sprake was van 576 externe interventies. Deze dataset is een revisie van en aanvulling op de dataset van Regan et al. (2009).

Een model dat gebaseerd is op de rationale-keuzetheorie en dat het evenwicht tussen de strijdende partijen beschrijft en de wijze waarop externe interventies het nut van de strijd beïnvloeden, is getoetst in een casestudy in Somalië en met een econometrische analyse van de nieuwe dataset. De voorlopige resultaten bevestigen de verwachting dat partijdige, militaire en

economische interventies escalerend werken, terwijl neutrale, diplomatieke interventies en VN-missies de-escalerend werken, wat ook blijkt uit andere resultaten uit de literatuur. Wanneer echter gecontroleerd wordt voor de endogeniteit van de relatie tussen conflictintensiteit en externe interventies, zijn alleen de escalerende effecten nog significant, wat in overeenstemming is met sommige mechanismen die in de casestudy beschreven worden. Bovendien zijn deze onverwachte resultaten niet afhankelijk van het slagen of mislukken van de diplomatieke inspanningen, nadat gecontroleerd is voor endogeniteit.

Concluderend blijkt dat partijdige en militaire interventies de intensiteit van conflicten verhogen, en dat het effect van neutrale en diplomatieke interventies nader onderzocht moet worden. Voortbouwend op deze resultaten blijkt uit een aanvullend vijfde artikel dat de Afrikaanse vredes- en veiligheidsarchitectuur (African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA), opgericht door de Afrikaanse Unie en gebaseerd op het principe van subsidiariteit, het primaat van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties bij beslissingen over militaire interventies niet expliciet en volledig veiligstelt. De wijze waarop subsidiariteit binnen de APSA en tussen de Afrikaanse Unie en de Verenigde Naties wordt geïmplementeerd, bepaalt of het primaat van de VN-Veiligheidsraad een fundamenteel principe van de architectuur van de veiligheidsinterventie is.

Publications

Chapter 2

Sousa, Ricardo Real P. (forthcoming) Comparing Datasets: Understanding Conceptual Differences in Quantitative Conflict Studies, In Helen Hintjens and Dubravka Zarkov (Ed.) "Conflict, Peace, Security and Development - Theories and Methodologies", Routledge

A version of chapter 4

Sousa, Ricardo Real P. (forthcoming) External interventions and conflict intensity in Somalia, Journal Caderno de Estudos Africanos

1 Introduction

1.1 The puzzle

Conflict is a malady that creates incommensurable human costs for societies, creating a negative impact on the economic, social and political development of a country. Since the end of the Second World War, conflict has taken on more of an intra-state nature; this trend became even more pronounced after the end of the Cold War. Foreign actors recurrently intervene in these internal conflicts. Their involvement takes many forms, such as through direct bilateral military or economic interventions, diplomatic initiatives or the more complex missions executed by multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. As interventions continue to occur, the effect of external interventions has come under scrutiny in terms of its effects on the frequency, duration and intensity of conflicts.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of conflicts has steadily declined until recent years. Conflicts are relatively short and less intense, and protracted conflicts have become the exception rather than the rule. The high recurrence of conflicts stems more from the difficulty involved in winning the conflicts rather than the incapacity to resolve them. More conflicts are terminated through negotiated settlements; even when these collapse, the conflict resumes with less intensity than before the agreements (Human Security Research Group, 2012). Together these indicators suggest an improved picture in terms of conflict frequency and duration.

Nevertheless, conflicts remain a concern: as of 2010, there were 31 active civil wars in the world (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In addition, the effect of external interventions on conflict intensity has been examined. Evidence is mounting that military and economic interventions have an escalatory effect on conflict processes while diplomatic interventions are

equated with peaceful modes of conflict resolution. UN missions are considered to have a positive effect in securing peace whereas non-UN missions have a more precarious record, even if both focus on conflict resolution. A closer look at patterns of interventions reveals a more pronounced escalatory effect from such interventions.

For the sub-set of cases of external interventions in conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2010, external interventions occurred not only in months with more battle deaths but also in months with an increase in the number of battle deaths compared to months with no interventions. Furthermore, this escalatory effect increased in the period under analysis. The effects occur for all interventions, with the exception of UN and non-UN missions. This is what Zinnes (1980) characterizes as puzzlement, "when something does not fit with something else" (337).

This association of external interventions and conflict intensity calls into question the means and intents of interventions as a whole. The intent of interventions is the cornerstone of the potential effect of interventions, even if little quantitative systematic work has been done about it. Interventions in other countries are promoted as a product of conflict management and as an effort to de-escalate the conflict. These escalatory effects are surprising, especially the apparent escalatory effect of diplomacy. Yet endogeneity exists in this relationship, as more battle deaths can lead to more interventions and more interventions can be the cause of more battle deaths. This research explores the question of the exact effects of external interventions on conflict intensity once controlling for the endogeneity in the relationship.

In order to operationalize the research, a region of the world had to be selected. Africa has experienced the most conflicts in the post-Cold War era, with more than one third of the world's total conflicts between 1989 and 2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). At the same time, Africa has attracted the most significant number of interventions, particularly diplomatic and multilateral. For instance, in 2005, UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) deployed 77% of their forces in Africa, corresponding to 75% of its budget that year (Murshed, 2009). Similarly Africa is the sole region where a specific institutional setting for the management of civil wars is being developed—namely, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). For these reasons, Africa was selected as the region for analysis.

1.2 Gaps in the literature, challenges of research, and contributions

How to define the dependent variable - conflict

The conceptualization of conflict is both a theoretical and methodological challenge. Theoretically researchers have seen conflict either as a binary outcome, with a conflict existing in a country or not, or as a process along a continuum. The former considers the requirements for parties to engage in a high intensity conflict which could be called a civil war (with a threshold set at 200 or at 999 battle deaths per year) to be qualitatively different from the processes of low intensity conflict. Therefore, the phenomenon of civil war is distinct from low intensity conflict, even if both events are armed conflicts. This could be considered a leaner conceptualization and is operationalized by the identification of a threshold of battle deaths, along with the criteria of being an armed challenge to the state carried out by organised group(s).

The alternative conceptualization of civil war confers a more diffuse nature to the conflict process, where conflict is an evolving process with different manifestations in terms of not only intensity, but also form. Conflict is seen along a spectrum of violent and non-violent manifestations, where civil war encompasses but is not limited to armed conflict. The conceptualization also involves group(s) challenging the state with a politically relevant agenda. These alternatives conceptualizations of conflict can be considered more holistic, but with severe operationalization challenges. By not relying exclusively on battle deaths to delimit civil war events, this conceptualization needs to rely on more subjective criteria of evaluation.

Overall, the debate on civil war can be framed with the former conceptualization including violent conflict and the latter conceptualization including both violent and non-violent conflict, thereby encompassing part of the negative peace phenomenon (Galtung, 1969). Negative peace refers to the situation where conflict is managed without violence.

External interventions and its limits

The end of the Cold War marked a moment of international system change. Although the origins of many post-Cold-War conflicts can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), the end of

the Cold War significantly altered the way these conflicts developed and how the international community dealt with them. The international community's interventions are normally of a military, economic or diplomatic nature or a combination of those and are executed by states or multilateral organisations, such as in missions carried out by the UN or other non-UN organisations.

In order to cover this full spectrum of possible interventions, a new dataset had to be developed, building on the dataset of Regan et al. (2009) for 1945 to 1999, but with several relevant features addressing some of the limitations of existing research. The time period is extended to cover the entire post-Cold War period, from 1989 to 2010. Existing datasets focus on either sub-types of interventions or exclusively on multilateral organisations' interventions, preventing the ability to control for the effect each has on the other interventions. Also, existing datasets defined conflict with high thresholds of battle deaths, which prevents an analysis of external interventions in lower intensity conflict. Both of these limitations have been overcome in the new dataset by including multilateral and non-multilateral organisations' interventions and by lowering the threshold to one battle death.

This broadening of the conflict period to a certain degree overcomes the extent to which the analysis could be subjected to the Robinson Crusoe Fallacy—namely, that the relationship between interventions and conflict is a game-theory model rather than a probabilistic decision-theory model (Tsebelis, 1989). The idea being that conflict parties' expectations of interventions determine their strategies in the conduct of the conflict at the same time that interveners factor in the parties' reactions to their possible interventions. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) modelled this dynamic to find that expectations of support can prolong civil wars. By lowering the threshold of deaths to very low conflict periods, the dataset included periods where such game-theory behaviour is less pronounced, even if not totally absent.

Nevertheless, two challenges to the research on external interventions have not been overcome. One relates to the universe of interventions considered and the other to the classification of the intent of interventions. All too often it is not the events that occur that constitute the intervention, but the events which have not happened or cannot easily be accounted for. Initiatives of withholding support or abstaining from

providing commonly used conditions in commercial transactions can constitute processes of interference in another country's affairs that could rival, in their outcome, more commonly known intervention processes, such as the provision of troops or the establishment of peacekeeping missions. Equally relevant are covert processes targeting the authority structures of the country. Due to their nature, both of these processes are difficult to measure; therefore, it was not possible to account for them in this research.

A second challenge in dealing with external interventions is the identification of the interveners' intentions. This is of critical importance when the objective is to measure outcomes of interventions. Methodological difficulties are encountered when coding these intentions, which were not addressed in the current research project; therefore, the current research used a limited proxy of intentions on the identification of targets of interventions.

Both of these issues constitute cases of omitted variable bias in any study on the effect of external interventions and can be considered limitations in the current research.

Mixed methods approach

Studies of external interventions in international relations and conflict and peace studies characterized by macro-level analysis through econometric methods identify general patterns of association or causality. Despite the relevance of these contributions, such studies are less tailored to inform on individual and micro- or meso-level cases. A case study can constitute a valuable complement to the research by allowing for a detailing of the processes under analysis. In this research, a case study was added with an exploratory intent to further identify relevant hypotheses to be tested.

The selection of the case of Somalia was based on the fact that Somalia's conflict spanned the entire dataset period, starting in 1991 and continuing after 2010. In addition, variation occurred in terms of conflict intensity and in intervention frequency and types. The conflict played a key role in the aftermath of the Cold War, when an opening to different intervention policies existed and the failed American intervention in the conflict led to a shift in the intervention doctrine at the time, resulting in a major international community troop withdrawal from Africa. Only

later in the decade was there a resurgence of an intervention doctrine, with new players (i.e., the African Union) working alongside the United Nations. Moreover, Somalia is also part of the recent conflicts and interventions associated with Islamism.

On the effect of external interventions

The studies on external interventions have predominantly focused on their effects on conflict duration (and not intensity) and have rarely addressed issues of endogeneity. The availability of data constituted a constraint on the possibilities of researching conflict intensity. The most recent UCDP Georeference Event Dataset overcomes this limitation by providing a comprehensive source of conflict event data that include the number of battle deaths for Africa.

The escalatory effects identified in most types of interventions are an important finding that is difficult to explain; thus, it needs to be analysed, taking into account the endogeneity of the relationship. Endogeneity has been rarely addressed in reference papers in the field of conflict studies (Sambanis, 2002). The current research attempts to correct this limitation within the possibilities of the dataset on external interventions.

The dataset on external interventions provides a richness of information related to the theoretically relevant variables of interventions (specially the target of interventions). Because of this objective the dataset has a cross-section but not a time series structure, even if the entries are per conflict-month. The lack of a time series structure is due to the fact that in a month there can be n entries corresponding to the number of interventions happening in that month. Not having a panel data structure creates specific challenges on the statistical analysis which will be addressed in the research.

The structure of military interventions in Africa

Among the different types of interventions, military interventions are the most intrusive form, regulated explicitly by the United Nations charter. This type of intervention is consistently associated with conflicts of a longer duration and higher intensity. In Africa, an institutional architecture is being developed with the objective of coordinating regional resources to allow for rapid military interventions in conflicts in the region.

The relevance of this architecture to this research is two-fold. First it is a multilateral military security initiative focusing on the threat of intra-state conflict. Having the African Union Peace and Security Council as the central organ, which responds to the African Union assembly, the architecture is planned to coordinate five sub-regional standby forces in each of the five African sub-regions. Therefore, once operational (expected in 2015), it can change the landscape of military interventions in the region. Second, this architecture highlights the role that regional organisations have on peace and security vis-à-vis the United Nations. With the global security system gravitating towards the United Nations Security Council, the position the African Union will assume has the potential to significantly shape the regionalization of power.

The cornerstone of this architecture lies on decisions related to military interventions which the United Nations Charter exclusively delegates to the United Nations Security Council. How the United Nations Security Council's role is recognized within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will determine the relationship between the two organisations, generating implications beyond them as well.

1.3 Outline

This dissertation consists of five chapters, each constituting standalone papers which flow logically and build on each other. Chapter 2 lays out the conceptualization of the dependent variable conflict and provides the analysis for a selection of a conflict dataset. Chapter 3 presents the new dataset on external interventions, the main independent variable. Chapter 4 provides an exploratory case study on Somalia and identifies relevant mechanisms at the meso- and micro-level. Using historical analysis, the case study proposes a set of hypotheses and provides a one-case validation of the conflict variable and the external interventions coded in the dataset. Based on a theoretical model, Chapter 5 verifies the hypotheses related to the relationship between external interventions and conflict intensity through an econometric analysis. Through process tracing, Chapter 6 conducts an institutional analysis of the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in terms of military interventions.

In Chapter 2, the spectrum of the conceptualization of conflict is analysed. The differences in conceptualization can lead to a different uni-

verse of cases. For instance, in 2009 alone, according to the classification of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002), ten minor intensity conflicts and two wars occurred in Africa. Other sources, such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), identified nine incompatibilities in seven countries in Africa in 2009 which can be considered in severe crisis and one country in war. These differences augment the period of observation and considerably change the universe of cases under analysis, thereby influencing all research.

The chapter explores the alternative specifications of conflict available within quantitative studies in order to make an informed decision on which concept and dataset to use for civil war. The analysis is inspired by the quantitative work of Sambanis (2004), who show that different conceptualizations and operationalizations of the dependent variable -civil war- can lead to significantly different results with the same model. The focus of the chapter is, therefore, to contrast a set of relevant datasets by reviewing the literature on the critique of the conceptualization and operationalization of conflict, with a special concern for validity and reliability issues.

For the universe of conflict cases identified through the dataset selected in the second chapter (i.e., the UCDP Georeference Event Dataset), a new external interventions dataset is developed for the period 1989 to 2010 and presented in Chapter 3. This work is conceptually based on Regan et al.'s (2009) dataset with a conflict-month unit of observation, where military, economic and diplomatic interventions are identified, but with several developments. A set of new categories of UN and non-UN missions and military and diplomatic sanctions were added. The Regan et al. (2009) dataset period from 1989 to 1999 was reviewed, and additional years up to 2010 were coded. Through a series of methodological procedures, the validity and reliability of the new dataset were secured, as was inter-coder consistency between the datasets.

Chapter 4 tests a preliminary theoretical model and mechanisms in the case study of Somalia for 1991 to 2010. The chapter uses chronological historical analyses based on secondary sources, contrasting conflict intensity with intervention processes. The results suggest that interventions not overtly intending to change the balance of capabilities, either neutral military (humanitarian) or diplomatic interventions, can lead to lower conflict intensity; however, if the interventions are partisan and

provided to both sides, they lead to higher conflict intensity (if they are military) or have no effect on conflict intensity (if they are diplomatic). Surprisingly, some conflict-escalatory processes were identified in association with diplomacy—a finding which will inform a hypothesis in the quantitative analyses.

Chapter 5 develops a theoretical model of the effect of interventions on the expected utility of the parties on fighting and presents a set of hypotheses, along with the hypotheses emerging from the case study. The new dataset is used on a conflict intensity level and conflict intensity change models. The former uses the count of battle deaths as the dependent variable in a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. The latter uses dummy variables for the increase, decrease or lack of change in the conflict intensity, regressed with a logit estimator on the changes of the independent variables. This latter model is more appropriate for controlling for the endogeneity of the relationship between external interventions and conflict intensity. The results suggest that the target of interventions is important in determining their effect. Partisan, military and economic interventions escalate conflict intensity while neutral and diplomatic interventions have no effect on conflict intensity. And successful or failed mediation have no significant effects on conflict intensity. The results of neutral and diplomatic interventions are new, and more detailed research needs to be conducted on this unexpected lack of effects of diplomacy.

Chapter 6 links the results that military interventions escalate conflict intensity to recent developments in the security architecture in Africa. This more applied, policy-oriented chapter makes a direct bridge to socially relevant research. Not only do military interventions escalate conflict, but states or organisations can also intervene militarily in another country only for self-defence or with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization—something normally referred to as UNSC primacy. This chapter investigates how the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) upholds UNSC primacy. APSA is the main security project for the region and is planned along an inter-institutional subsidiarity principle. The analysis uses process tracing and is based on official documents and semi-structured interviews conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 2011 and 2012. The results suggest that exceptions to UNSC primacy are inscribed at different levels of policy, and the 'principle of subsidiarity' and APSA do not explicitly and fully

safeguard UNSC primacy. The conclusion is that the way subsidiarity is implemented determines wether UNSC primacy is a fundamental principle of the security intervention architecture in Africa.

2 Comparing datasets: understanding conceptual differences in quantitative conflict studies

Abstract

Since the 1960s data gathering initiatives emerged trying to provide data for a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict. Most of these studies operationalize civil war as a distinct phenomenon of political contestation, focusing on agency in a dyad government-challenging group, with the country as the unit of analysis and a dichotomous peace versus war approach determined by a threshold of battle related deaths. Some datasets relaxed the battle death threshold to broaden the analysis to violent and non-violent conflict processes. A representative set of five datasets is compared in terms of the conceptualizations and operationalization of violent conflict. The framework of analysis looks into issues of validity and reliability in terms of the datasets level of analysis, characterization of agency, conflict motivations and characterization of conflict as strictly violent (civil war) or not. The relevance of this study is found in the fact that the specifications of key variables, in this case the dependent variable of violent conflict/civil war, can lead to significantly different results in the statistical models.

2.1 Introduction[1]

Several rational choice approaches to the study of peace and conflict significantly use statistical methods in which violent conflict, rather than peace, is the main unit of analysis. This chapter will contrast different conceptualizations of conflict, from violent to non-violent conflict, and evaluate their validity and reliability through a comparative analysis of representative datasets.

Key variables used in quantitative approaches to conflict include civil war onset, incidence and duration (Blattman and Miguel 2010). This fo-

cus on conflict can be justified by the need for conflict management, but also based on conceptual grounds. In Johan Galtung's groundbreaking work, the definition of peace is reached by first defining violence, which is characterised as having three main components: direct or overt violence, as in direct physical attacks, massacres or other forms of injury and killing; structural violence whereby avoidable deaths occur, such as through malnutrition and other forms of indirect violence caused by unjust structures; and cultural violence which culturally justifies the other two forms of direct and indirect violence (Galtung, 1969). Following Galtung's definition, the absence of direct violence in the form of battle-related deaths in armed conflict is usually defined as negative peace, whereas the absence of both direct and indirect structural violence is usually considered positive peace (Galtung and Jacobsen, 2000).

The mainstream epistemological community within the rational choice, statistical modelling-based school of analysis of civil war is associated with the original "greed and grievance" motivation's model of conflict onset, as proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) (see Mansoob Murshed's chapter in this book or Sousa, 2011b). And a subsequent theoretical development proposed by the same authors, together with Rohner, where the feasibility of war becomes the driving factor; the assumption being that wherever rebellion is materially and economically feasible, it will tend to occur (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). However, rational choice approaches and their methods have been criticised for the assumption of universal law-like causality, lack of empirical field work (Korf, 2006), for being empty of specificity and contingency of the phenomena and for disregarding complexities of the social and individual motivation (Cramer, 2002).[2] The main arguments in favour of the use of statistical methods are that they can offer a good safeguard against over-generalisations, researchers' bias and ideological and political influences (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). In such studies where the object of analysis is civil war, the focus is mostly on direct violence using an actor-oriented and state-centred approach.[3]

The conceptualization of civil war in such studies requires further assessment for four reasons. First, research indicates that different results can arise in the applications of the same model due to slight changes in the conceptualisation or operationalisation of the dependent variables (Sambanis, 2004a). Second, the concept of civil war and its state-based dichotomous (war/peace) operationalisation fails to account for the

complex and changing dynamics of violence and conflict processes in terms of higher and lower levels of conflict intensity, spatial distribution of patterns of violence and questions of agency. Third, the higher incidence of low-intensity conflicts (below 999 and above 25 battle deaths per year as in minor conflict or even below 25 battle deaths per year) makes it more relevant to understand non-violent forms of political conflict which co-exist with violence and might involve the same actors, over the same issues; as such, it is closer to the concept of "negative peace". Finally, developments in data availability, especially of georeferenced event data (with identification of the latitude and longitude of the event) and datasets, remove constraints in operationalisation and open up research possibilities, including new conceptualisations of conflict.

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of a selection of datasets to critically assess the conceptualisation of conflict in terms of the most relevant dimensions of the units of analysis (i.e., level of analysis, agency, issue and technology of conflict—both violent and non-violent) as well as the validity and reliability of the datasets. As a preamble to the analysis, the next section gives a brief account of the evolution of quantitative studies of peace and conflict.

2.2 Evolution of Quantitative Peace and Conflict Studies

A differentiation of broad epistemological communities emerged in the 1960s, the early days of peace and conflict studies. An epistemological community more associated with the use of quantitative methods can be traced back to a meeting in 1963 promoted by Walter Isard; this community ultimately led to the Peace Science Society. In the same year, a symbolic watershed moment for this epistemological community was the initiation of the Correlates of War (COW) project by J. David Singer and Melvin Small at the University of Michigan, which focused on the systematic collection of conflict-related quantitative data.

The COW project identified the methodological principles for quantitative conflict studies for decades to come. The object of analysis—namely, civil war—was defined as the conflict within state borders in a dyad between government and non-governmental groups. Such violent conflict required a certain sustained intensity to be considered war. The threshold for being considered a civil war was of at least 1,000 battle-

related deaths within 12 months. Two other projects built on the COW initiative, making their own distinct contributions. One was the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), started in Sweden in the 1980s, which lowered the annual fatalities threshold to 25 battle-related deaths per year and per dyad, classifying this as a minor intensity conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The other was the Minorities At Risk project (MAR) at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) in the University of Maryland in the USA, which disaggregated agency in terms of minority groups with an exhaustive identification of ethnic civil wars involving minorities at risk (Gurr, 2993).

Despite these differing forms of data collection, and several other relevant datasets developed since the COW project, some authors, like Sambanis, suggest there is little substantive difference among them in terms of how they analyse and measure conflict (Sambanis, 2004a). For example, a different conceptualization of civil war is found on the work of the Working Group for Research on the Causes of War (AKUF), founded in the late 1980s at the University of Hamburg, focused more on the systematic nature of the conflict between two organised groups (one of which is usually the government) and dropped the death threshold from the definition of civil war altogether (Eck, 2008). Along similar lines, the Conflict Information System (CONIS) dataset developed in the early 2000s and hosted at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), extended conflict analysis to non-violent forms of political conflict, based on the notion that "conflicts can be gathered empirically and displayed in their whole possible dynamic, starting from a non-violent conflict to a war and to possible de-escalation" (CONIS, 2013).

These differences led to a distinct list of civil wars. For instances, according to the classification of the UCDP and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), in 2009 alone 10 minor intensity conflicts and 2 wars occurred in Africa. Other sources, like the HIIK conflict barometer (the bases of CONIS), identified 9 incompatibilities in 7 countries in Africa in 2009 which can be considered severe crises and one country at war. Augmented to several years of the period of observation, these differences considerably change the universe of cases under analysis and influence all research. The differences in datasets further illustrate the main focus of this chapter—namely, the challenges of the conceptualisation, measurement and operationalisation

of the dependent variables of conflict: the unit of the analysis, time–space dimension, actors and issues, and the intensity of violence. In the next section, I turn first to the conceptualization of conflict as an object of analysis in the selected datasets. After that I analyse similarities and differences of their dependent variables. Before drawing conclusions I reflect on validity and reliability of the datasets.

2.3 Conceptualizing Conflict

The main criteria for the selection of the datasets for comparative analysis have to do with their conceptualisation of conflict. Galtung describes conflict as a triangle of incompatibility (the issue), attitudes and behaviour (actions undertaken by the parties) (Galtung, 1969). Their interplay generates processes along a spectrum of possible conflict from the frontier of positive peace to war (also civil war) as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of conflict



Source: KOSIMO 1 dataset, renamed to CONIS in the second version

In the figure it is not so much the detailed definitions of each dimension that matter, but the principle that "war" and "severe crisis" are connected to violent conflict, where direct violence is measured in battle-related deaths. When direct violence stops, then a situation of non-violent conflict associated with negative peace can exist, constituting either a "crisis" or a "latent conflict". Parties to non-violent conflicts are generally not armed, and conflict takes forms like demonstrations, riots or peace talks. Although even events conceived as non-violent can lead to deaths (for example, if a peaceful demonstration is met with police violence), these are not considered battle-related deaths and thus do not meet the criteria mandated by most of the datasets for violent conflict.[4]

Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) followed some elements of Galtung's definitions of the continuum of war and peace. They defined conflict as the clashing—of a certain duration—of opposing interests or positional differences around national values and issues carried out between at least two parties where one is an organised state. War is also defined as the systematic and collective use of force of some duration and extent between comparable opponents. Severe crisis occurs when violence is repeatedly used in an organised way. Crisis is predominantly non-violent, but involves one party's use of violent force in sporadic incidents. Latent conflict is defined when groups, parties or states question existing values, issues or objectives that pertain to an issue of national interest. The positional differences and opposing interests in a latent conflict must be articulated as demands or claims. The affected party must be aware of these demands.[5]

Following the definitions provided thus far as a broad, general guideline, I have included five datasets covering violent and non-violent conflict processes. The selection is based on the similarities and differences between them in terms of their unit of analysis, that is, for the implications their theoretical and methodological approaches would have for research and analysis.

As shown in Table 2.1, the conceptualiations of the conflict, the unit of the analysis, actors and issues show a range of similarities and differences across datasets. In the case of the definition of conflict focusing on direct violence, two key datasets emerge: the COW intra-state dataset (Small and Singer, 1982) and the UCDP/PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Based on the death threshold, COW covers war while UCDP/PRIO covers both war and severe crisis. The former is the pioneer project which set the standards while the latter is the most solid contribution to enlarging the conflict scope by decreasing the death threshold. These datasets, and others based on their data, have been the main ones used in influential academic studies focused on the "greed or grievance" debate.

*Table 2.1 Civil War and Conflict Datasets *1*

Dataset and coverage	**Unit of Analysis**	**Actors**	**Issue**	**Violent/Non-Violent**
COW-intra (Small and Singer, 1982) All countries: 1816-1997	Conflict-Year	Armed forces capable of effective resistance on both sides where one is the government.	Control central government, dispute over local issues	War: minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year
UCDP Armed Conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2002) All countries: 1946–2000	Conflict-Year *4	Government-opposition group(s) / dyad(s)	Government, territory	Battle-related deaths per year: Minor: 25 to 999; War: 1,000 or more
CONIS Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) (methodological approach as of May 2013) All countries: 1945-1998	Conflict-Year-Sub-national	Groups including the government.	Territory, borders, sea borders; decolonization, national independence; ethnic, religious or regional autonomy; ideology, system; internal power, international power; resources; others.	Latent conflict; manifest conflict; crises; severe crises; war. *2 Communication as determinant of conflict *3
UCDP Georeference Event Dataset (UCDP GED) Sundberg et al. (2010) Africa: 1989-2010	Conflict-Event-georeferenced *4 *5	Government-opposition group(s) / dyad(s)	No identification. Issue identified through the connection to UCDP armed conflict (government/territory)	Event with at least 1 battle-related death
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) Raleigh et al. (2010) Africa: 1997-2012	Conflict-Event - georeferenced	Government or mutinous force; rebel force; political militia; ethnic militia; rioters; protesters; civilians; outside /external force (e.g. UN)	No identification.	Both occurring within and outside the context of civil war – violent and non-violent (no minimum causality requirement)

Notes: Table constructed by the author.

*1 Only the characteristics of intra-state or civil war type of conflict of the datasets are identified.

*2 The terms have been changed in the recent version to: dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, war (CONIS 2013).

*3 Communication refers to all forms of verbal disputes, acts and threats used to decide the conflict.

*4 Conflicts over territory that occur in different countries are coded as separate conflicts for each country in UCDP Armed Conflict and UCDP/GED.

*5 The events of a conflict can occur in more than one country in UCDP GED.

The Conflict Information System (CONIS) dataset of Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) includes both violent and non-violent conflict in its definitions; this is the main reason it was selected for the current discussion.6 Two other datasets, the UCDP Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), account for the geographical and temporal (event-based) disaggregation of conflict.7 UCDP GED is the UCDP/PRIO yearly dataset but disaggregated to the corresponding events and geo-referenced to cover all violent conflict. The ACLED dataset is also a geo-referenced event dataset and focuses on both violent and non-violent political events (Raleig et al. 2010). ACLED includes violent conflict and some types of events that occur in latent conflict or crisis situations that are non-deadly, such as battles without fatalities, the establishment of military bases, the transfer of armed control over specific locations, non-violent rebel activity, riots and protests, and non-lethal violence against civilians.8

It is crucial to note that these datasets, as most currently used dataset initiatives, are predominantly English language based, in terms of both the sources of data (which are often based on newspapers and different kinds of grey literature and reports) and their output format. This means they are prone to selection bias (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Some data search engines use English translations of local radio (such as in BBC monitoring), but it is difficult to access the original language of the news. Some datasets rely more on local news and information reports (such as ACLED).

The analysis of these datasets will focus on two overall factors. First, the validity of the dataset, connected to the degree to which a variable captures the theoretical concept of interest, and second, the reliability of the datasets, consisting of the degree in which the use of an operationali-

sation has the same results every time it is applied across cases (Sundberg and Harbom, 2011). I will first present in detail the differences and similarities between the datasets in terms of the criteria they use to define the conflicts, most of the times connected with issues of validity, and then summarise issues of validity but also reliability in the final section.

2.3.1 Space and Time in the Unit of Analysis

Broadly speaking, the spatial levels of analysis can be grouped into four levels: (i) a mega level for regions or civilisations; (ii) a macro level to account for variations among national processes; (iii) a meso level within countries and (iv) a micro level dealing with interpersonal and localised conflictual interactions (Galtung, 2010).

Traditionally, the mega- and macro-systemic levels of analysis have been used to analyse international relations and national systems. These levels have the disadvantage of assuming that a relatively coherent system exists at the regional and national levels. They assume that sets of regional and national actors share a relatively homogenised set of foreign policy goals. In contrast, a meso- (within-country) level analysis allows for more differentiated information regarding decision-making processes. Its disadvantage is the possibility to over-represent the differences among actors or become ethnocentric at the sub-system level (Singer, 1961).

Mega-, macro- and meso-level datasets all accept the state (i.e., the country or the national level) as the key referent unit of analysis. Where several conflicts occur within a country or across countries, each country–conflict combination constitutes a specific conflict. In this regard, the only particularity of CONIS, UCDP/GED and ACLED is that they localize conflict events to the micro level by georeferencing the events or identifying the administrative units in which these events occur. These advancements in creating datasets allow for an investigation of the contested homogeneity of the macro- and micro-conflict processes. Kalyvas proposed approaching civil war as a medium for a variety of grievances to be realized within the broader conflict (Kalyvas, 2003). This could mean that the motivation of elites at the centre (for instance, in the capital) will differ from those in the periphery, which will have a mix of identities, actions and motives. One implication is that actors of the conflict should not be seen as unitary, but as having their own sets of agendas; in addition, they can be in conflict with one another in non-state dyads.

From this perspective, three levels of analysis have been proposed: the international system level; the neighbourhood level, and a micro individual or household level (Kalyvas, 2008).

Results of the research using such disaggregated spatial data appear to provide more nuanced explanations than earlier national cross-country analyses. For example, using such data, Buhaug and Rød (2006) demonstrated that territorial conflict is more likely to occur in sparsely populated areas near the borders far from the capital and without significant rough terrain whereas conflict over government is more likely to occur in densely populated areas, near diamond fields and near the capital city.

The relevance of space is also evident in the fact that the level of analysis might occur above a single country level but below the international system level. It is often at the regional level that contagion occurs in the forms of spillovers from conflicts in the neighbouring countries. This was the case, for example, in 1993 in Burundi, with conflict spreading to Rwanda in 1994 and subsequently to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996. The interlinking of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars after 1991 and the Serbian and Croatian war spreading to Bosnia in 1992 and Kosovo in 1998 are two other examples. Even without spillover effects, the high degree of actor interdependence in the regions led to the identification of regional security complexes (RSC) by Buzan and Waever (2003), a concept found to be statistically significant in all regions of the world (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998). The mechanisms at play can be based on the existence of trans-border ethnic groups and reciprocal movements of refugees (Blattman and Miguel, 2010), as well as direct external support or ethnic, political and economic transnational linkages (Gleditsch, 2007).

The spatial level of aggregation used in the unit of analysis depends on the theoretical premises of research and the formulation of the hypothetical causalities (Cederman and Gleditsch, 2009). As Sambanis (2004b) has suggested, the level of analysis should be the one most relevant to the problem at hand, without excessive detail. Too much focus on micro-level cause-and-effect relationships can also remove focus from the variance in the outcome of what is being explained. Thus, the more varied spatial levels of analysis the dataset allows, the more precise the information about conflict will be.

When it comes to time as an important element in defining the unit of analysis, the datasets that use the battle-related death criteria do so by

linking the initiation and termination of the conflict to a threshold of death toll sustained for a certain time period (Small and Singer, 1982). COW and UCDP/PRIO focus on the year, in CONIS the time frame is the month, whilst for both UCDP-GED and ACLED the unit of the analysis is a single event of organised violence (event-based) with a beginning and end date (the year and month unit of analysis constitute an aggregation of these events). However, differences in time measurement also indicate the possibility of focusing on the time-intensity of conflicts (for example, the number of events in one territory, in the given period of time).

2.3.2 Agency and Actors

Any conflict is, to a large extent, determined by the actors involved in it. The criterion for an intra-state conflict is that government authority is being challenged either centrally (nationally) or locally by a group or groups located mainly within the state's recognised borders (Small and Singer, 1982). It is normally a part of the definition of an intra-state conflict that the groups involved have some form of permanent organisation and persist over time. Slight differences can exist in this dyad; for instance, in ACLED, the government side is defined as regimes.

If either the government or the group(s) involved are in turn supported militarily and financially by outside parties, then an intrastate conflict can be said to be internationalised. The UCDP/PRIO identifies such external support for the cases when it involves the deployment of troops.

In the UCDP-GED dataset, in addition to the previously mentioned (internal and internationalised) state-based violence or civil war, two other kinds of conflicts are possible: communal violence, where non-state actors can fight or attack one another without directly involving the state, and one-sided violence, where a government or an organised group uses violence against civilians.

One criticism of these simplified formulations is that they ignore the horizontal diversity between and within actors by splintering groups and intragroup variations (Cederman and Gleditsch, 2009) which can be viewed in tandem with the previously referred centre-periphery diversity (Kalyvas, 2003). In terms of agency, the groups can be defined through identities along the lines of race, religion, language, etc., and such charac-

teristics can be seen associated with group inequalities in access to social, economic and political power and resources. Some of these horizontal inequalities have been found positively associated with conflict onset (Ostby, 2008). Whereas group identities might be over-exaggerated as the main and single cause of the conflict, they might also obscure the possibilities of the political economy of class formation and class relations (Cramer, 2002) (as shown in chapters by Jayasundara-Smits and Zarkov in this volume). Among the five datasets discussed herein, ACLED allows for the most explicit variety of the actors involved in the conflict. Yet how the agents of the conflict will be defined is often directly linked to the issues around which the conflict presumably arises.

2.3.3 'Having Issues'

The definition of civil war involves actors who start an armed conflict with the state or each other around some issue. Their goals can be to control the government and its resources, change government policies or acquire a regional power base (Small and Singer, 1982). The acquisition of regional power might be associated with specific territorial issues such as demands for increased autonomy or even secession (all identified in UCDP PRIO and CONIS event datasets). Overall, for these issues to be clearly recognised, they should be stated publicly by the actors concerned (Sambanis, 2004a) and be of national interest (Schwank, 2010).

One serious limitation of current datasets is that the issues are identified at face value, through public pronouncements and statements by various actors. The datasets do not include a system by which such statements can be challenged and other, unstated issues recorded as relevant to the conflict. Clearly, what the warring parties say they fight about might be quite far from the actual reasons for the war. In addition, an implicit assumption of issue symmetry exists as the dyad of actors is treated as if the specific salience of an issue is similar for each actor, which may not be the case (Diehl, 1992).

The issues are also theorized under the new war/old war dichotomy, where the new wars of the post-Cold War era are defined as violent processes of private looting with little popular support and full of gratuitous violence against civilians. These new wars are viewed mainly as apolitical or as criminal (Kaldor, 2006). Kaldor contrasted such new wars with the classical old war—that is, inter-state warfare grounded in issues of collective grievance. Those old wars were characterised by the capability of

gathering popular support during warfare involving controlled forms of violence, thereby having ideological and political causes. However, this dichotomy has been criticised as leading to the mischaracterisation of civil wars and related violent conflicts (Kalyvas, 2001) (see Zarkov in this volume).

Sambanis proposed including and linking both economic and emotional perspectives of conflict in order to reconcile the distinction between the new and old wars (Sambanis, 2004b). In his approach, greed and economic incentives are associated with the economic rationale of most neoclassical formulations of new wars, where the control of the state and its resources plays a key role, especially in the presence of natural resources (often considered to be the supply side of civil wars). He proposed that, in addition to these factors, one look at the emotions related to ideology and psychology and connect them to the relative positioning of the social groups, the value systems and ethnicity as relevant issues (often considered to be the demand side of civil wars).

2.3.4 The Intensity of Conflict: Violence and Non-Violence

In the selected datasets, battle-related deaths are the main indicator determining the thresholds for differences between a minor conflict (i.e., between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths per year; UCDP/PRIO) and a war (i.e., 1,000 or more battle-related deaths per year; COW and UCDP/PRIO). By contrast, peace is defined negatively, as the absence of (or not reaching a certain number of) battle-related deaths.[9]

Such data is prone to be imprecise and unreliable as well as subject to manipulation by many interested parties: media and NGOs, government, its military and other armed groups involved in the fighting. Measuring battle-related deaths becomes even more problematic when the number of deaths is taken as the main distinction between civil war and other forms of (lesser) political violence (Sambanis, 2004a).

Another difficulty is the bias in the data, as the distinction by numbers applies irrespective of the population size of a specific country. Cross-country comparisons might be relevant when the rates of deaths are considered, but do not reflect the comparative intensity of conflicts when they rely on absolute thresholds. An absolute number of deaths indicates little if the size of countries' populations is unknown. Sambanis suggests that an alternative indicator could be a measure of the annual,

monthly or event-related per capita number of deaths (Sambanis 2004a). Furthermore, the emphasis on battle-related deaths omits civilian killings (such as massacres), refugee fatalities and movements, and other forms of violence and state repression against non-combatants (Cramer, 2007). This is especially relevant as battle-related deaths are a poor indicator of overall mortality in contemporary civil wars, especially considering the high levels of displacement and death from disease (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).

CONIS considers the inclusion of violent and non-violent events in the conflict, but this variable brings another set of problems in terms of indicating what conflict is occurring in the country (as explained in the next section). A different research design could instead be used to analyse non-violent conflict separately, such as through a specific dataset on non-violent political competition, alongside the violence. One example is the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) which tracks a range of violent and non-violent confrontational events like demonstrations, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, pro- and anti-government violence, and intra-government violence in cases of violence between two armed factions within the government (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). The particularity of this dataset is that it is linked to UCDP/PRIO, and the events have been checked to avoid double counting. The intensity of the event is recorded by both the number of participants and an estimation of any deaths that occur.[10]

Other less tangible forms of conflict include systemic political discrimination in employment, political and other civil rights of citizens, or political and other actions consisting of a series of events with a certain degree of causality intended to improve a group's position vis-à-vis another group.

2.3.5 Validity and Reliability

Much of the previous discussion on characteristics of datasets reflected issues related to the conceptualisation of different types of conflict and how it links to broader issues and critiques found in the literature. In this section, I compare the datasets in terms of their relative validity and reliability, a discussion that builds on the analysis in Table 1. This focus does not disregard the issue of conceptualization. Rather, as I will discuss, I presume that specific ways of conceptualising conflict are directly linked to the issues of validity and reliability.

The main difference between the COW and UCDP/PRIO datasets is the significantly lower death thresholds—25 compared to 1000—for inclusion in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Sambanis' (2004a) comparative analysis of ten datasets shows that more and longer conflicts are recorded in the UCDP/PRIO dataset, leading to low correlation values (0.45 for onset and 0.69 for prevalence of civil war) when compared to other datasets.[11] This is neither an issue of validity nor of reliability only, but actually stems from a broader conceptualisation of the phenomena.

More significant differences are found between CONIS and either COW or UCDP/PRIO due to the CONIS conceptualisation of both violent and non-violent conflicts. A first difference is the number of conflicts included. CONIS includes about the double the number of conflicts and conflict years compared to UCDP/PRIO for the Sub-Saharan countries: 155 conflicts and 1,112 conflict years versus 73 conflicts and 527 conflict years, respectively. Another difference is that, even with a correlation for the whole period of 0.50, significant variations per decade occur: from -0.64 to 0.89, with the peak of divergence at the end of the Cold War. Most illustrative of the differences is that UCDP/PRIO gives a view that conflict is disappearing while CONIS that conflict is rising (Schwank, 2010).

Furthermore, by removing the death criteria from its definition of conflict, CONIS creates added complexity and introduces relativity by requiring a subjective assessment by the coder of a conflict situation. An individual coder needs to make a value judgement about which of the many events that occur "lie beyond established regulatory procedures and threaten a core state function" (CONIS, 2013). This is a difficult judgement to make, and is prone to errors, bringing into focus the issue of validity. For instances prima facie evidence seems to indicate that in CONIS leftist conflicts are perceived as less intense than Islamic conflicts. Furthermore, the assessments might vary across individual coders and be dependent on the source materials used to extract data, bringing up the issue of data reliability (Sundberg and Harbom, 2011).

Similarly, the event datasets ACLED included non-violent conflict whereas UCDP GED was restricted to armed conflict defined in terms of battle-related deaths. As a result, ACLED had three times more comparative counts of events for Africa as a whole—34,742 in the period between 1997 and 2012—compared to 11,418 events recorded by UCDP GED (although here a longer period was observed: 1989–2010).

This difference is partially explained by the 2,700 non-violent events which ACLED considered to be conflict events and 6,500 events of riot and protests, which are all absent from the fatality-focused UCDP GED dataset (alongside differences derived from the classification of organized groups or stated incompatibility).

The inclusiveness of ACLED—like that of CONIS—constitutes an advantage, but raises some similar validity and reliability issues as those identified earlier for CONIS. In addition, as ACLED does not differentiate events in terms of numbers of fatalities, one event could represent a massacre of hundreds or thousands of people or a single sniper killing. Each are counted as one conflict event. Furthermore, the quality of the dataset varies from case to case, with some countries suffering from an under-reporting of events. ACLED data quality is also compromised due to geo-coding precision which is prone to urban bias. In this respect, some authors have found the UCDP GED to be more valid and reliable (Eck, 2012).

Validity and reliability of the datasets are fundamental in the choice of datasets; in some cases, this means that a researcher has to choose which "errors" are less important for his/her work as no dataset will be able to fully capture the phenomena under analysis. Yet in any case, the choices of datasets reflect substantive conceptual and operationalisation differences between researchers.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has revisited some of the challenges of quantitative conflict research relying on databases that in turn depend on conceptualisations of conflict. In addition to the negative peace–violent conflict continuum (depicted in Figure 2.1), the chapter has tried to compare a number of much-used quantitative datasets in terms of their validity and reliability. The main features of the datasets have been identified and broadly compared in terms of limitations and strengths according to how they address the temporal and spatial levels of analysis, agency and actors, issues and the intensity of both violent and non-violent conflict.

Summing up the main point, it can be noted that politics in general, as a highly dynamic process characterised by different degrees of complexity, can almost by definition be considered conflictive and become violent (Kalyvas, 2003). Conflict and violence indicators can be identified at dif-

ferent levels of disaggregation of data in terms of space over time and involving a range of actors and forms of agency. In terms of a timeline, periods of violent conflict can overlap with events of non-violent conflict. Paths of violence require forms of modelling that might require datasets to be able to capture the very different forms of violent political conflicts, including riot, genocide, politicide, civil war and terrorism (Sambanis, 2004a).

Some recent refinements of the quantitative methods include the collecting of more disaggregated data in the form of new datasets. It has been suggested that these refinements might contribute to a better understanding of how violence can be used to create, maintain and uphold order in the face of challenges at the national, local and intra-community levels (Kalyvas, 2008). They might also illuminate how conflict is de facto a site of pro-active social re-engineering and of changes in the power relations within societies, including between classes (Cramer, 2007). This perspective connects the process through which wars occur to the processes of breaking down the social contract which regulates the use of violence by the state and non-state actors alike (Murshed, 2009).

The main difficulty of those datasets, as Kalyvas (2003) notes, is that characterizing civil wars is more a question of conceptualisation than one of measurement. For this reason, the operationalization of different concepts can pose significant challenges for researchers using the datasets, and for those organising data collection. On one hand, more traditional conceptualisations of conflict that focus on violent armed conflict, such as COW and UCDP/PRIO, are not able to fully capture the changing dynamics of broader social conflicts until they become overtly violent and result in fatalities. On the other hand, the ambition to have a broader conceptualisation of conflict which can incorporate negative peace and non-violent conflict as well as violent conflict in one variable is also problematic. Both the CONIS and ACLED datasets are prone to the problem of operationalisation due to the removal of the criteria of battle-related deaths. Removing this admittedly far-from-perfect measurement has in this case been shown to negatively affect both the validity and reliability of the datasets and, hence, of the research that uses their datasets.

A possible compromise may be to use the events dataset of UCDP GED alongside non-violent events datasets. Ultimately, however, the choice of datasets depends on the theoretical and methodological choic-

es of the researchers, and on the particular aspects of validity and reliability they considers vital for understanding the topic at hand.

Notes

[1] Research for this chapter was supported by a scholarship from the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (SFRH/BD/44998/2008). Support to attend conferences was provided by the Erasmus University Trust Fund. I would like to thank Peter van Bergeijk, Scott Gates and Kristine Eck for providing comments on an earlier version of this text. Any remaining errors are my own. The chapter is forthcoming in Helen Hintjens and Dubravka Zarkov (Ed.) "Conflict, Peace, Security and Development - Theories and Methodologies", Routledge.

[2] In addition, they are accused of taking facts and data for granted with limited ability to deal with multiple meanings and different possibilities of interpretations of data.

[3] Another group of research focuses on peace as the unit of analysis; for example, research on the success of peacekeeping operations where the unit of analysis is the absence of battle-related deaths or research on the conditions for peace as in the Global Peace Index (GPI).

[4] It is possible to have non-violent events in severe crisis and war, although no violent events can occur in latent conflict or crisis.

[5] An additional category of manifest conflict was added in subsequent versions with a similar definition to latent conflict but where the measures used by the parties are in the preliminary stages of violent force, see Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) and KOSIMO (2003).

[6] CONIS is currently not available, but the analysis is based on the earlier version of the dataset, KOSIMO, see Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000).

[7] The Event Data on Conflict and Security (EDACS) fits this category of datasets; however, it only covers six African countries and, thus, is not considered here for comparison.

[8] For an extensive list of additional conflict datasets see Eck (2005).

[9] The threshold of 25 battle related deaths in UCDP/PRIO is considered to have a sufficient margin to be sure that a violent conflict occurred.

[10] Other approaches could be to reconceptualise the unit of analyses, such as by defining it as violent and non-violent campaigns (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).

[11] In a comparison of 11 datasets correlations of different authors, the onset vary between 0.42 and 0.80 and prevalence vary between 0.53 and 0.83. Most of these datasets follow the COW conceptualization of conflict (Sambanis, 2004a).

3 External interventions in the post-Cold War in Africa – 1989-2010

Abstract

The relevance of the study of the efficiency of external interventions in conflict management is critical, and has implications for international relations and conflict theory. Quantitative studies of the relationship between external interventions and civil war have been prone to some conceptual (understudied lower intensity periods) and data limitations (unavailability of event battle death data). This paper presents a new external interventions dataset for the period 1989 to 2010 for Africa, based on the monthly dataset of Regan et al. (2009), which covers the period 1945-1999. Novel features are the re-coding of the overlap period, the wider range and characterization of interventions and extending the period of analysis by updating the dataset to 2010 and broadening the conflict periods (based on UCDP GED version-1.5-2011).

3.1 Introduction[1]

Civil wars have been a recurrent type of conflict in the past few decades (Gleditsch, et al., 2002). The great majority of conflicts have experienced several external interventions by bilateral, multilateral and non-state actors. In Regan et al.'s (2009) dataset of conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 1999, 69% experienced some form of intervention. The literature is still debating whether these interventions have an effect on the duration or intensity of conflict, and if they do, what is the exact type and direction of the effects. Most illustrative is that neutral military and economic interventions have been found to lead to longer conflicts (Regan, 2002c; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) but this effect has been argued to be driven by interventions in which the interveners pursue their own agendas (Cunningham, 2010). Furthermore, other results suggest that if the support is military and biased to the challenging group, it can shorten the

conflict (Collier et al., 2004). This dataset allows a re-analysis of these potential mechanisms.

The paper presents a new dataset based on Regan et al. (2009) and works with the following contributions: It revises the coded period of the dataset from 1989 to 1999; it extends the dataset by lowering the threshold of inclusion to one battle death per month in conflicts that reached 25 battle deaths (based on UCDP GED – Melander and Sundberg, 2011); and codes an additional period from 2000 to 2010. Furthermore, the dataset uses a monthly unit of analysis; considers military, economic and diplomatic interventions and their targets, including UN and non-UN missions by all interveners; and specifies a series of possible variables to control for interveners' characteristics.

This paper first reviews the existing data sources on external interventions, followed by a description of the methodology and descriptive information of the new data set. The codebook of the dataset, including extensive identification of coding decisions, and a conflict-intervention narrative that mirrors the coded interventions is included in this book as appendice 1. Additionally a technical analysis was made of the inter-coder consistency of this dataset with the dataset of Regan et al. (2009) and the results are reported in this chapter and documented in appendice 2.[2]

3.2 Existing data sources

Existing research looking into external interventions in civil wars has focused mainly on separate analyses of military, diplomatic or peacekeeping interventions and only one dataset analyses them together.

Military interventions with overt external troops on the ground are the most recurrent dimension analyzed, as they are traditionally considered to have the most dire legal and conflict consequences. Such is the case of the Military Intervention Data (OMID) by Tillema (1989) or the International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI) by Pearson & Baumann, updated by Kisangani and Pickering (2009). Some datasets focusing on civil war also provide additional information regarding overt external troop involvement in the conflict dyad, such as in the case of COW (Sarkess, 2010), UCDP Armed Conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012), and Harbom and Wallensteen (2005). In more detail the UCDP external support dataset by Högbladh et al. (2011) codes military

support provided along ten separate categories; troops, access to territory, access to military/intelligence infrastructure, weapons, material/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support, intelligence material, other forms of support, and unknown types of support. In one case, military and other unspecified non-military support was added to the information on troops in the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset by Cunningham et al. (2009).

Separate initiatives have coded diplomatic intervention (more specifically a sub-type of mediation). Such is the case of Bercovitch (1999), Karl DeRouen et al. (2011) or the UCDP Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) datasets (Melander, Möller and Magnus, 2009). Less focus has been applied to economic interventions in the context of civil wars, the type connected to the balance of capabilities of the parties, which is different from the humanitarian or development aid type of assistance or economic sanctions, which have been researched in depth.

The dynamics on peacekeeping interventions has been a field of research in itself and datasets focus either almost exclusively on the United Nations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004) or include non-UN missions (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007). A singular initiative of datasets that capture all of the above intervention types is the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project directed by Mark Mullenbach, which has rich conflict narratives. However, only the third-party peacekeeping mission's dataset has been made available.[3]

The dataset with the broadest coverage of types of interventions available at this moment is Regan et al.'s (2009) Third Party Intervention Data, a global dataset that covers the period 1944 to 1999. For conflicts that recorded at least 200 battle deaths a year it codes military, economic and diplomatic intervention types and typifies a series of sub-types of interventions.

Regan et al. (2009) is a conflict-month level dataset that merges Regan (2002a), deals with military and economic interventions, with a diplomatic dataset developed by Regan and Aydin (2006). Regan (2002a) contains 13.048 conflict months, 150 conflicts of which 100 experienced interventions, of which 1,038 were individual interventions. Regan and Aydin (2006) have 13.243 conflict months with 68 conflicts in which there were diplomatic interventions corresponding to 436 individual interventions. The interventions can be both partisan and neutral and there is a detailed identification of the state and non-state interveners.

The scope of types of interventions and the time unit disaggregation to the month of the Regan et al. (2009) dataset are unique characteristics that made it the initial reference of the current dataset. Nevertheless, its limitations in terms of not covering more recent periods (the dataset ends in 1999) and the absence of lower intensity conflicts and conflict periods (with less than 200 battle deaths per year) have been overcome in this new dataset.

Specifically, the novel features of the new dataset are: the period from 1989 to 1999 was recorded to ensure consistency of coding[4]; a new period from 1999 to 2010 was coded; sub-categories of military sanctions and diplomatic sanctions, and UN and non-UN missions (with identification of mandates), were added [5]; the death threshold of civil wars was lowered from the 200 battle deaths of Regan et al. (2009) to 25 battle deaths of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset; and the lower intensity was further extended by starting conflict periods from the first event with a battle death and the inclusion of events during inactive years, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Geo-referenced Dataset (UCDP-GED), version 1.5.[6]

Other main characteristics of the Regan et al. (2009) dataset are retained. These include the conflict-month level of analysis, identification of the target of intervention, whether it is biased or neutral, and that an entry is made for each intervention. A biased intervention occurs when the target of the intervention supports either the government or the opposition. A neutral intervention can be considered one that does not affect or intend to affect the balance of capabilities between the parties; these are normally to promote peace. This information on the target of intervention is a key dimension of analysis of the theoretical framework used in several studies (Regan et al., 2009; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier et al., 2004), and therefore there is the option of detailing it for each intervention. However, coding the target for each intervention has the drawback that the data structure is not a pure time series, as n interventions in one month will produce n entries for that month. This data structure option has implications but the alternative would be to aggregate the information of the target to the month level, losing significant information in the key set of variables.

3.3 The dataset

The dataset is built with a conflict-month unit of analysis, with conflict based on the UCDP/PRIO definition where a civil war is a "contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths". (Gleditsch et al., 2002).[7] In Africa between 1989 and 2010 there were 42 conflicts in 30 countries that meet these criteria. Furthermore, the date the conflict starts is the first "incidence of the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor (…) resulting in at least 1 direct death in either the best, low or high estimate categories (…) for a specific temporal duration", as identified in UCDP-GED (Sundberg et al., 2010). These two definitions correspond to 5,582 months, 1,845 of which experienced deadly conflict. Because each intervention is coded independently, some months with more than one intervention have more than one entry in the dataset, which results in 5,788 dataset entries.

External interventions were added to this structure. The definition of external interventions is adapted from Regan et al. (2009), and their definition is based on Rosenau (1968). I defined external interventions as convention-breaking political, economic or military (including UN and non-UN missions) actions in a country targeting the authority structures of the country (in support of the government, opposition or neutral) in order to influence the balance of power between the parties. The intervention is made by a third party foreign to the conflict country, and this third party can be a state or non-state actor. Convention breaking refers to a significant and temporary change in the normal course of relations between the countries. A main qualification for the convention-breaking or exceptionality criteria is the characteristics of the intervention and the fact that it occurs during a conflict.

Two adaptations are made from the original definition. One is the explicit inclusion of both UN and non-UN missions, as they meet similar criteria as a military or diplomatic intervention. It is easily understood that an enforcement mission is similar to a bilateral or multilateral military intervention or that a political mission can have characteristics of an ongoing mediation or forum. Nevertheless, in much of the literature there is a conceptualization that peacekeeping missions (which are the main types of these new missions coded) occur during peacetime peri-

ods, and therefore fall outside an analysis of interventions in civil war. Such conceptualization is not validated by the facts, as within the conflict period there are 58 missions, with 29 not having a mandate of enforcement or a political mandate. Such a high number can be attributed partly to the broadening of the conflict period, and also reflects the fact that even if peacekeeping is effective in sustaining peace, defined as not having more than 999 battle deaths (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna 2004), they may be less efficient in ending low-intensity conflict which this definition of conflict is intended to capture. The second adaptation had already been implicitly made by Regan et al. (2009) and is connected with broadening the concept to also consider political and neutral interventions.

In total there were 576 external interventions, including military, economic, diplomatic and UN and non-UN missions.[8]

The external interventions data collection was based on the news search engine FACTIVA, which provides broad coverage of the top news sources in Africa.[9] All the entries of Regan et al. (2009) for the period 1989 to 1999 were double-checked.[10] Whenever doubts emerged, academic case studies were used. Due to the unavailability of data (news or academic case studies) for five entries, the UCDP External Support Dataset was consulted and is the single reference to each entry. Because the cases of UN and non-UN missions are widely documented in official sources or academic publications, their identification was gathered based mainly on the websites and official documents of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the African Union and the European Union alongside Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), Mays (2011) and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (SIPRI MPOD). The resulting conflict-interventions narratives were cross-checked with the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) intrastate dispute information. The data were supplemented by interviews with six military attaches in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, after we approached embassies there of all the countries represented in the dataset. These interviews confirmed the conflict-interventions narratives with very few changes.[11]

Particular attention was paid to ensuring inter-coder consistency with the dataset of Regan et al. (2009), which is reflected in the high correlation, similar patterns and regression results for the overlapping conflicts periods. (see footnote 2).

The coded interventions have 1,639 references, with an average of 2.8 references per intervention. Fifty-eight percent of all the references come from news reports: Reuters News; BBC Monitoring; Agence France-Associated Presse; All Africa; Xinhua News Agency; Associated Press Newswires; the Financial Times; Dow Jones International News; BBC Timeline; Inter press Services; The New York Times; The Guardian; The Times; The Independent – London; and several others with less than 10 references each. About 29 percent of the references are from academic datasets, namely: the UCDP Peace Agreement, Regan et al. (2009), UCDP External Support, Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. About 9 percent of references are from official sources: the United Nations, the African Union, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union and NATO. The remaining 4 percent of references are from academic case studies. There is a predominance of Anglophone sources.[12] Table 3.1 resumes the main data structure.

Table 3.1 Descriptive indicators of the dataset

Conflicts in Africa	Period	CW events	Interventions
30 countries with 42 conflicts	5,582 months with 5,787 entries	291.648 battle deaths occurring in 1,845 months	576 interventions

The distributions of the conflicts per sub-region are presented in the next figure, with the tow sub-regions with most conflict being Eastern and Western Africa.

Figure 3.1 Conflicts per sub-region



The types and targets of interventions are identified in the next picture. Diplomatic and military interventions are the most recurrent types of interventions, interventions which are mostly neutral or in support of the government.

Figure 3.2 Numbers of types and targets of interventions



Interventions are of the following types and sub-types (number of interventions in parentheses):

a) Military type (161) with a specification if it was troops (62), naval forces (2), equipment or aid (48), intelligence advisors (22), air support (10) and military sanctions (17);

b) Economic type (52) with a specification if it was grants (23), loans (3), non-military equipment or expertise (0), credits (1), relieved of past obligations (10) and economic sanctions (15).

c) Diplomatic type (305) with a specification if it was a case of mediation (248), international forum (24), arbitration (0), recall of ambassadors (1), offers to mediate by third parties that were not accepted (18), requests for diplomatic intervention by one of the warring parties that were not accepted (8) and political sanctions (6). Figure 3.3 presents a timeline of the number of interventions by type of intervention.

Figure 3.3 Military, economic and diplomatic interventions per year[13]



There was a higher number of diplomatic interventions up to 1999 but a more balanced distribution since 2000, together with military interventions. Economic interventions are less common. The military interventions in 1998 were driven by the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict, and in 2006 they were driven by the Somalia conflict. Military interventions are mainly made with troops, economic interventions with grants and diplomatic interventions with mediation.

The criteria to determine if an intervention is a peacekeeping operation or not is based on Heldt and Wallensteen (2007). A peacekeeping

operation consists of: the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in target states; a mandate (multilateral agreements, peace agreements, or resolutions of the UN or regional organizations) established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones and taking responsibility for the security situation between formerly, potentially or presently warring parties; and being neutral towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behavior. This covers all the possible mandates considered, with two exceptions: prevention or political operations and enforcement missions. These are also included as they equally meet the intervention definition. For this reason the reference in this category is to a broader category of UN and non-UN missions (instead of peacekeeping).

Thirty-two UN missions and 26 non-UN missions were classified according to the mandate based on the definitions of Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Diehl (2008) and Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) (see Figure 3.4).

Missions classified as preventive or political operations are normally deployed prior to the outbreak of armed conflict. These can be fact-finding or mediation missions (cases of UN mediation or peacemaking without, however, a follow-up peacekeeping mission). It also includes cases of UN political and peacebuilding missions run through the department of Political Affairs (as opposed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations). These are not normally considered peacekeeping missions and do not fit the definition made earlier. Nevertheless, they constitute an intervention of a diplomatic type and are more permanent than typical ad-hoc short-term negotiating teams.

Observer missions are the ones with a specific mandate on monitoring, reporting or observing. These missions usually do not have a large military component (personnel numbering in the hundreds) and have very limited rules of engagement (they are often unarmed missions).

Traditional peacekeeping operations are normally interposition missions and have one of the following mandates: provide protection through interposition or the separation of conflict parties and maintenance of buffer zones; monitoring ceasefires; maintaining law and order; disarming and demobilizing factions. These are normally lightly armed missions. If the only function was one of these (or even providing security and humanitarian assistance) it would be a traditional peacekeeping operation.

Multidimensional operations have at least two additional mandates beyond the protection a traditional peacekeeping operation provides. These dimensions include electoral assistance/monitoring; humanitarian assistance; and training of local police or the security sector. These missions normally have a substantial civilian component to perform these dimensions, and can include transitional administration.

Enforcement missions are those where the peace operation is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter and/or frequently involve large-scale combat operations against one or more of the parties. These missions are not based on consent, can be with or without transitional administration and are deployed to create – rather than maintain – peace.[14]

Figure 3.4 UN and Non-UN missions per year



The target of the intervention is identified: whether it is in support of the government (139), opposition (60) or neutral (377) (see Table 3.2) and up to six parties are coded for each intervention. Most interventions in support of the government or opposition are of a military nature, while most neutral interventions are diplomatic. A series of characteristics of the interveners is identified. These characteristics include geographical origins; for instance, if one of the interveners is from the same sub-region or from Africa; if it is the AU or UN; and which African sub-regions (through states) intervened. The type of third party: if a single or group of states, single or group of International Government Organization (IGO), other or in combination with the state, IGO and other; if

one was a permanent member of the UN Security Council (P5) or an ex-coloniser. Another characteristic also examined is bilateral trade with the highest ratio of export and imports overall exports and imports of the dyad's interveners and intervened.

Table 3.2 Target of support by type of intervention

Type of intervention	Government	Opposition	Neutral	Totals
Military	102	40	19	161
Economic	23	17	12	52
Diplomatic	8	2	295	305
UN Mission	1	0	31	32
Non-UN Mission	5	1	20	26
Total	**139**	**60**	**377**	**576**

Although the top interveners are France and the USA, with Italy in 10th place, all the other interveners are from Africa (Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Uganda) (see Table 3.3). This pattern is repeated in the breakdown by type of intervention, except for diplomatic interventions where African states are the top interveners, with Italy and France being the first non-African states, in 6th and 7th place among the top 10. Non-UN state missions are all by non-African states.

Table 3.3 Top 10 state interveners per intervention type

Code	Country / Intervention Type	All types	Military	Economic	Diplomatic	Missions
220	France	53	25	14	12	2
2	United States of America	34	14	9	9	2
620	Libya	25	10	1	14	0
530	Ethiopia	23	13	2	8	0
510	Tanzania	21	1	2	18	0
501	Kenya	19	2	2	15	0
560	South Africa	18	2	0	16	0
552	Zimbabwe	17	4	0	13	0

Code	Country / Intervention Type	All types	Military	Economic	Diplomatic	Missions
500	Uganda	16	7	2	7	0
325	Italy	15	1	1	13	0
483	Chad	15	6	0	9	0
540	Angola	12	9	0	3	0
625	Sudan	12	6	0	6	0
531	Eritrea	7	6	0	1	0
200	United Kingdom	6	5	1	0	0
517	Rwanda	8	4	2	2	0
651	Egypt	10	2	0	8	0
481	Gabon	8	0	0	8	0

Note: The table shows the top 10 state interveners for each type of intervention identified in bold. This means that in the first column of all types of interventions the first 10 states are the top interveners. In the second column the top 10 state military interveners include five that are also in the top 10 of all types of intervention (France, United States of America, Libya, Ethiopia, Uganda), plus an additional five countries (Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Sudan, United Kingdom). In economic interventions several countries are within the top ten with only one intervention; for these cases, only countries that are the top ten in other types of intervention are identified. The number of interventions for non-top 10 countries listed in the table is also reported. The same procedure is followed for economic, diplomatic and UN and non-UN missions. These criteria mean that some well-known interveners may not be listed because they are not top ten in any of the types, as in the case of Nigeria.

For non-state interventions (see Table 3.4) the main intervener is the UN, with about 33% of the all interveners, and African-based organizations (about 51% of all interveners, with AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, the Arab League and the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative in the top 10). The fifth most relevant intervener is the European Commission (EC), with about 7% of all interveners.

Military and economic interventions normally have the involvement of parties from outside the region. Most of these are by the UN or EC, but diplomatic interventions have significant involvement from African-based organisations. The UN and EC comprise about three quarters of all military interveners (38% and 36%, respectively), with African-based interveners comprising one tenth of all interveners. The UN and EC are the main interveners (35% and 44%, respectively) among economic interveners. Diplomatic interventions are predominantly African (66% of all interveners), followed by the UN (22% of all interveners). In terms of UN and non-UN missions, most interventions continue to have UN involvement (55% of all interveners), with a significant number of African

involvement (28% of all interveners), followed by the EC (11% of all interveners).

Table 3.4 Top 10 non-state interveners per intervention type

Code	Non-state actor / Intervention Type	All types	Military	Econom-ic	Diplomat-ic	Mis-sions
1.1	United Nations (UN)	100	11	8	49	32
1.4	African Union (AU)	46	1	0	35	10
1.9	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOWAS/ECOMOG)	43	1	1	36	5
1.5	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	26	1	0	25	0
1.3	European Commission (EC)	22	8	7	1	6
1.6	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	11	0	0	10	1
2.4	Arab League	10	0	0	10	0
2.7	Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi	10	0	0	10	0
3.7	Catholic Church	9	0	0	9	0
4.1	Carter Center	8	0	0	8	0
3.1	Inter-Congolese Dialogue	5	0	0	5	0
1.7	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	4	0	1	1	2
3.6	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)	3	2	0	1	0
1.12	World Food Programme (WFP)	2	0	2	0	0
3.5	Paris Club	2	0	2	0	0
1.14	World Bank (WB)	1	0	1	0	0
1.2	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)	1	0	0	0	1

Code	Non-state actor / Intervention Type	All types	Military	Econom-ic	Diplomat-ic	Mis-sions
3.3	Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission	1	0	0	0	1
4.5	World Vision International	1	0	1	0	0

Note: In Table 4 it should be noted that for non-state interveners using military intervention several actors that are in the top ten conducted only one intervention. Also, here only the actors that were among the top ten of other types of interventions were coded. A noticeable absence in this table is the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth, which was only in the top ten of military interventions with one intervention, and therefore did not make it to the table, although it conducted three diplomatic interventions.

Overall, for state and non-state interveners, African interveners comprise the majority present in military and diplomatic initiatives, while economic interventions are mainly initiated with the involvement of interveners out of the region (France, USA, the UN and EC) and missions mainly with the involvement of the UN.

The outcome of the intervention is captured through conflict intensity based on which additional variables have been developed. Based on the UCDP GED (v1.5) event dataset, battle death events were aggregated to the month (based on date of termination of the event). Among other transformations this count variable was converted into a categorical variable for different levels of conflict: 0 for zero deaths; 1 for a new lower intensity level below 25 battle deaths; 2 for a minor intensity, with deaths between 25 and 999 (similar to the UCDP minor intensity category); and 4 for a civil war intensity, with more than 999 battle deaths (similar to the Correlates of War civil war level).[15] Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 summarize the annual battle death data count together with the number of each type of intervention.

Figure 3.5 Battle deaths in civil wars and types of interventions



Note: Battle deaths on the left axis and all types of intervention on the right axis.

The lower number of battle deaths from 2000 onwards requires zooming in from that date onwards for a better visualization of the pattern.

Figure 3.6 Battle deaths in civil wars and types of intervention after 2000



Note: Battle deaths on the left axis and all types of intervention on the right axis.

At this level of aggregation for all conflicts there is an association of frequency of the number of battle deaths and number of diplomatic and military interventions as well as of diplomatic interventions and military interventions. Specific civil wars have significantly increased the number of interventions, specifically in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 and Somalia in 2006. Economic interventions do not follow a di-

rect association with any other indicator, and their use decreases in the period under analysis. UN and non-UN missions overall have a similar number of missions initiated and a temporal pattern, with a peak in 1993 followed by a decline up to the late 1990s when there was a resurgence, with a steady number of new missions being established annually from 2002 onwards.

Comparing the average monthly battle deaths in the month of the intervention with intervention types and their numbers (see Figure 3.7) provides a more detailed perspective of the association of types of intervention with conflict intensity.

Overall military and biased interventions in support of the opposition occur in months with higher average battle deaths. Air support, deployment of troops and offers of mediation occur in months with significantly more average battle deaths. Biased interventions in support of the opposition occur in months where average battle deaths almost double those of months with interventions in support of the government and more than double the average of battle deaths of months with neutral interventions.

Military air support is a type of intervention that occurs in conflicts with more battle deaths. There are, on average, 1,688 battle deaths in months with air support, a type of intervention with only 10 occurrences in the dataset. The second type of intervention occurring in months with higher battle deaths is non-UN multidimensional missions, with an average of 977 battle deaths, but occurring only once. The next distinguishable type of intervention is the deployment of troops; this occurs 62 times in months with an average of 574 battle deaths. Mediation offers also occur in months with significant battle deaths, 454 on average, with 18 entries. The most common intervention, mediation, with 248 entries, occurs in months with 227 battle deaths on average. Finally, the 60 interventions in support of the opposition occurred in months with a higher average number of deaths (480) than those that took place during 139 interventions in support of the government (277 battle deaths) or the 377 neutral interventions (215 battle deaths).

Figure 3.7 Average battle deaths in the months of the interventions



Note: Number of interventions in the upper axis and number of battle deaths in the lower axis. Number of interventions identified in front of each bar. Entries with no interventions and neutral interventions are not represented in full for graphical reasons.

Although at sub-regional level the distribution of interventions is similar to the distribution of battle deaths at the national level, it is clear that the occurrence of more interventions is not systematic in countries with conflicts in which there are more battle deaths.

Figure 3.8 Weight of battle deaths and interventions per sub-region



+ Western Africa - 14 conflicts -19,723 battle deaths, 108 interventions
– Middle Africa - 7 conflicts - 67,730 battle deaths, 158 interventions
: Eastern Africa - 15 conflicts - 143,002 battle deaths, 221 interventions
■ Southern Africa - 2 conflicts - 68 battle deaths, 3 interventions
I Northern Africa - 4 conflicts - 61,125 battle deaths, 86 interventions

The sub-region of Africa with more battle deaths and more interventions is Eastern Africa, which represents 49% and 38% of the totals, respectively (see Figure 3.8). The main countries are Ethiopia with more than 80,000 battle deaths but which had only 9 interventions, Somalia with more than 20,000 battle deaths and 85 interventions, Uganda with more than 10,000 battle deaths and 7 interventions and countries with less than 10.000 battle deaths but many interventions, such as Burundi, with 37 interventions, and Rwanda and Mozambique, each with 36 interventions (see Figure 3.9). Middle Africa is the second sub-region with more battle deaths (23% of total) and interventions (27% of total).

Figure 3.9 Total battle deaths and interventions per country



Figure 3.9 note: On the left axis countries by sub-region with number of conflicts in the country in parentheses, country name and total battle deaths. Total battle deaths in the lower axis and total interventions in the upper axis. Number of interventions identified in front of each bar. Ethiopia's total battle deaths are not represented in full for graphical reasons.

The main countries are Angola with more than 30,000 battle deaths and 31 interventions, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo each with more than 14,000, battle deaths and 13 and 63 interventions, respectively. The third sub-region with more battle deaths is Northern Africa (with 21% of battle deaths and 15% of interventions) mainly due to the conflict in Sudan with more than 40,000 battle deaths and 67 interventions and Algeria with more than 17,000 battle deaths and 13 interventions. Western Africa is the fourth sub-region with 7% of battle deaths but the third in terms of interventions, with 39% of the total. Sierra Leone has more than 10,000 battle deaths with 32 interventions and Liberia, has more than 4,000 battle deaths with 33 interventions, These are the two countries in the sub-region with more interventions. Southern Africa countries had very few deaths and interventions (less than 1,2% of the totals).

3.4 Conclusion

The paper has presented a new dataset in external interventions. The dataset has three main limitations. It is in all aspect a panel data with the exception of the very important time dimension, which is "broken" in the sense that when there are intervention, there is the same number of entries in one month as the number of interventions. This structure is justified by the theoretical relevance of the additional information that can accounted for but limits the statistical uses of the dataset. A second limitation has to do with the impossibility to systematically identify the end date of each intervention. The interventions are coded in their date of initiation with the identification of their dates of termination in most but not all interventions. The reason for this is that news reports are more consistent in informing of a new event then when that event ended. A third limitation is related with the unavailability of information to determine the size of the interventions, being it measured in terms of soldiers, equipment, days or a measurement in money. This means that interventions with different sizes will have the same weight in the da-

taset. The last two limitations apply to the types of intervention more than the missions, for which such information is normally available.

Despite these limitations the dataset makes an unique and useful contribution to the available data on interventions in civil wars by revising and extending the Regan et al. (2009) dataset.

It is the sole dataset which combines different types of interventions: military, economic and diplomatic with UN and non-UN missions. Also disaggregates interventions with information on sub-types of interventions and mission mandates. Therefore it allows to analyse the effect of a specific type or sub-type of intervention controlling for the effect of other interventions within a single dataset increasing the reliability of the analysis. Furthermore the characterisation of each intervention is extensive, covering issues of intent –target- and interveners characterisation – identification, location, categorisation - with identification of the diplomatic outcome in the form of peace agreements.

In terms of the time dimension, by using the month level, it goes into enough disaggregation to account for the variations relevant to a study of external interventions. A yearly unit or event unit would be too aggregated or disaggregated, respectively, for an analysis of the effects of interventions on high and low intensity conflict.

By using the UCDP conflict definition and information the dataset can be easily linked to other datasets with this reference and results from its analysis can be more directly compared with other research initiatives.

Finally validity and reliability of the dataset have been secured with inter-coder consistency with Regan et al. (2009) and the result is a new source of information for interventions and conflict for Africa since the end of the Cold War.

Notes

[1] Research for this paper was supported by a scholarship from the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Portugal (SFRH/BD/44998/2008). Fieldwork was possible in the context of the project "Monitoring Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" of the Center of African Studies – ISCTE, Lisbon University Institute (PTDC/AFR/100460/2008), funded by the same foundation. Support to attend conferences was provided by the Erasmus University Trust Fund. I would like to thank Andrea Vilán and João Correlo and interviewees from six African embas-

sies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for providing comments on the development of the dataset. In particular I gratefully acknowledge Patrick Regan for his support and for making the original coding sheets and sources available for crosschecking and reviewing the inter-coder consistency report. Additionally Peter van Bergeijk checked the overall coding procedure. Any remaining errors are my own.

[2] Appendice 2 can be accessed online at:

https://sites.google.com/site/ricardosousa2000/phd_attachments

[3] The Intrastate Disputes Data Set and the Third-Party Dispute Management Data Set are not available.

[4] Also, improvements in data availability and search capabilities since 2000 (the time when the first dataset on military and economic interventions was developed) means that more information on events has been made available in an accessible format.

[5] Hogbladh at al. (2011) consider that partisan and neutral interventions should be analyzed separately, and they identify different datasets for that effect. They consider this to be a limitation of Regan et al.'s (2009) dataset. Such differentiation is made in other studies; for instance, through specific datasets of peacekeeping, mediation or military interventions. This paper follows Regan et al.'s (2009) structure as it allows, within a single dataset, for analysis of each type of intervention controlling for other types of interventions.

[6] Therefore, the dataset includes conflicts that reached 25 battle deaths, but for the period since the month in which the first battle death occurred and includes inactive years. Inactive years are periods during which the threshold of 25 battle deaths was not reached but there were deadly events throughout the year.

Although UCDP GED has the geographical positioning of conflict events, such information is not used because at this stage it is not possible to link interventions to sub-national units across the spectrum of conflicts

[7] The challenges of determining civil war deaths have been amply documented (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005) and warrant caution by researchers, especially when dealing with low thresholds of deaths as a criteria. In this case the threshold of one battle death is followed and justified on theoretical bases and on the validity and reliability of the UCDP dataset, in particular of the specific project of the UCDP GED extending the UCDP Armed Conflict information. Theoretically, the dataset focuses on the intensity of conflict and less on its initiation. One argument for using 25 battle deaths in the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset is that this figure offers a threshold high enough to be sure a conflict existed, taking into account possible errors when recording the casualties. If the threshold were lower, for instance 5 or 10, one may be identifying that a conflict exists based on numbers close to the possible reporting error. This dataset respects this caution-

ary criterion, only UCDP conflicts that reached 25 battle deaths are coded, but then for such conflicts it considers valid information for the events reported for the years with less than 25 battle deaths (as it equally considers event deaths reported in years with more than 25 battle deaths). This means the initiation of conflict can be coded on the date the first battle death occurred, which may be different from the date on which it reached 25 battle deaths, broadening the scope of analysis. See Hoglund and Oberg (2011), who extensively document the UCDP experience and procedures.

[8] Entries in the dataset are for the date the intervention was initiated.

[9] A FACTIVA search was conducted based on the following parameters: a) articles with at least the word "Intervention"; b) with at least one of the keywords of the type and subt-ypes of interventions: troops, naval forces, equipment, aid intelligence, advisors, air support, military sanctions, grants, loans, non-military equipment, expertise, credits, relief of past obligations, economic sanctions, mediation, forum, arbitration, recall, offer, request; c) between 01/01/1989 and 31/12/2010; d) within subjects: Economic news; International Political Economic Organizations; Political/General News and Selection of Top Stories/Trends/Analysis; e) for the specific country (in Region).

[10] The final dataset contains 196 (34% of the total of 576 interventions), originally from Regan et al. (2009) with changes made to the characterization of interventions in 11 countries. Details are identified in the codebook and appendice on inter-coder consistency.

[11] Also, the internal (inter-variables) consistency of the dataset was re-checked by a research assistant. For a detailed account of the procedure see the codebook.

[12] The most numerous references by type are: Reuters (289), BBC (135), Agence France Press (130) and All Africa (63). They account for 65% of news references. DADM is the main academic source with (222) 43% of academic references, followed by Regan et al. (2009) with (200) 39% of references. The UN is the main source of official documentation, with (139) 82% of official references (values in parentheses are absolute number of references).

[13] Interventions are coded in the month of initiation, and in this figure are summed up in the corresponding year.

[14] The first four mandates are based on Chapter VI – peaceful settlement of disputes (consent) and the fifth mandate on Chapter VII – use of sanctions or force to settle disputes (enforcement). The coding is for the strongest mandate taken by the mission increasing in strength from prevention or political, to observer, to traditional peacekeeping, to multidimensional operations and to enforcement missions. There is a difference between UN Peacekeeping and AU Peace support

missions, but in this case the UN Peacekeeping definition is followed and AU missions analysed accordingly.

[15] Additionally, variables were coded for the natural log and square root of the count and categorical cumulative intensity level and categorical intensity level per year.

4 External interventions and civil war intensity in south-central Somalia (1991-2010)

Abstract

External interventions in conflicts are prescribed to be peace-promoting mechanisms, but their effects seldom de-escalate conflict intensity. Based on the balance of capabilities theory, this paper tests the effects that the type of intervention, military or diplomatic, and the target of the intervention, partisan or neutral, has on conflict intensity. In the case of Somalia, for the period 1991 to 2010, the results suggest that neutral interventions, either military (humanitarian) or diplomatic, can lead to lower conflict intensity, but if partisan and military they lead to higher conflict intensity. If partisan and diplomatic and provided to both sides of the conflict they have no effect on conflict intensity. The conclusion is that peace competes with other objectives of external interventions.

4.1 Introduction[1]

External interventions are a mechanism the international community uses for conflict management in a country. Intervention effects are determined by the motivations of the intervening parties and the effectiveness of the military, economic or diplomatic initiatives undertaken. But, at the same time, the relationship between interventions and conflict is endogenous, which makes it difficult to determine when interventions are causing a conflict pattern or when interventions are responses to conflict patterns.

It has been suggested that the expected effect of external interventions on civil wars is to de-escalate conflict intensity in order to allow a mediation process to unfold. This is attributed directly not only to diplomatic initiatives but also to military and economic initiatives. The un-

derlying assumption is that interveners' motives, regardless of the type of intervention, are primarily "peace promoting" (Regan, 2002a).

This paper questions this assumption by examining how military and diplomatic interventions and interveners' motivations are associated with conflict intensity. The paper aims to contribute to the broader literature in international interventions and conflict management.

The paper starts by presenting the theoretical formulation that external interventions are mainly conflict management mechanisms; we then propose three expected mechanisms for military and diplomatic interventions and interveners' motivations. The proposed mechanisms are then tested on a case study of Somalia for the period 1991 to 2010. For the sake of clarity, the conflict-interventions analysis is sub-divided into four periods. The data is based on secondary sources relying on a conflict event dataset for a monthly account of battle-related deaths as a measure of conflict intensity.

In the final section we present the results, which show that military interventions lead to higher conflict intensity, and diplomatic interventions can lead to both higher and lower conflict intensity periods as well as have no effect on conflict intensity. We also show that conflict intensity does not seem to determine interveners' interventions, meaning that more bloodshed does not increase the chance of more interventions.

4.2 External interventions and conflict intensity

A broad conceptualisation of interventions would consider that they can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or indirect (through the use of a proxy state), open or clandestine (covert) operations perpetrated by state and non-state actors and are not necessarily lawful or unlawful but should break the conventional pattern of international relations (Vincent, 1974, p.13).

More specifically, for the case of intra-state conflict, Regan (2002a) and Rosenau (1968) define external interventions as convention-breaking military, economic or political activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country that are targeted at the authority structures of the government (in support of the government, in opposition to it, or neutral), with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the parties in the conflict.

This definition is associated with the traditional conceptualization of civil war as a state (with a government) that is challenged by at least one

political group using armed force over a sustained period and producing a minimum threshold of deaths. Battle deaths are a clear indication of the extraordinary nature of the period under review (even if the conflict is protracted) and of the intensity of conflict (Gleditsch et al, 2002).

Since 1991 Somalia has usually been referred to as an extreme case of "state collapse", a country characterized by a constellation of commercial city-states and villages separated by areas of pastoral statelessness without a central authority (Menkhaus, 2006). In this sense, the identification of a state is more formal than de facto in Somalia, where there is a more decentralized form of conflict. In this way, the civil war in Somalia is not only of a state-based type, associated with conflict involving an internationally recognized group representing the "state", which in Somalia was the case with two transitional governments, being challenged by other group(s), but involves conflicts of other types.

Additionally and despite ethnic homogeneity, Somalian society is characterised by a clan system structured around six major clan families (the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir, the Hawiye, the Rahanwein and the Digil), which then break down into sub-clans. The clan families are "communities of relations" with common genealogy and complex networks of relationships (Ssereo, 2003). Typically, clan militia respond to clan elders but operate in a decentralised and opportunistic guerrilla fashion. Linked to both "state collapse" and clan politics are the warlords, who are characterised by their personal rule paradigm, the monopolization of economic resources and the extensive use of coercion through militias (Clapham, 2002). They also oppose any effort to impose government in the capital, in this way avoiding predatory government practices (Menkhaus, 2007).[2]

In this context, conflict in Somalia is not only state based but also, significantly, of two other types. The one is conflict involving actors fighting each other without the state's involvement (normally called non-state conflict or communal violence); the other type is groups (or the state) attacking civilian populations (normally referred to as one-sided conflict). Such specificity of conflict can be accommodated in the above definition of external interventions, where the "authority" is the diverse groups competing for control of different levels of power in pastoral areas, communities, towns, regional administrations, states or the central government.[3]

Within this definition of external interventions, it has been proposed that interventions attempt to control hostilities, and ceteris paribus, interventions should reduce conflict (Regan, 2002a). Therefore the success of interventions is assessed in terms of their capacity to lower conflict intensity, as in the number of battle deaths, or decrease the duration of conflict, as in the days, months or years the conflict is active (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011). In Regan (2002a) the point of "departure for outlining the goals of the interveners works from the assumption that states intervene to stop the fighting between groups in conflict" (p. 10). Furthermore, it is assumed that third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fighting. The key issue here is the desire by the intervener to bring stability to a specific region; one approach for achieving this – and the one that is under consideration – is the active intervention by a third party into the ongoing conflict. (p. 11)

One way to achieve this is by the intervener trying to bolster one side to compel the opposing side to quit fighting, which can come about through a ceasefire or one side's defeat (Regan, 1996, p. 340). The missing link in this argument is that the peaceful objectives of interveners are conditional on who would be the possible winner in a conflict. An intervention neutral towards the outcome of a conflict and focused solely on de-escalation or ending the conflict would primarily support the strongest side so that victory would be more likely. A victory is the most decisive outcome to a conflict and the one type less likely to lead to conflict recurrence. If a military victory seems unlikely, an alternative strategy could be to support the weaker side to the extent that a military stalemate is reached, forcing both parties to engage in negotiations, which could eventually lead to a lasting peace agreement. But this later strategy is more prone to the difficulties of political negotiations and the emergence of spoilers.

Instead, interveners are more likely to pay close attention to the conditions of the conflict and simultaneously to which parties would better represent the interests of the interveners. If a preferred party is losing the war, it is more likely it will be supported to remove the possibility of its military defeat. Additionally, if negotiations are being pursued, external parties can add extra conditions on the political solutions to be found and therefore make an agreement less likely.

Therefore, on the one hand, interventions are not intended to exacerbate the fighting; on the other hand, an intervention may bolster one side

of the conflict, regardless of its effect on the conditions that would lead to a faster peace.

This paper looks precisely at this tension and proposes that interveners may not be motivated initially to stop the fighting (in this case by lowering intensity). It considers that external interventions in conflict processes refer mainly to the balancing of capabilities between groups (Regan, 2010) connected to the goals or objectives of interveners and combatants. The interventions can aim to ensure a group's victory or its demise, to enhance the position of the groups in negotiation processes or to reach a stalemate so that negotiations can begin. This may mean an escalation (e.g. through direct military support or imposing unattainable negotiation positions) or de-escalation (e.g. by withholding military support or promoting mediation) of the conflict. This definition departs from Regan (2010) in the sense that it more clearly formulates that interveners promote peace if they can but through conflict if they must.

4.3 Effects of External Interventions on conflict intensity

The unit of analysis is external interventions' effect on conflict intensity. Because of the focus on conflict intensity, the choice of a single case study is appropriate, as variation of intensity can be observed across time. Nevertheless, quantitative studies of conflict have focused more on conflict duration. Because of this research scarcity and because conflict duration can be considered a measure of (sustained) intensity, this literature is used as a reference for inference on expected mechanisms.

The classical type of military intervention involves the deployment of military personnel across recognized borders, with other less intrusive actions being the provision of military equipment or aid, provision of technical support or intelligence information or withholding military support. This type of support is considered more conflict prone as it directly increases the fighting capacity of the groups. Comparatively, economic interventions impact more indirectly on the fighting capacity of the parties. Nevertheless, the provision of loans, grants, non-military equipment, expertise or economic sanctions can significantly affect the resources and resolve of the conflicting groups. Also, both military and economic interventions can be associated with a de-escalation of conflict, for instance, when neutral military interventions have a mandate to oversee a ceasefire or secure a buffer zone.

Overall, studies identify a positive association between military and economic interventions and conflict duration, unless the intervention is biased in support of either the government or rebel group (Regan 2002a; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Some research suggests that these results are driven by a subset of cases where external interventions were made by actors pursuing their own agenda, which results in longer conflicts (Cunningham, 2010). The issue of the intentions of the interveners is therefore relevant and is analysed separately ahead.

Regarding conflict intensity, findings on low-intensity conflict confirm previous results that military interventions increase the likelihood of conflict escalation, while economic interventions increase the likelihood of stagnation (Regan and Meachum, 2014).

Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the high intensity that attracts interventions or interventions that cause the high intensity. Studies have identified that bloodier wars attract more interventions (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), which is in contrast to the proposal that interventions are more likely to end conflict in high-intensity conflicts but are less likely to occur (Regan, 2002a).

In one study military interventions have been found to decrease conflict duration when the support is provided to the challenging group (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom, 2004).

The majority of findings support the proposition of an association between military interventions and higher conflict intensity, although the causality of the process is less certain. The effect of economic interventions is less pronounced and therefore no hypothesis is formulated.

Hypothesis: Military interventions are associated with, and lead to, higher conflict intensity.

The most frequently used diplomatic intervention is mediation, which occurs with the consent of both parties and is therefore closer to the conflict management intended to de-escalate the conflict (Regan, 2002b). Mediation is defined as initiatives for the settlement of disputes "without resort to physical violence" (Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille, 1991, p. 8). This conflict mitigation criterion occurs equally in other interventions. Elbadawi (1999) distinguishes the military and economic types of interventions with what he calls an "external agency" type of intervention,

which is defined as a "multilateral and essentially neutral mode of intervention that is aimed at promoting or facilitating peaceful resolution of conflicts..." (p. 4).

Results show that diplomacy facilitates the termination of civil war (Regan, Frank & Aydin, 2009) even when used alongside economic or military intervention. (Regan and Aydin, 2006). Furthermore, longer wars and those with higher numbers of deaths attract more meditation initiatives (Karl DeRouen et al., 2011). More significantly, diplomacy has a de-escalating effect on low-intensity conflict (Regan and Meachum, 2014).

Considering these results, it can be proposed that there is a positive relationship between diplomatic interventions and conflict de-escalation.

Hypothesis: Diplomatic interventions are associated with, and lead to, decreased conflict intensity.

Finally, interveners' motives can be self-centred; for example, they could be related to territorial acquisition or to regional stability, protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic or military interests, ideology, specific international politics and superpower rivalry and domestic and organisational politics. The intervener's motives might also be related to cultural affinities with people in the target countries. Interventions can be more solidarist or legalist as in the upholding of human rights, stopping genocide, promoting democracy or the moral commitment of an intervening state (Regan 1996, 2002a, 2010).

In most cases, interveners' motivations are exogenous to the conflict and even UN interventions occur for reasons other than the human catastrophe of conflict (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Mullenbach, 2005). Nevertheless, no systematic study has been able to identify intentions in interventions and therefore control for it in quantitative studies. The main reason is that actors are motivated by a complexity of self-centred and altruistic factors that are not always disclosed. Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate that conflict intensity does not unequivocally attract interventions.

Hypothesis: High conflict intensity does not lead to more external interventions.

These hypotheses will be tested for the Somalia conflict for the period between 1991 and 2010. This period is subdivided into four periods according to patterns of conflict intensity and external interventions. The conflict intensity data is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georeferenced Event Dataset (v1.5) (Melander and Sundberg, 2011) for state-based, non state-based and one-sided violence. The external interventions information is based on Regan et al. (2009), Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) and secondary sources.

4.4 Somalia – 1991-2010

In 1991 the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown, ending a 22-year military dictatorship. Since this date, central and south Somalia have been characterised by civil war and the absence of a functioning central government. The country has also been the target of several external interventions.[4] Map 4.1 presents the regions of Somalia. Somaliland comphreends the regions of Awdal, Woqooy Galbeed and the western parts of Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool where the eastern parts of these three regions, delimited in the cities of Buhoodle, Garadag and Laasqoray, are disputed areas. Puntland comphreends Bari, Nugaal and the north region of Mudug north of Gaalkacyo. All the area south of Gaalkacyo inn Mudug comphreending also the regions of Galguduud, Hiraan, Shabelle Dhexe, Shabelle Hoose, Banadir, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Juba Dhexe and Juba Hoose are considered the south-central Somalia (see map 4.2 ahead for a simplified identification of Puntland, Somaliland, the disputed area and south-central Somalia). Figure 4.1 the timeline of conflict intensity and external interventions.[5]

Map 4.1 Somalia

Source: United Nations

Figure 4.1 Battle deaths and external interventions in Somalia, 1991-2010



Figure 4.1 notes: On the left axis are monthly battle-related deaths for state-based and non state-based conflict and monthly deaths for one-sided conflict. Number of interventions on the right axis is identified for the date of initiation. Timeline axes with year start. For months with more than 300 battle deaths, the total number of deaths is reported in a label on top of the chart in the corresponding month. The dashed lines correspond to the delimitation of the periods of analysis. Other text identifies chronologically relevant events. Legend: TNG – Transitional National Government; TFG – Transitional Federal Government; ICU – Mogadishu-Islamic Court Union controls Mogadishu; ETH Int.-Mogadishu – Ethiopian intervention controls Mogadishu. Military, economic and diplomatic interventions and peacekeeping operations (PKO) are external interventions.

Figure 4.1 sources: Battle death data from Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georeferenced Event Dataset (v1.5) (Melander and Sundberg, 2011). Military, economic, diplomatic and PKO interventions are from the new external interventions dataset, see chapter 3 for a detail presentation.

4.4.1 January 1991 to March 1992 – De-escalation of the conflict by international "humanitarian" intervention in the aftermath of the power vacuum left by the toppling of the Barre regime

The overthrow of the Siad Barre regime was marked by open civil war, particularly between 1988 and 1991. Despite the establishment of the interim government of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed on January 29, 1991, the conflict continued, as identified in Figure 4.1.

On July 21, 1991 promoted by external actors (Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt), a ceasefire agreement was signed in Djibouti between six political groups without the participation of the Somali National Movement (SNM).[6] The agreement recognised Ali Mahdi Mohamed, leader of the USC, as head of an interim government, but his leadership was contested within the USC, resulting in a split into his USC/Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), which had its roots in a more sedentary lifestyle, and the USC/Somali National Alliance (SNA) headed by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, which had its roots in a nomadic lifestyle (Rutherford, 2008). The contest would lead to intense fighting for control of the capital, Mogadishu, in the last quarter of 1991 and in the south of Somalia in January 1992, which claimed more than 4,000 lives in four months (Melander and Sundberg, 2011).[7]

In January 1992 several external actors (the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, the AU and Ethiopia) mediated on the conflict, which led to a ceasefire agreement signed on March 3, 1992 with provisions for a transitional governance mechanism and a peace-keeping mis-

sion (DADM, 2012). As a result, the conflict de-escalated and crystallised into the separation of Mogadishu along the so-called "green line" separating the territory controlled by the USC/SSA and the USC/SNA (Rutherford, 2008).

With the exception of Mogadishu, up to the early 1990s the nature of the conflict in the south was mainly inter-clan, with the Darood (SPM) and Hawiye (USC) opposing each other. This conflict, which was characterised by atrocities and looting, involved fast-moving campaigns in which large slices of land were seized (Menkhaus, 2004).

The lack of authority and the transition of governance during this period are particularly prone to conflict. There was an "end-of-hierarchy" moment (Cramer, 2002) when the fall of the Barre regime opened up a space for various parties to contest authority. The period signalled a transition (Hegre et al, 2001) from autocracy to what would become an anarchic, decentralized, stateless system in which 'contenders struggle to conquer and defend durable resources, without effective regulation by higher authority' (Hirshleifer, 1995, p. 27). The possibility of reaching an agreement that would hold under these conditions came about as a result of a "military stalemate" (Zartman, 2001) and international pressure which offered incentives to the parties to allow humanitarian interventions to take place as well as guaranteeing that there would be no interference in the dynamics of the conflict. This was reflected in the lack of an enforcement mandate of the first United Nations mission.

4.4.2 April 1992 to October 1996 – Conflict escalation in General Mohamed Farah Aidid's bid for control and the international community's failure to manage the conflict

In April 1992 the UN approved the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), with the primary objective of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, at a time when an estimated 40 percent of humanitarian food was being hijacked by conflicting parties in Somalia. The mission was limited in strength due to the opposition of General Aidid, who reluctantly only accepted a deployment of troops smaller than authorized (Reuters, 1992). Aidid feared that the UN intended to deprive him of the presidency, a suspicion reinforced when a plane with UN markings delivered military equipment to Ali Mahdi Mohammed in North Mogadishu. Also, Aidid distrusted Boutros-Ghali, who was considered a pro-

Barre person since his tenure as deputy foreign minister of Egypt (Adebajo, 2011).

Later in the same year, on December 6, the UN authorized a peace enforcement mission (UNSC 794/1992) to support the UNOSOM I. The mission, called UNITAF (United Task Force), was led by the US and had about 37,000 personnel (DADM, 2012) with a mandate to create conditions for effective humanitarian operations in the southern half of the country, an objective that was ultimately achieved (Rutherford, 2008).

With the involvement of external mediation several factions, including General Aidid's USC/SNA, signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on March 27, 1993. An important issue in this mediation had to do with determining who had the right to represent Somalia at the negotiation table. It was argued that the decision to recognize 15 clan-based factions to the detriment of civic and traditional authorities may have given further strength to militia leaders and affected the political trajectory of the conflict and of subsequent peace talks (Bradbury, 2008).

Also in March 1993 and without consulting General Aidid, an expanded UNOSOM II (UNSC 814/1993) was approved (Rutherford, 2008). This time the UNOSOM II had enforcement powers, an authorized force for 1993 of 28,000 personnel and the mission's mandate change from feeding the population to a large nation-building project including the disarmament of militias. But on June 5, 1993, the March Agreement was broken when General Aidid's forces attacked UN troops. This was a frequent occurrence and attacks were also directed at UNITAF troops (Harbom, Hogbladh and Wallensteen, 2006).

In an escalation of the confrontations, a UN-mandated manhunt was initiated to capture the faction leader, General Aidid, which led to the Somalis considering the UN was a warring faction. In this process the "Black Hawk Down" incident occurred in the US-led Operation, Gothic Serpent, on October 3, 1993. Eighteen US troops died in that incident and it was estimated that there were 1,000 deaths among General Aidid's military supporters and civilians (Adebajo, 2011). This event marked the end of American involvement not only in Somalia but in humanitarian interventions elsewhere. In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, several unsuccessful negotiation attempts were made in Somalia in 1994. In March 1995 the UNOSOM II was terminated (Regan and Aydin, 2006 and DADM, 2012).

General Aidid (USC/SNA) proclaimed himself president on June 15, 1995, and Libya recognized his government on November 6, 1995 (DADM, 2012). But Ali Mahdi Mohamed (USC/SSA) contested it and the country continued to be engaged in conflict (Dow Jones, 1995). From 1995 up to the first half of 1997, intense fighting returned mainly to the cities of the administrative region of Lower Shabelle, including Mogadishu, and in neighbouring administrative regions. Most conflicts involved the USC/SNA fighting the USC/SSA or other parties (Melander and Sundberg, 2011).

This period was characterised by a process in which a light humanitarian intervention gradually assumed enforcement powers, to end up being a political mission attempting to remove a warlord (Betts, 1994). The disengagement in late 1993 left no political will to promote mediation initiatives, which were absent in the country from the middle of 1994 to late 1996 (see Figure 4.1).

Nevertheless, in spite of the failure to establish peace in the country and the continuation of a stateless conflict, the intervention decreased the intensity of the conflict significantly from early 1992 until the middle of 1996, with the exception of a few periods. Also, the conflict became more localised, briefer and less costly in terms of human lives, and with less damage to property. At the same time, atrocities and looting became less common and warlords became less of a factor vis a vis the relevance of clan conflict (Menkhaus, 2004).

From 1991 onwards centrifugal forces fragmented the clan families, which led to intra-clan rivalries, in the case of Mogadishu with conflict over a single city block (Menkhaus, 2003). Notwithstanding other relevant processes and actors, Menkhaus's (2007) proposition that since the signing of the Djibouti agreement in 1991, the conflict in Somalia could be seen as a contest for control of political and economic power in Mogadishu between two factions of the Hawiye clan (General Aidid and Ali Mahdi's clans) is confirmed in the above analysis of the process and the conflict itself.

4.4.3 November 1996 to May 2005 – Intra/inter clan conflict and ascension of the ICU amidst international disengagement and regional efforts for mediation

In November 1996, in Sodere, Ethiopia, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiated mediation initiatives between 26 faction leaders (Dagne, 2010), with follow-up meetings throughout 1997 mediated by Ethiopia.

But this negotiation process collapsed when Egypt convened a meeting of Somali groups in Cairo in December 1997, which led to the Cairo Declaration on Somalia (Dagne, 2010). The agreement included provisions for a ceasefire and an interim government but was not signed by some parties and would never be implemented (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen, 2006). This initiative would also lose momentum when another peace conference was convened in Somalia in 1998.

This is one illustration of the Somalia conflict becoming a proxy for the regional dispute between countries of the Muslim Arab world, headed by Egypt, and of the Christian Horn of Africa region, headed by Ethiopia. [8] It was a competition that also extended to the military support provided to the parties throughout the conflict.[9]

The conflict between February 1998 and February 2000 featured several clashes of lower intensity, mainly in central and south Somalia, involving not only the USC/SNA and the USC/SSA but also a series of other forces.[10] The frequency and intensity of the fighting would only decrease temporarily with the initiation of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in May 2000 (see Figure 4.1).[11]

This peace process was mediated internationally (Arab League, Libya and IGAD) and involved a meeting of 400 delegates in Djibouti (it was boycotted by several powerful warlords as well as the governments of Somaliland and Puntland (Dagne, 2010)). By August participants had agreed to a Transitional National Government (TNG), with a three-year mandate, and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) that nominated Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as president. The TNG was dominated by the "Mogadishu group", which was backed by the Arab world, was anti-Ethiopian, included Islamists in its alliance, had a vision of a strong central government and was dominated by lineages of the Hawiye clan (Menkhaus, 2007). The new government was promising for a short time

when, facilitated by Libya, it was able to sign a reconciliation pact with Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid of the USC-SNA in September 2000. As a result, the intensity of the conflict decreased for about a year (DADM, 2012).[12]

But the government was being challenged by an alliance of warlords, the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The SRRC was headed by Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the autonomous state of Puntland. The SRRC was backed by Ethiopia, was anti-Islamic, was based mainly outside Mogadishu, was federalist and was dominated by lineages of the Darood clan (Menkhaus, 2007). In June 2001 Ethiopia made a failed attempt to mediate between the TNG and the SRRC (DADM, 2012), after which there was intense fighting from June to October 2001.

On September 11, 2001 the terrorists attacks in the United States would reconceptualise security concerns worldwide with implications for Somalia. The attacks were linked to an Islamist group, al-Qaeda, which had struck before in the region on August 7, 1998, when it bombed the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Dagne, 2010).

After the 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident, the United States (US) ignored Somalia but the US changed its policy because of its need to fight al-Qaeda, and initially recruited warlords to seize terrorist suspects in the country (Hartley, 2006). A consequence of this policy was a decrease in the power of the transitional government (Hartley, 2005) and the power of clan structures, reinforcing the power of warlords. Another consequence was that the US support to warlords had a backlash by increasing Somali support for the Islamic alternative of Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, which would grow in the following years (Scahill, 2011).

On October 15, 2002, a two-year negotiation process started in Kenya. It was organized by IGAD and involved the TNG and representatives of 22 Somali factions; some factions and the government of Somaliland did not attend. During this negotiation process some of the conflict in the Bay region (and Puntland) related to previous tensions between the clans, and leaders of the administrative region turned violent when criteria had to be used to select participants in this mediation process (Menkhaus, 2004).

The first phase of the process involved the signing of ceasefire agreements, which the parties routinely broke. Despite this, phase two was initiated. It intended to address the root causes of the conflict and focused on how to address issues related to territorial occupation and conquest in southern Somalia (Menkhaus, 2006). But negotiations were fruitless and the mediators decided to move to phase three of a power-sharing agreement (Menkhaus, 2007).

In September 2003 IGAD (with the active involvement of Ethiopia), the AU, the UN and the Arab League, organized a forum where the parties agreed to a Transitional National Charter (TNC), paving the way for a government of national unity, even if some factions were not present at the negotiations. As a result, in August 2004, a 275-member Transitional Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya; it was formed along the principle of a consociational democracy, based on clan families' representation. On October 10, 2004, Abdullah Yusuf was elected president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by an electoral college based on a coalition pact instead of a national unity project. The swearing-in ceremony was attended by 11 heads of government from African countries and representatives from regional organisations and the United Nations (Dagne, 2010). Abdullah Yusuf was closer to Ethiopia and while in office he followed a policy of imposing a victor's peace on the adversaries – the TNG and the "Mogadishu group" (Menkhaus, 2007).

The creation of the TFG and its policies provoked a reaction in Mogadishu where a militant youth – the Shabaab – developed and began assassinating TFG members and supporters (ICG, 2005). As a result, the United States reinforced the programme of capturing suspected al-Qaeda members in the country (Bruton, 2010).

Between December 2001 and early 2006 most of the conflict involved several other parties besides the TFG and occurred throughout central and southern Somalia, not only in Mogadishu, and spread to villages in the Shabelle and Bay regions. Most of the fighting was intra-clan or intra-faction rivalry, with some inter-clan and inter-factional conflict. There were fewer instances of conflict directly involving the TFG or against civilians (see Figure 4.1).[13]

This period was characterised by opposing regional interests playing out diplomatic initiatives, which pre-empted any chance of successful agreement. The main diplomatic initiatives would not be directly associated to conflict intensity but occurred in the context of years of lower

intensity conflict. Only when the balance of capabilities started to shift significantly in favour of the ICU in 2006, did international support for the conflicting parties become military.

4.4.4 June 2005 to 2010 – Foreign regional and international intervention and conflict escalation[14]

In the first half of 2006 the conflict dynamics would change significantly with the emergence of the Islamic Court Union (ICU). The ICU was a heterogeneous group of eleven Sharia courts with some radical individuals, namely Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a salafist who used to head the al-Qaeda-linked al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), and Adan Hashi Farah Ayro a jihadist in charge of the al-Shaabab militia, who was killed in a US airstrike in May 2008 (Moller, 2009).[15]

The ICU had been established in mid-2005 and its rise to power was due to the growing influence of the courts as a source of law and order, the support of the business community that was interested mainly in public security and the clan-based backlash against international efforts to counter terrorism and state building through warlords (Bruton, 2010). The ICU was initially aligned with the "Mogadishu group" but in 2005 a rift developed between both as a result of a regional administration dispute which led to them becoming two distinct interest groups (ICG, 2006). In the months ahead, this would enable the ICU to further capitalize on the population's desire to terminate warlords' power[16] (Hartley, 2005).

In tandem with the rise of the ICU, the United States promoted the establishment of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), which was made public in February 2006. The alliance was constituted by Hawiye clan militia leaders and businessmen and was the main military opponent to ICU growth (Menkhaus, 2007). This active support was justified by the assessment of George W. Bush's administration that the ICU was a de-facto Al-Qaeda-supporting organisation that was on the verge of controlling an African capital (Scahill, 2011).

Between February and June 2006 the ICU's bid to control Mogadishu was opposed by the TFG and the ARPCT, in what is known as the second battle for Mogadishu (Bruton, 2010). Both sides had diverse forms of military and economic support throughout 2005 and 2006, some in

breach of the UN arms embargo (UNSC S/2006/229). The support for the TFG came from Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Uganda and the USA, and support for the ICU from Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Libya, Syria and Egypt (Regan and Aydin, 2006 and DADM, 2012).

By mid-June 2006 the ICU triumphed not only in Mogadishu but in much of the central and southern regions of Somalia. Sudan, Yemen and the Arab League promoted a mediation process in late June 2006 proposing a power-sharing agreement between the ICU and the TFG, but without results. In the negotiations both parties avoided serious concessions; the ICU was convinced of political and military advantage and the TFG was confident of Western backing and fearful of having to lose too much in the negotiations[17] (Bruton, 2010).

There was a series of dynamics of ICU control in the second half of 2006. One dynamic was that for the first time since 1991, Mogadishu was not immersed in the mayhem of warlords' wars; some order and security had been established and some services were reported to have been provided (Scahill, 2011 and Hartley, 2006). This was largely the result of an authoritarian ICU, concentrating power by replacing non-central authorities through the courts, forbidding civil society groups, replacing customary law with sharia law, ending neighbourhood watch patrols and marginalizing some traditional elders, civic leaders and business people (Menkhaus, 2006). Another dynamic was that within the traditionally moderate Islamic population of Somalia the ICU had become radicalized. Among the measures taken was a ban on Western cultural expressions, a prohibition of the popular stimulant qat and an increase in taxes on the business community (Bruton, 2010 and Hartley, 2006). But a more significant dynamic, especially for the Ethiopian decision to intervene decisively later in 2006, was the ICU's position on calls for jihad against Ethiopia; appeals to the people of Ethiopia to overthrow its government; close links with Eritrea; the provision of logistical support and bases to two armed insurgent groups opposing the Ethiopian Government, which had increased activity in the country; and a revival of the "greater Somalia" project, with territorial claims in all of Somalia's neighbouring countries, but especially to the Ogaden region, over which Ethiopia and Somalia fought between 1977 and 1978 (Menkhaus, 2007).[18] Moreover, the possibility of a stable Islamic-inspired country emerging in Somalia could be seen as a platform to strengthen the Mus-

lim population of Ethiopia, the biggest group after the orthodox Christians.

Between June and October 2006 Ethiopia unsuccessfully attempted negotiations between the TFG and the UIC (Aimé, 2013). By October Ethiopia declared it was "technically at war" with the ICU, and on December 24, with an overwhelming force of about 20,000 troops fighting alongside the TFG troops, it launched an offensive against the UIC, unseating it from Mogadishu on December 28, 2006 (Menkhaus, 2007).[19] This changed the dynamic and intensity of the conflict significantly.

Formally, the Ethiopian regime justified the non-authorised intervention in Somalia on the grounds of the right to individual and collective self-defence against a terrorist threat from a regime that could harbour terrorists. It was also argued that the intervention was in response to a request by Abdulahi Yusuf, the TFG leader, for a military force to help the government (Warbrick and Yihdego, 2006). Besides the historical and strategic reasons presented above, as well as the regime's stated motivations, a more immediate motivation was associated with the contested elections of Ethiopia's Zenawi regime in May 2005 and the subsequent crackdown on the opposition with serious human rights violations (US Department of State, 2006). This resulted in strong international criticism, particularly from the United States Congress which discussed in early 2006 the possibility of Ethiopia losing United States aid. By assuming the role of the regional power fighting the "war on terror" Prime Minister Meles Zenawi assumed an important role, which outweighed concerns over human rights. The Ethiopian regime would continue to receive aid and diplomatic support from the international community, including the United States (Aimé, 2013).

Two specific sources of external support require highlighting. One was the US's unequivocal support for the Ethiopian intervention, even if such support was not necessarily operational (Bruton, 2010; Scahill, 2011). In either case, it is considered that the Ethiopian offensive would have occurred, regardless of the US support and therefore could not be considered per se as a subcontract of the "war on terror" (Menkhaus, 2007). But although Ethiopia intervened regularly in Somalia to weaken Islamist militant groups or strengthen allies (Bradbury, 2008), the scale of the 2006 intervention was unprecedented.[20] Another source of support for the ICU was Eritrea, which supplied equipment and training and eventually 2,000 troops (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006), alt-

hough this was disputed. This support was justified solely by the enduring rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which started with the war they fought between 1998 and 2000.

When forced to retreat in December 2006, the ICU leadership stated that it would resort to guerrilla tactics, pledged alliance to Al-Qaeda (Scahill, 2011), and saw the second top figure in Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, call for a jihad against Ethiopia and the TFG (Warbrick and Yihdego, 2006). The ICU would disintegrate into different smaller factions, among them the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/ICU); the Al-Shabaab, which would join al-Qaeda in 2012, and the Harakat Ras Kambooni.

The intensity of the conflict from January 2007 onwards increased significantly. This time the conflict was mostly against the TFG and Ethiopian troops; in 2007 mainly by the ARS/ICU and was centred mainly in Mogadishu. The warfare was based on attacks on Ethiopian convoys, military installations, TFG buildings and vital infrastructure, through classical ambushes with AK-47s, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Some new tactics included suicide bombings, roadside bombs and targeted assassinations (Menkhaus, 2007).

The insurgency was not exclusively Islamic and brought together different groups in a movement that could better be characterised as a "complex insurgency" of clan militia and warlords. Only from 2008 onwards did the Islamic Al-Shabaab become the main insurgent force in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. By the end of 2008 Al-Shabaab had been able to retake most of southern Somalia, with its leadership concentrated on the southern coast and in the port city of Kismayo. By January 2010 insurgent groups were still in control of most of south-central Somalia (Dagne, 2010).

The foreign presence in Somalia, especially of Ethiopians and Americans, was the main contributing factor to the high conflict intensity during this period by increasing the capacity of the Al-Shabaab to recruit local and foreign jihadists. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was seen as an occupation reviving Somalian nationalism. At the same time, it was a source of serious human rights violations that were also perpetrated by the TFG and African Union (Bruton, 2010).[21] Furthermore, the United States was perceived as a supporter of the Ethiopian troops as it had launched missile attacks against ICU leaders in January 2007 that caused numerous civilian casualties (Menkhaus, 2007).

The replacement of Ethiopian troops was a political and military priority. In order to replace them, the African Union established the African Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) on January 19, 2007. The UN Security Council endorsed the AMISOM on February 21, 2007 with a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate (UN SC 1744) mainly to support the TFG. The mission began deployment of a planned 8,000 troops, but by the end of the year it had only 1,700 troops from Uganda and Burundi. Up to the beginning of 2010 the AMISOM would never reach more than about half of its authorised strength (4,300 troops by April 2009). The failure to attract the commitment of contributing countries was due mainly to the dangerous environment of operations and the lack of stable funding and capabilities (Williams, 2009).

The UN started mediation in May 2008, which led to the signing of the Djibouti Agreement between the TFG and ARS/ICU on August 19, 2008. The agreement stipulated a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. In January 2009 a faction of the ARS/ICU, the Djibouti branch, merged with the TFG to form a winning coalition in parliament that would elect Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate sufi and former ICU commander in chief, as president in January 2009 (Bruton, 2010).

Even though it had to rely exclusively on the poorly staffed AMISOM, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops occurred in January 2009. At the end of the intervention it is estimated that about 6,000 Ethiopian troops were still deployed; therefore, the intervention force totalled around 10,000 troops in 2009 (Aimé, 2013). To compensate for the Ethiopian troop withdrawal, the International Conference on Somalia held in Brussels in April 2009 decided to increase the reimbursement rate of the AMISON troops from US$550 to US$1028 per soldier per month, which significantly renewed the interest of countries contributing to the mission (Williams, 2009). Over the next years the deployment of troops would increase significantly, reaching 11,000 troops by 2011 and a full revised strength of 17,000 by 2012 (IPSS, 2012).

The intensity of conflict would increase in 2009 and 2010, between Al-Shabaab and the TFG and between Al-Shabaab and the moderate sufi group of Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, both of which were in Mogadishu and in the centre and south of Somalia. During this period the conflict was the most intense it had been since the overthrow of Barre's regime. At this stage the conflict had a religious configuration connected to clan

politics and raged alongside an international force attempting to establish a functioning government.

Since 2010 there have been two additional military interventions, both in late 2011. One was by Ethiopia and another by Kenya to help the TFG and the AMISOM defeat Al-Shabaab. Kenya intervened in the south along its border to protect its national interests (it would integrate its forces in the AMISOM in 2012), while Ethiopia intervened from the West (Wiklund, 2013). By 2013 a series of actors had gained control of central and south Somalia: the AMISOM directly controlled Mogadishu, the road to Baidoa and the southern border area with Kenya; the pro-government militia, supported by Ethiopia or directly by Ethiopian troops and local militia, controlled the interior border areas with Ethiopia; Islamist groups controlled the coastal and interior areas of central Somalia and part of the south; and a pro-government administration controlled the northern region bordering Puntland (see Figure 4.2).

Map 4.2 Political map of Somalia

Source: Wiklund (2013)

More generally, and according to Merkhaus (2007), this period was also a continuation of the Hawiye intra-clan conflict, with the UIC being an Islamic cover for a Hawiye sub-clan (the Haber Gedir Ayr) to fight the equally Hawiye sub-clan of the ARPCT. Nevertheless, the confrontation with the TFG was more of an inter-clan affair as the TFG was of the Darood clan, which was dominated mainly by the Mijerteen sub-clan.

4.5 Results

In Somalia a unique combination of factors has determined internal and external actors' conflict behaviour. Internal factors (even if they have external links) are the main divisive elements in inter- and intra-clan conflictive culture, which exists in tandem with warlordism. These actors often engage in opportunistic behaviour, shortsighted politics and zero-sum views, which result in an abundance of spoilers for peace building, state building and central authority projects.

This confluence of internal and external spoiler behaviours exist together with other structural factors such as environmental degradation (drought, erosion, deforestation), poverty, legacies of colonization and Cold-war geopolitics, demographic pressures, diaspora or the ethnic composition of the country. A divisive issue in the country is the control of resources (Dias, 2013), either renewable resources, mainly land and water, or control of the state and economy, particularly of the livestock trade, which is associated with the pastoralist culture.

Since 1991 more than a dozen peace processes have been tried as well as several military and economic interventions. The interveners have had very different motivations, influenced not only by conditions in the country (such as the humanitarian disaster of the late 1980s and early 1990s) but also by regional and international processes. Regional players such as Ethiopia and Egypt have been involved in proxy competition through Somalia. Eritrea's motivations are more connected with the conflict with Ethiopia. The IGAD, as an organisation with significant Ethiopian influence, was designed in an attempt to continue Ethiopia's policy, while the African Union was more distant, getting involved militarily but only with UN SC approval. The initial humanitarian motivation of the US changed into a concern for terrorism after 9/11. This meant that not all interventions were necessarily intended to reach any kind of

peace; instead, specific state and governance requirements underpinned the interventions, which had different effects on conflict intensity.

The effects of military interventions on conflict intensity depend on the nature of the conflict and the objectives of the intervention. Two main overarching periods can be identified in Somalia. During the first, from 1991 to 2006, the conflict was mainly of an inter- and intra-clan nature of lower intensity and with regional links; the second period occurred after 2006 when the conflict assumed a higher intensity because of its religious Islamic nature and associations people ascribed to it with the "global war on terror" (Hoehne, 2009).

Within this context the case study shows that neutral military interventions have the capacity to decrease conflict intensity, and they normally happen after a peace agreement is established. Partisan military interventions, intended to increase the capacity of one side, lead to an escalation of the conflict if both sides are being supported. The early 1990s interventions by the US and UN occurred in the context of a relative stalemate in the conflict and had humanitarian objectives; therefore, they left the political-military balance in the field untouched. Such missions were able to decrease conflict intensity. When the mission's mandate was changed in 1992 with potential effects on the balance of the parties' capabilities, it faced violent resistance and the intervener decided to withdraw.

The military intervention initiated in 2006 to support the TFG (which involved Ethiopia, Kenya and the AMISOM) aimed to alter the balance of capabilities in favour of the TFG. This support was counterbalanced by support for the Islamic groups (especially from Eritrea) and anti-intervention feelings from Somalis. The result was that no party was able to acquire an overwhelming capacity to defeat its opponents.

Diplomatic interventions, which are neutral, have been associated with lower conflict intensity, but have no causal effect if they are partisan. Neutral mediations throughout the conflict period have led to periods of decreased conflict intensity, although never full peace, due to the number of spoilers. Such was the case in the early 1990s and 1997. But if the mediations are partisan, in support of one side or another, they have no causal impact on conflict intensity, regardless of achieving peace agreements, such as between 1998 and 2003.

Contrary to expectations, there are three situations in which diplomatic interventions may lead to higher conflict intensity. The first is in determining which parties are entitled to be at the negotiation table. This had at least two manifestations: one in 1993 when clans were favoured for negotiations regarding civic and traditional authority, therefore setting incentives for eligibility on the side of militias. The other manifestation was in 2004 when parties competed for eligibility for admission to the negotiation table. A second situation refers to when an agreement is reached but is not all-inclusive and leaves out parties who then engaged in high-intensity fighting to signal their relevance. Such was the case in 1991, when the agreement was rendered void. A third situation is when negotiations fail and the parties become committed to a military solution, having exhausted a political settlement, as happened in 2006.

High-intensity conflict attracts more neutral interventions, such as military interventions with a humanitarian objective and diplomatic interventions, as in the early post-Cold War era. But in the post-September 11 "global war on terror" higher intensity conflict with radical Islamic group acquiring power led to partisan military interventions in support of the internationally recognised government. Diplomatic initiatives are associated with both higher and lower conflict intensity periods.

4.6 Conclusion

This study focuses on national peace processes but recognizes this as a limitation. Lowering the level of analysis to the micro level of regions' or villages' initiatives could enhance the explanatory power of interventions in conflict, especially regarding the effect of diplomatic initiatives not supported by external actors or the relevance of which peace plans are being discussed and how appropriate they are for dealing with the challenges Somalia faces (Bradbury, 2008).

The assumption that external interventions are mainly peace promoting can be traced back to the late 1990s when a framework was developed to protect people in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide – the responsibility to protect. In this paper interventions are to be justified not only when civilian populations are targeted, but also more broadly when conflict intensity has increased significantly. Military, economic and diplomatic interventions are tools actors use to influence the outcomes of conflict. Different types of interventions affect conflict intensi-

ty differently, and different objectives of the same type of intervention have different results. Partisan military interventions escalate conflict while neutral interventions have no significant effect. Partisan diplomatic interventions that support both sides have no effect on conflict intensity, but if they are neutral, they can be associated with lower conflict intensity. The motivations of the actors did not seem to be directly linked to conflict intensity, specifically after the middle of the 1990s. Overall, the assumption that interventions promote peace is rejected. Instead, the peace objective may compete with other objectives in a constellation of external and internal actors' motivations and initiatives.

Notes

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[2] It is relevant to highlight that it is not clear if "state collapse" precedes or is a consequence of warlordism and that warlords in Somalia are not necessarily clan based (Marchal, 2007).

[3] State collapse cannot be equated with criminality and armed conflict as areas of non-existent state authority have enjoyed peace and the rule of law at the same time that areas with state authority have been prone to conflict. This means the assumption is not that "state collapse" leads to conflict in Somalia, but that in the context of "state collapse" different types of conflict occur.

[4] The analysis focuses on central and south Somalia where most conflict occurred after 1991, and therefore Puntland or Somaliland is referred to only in connection with it.

[5] In the narrative only relevant diplomatic interventions are identified, even if Figure 2 identifies more interventions.

[6] The SNM did not recognize the Mogadishu government, and on May 18, 1991 declared the northwestern Somali regions independent as the republic of Somaliland. Ethiopia supported the SNM.

[7] In the south two rival warlords, General Siad "Morgan"and Colonel Omar Jess, fought for control of the important coastal city of Kismayo (Adebajo, 2011).

[8] The rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia can be attributed to each being a regional power and the competition between both countries over the Nile's water (Dehéz and Gebrewold, 2010), with Somalia constituting a counterweight to Ethiopian control of the Nile (Bradbury, 2008).

[9] See, for instance, Egypt's involvement in 2006 (UN, 2006), the same year of the Ethiopian military intervention.

[10] For instance, it involved: the forces of General Morgan, the forces of Omar Jess, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), the Somalia National Front (SNF) and the SNF faction of Mohamed Sheikh Ali Buraleh, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Digil Salvation Army (DSA), the Abdalleh-Agon-Yar sub-clan of the Abgal clan (Hawiye) and the Eli-Agon-Yar subclan of the Abgal clan (Hawiye) (Melanger and Sundberg, 2011).

[11] In August 1998, the northeastern Somali region of Puntland declared itself an autonomous state, with Abdullahi Yussuf as its president. Puntland status as an autonomous state was different from the un-recognised self-declared sovereign states of Somaliland.

[12] Egypt and Sudan expressed diplomatic support for the new government.

[13] The intra-clan conflict occurred within the Digl, Abgal, Habar Gidir and Mirifle clans while intra-faction conflict was present in the USC/SSA, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) and the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA). The inter-clan conflict involved the Sede clan of the Darod and a subclan of the Dir, the Digil and Mirifle clans and the Digil and Sede clans; the inter-faction conflict involved the JVA and forces of General Morgan. The cases involving the TFG were conflicts with the SRRC and ONLF while against civilians involved the RRA and the USC/SSA-Omar Mohamed Mohamud "Finish" (OMF) faction (Melanger and Sundberg, 2011).

[14] During this period there were three Somali-led peace processes not identified in the narrative due to their national nature: the Idale peace process (2004-2007), the Jijeele and Gaalje'el peace process (Hiran, 2007) and the Mudug-Galgadud peace process (2005-2007) (Johnson, 2009).

[15] Salafism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas demanding a return to traditional Islamic practices (Kepel, 2002), and jihadism refers to the struggle against those who do not believe in Islam.

[16] In 2005 a short lived civic movement emerged out of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) against the war-prone political elite in the city (Menkhaus, 2007).

[17] Puntland and Somaliland oppose the ICU.

[18] The "greater Somalia" project threat is an issue of contention among analysts, but UIC leader Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, in an interview on June 22, 2006, claimed Ogaden as a Somalia region (Norland, 2006).

[19] Throughout 2005 and 2006 Ethiopia proposed this mission to be executed through IGAD, but despite the backing of the AU, it failed to get the necessary regional and international support (Sousa, 2013).

[20] For instance, the intervention in Puntland in November 2001 was executed with a 1,000-strong contingent (Agence France-Press, 2001).

[21] For instance, the TFG was involved in indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighbourhoods and withholding food aid in the midst of famine (Menkhaus, 2007).

5 Effect of external interventions on conflict intensity

Abstract

External interventions in civil wars are a recurrent practice of the international community, executed through a series of mechanisms—most notably, military, economic or diplomatic interventions (with UN and non-UN missions being a combination of these). Studies of these interventions have focused on how effective they are in stopping civil war or maintaining peace. Despite the focus of these studies on high intensity conflicts, the effect these interventions have on conflict intensity is still unclear. Additionally studies have not appropriately controlled for the endogeneity of the relationship between interventions and conflict. Conflicts' characteristics attract interventions, and interventions influence conflict characteristics. Based on a model of the balance of the capabilities of the conflict parties, this paper explores levels of conflict-intensity and changes in conflict-intensity. It uses a new dataset on external interventions for Africa for the period between 1989 and 2010. The regression results, based on a zero-inflated negative binomial and logit models controlling for endogeneity, indicate that partisan, military and economic interventions increase conflict intensity whereas neutral and diplomatic interventions have no effect on conflict intensity. In fact, after controlling for endogeneity, successful or failed mediation is found to have no significant effect on conflict intensity. The conclusion is that more detailed research needs to be conducted to understand the unexpected effect of diplomacy and of interventions' objectives.

5.1 Introduction[1]

In recent decades, civil wars have become the most recurrent form of conflict, and most of them are characterized by the active involvement of foreign actors. These external interventions use military, economic or

diplomatic means and can be carried out by single states, coalitions or multilateral organisations, taking the form of more or less complex missions. One thing all interventions have in common is their intent to affect the conditions of the conflict.

Yet the objectives of external interventions have been questioned as they are more often than not occurring in months with high numbers of battle deaths. In Africa, 42 conflicts occurred between 1989 and 2010, with an average of 14 interventions per conflict. Months in which an intervention started had on average 6.1 more battle deaths than months without interventions; this positive ratio was observed across all types of interventions, with the extremes being military interventions with 7.6 and UN and non-UN missions with 0.75. Furthermore, the diplomatic initiatives, by definition intended to manage conflicts, were started in months with 4.5 more battle deaths then months without interventions. But the direction of causality is unclear, as external interventions can escalate conflict and more intense conflicts attract more external interventions

More than duration, which has been the object of analysis in other studies, this chapter investigates the effect that different types of external interventions have on conflict intensity and, in more detail, the effect of successful and failed diplomacy. This research is done through an econometric approach based on a new dataset on external interventions.

The chapter will first review the main findings from other researchers. It then proposes a theoretical framework based on the balance of capabilities of the conflict parties. The research design is then discussed. The design is divided between an analysis of the external interventions' effect on the conflict intensity's level and change, the latter providing a better control for endogeneity. The empirical results are then presented as well as the conclusion.

5.2 Previous research on external interventions

External interventions' effects on conflict are measured in terms of changes in conflict duration or intensity (Högbladh et al., 2011), but to date studies have mainly focused on the effect on duration. The ways external interventions affect conflict have been found to depend significantly on the targets and types of the intervention. Intervention targets can be biased and partisan, when in support of the government or opposition, or neutral, when not intended to change the balance of capabilities

of the parties. Intervention types can be grouped into military, economic, and diplomatic interventions as well as missions by the UN and other actors.

Previous studies on the targets of interventions have demonstrated that neutral interventions increase the duration of the conflict but biased interventions do not (Regan, 2002c; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) and can increase the chances of military victory by the supported group (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). If these bias interventions support the rebels, the interventions are bloodier than if in support of the government (Lemke and Regan, 2004). The result of no effect of bias interventions on duration has been questioned by findings that biased military support provided to the challenging group can shorten the conflict, but if provided to the government or if economic support is provided to either side, it does not have an effect on conflict duration (Collier et al., 2004).

In terms of the types of interventions, military or economic interventions have been found to increase the duration of conflict (Regan, 2002c; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000); this escalatory effect has been attributed to a sub-set of interventions, where interveners pursue an 'independent agenda' (Cunningham, 2010). The results for diplomatic interventions, normally considered neutral interventions, are more unequivocal. Diplomacy facilitates the termination of civil war (Regan et al., 2009), even when used in combination with other types of interventions (Regan and Aydin, 2006). Therefore, it has been concluded that the manipulation of information, as in negotiations by third parties, is a more effective tool for conflict management than the manipulation of fighting capabilities (Regan, 2010).

Recent research on periods of instability (and not necessarily only civil war)[2] confirms some of the results that military interventions increase the likelihood of a civil war onset (escalation of conflict) whereas economic and diplomatic interventions decrease the likelihood of civil war onset (Regan and Meachum, 2014). Although UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in the most difficult cases (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003), most studies indicate that they are effective in increasing the chances of peace and its duration (Fortna, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001) and more effective than non-UN peace operations (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007).

5.3 Theoretical framework

The balance of capabilities of the parties to the conflict play a decisive role in the outcome of the fight (Eldabawi and Sambanis, 2000). Parties opt for a military or political solution depending on the expected net benefit of the outcome of the conflict versus a settlement through negotiations (Wittman, 1979). External interventions affect the absolute or relative capabilities of parties by changing their expected payoffs of conflict determined by a cost-benefit analysis of fighting, risk preferences and estimations on the likelihood of victory or no-defeat (Regan, 1996, 2002a).

If one party acquires a significant fighting capacity vis-à-vis its opponents, its chances of a military victory will increase which in itself can increase the likelihood that opponents are more willing to negotiate. If fighting capabilities are more evenly distributed, chances are that the parties reach a military stalemate (Zartman, 2000). A military stalemate predisposes both parties to attempt a negotiated solution, in which case a set of other factors become more crucial for an agreement to be reached and for it to hold. Otherwise, if both parties overestimate their fighting capacity, the fighting will continue (Collier et al., 2004).

A broader conceptualisation of intervention would consider that it can be forcible or non-forcible (like economic coercion), direct or indirect (through the use of a proxy state), and open or clandestine (covert operations) as perpetrated by different actors (state and non-state) (Bull, 1984); it is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but breaks a conventional pattern of international relations (Vincent, 1974:13).

In the literature, researchers debate about the assumption that external interventions are primarily intended to lower conflict intensity or shorten the conflict period through a process of conflict management. Some scholars ascribe a conflict resolution intent to interventions (Regan, 1996, 2002a; Cunningham 2010), with a specific (moral) imperative of stopping the killing (Licklider, 1993, 2001; Hampson, 2001). The success of interventions is normally understood to be the capacity to de-escalate conflict, allowing for a diplomatic solution to be sought (Regan, 1996, 2002a, 2010). Altruistic motives are ascribed to interventions such as upholding human rights, stopping genocides, promoting democracy or a moral commitment of an intervening state. In this perspective, humanitarian considerations prevail—in terms of lowering conflict intensity—

not only as an end in itself, but also as a means for the negotiation process.

If peace takes precedence, interventions should support the stronger side in order for it to more quickly reach victory or force the signing of an agreement (Betts, 1994). The stronger side is often the government, especially in the early stages of the conflict. Some results confirm this dynamic as, dependent on the type of intervention, there can be an higher probability of ending the war if the intervention supports the government rather than the challenging forces (Regan, 2002a). But empirically this intervention pattern is not observed, as not all interventions support the government. In this dataset, covering Africa from 1989 to 2010, 139 interventions support the government and 60 support the opposition, with 377 being neutral (of these 102, 40 and 19 are military, respectively).

Third parties' motivations are normally exogenous to conflict (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008, Mullenbach, 2005; Suhrke and Noble, 1977) to the point that, when the parties are still pursuing the military option, a partial intervention is considered mandatory in the context of peace enforcement (Betts, 1994). In particular, Cunningham (2010) found that, when military state interventions have independent agendas, they prolong the conflict duration to the extent of offsetting possible benefits from external intervention peace objectives. This could be explained by the fact that interventions are costly and third parties do not intervene randomly, but choose the cases where they have the greatest marginal effect in getting a preferred outcome. These mainly occur in the 'toughest' cases—namely, when there are strong rebel groups capable of overcoming the government. In such a situation, support for either the government or the rebel group will have the greatest return to interveners versus a non-intervention (Gent, 2008).

Therefore interventions can be self-centred, such as being motivated by territorial acquisition; regional stability; protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic or military interests; ideology; specific international politics and superpower rivalry; domestic and organisational politics; and cultural affinities between the peoples in the target countries and intervening countries (Regan, 1996, 2002a, 2010).

The de-escalation of the conflict should be seen not as an end in itself to the intervention, but as a possible means for other ends. In this case, not all peace solutions are desirable by interveners, and interveners will seek to achieve their preferred peace solution, eventually through force-

ful processes. The escalation of the conflict can be part of a coercive intervention strategy to bring the parties to negotiations or reach an agreement (Schelling, 1960).

In practice, interventions can have a multitude of motivations, including multi-actor, overlapping, possibly conflictual or changing, and eventually illusive. Regan (1996) identified additional challenges—namely, in terms of determining links among a particular intervention, a conflict and the outcome of the fighting. These challenges pose serious operationalization problems if one is to quantify in a dataset the intention of interventions in a conflict.[3]

This analysis did not overcome this challenge, but rather considers interventions to be carried out to stop the fighting on terms favourable to the intervener, which can mean an escalation, de-escalation or continuation of the conflict intensity. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the effects of interventions measured in terms of conflict intensity and not on the success of interventions. This means that an intervention that escalates or prolongs the conflict is not unsuccessful as it is not possible to determine what the objectives are. Instead, the understanding is that different interventions affect conflict intensity (and duration) differently, and we have a case of omitted variable bias in intentions which may be a source of spurious correlation.[4]

Although it is not possible to identify intent, interveners make specific intervention choices. A combination of target, if biased or neutral, and types of interventions, if military, economic, diplomatic or missions and the option made, will reflect interveners' objectives in specific civil war contexts and can have a decisive influence on the civil war (Rosenau, 1964).

Biased partisan interventions aim to achieve victory for one side regardless of conflict escalation or duration whereas neutral interventions' objective is to de-escalate or solve the actual conflict (Högbladh et al., 2011). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) made a similar distinction between unilateral partisan interventions (by one or more parties) in favour of either the government or opposition and 'external agency' intervention which are 'multilateral and essentially neutral', aimed at impartial resolution of conflicts (e.g., peacekeeping and peacemaking). This conflict management intent is normally ascribed to the case of mediation, closer to an objective of peace promotion (Regan, 2002b).

Within this framework, biased partisan interventions can boost the capacity of belligerents while fighting (Regan, 1996), and neutral interventions can facilitate negotiation processes (Zartman, 1993) or have a key role in securing the implementation of an agreement (Walter, 2002).

Although war endures biases, partisan interventions can directly increase the fighting capabilities of the parties, such as through the provision of troops or other military equipment. These interventions can also aim to curtail such capabilities, such as through military sanctions. By either boosting or curtailing the military capacity of parties, the interventions affect the balance of capabilities leading to an increase of military action to materialize the advantage.

If a negotiation process is ongoing, a neutral intervention can facilitate the process, such as through the efforts of international mediation teams in brokering information between the parties. These efforts can significantly increase the capacity of parties in dealing with the political process and find more agreeable solutions. In such cases, the intervention would alter the utility function of the parties by at least making a settlement more attainable, thereby increasing the likelihood of the benefits of an agreement vis-à-vis the costs in continuing fighting. If an agreement is reached, neutral interventions can guarantee its implementation, such as through the establishment of a third-party peacekeeping mission. This significantly reduces the risk function that a fighting party might have of being betrayed during the implementation of the agreement.

Neutral interventions affect the balance of capabilities in the sense that they increase the benefits of settling by signalling the existence of potential neutral third parties to mediate, monitor and implement a peace process. In contrast, biased partisan interventions affect the balance of capabilities, either by giving an advantage to one party or, if there are countering interventions (interventions in support of both sides), by raising the level of capabilities of both parties to a new level.

This is a model of the effect of intervention on fighting capacity, and indirectly on conflict related fatalities and not a model of the interaction between intervener and civil war protagonists. This is modelled in terms of the utility of fighting for the government and challenging groups where the expected utility in terms of the payoffs from fighting is the

proxy for conflict intensity: higher expected utility increases conflict intensity and lower expected utility decreases conflict intensity. Such an expectation occurs even if parties who have higher utility might not fight or the fight might not produce deaths, and parties without the expected utility, for instance without external support, might fight harder with their own resources (more on this processes in the zero-inflated negative model specification). The model is silent on the motivations of the intervener focusing on the changes to payoffs to the fighting parties

In the model, government is represented by 1 and rebels by 2. The expected utility of fighting for the government is:

$$\prod \left(\frac{\alpha\, F_1}{F_1 + F_2}\right) R_1 + Z_1 - C\,(F_1) \qquad (1)$$

$\prod$ − probability of victory

F_1 − fighting by government

F_2 − fighting by rebels

α − military effectiveness parameter for government

β − military effectiveness parameter for rebels

R_1 − pecuniary value from victory

Z_1 − other non − conflict − related income

C − cost of fighting

R_2, Z_2 and $C\,(F_2)$ are similar for rebels.

The expected utility of fighting for rebels is:

$$\prod \left(\frac{\beta\, F_2}{F_1 + F_2}\right) R_2 + Z_2 - C\,(F_2) \qquad (2)$$

For simplicity, the denominator in the Tullock contest function $\left(\frac{1}{F_1 + F_2}\right)$ is treated as a constant.

Strategic variables for the two sides are F_1 and F_2.

For the government, one maximizes function (1) with respect to F_1:

$$\prod_{F_1} R_1 - C_{F_1} = 0 \qquad (3)$$

where $\frac{\delta\Pi}{\delta_{F_1}} = \prod_{F_1} > 0; \prod_{F_{11}} < 0$ and $\frac{\delta_C}{\delta_{F_1}} = C_{F_1} > 0; C_{F_{11}} > 0.$

Note that the probability of victory rises with fighting effort, but at diminishing rates, such that the second derivative is negative.

For the rebels, from (2):

$$\prod_{F_2} R_2 - C_{F_2} = 0 \qquad (4)$$

where the partial derivatives have similar signs as after (3).

To obtain the reaction functions in F_1 and F_2, derivatives of (3) and (4) with respect to F_1 and F_2 are used.

Note that by symmetry, $\prod_{F_{12}} = \prod_{F_{21}} > 0$.

From (3) we have:

$$\prod_{F_{11}} R_1 \ dF_1 - C_{F_{11}} \ dF_1 + \prod_{F_{12}} R_1 \ dF_2 = 0$$

or

$$\left(\frac{dF_2}{d_{\frac{F_1}{R_1}}}\right) = \left(\frac{\prod_{F_{11}} R_1 - C_{F_{11}}}{-\prod_{F_{12}} R_1}\right) > 0 \qquad (5)$$

From (4) we have:

$$\prod_{F_{22}} R_2 \ dF_2 - C_{F_{22}} \ dF_2 + \prod_{F_{21}} R_2 \ dF_2 = 0$$

or

$$\left(\frac{dF_2}{d_{\frac{F_1}{R_2}}}\right) = \left(\frac{-\prod_{F_{21}} R_2}{\prod_{F_{22}} R_2 - C_{F_{22}}}\right) > 0 \qquad (6)$$

where (5) is steeper than (6) with a Nash equilibrium at intersection A (see Figure 5.1 for the reaction function of F_1 and F_2).

Figure 5.1 - Reaction functions of fighting by the government and rebels



Changes in exogenous parameters of external intervention can shift the reaction functions. A rightward shift in F_1 shows more fighting by government for each F_2, and an upward shift in F_2 shows more fighting by rebels for each F_1. The converse applies to leftward and downward shifts.

Biased partisan interventions only shift one reaction function, with countering interventions shifting each party function in turn. Neutral interventions both shift in the same direction.

A military intervention supporting only the government, as with military aid, lowers the cost of fighting the government, and F_1 moves to the right. Bombing, if by both sides, can first increase fighting capacity to both, F_1 shifts right and F_2 up; however, as a result the bombing can also reduce both sides' capabilities: F_1 shifts left and F_2 down.

Economic aid lowers the costs of fighting (to both sides or to the government), leading to more fighting; the partisan shifts only one while neutral shifts both.

Diplomacy raises Z_1 and Z_2 through the income accrued for the parties in the negotiations or lowers α and β. When parties use the negotiations period to build up their capacity, then α and β increase.

The above analysis is static. The dynamic effect of an intervention, L, over time (t) in months will be:

$$L_t = \begin{cases} 1, & t > 0 \wedge t \leq 12 \\ 2, & t > 12 \wedge t \leq 24 \\ 0, & t > 24 \end{cases}$$

The effects are cumulative and it is proposed that interventions' effects are short lived in contrast with other studies specifications. Collier et al.'s (2004) specification considers a permanent and cumulative effect and Regan and Aydin's (2006) specification of a non-cumulative effect with a declining utility over time. The main difference of these two specifications is that, in this paper, interventions have a temporal effect on conflict intensity but then the changes in capacities are absorbed into the conflict dynamics and the intervention ceases to have a direct effect on conflict intensity. The two alternative specifications consider the effect to be permanent until the end of the conflict (even if declining in one of them).[5] The rationale for our specification is that unless interventions are constantly renewed and redoubled, they cannot have lasting effects beyond a certain period—in this case, proposed to be two years. For instance, economic aid has an effect with an impact that wanes unless aid is continued. Military support (e.g., with equipment) similarly wanes, even if the equipment continues to serve the fighting, the reason being that changes in expected utility are progressively incorporated into a new equilibrium.

The driving property that determines interventions' effects on conflict intensity is therefore the target, if biased/partisan or neutral, and the utility of fighting is considered a direct proxy for the conflict-intensity measure in battle deaths.

The two main hypotheses proposed are:

H1: Partisan interventions increase conflict intensity

H2: Neutral interventions decrease conflict intensity

In addition, each type of intervention occurs normally, but not necessarily with a certain target: Military and economic are normally partisan and diplomatic, and missions are normally neutral.[6] Most cases of military interventions, like troops, equipment or air support, are provided in support of one of the parties, although in some cases they can be neutral, such as with the deployment of troops to supervise a ceasefire or control a buffer zone. Similarly, most economic support is directed to one of the parties but can be provided to both. The most recurrent type of diplomatic initiatives, mediation, is by definition neutral as it is defined as initiatives for the settlement of the dispute 'without resort to physical violence' (Bercovitch et al., 1991: 8). In addition, with this type there can be partisan diplomatic initiatives, as with political sanctions that target only one side of the conflict. For UN missions, one would expect them to be associated with less conflict intensity, as UN interventions are rarely of peace enforcement and consistently follow a peace agreement. Non-UN missions are different from UN missions in their nature as they do not require the existence of a peace agreement but are nevertheless mostly done by sub-regional or regional multilateral institutions that have a broader legitimacy than unilateral state-based interventions. For this reason, the non-UN missions are expected to equally lead to less conflict intensity.

Considering these patterns per type of intervention, five additional hypotheses are tested:

H3: Military interventions increase conflict intensity.

H4: Economic interventions increase conflict intensity.

H5: Diplomatic interventions decrease conflict intensity.

H6: UN missions decrease conflict intensity.

H7: Non-UN missions decrease conflict intensity.

Based on the theoretical model and case study, diplomacy—or, more precisely, mediation—can lead to increased fighting under some circumstances: directly when mediation periods are used by the parties to build up the fighting capacity and indirectly when mediation initiatives break down and the parties realize the only solution for the conflict is military and thus fighting resumes with increased intensity. This increased utility of fighting does not have to be, although it can be, supported externally as the parties might resort to their own resources for it. Thus, an additional hypothesis is that:

H8: Failed mediation increases conflict intensity.

Before presenting the research design, it is important to clarify the conceptualization for the possible patterns of conflict phase and interventions. Some studies represent conflict along a continuum of phases, such as from a pre-crisis to crisis, severe crisis and war, and post-crisis, with different initiatives of third parties in each phase (Ryan, 1998). Although some general trends can be found along these dimensions, this theoretical design considers instead the possibility for a multitude of intervention types and intentions that occur in tandem matched by equally diverse utility functions of the conflicting parties, creating a scenario where several concurrent effects occur. In some cases, fighting persists while negotiations are ongoing, whether by parties not considered in the negotiations, by parties involved in the process but attempting to improve their negotiation position, or as a result of a diversity of positions within a party. For example, in the case of Angola, the 1989 Gbadolite Accords were frustrated not only by the shortcomings of the agreement, but by the government's (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA]) unsuccessful attempt in winning over the rebel side (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola[UNITA]) in the 1990 Zebra military operation (Sousa, 2011a). The peace process that culminated in the more successful Bicesse peace accords of 1991 was possible because of the military stalemate that resulted from the failure of Operation Zebra but also by the progressive disempowerment of the

war-prone party wing of the MPLA (Sousa, 2009). In other cases, negotiations are the only mechanisms used by the parties to serve specific interests, such as a tactic to gain time or circumvent sanctions, but where there is little propensity for the party to cease the armed struggle. Such was the case of the unsuccessful 1994 Lusaka accords in Angola, which only occurred in the context of military losses and sanctions to the UNITA (Stedman, 1997). Once agreements are reached through negotiations, even if they can be genuine attempts to bring all stakeholders into an agreement, there are a series of conditions which need to be meet for the agreement to hold. When such is not the case, parties can denounce the agreement or splitting factions might continue to fight, as evidenced by the international efforts in the 1992 elections in Angola, which were insufficient in size and capacity, to secure the implementation of the peace agreement (Hodges, 2001).

The next section presents the research design with the econometric approach and dataset.

5.4 Research design

5.4.1 Econometric approach

There are four main limitations of the current research which this study attempts to address: the reliance on categorical outcome variables instead of count data, overlooked periods of low intensity conflict, improved controls for endogeneity and the lack of recent and comprehensive data on interventions.

The studies on the relationship between interventions and conflict have focused mainly on the duration of conflict as the dependent variable. Normally the success of interventions is determined by an outcome variable that identifies whether the conflict stopped or not, normally operationalized by a threshold of 200 or 999 battle deaths per year. This procedure provides little information on the exact effect that interventions have on escalating conflict, particularly for the escalation above the threshold and for low intensity conflict.

Based on recently available event data on conflict, it is possible to build a monthly account of battle deaths and, in this way, measure the actual effects of interventions along the full range of conflict intensity with at least one battle death.

The relationship between interventions and conflict intensity or duration is endogenous. Interventions affect conflict intensity, and conflict intensity affects the patterns and modes of interventions. This effect of conflict on interventions has been identified in several studies. In Holl (1993), third parties are more likely to be involved in the termination stage of the conflict motivated by an interest in acquiring political leverage.[7] With mediation (a form of diplomatic interventions), it is more likely to occur in longer and more intense wars (Karl DeRouen et al., 2011).

Specifically, given the effect that conflict intensity has on military interventions, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) considered that interventions are more likely in bloodier wars, and Regan (2002a) found that interventions are more likely to end the war when the conflict is more intense but interventions are less likely to occur. In addition, third-party interventions make a negotiated settlement less likely unless the civil war last for a long duration (Mason et al., 1999) and war duration, intensity and the military balance have been found to be determinants in the initiation of negotiations (Walter, 2002).

This study addresses endogeneity by analysing the level of conflict intensity and change in conflict intensity. The model of conflict-intensity level includes the count of battle deaths as the outcome variable controlling for endogeneity through a lagged variable of conflict-intensity level on the right-hand side of the equation. Because the outcome variable has an over-representation of zeroes (3808 zeroes corresponding to 66% of entries) and is over-dispersed with a variance greater than the mean, a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression is used in the analysis. However, this estimation is considered insufficient for dealing with endogeneity, and it is complemented with an analysis of change.

The model of conflict intensity changes regresses the monthly change in intensity on the change of the independent variables. The variable of the monthly change is based on the changes in the monthly count of battle deaths which, due to having a normal distribution, is transformed into three dummy variables of change: one for positive change (escalation of conflict), one for negative change (de-escalation of conflict), and one for no change (no escalation or de-escalation). As the outcome variable is a dummy, the model is regressed with a logit estimator.

For a robustness check of the outcome variable, the main model on conflict-intensity level was regressed with an ordered logit on a categorical variable of the conflict-intensity level.[8] The analysis is based on a new

broad dataset that covers the period from 1989 to 2010 for Africa and includes detailed information on a series of interventions that can have effects on conflict intensity, including UN and non-UN missions. A detailed presentation of the dataset is provided in Chapter 3.

5.4.2 Dataset

The unit of analysis of the study is interventions in conflicts (civil wars) in a month. Conflicts are defined as a contested incompatibility for the government or territory through armed force between two parties, where at least one party is the government of a state and which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Although other forms of conflict exist, such as communal violence or one-sided violence, the analysis is restricted to state-based violence as it is the one that attracts the most interventions. The dataset includes 42 conflicts in 30 countries.

The dataset starts the period of each conflict from the date of the first battle death, which significantly enlarges the conflict timeline to periods where there was very low intensity of conflict (fewer than 25 battle deaths). This minimizes the potential problem of a selection bias where the analysis only looks at interventions that occur in countries where the state authority has already been significantly challenged as evidenced by higher conflict intensity. Instead, the analysis covers the full spectrum of battle deaths, from the first to the highest recorded monthly values. The dataset includes 5582 conflict months corresponding to 5787 entries.

The two main outcome variables are the count of monthly battle deaths (int_m) and the monthly change of this count transformed into the dummy for positive change (increased intensity), negative change (decreased intensity) and no change (same intensity). All variables are based on UCDP's Georeferenced Dataset (GED) v1.5-2011 database (Melander and Sundberg, 2013).

The definition of external interventions is adapted from Regan et al. (2009) and Rosenau (1968), where external interventions are convention-breaking political, economic or military (including UN and non-UN missions) actions in a country targeting the authority structures of the country (in support of the government, opposition or neutral) in order to influence the balance of power between the parties or have an effect on the conflict process. According to the definition, the intervener can be a

state or non-state party, but must be foreign to the country. 'Convention breaking' refers to a significant change in the normal course in which relations between the countries were being held. Such changes should be temporary (so as not to become the convention) and 'profound and enduring' in the target society (Rosenau, 1971: 357). This new form is different from influence, which is a normal characteristic of international relations between states. The other criterion, 'authority target', means that interventions are political in nature and should aim at the 'identity of those who make the decisions that are binding for the entire society and/or processes through which such decisions are made' (Rosenau, 1971: 359), regardless of the attempt to overthrow or uphold such authority. The fact that the intervention occurs within a conflict period automatically meets the convention breaking or exceptionality criteria. The main adaptation in this definition is the inclusion of neutral interventions, as they can crystalize conflict conditions or enable agreements that change the conflict dynamics. In this way, they affect the balance of capabilities.

The interventions data are based on a dataset developed by the author (see Chapter 3 for a presentation of the dataset). Interventions are coded for the date of initiation, and there are as many intervention entries in one month as the number of interventions. Thus, the dataset is a cross-section of country-conflicts but without a real-time dimension, even if the entries are per month. This creates specific limitations on the estimation techniques that can be used and is justified by the possibility to have more information on the theoretical variables of interest.[9]

As Table 5.1 indicates, 576 interventions are distributed between targets and types of interventions.[10]

Table 5.1 Intervention types and targets

Intervention	Partisan	Neutral	Total
Military	142	19	161
Economic	40	12	52
Diplomatic	10	295	305
UN mission	1	31	32
Non-UN mission	6	20	26
Total	**199**	**377**	**576**

These interventions have been coded in their month of start in the dataset, and then the lagged effect is applied. The effect is cumulative and lagged with a value of 1 for the first 12 months and a value of 2 for the second 12 months (with the exception of the sub-type of military intervention air support which has a value of 2 only in the month it occurs). For descriptive statistics of conflict intensity and intervention variables, see Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Summary of statistics of conflict intensity and interventions

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Count of battle deaths (int_m)	63.61	392.66	0	14100
Increased intensity	0.22	0.41	0	1
Decreased intensity	0.20	0.40	0	1
Same intensity	0.58	0.49	0	1
Neutral intervention	2.44	5.13	0	47
Partisan intervention	1.40	3.82	0	43
Military intervention	1.10	3.02	0	40
Economic intervention	0.36	1.11	0	10
Diplomatic intervention	2.03	4.34	0	45
UN missions	0.19	0.60	0	6
Non-UN missions	0.15	0.54	0	4

A robustness check of the specification of interventions was made using Collier et al.'s (2004) and Regan and Aydin's (2006) specifications.

The main conflict intensity level model is specified as:

$$Conflict\ intensity_{it} = a_{1i} + I_{it}b_2 + C_{wit}b_w + d_{it}month_t + e_{it} \quad (7)$$

Conflict intensity is the count of battle deaths per month, where I_{it} is the effect of the interventions (growing but limited in time and cumulative). A vector of w control variables C_{it} relevant to either conflict or interventions is identified. First, previous levels of conflict intensity allow for the reduction of endogeneity; this is controlled with a categorical var-

iable of intensity with the same categories as identified in footnote 7 (int_yrleveln1). Second, the size of the country's population might have an effect on the number of battle deaths and is controlled for with a natural log of the population (lnpop). Third, the measure of wealth is controlled for with the purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita of the previous year (income_pc_n1). Fourth, one controls for the level of democracy in the country with the polity score converted to a 0 to 20 scale (polity). Fifth, the existence of natural resources in the form of oil or gas is controlled for with a dummy variable (oil_gas_on_off). Both oil and democracy have been found to be associated with conflict in other studies and can equally be linked to the likelihood of interventions. A sixth variable controls for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), with a natural log of ODA (lnoda). This is the foreign action most similar to an external intervention. A conflict-specific time trend starting from the initiation of the conflict $(d_{it} month_t)$ is included to account for the temporal dependence (time_m). Country fixed effects (a_i) capture time-invariant country characteristics. The term (e_{it}) is a disturbance term.

The change of conflict model is similar to the level of conflict model, but with the change factor—namely:

$$Conflict\ change_{it} = a_{1i} + \Delta I_{it} b_2 + \Delta C_{wit} b_w + d_{it} month_t + e_{it} \quad (8)$$

where the change of each variable is the difference between month t-1 and t. The outcome variable is the dummy for positive, negative or no change in battle deaths between months. For the country variables with yearly data, the overall change is attributed to each month of the year.

Finally, the hypothesis that failed mediation increases conflict intensity is modelled separately. The full treatment of this hypothesis would require a different unit of analysis, such as mediation processes, which would entail a new dataset. Instead, within the existing dataset, it is possible to address this question through the use of interaction variables. The mediations (a sub-type of diplomatic interventions) interact with the proxy for success and failure of mediation.

The UCDP Peace Agreement (PA) (Harbom et al., 2006) dataset provides information on all peace agreements, identifying whether the peace

agreement ended. The period after the end of the peace agreement can constitute a proxy for a time of failed diplomacy (failed mediation). Twelve months is considered long enough to allow for military repercussions to be planned and executed, but not too distant from the point where events become detached from the moment the agreement failed.

The UCDP PA dataset offers more options to proxy for the success of mediation than failure. At the same time, it is reasonable to state that if failed mediation escalates conflict, successful mediation de-escalates conflict intensity, even if one is not a logical deduction of the other. In this way, three proxies for success of mediation were developed. One refers to whether mediation occurs in the aftermath of signing a peace agreement (mediation with a peace agreement). This variable is further disaggregated into three levels of success: signing a peace agreement process, a partial peace agreement and a full peace agreement. Because a peace agreement is a long process, its effect is considered felt within 24 months of its signing. Another proxy of success is for mediation in the aftermath of peace agreements with a ceasefire provision, which should have a direct effect on conflict intensity (mediation with ceasefire). Signing a ceasefire agreement is expected to have a quicker effect within a 12-month timeframe. The other proxy for success is that mediation occurs while a peace agreement is holding, which has a time effect from the signing of the agreement until its end (mediation within the peace agreement period). The interaction variable assumes the value of the mediation variable during the period of the effects of the proxies. Descriptive statistics of the interaction variables are presented in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of failed and successful mediation proxies

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Mediations with ceasefire	0.585623	2.360023	0	23
Any type of peace agreement	1.03888	3.056396	0	24
Mediations with peace process agreement	0.122862	1.003592	0	19
Mediations with partial peace agreement	0.546224	2.254863	0	24
Mediations with full peace agreement	0.369794	1.96955	0	23
Mediations within peace agreement period	0.747883	2.578098	0	24
Mediations with failed agreement	0.272853	1.6929	0	21

Because mediation is mainly neutral (with 247 neutral interventions and one intervention in support of the government), analysing mediation is synonymous with analysing neutral mediations.

The model estimations are similar to those previously specified for conflict-intensity level and change—namely:

$$\text{Conflict intensity}_{it} = a_{1i} + M_{it}b_2 + I_{it}b_3 + C_{wit}b_{it} + d_{it}\text{month}_t + e_{it} \quad (9)$$

$$\text{Conflict change}_{it} = a_{1i} + \Delta M_{it}b_2 + \Delta I_{it}b_3 + \Delta C_{it}b_{it} + d_{it}\text{month}_t + e_{it} \quad (10)$$

The difference is that the interaction variable of success or failure of mediations (M_{it}) controls for other intervention types and other subtypes of diplomatic interventions besides mediation (I_{it}). The results will be presented in the next section in the same order: first the conflict-intensity level, then conflict-intensity change, and then the failed diplomacy, with an analysis of the level and change of conflict intensity.

5.5 Empirical analysis

The way for using the ZINB estimation to deal with the excess zeroes is to model two different processes, one dealing with the zeroes and another for the count, with the underlying assumption that there are two distinct processes. The first process is used when there is no intent to fight, and the second process is used when there is intent to fight. The first process is considered 'certain' zero as, with no fight, there is no battle death regardless of other factors. In the second process, the intent to fight can be enhanced by other factors, but is not enough to produce battle deaths; thus, one also needs to fight, resulting in battle deaths. Therefore, in the second process, there is a propensity for battle deaths if certain conditions are meet.

The first process is modelled with an outcome variable of 1 for a certainty of zero battle deaths in the month and 0 otherwise (identified as inflate in the tables); it is estimated with a logit regression. In this case, a

negative sign in the coefficient of the independent variable indicates a decreased likelihood of a certain zero, thereby resulting in an escalation of the conflict. A positive sign in the coefficient indicates either a non-escalation or a de-escalation of the conflict. The second process is modelled with an outcome variable of the count of battle deaths (identified with int_m in the tables) and is estimated using a Negative Binomial Regression. In this case, the reading of the coefficients is more straightforward with a positive coefficient, meaning escalation of the conflict and a negative coefficient a de-escalation of the conflict. The results are presented in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) of intervention targets and types on conflict intensity level

VARIABLES	(1) int_m	(2) Inflate	(3) int_m	(4) inflate
Neutral interventions	-0.0432***	-0.000613		
	(0.00877)	(0.00910)		
Partisan interventions	0.0215**	-0.0939***		
	(0.00879)	(0.0141)		
Military interventions			0.0203*	-0.110***
			(0.0119)	(0.0190)
Economic interventions			0.0495*	-0.0720*
			(0.0274)	(0.0434)
Diplomatic interventions			-0.0410***	0.0101
			(0.0111)	(0.0126)
UN missions			-0.187**	0.0331
			(0.0811)	(0.0783)
Non-UN missions			-0.0616	0.0204
			(0.0798)	(0.0951)
int_yr_leveln1	0.266***	-0.787***	0.254***	-0.797***
	(0.0554)	(0.0477)	(0.0556)	(0.0481)
lnpop	-4.848***	-0.219	-5.026***	-0.165
	(0.510)	(0.462)	(0.518)	(0.472)
income_pc_n1	-0.000740***	-5.15e-05	-0.000759***	-4.30e-05
	(0.000155)	(0.000176)	(0.000158)	(0.000176)
Polity	-0.0513***	0.0321**	-0.0489***	0.0341**
	(0.0150)	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)
oil_gas_on_off	1.002***	-0.849*	1.050***	-0.918*
	(0.366)	(0.501)	(0.364)	(0.478)
lnoda	0.0486	0.0557	0.0844	0.0849
	(0.0959)	(0.0829)	(0.103)	(0.0860)
time_m	0.00521***	-0.00267***	0.00571***	-0.00277***
	(0.000884)	(0.000815)	(0.000896)	(0.000829)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

VARIABLES	(1) int_m	(2) Inflate	(3) int_m	(4) inflate
lnalpha	0.721***		0.722***	
	(0.0425)		(0.0430)	
Observations	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: lnalpha is the natural log of the dispersion parameter alpha. A significant value identifies that the Negative Binomial is justified instead of a Poisson model.

The results for target and types are very consistent considering the overlap of the two.[11] Partisan interventions and military and economic interventions increase conflict intensity by both decreasing the likelihood of having a zero battle death month and increasing the intensity in months with a propensity for battle deaths (all models).

Neutral interventions and diplomatic interventions de-escalate conflict only in the months with a propensity to battle deaths (Models 1 and 3) and with no significant effect in the month without a propensity for battle deaths (Models 2 and 4). The lack of significance in the inflated model could be justified by some findings that mediation (the main diplomatic initiative) occurs in the later and more intense periods of the conflict.[12]

UN missions have a de-escalating effect in months with a propensity for battle deaths (Model 3). This is an expected effect considering the success ascribed to the UN and that most missions occur once a peace agreement has been signed. Non-UN missions have no significant effect on conflict intensity in either model, falling short from the theorized effect of de-escalating conflict. This could be due to the identified smaller capacity of non-UN missions in comparison to the UN, making them less effective, or by the different nature of the mandates.

The results of the control variables are consistent across the models.

The measure of the last year's conflict intensity is significantly and positively associated with conflict intensity in the current month. This is expected as the history of conflict affects current levels of conflict, which can be happening through different channels, such as due to accumulated hatred, war capital (such as with equipment and fighters) or the maintenance of a war economy.

Contrary to expectations, a larger population has a de-escalation effect on conflict intensity in the months with a propensity for battle deaths. Intuitively, one would expect that a greater population would mean more deaths. One explanation for this result could be the specification of using solely state-based battle-related deaths. This means that only deaths directly related to combat between warring parties are counted and that one-sided violence against civilians, communal violence or other indirect civilian deaths are not considered. Therefore, the battle death measure will only be connected to the population size as a function of the recruitment capacity of fighting groups, which is in itself dependent on other factors.

The wealth of the country in the previous year is negatively associated with conflict intensity in the current month, meaning that richer countries have fewer battle deaths. This is an expected result found in other studies where two main mechanisms have been identified. The wealth of the country determines the opportunity costs for would-be rebels, making it more or less difficult to recruit. Therefore, even if there is an opportunity for conflict, the costs to mount a rebellion are increased (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009). The other mechanism is that the wealth of the country is also representative of state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). If the state is wealthier, therefore stronger, it can mean less conflict due to its capacity to crash the rebellion or, because the dataset is limited to the cases when a conflict occurs, it can mean the conflict results in low intensity guerrilla strategies in peripheral locations (Human Security Research Group, 2012).

Democracy de-escalates conflict intensity, by both increasing the likelihood of zero battle death months and de-escalating intensity in months with a propensity for battle deaths. This is an expected result as the intensity of conflict in democracies has been found lower even if the conflicts last longer (Gleditsch et al., 2009), and more democratic countries prior to the initiation of the conflict have a higher probability that the negotiated peace settlements will endure (Hartzell et al., 2001).

The existence of oil and gas increase the intensity of conflict in months both with and without a propensity for battle deaths, which is in line with the results of other studies of the ‘greed and grievance’, either for the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) or for lower level armed conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).

The level of ODA is not significantly associated with the level of conflict in both models. In this case, a reverse relationship with conflict intensity would be expected, as the levels of ODA would decline in the cases where there is an open war with a high number of battle deaths. It could be that the decline of the budget of the main ODA programmes, which target sustainable, long-term and poverty-reducing initiatives, is slightly compensated by the programme on humanitarian assistance (which is a smaller portion of the main programmes), making the coefficient non-significant. The conflict specific time trend is significant where longer conflicts are more intense. Longer conflicts are less likely to have months with zero battle deaths while simultaneously having more battle deaths in the months with a propensity for battle deaths.

These results confirm the previous findings in the literature and the propositions of the theoretical model. They are robust to an estimation with an ordered logit on the categorical transformation of the outcome variable, but are sensitive to the specification of the external interventions. Indeed, Regan and Aydin's (2006) and Collier et al.'s (2004) specification produce distinct results (see appendice 3 for a detailed presentation of the results).

The model leaves two issues to solve. One is that the estimation does not control enough for endogeneity, the effect of interventions on conflict intensity and vice versa; the other is that the results for partisan, military and economic interventions with the ZINB are more robust (both inflated and negative binomial estimations have significant values in the expected direction) than the results for neutral and diplomacy (which is only significant in the negative binomial estimation). We will first address the issue of endogeneity and then further investigate neutral diplomacy.

As presented in Equation (8), a model of change is used with three dummy outcome variables for positive, negative and no change in the monthly count of battle deaths which are regressed with a logit estimator. The results are presented in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Logit estimation of changes of intervention targets and types on conflict intensity change

VARIABLES	(1) Positive	(2) Positive	(3) Negative	(4) Negative	(5) No change	(6) No change
Δ Neutral interventions	0.0416		0.0239		-0.0623	
	(0.0537)		(0.0533)		(0.0513)	
Δ Partisan interventions	0.123**		-0.0670		-0.0385	
	(0.0492)		(0.0451)		(0.0436)	
Δ Military interventions		0.160**		-0.166**		0.0269
		(0.0713)		(0.0650)		(0.0655)
Δ Economic interventions		0.326**		0.156		-0.462***
		(0.148)		(0.130)		(0.149)
Δ Diplomatic interventions		-0.0203		0.0407		-0.0202
		(0.0568)		(0.0576)		(0.0555)
Δ UN missions		-0.165		0.153		0.0328
		(0.192)		(0.199)		(0.196)
Δ Non-UN missions		0.0493		-0.327		0.241
		(0.221)		(0.211)		(0.207)
Δ int_yr_leveln1	0.264***	0.266***	0.294***	0.298***	-0.425***	-0.428***
	(0.0392)	(0.0393)	(0.0404)	(0.0405)	(0.0360)	(0.0360)
Δ lnpop	0.527*	0.510*	-3.466**	-3.466**	-0.180	-0.169
	(0.303)	(0.305)	(1.445)	(1.449)	(0.236)	(0.236)
Δ income_pc_n1	-0.000657**	-0.000635*	-0.000505	-0.000489	0.000776***	0.000755***
	(0.000325)	(0.000325)	(0.000326)	(0.000326)	(0.000286)	(0.000286)
Δ polity	-0.0177	-0.0154	0.00435	0.00735	-0.00100	-0.00467
	(0.0186)	(0.0186)	(0.0191)	(0.0192)	(0.0171)	(0.0171)
Δ oil_gas_on_off	0.219	0.219	-0.153	-0.168	0.00356	0.0105
	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.257)
Δ lnoda	0.0178	0.0235	0.114	0.120	-0.131*	-0.135*
	(0.0823)	(0.0823)	(0.0864)	(0.0864)	(0.0720)	(0.0721)
time_m	0.00293***	0.00293***	0.00265***	0.00263***	-0.00404***	-0.00404***
	(0.000470)	(0.000471)	(0.000486)	(0.000487)	(0.000427)	(0.000428)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,409	5,409	5,409	5,409	5,409	5,409

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results reinforce the findings that partisan, economic and especially military interventions increase conflict intensity. Their coefficients are significant and positive in the models of positive change (Models 1 and 2), and the military interventions effect is also significant and negative in the model of negative change (Model 4). The only other significant coefficient is economic interventions which is negatively associated with no change (Model 6). UN missions are no longer significant, which can be explained by the fact that even if UN missions are associated with lower levels of conflict they are not necessarily associated with significant changes in conflict intensity as normally UN missions start once peace agreements have been signed.[13]

The novelty of the results is the non-confirmation of the de-escalating effect of neutral and diplomatic intervenitons which are non-significant in all models, with the expected sign in each of them, but with standard errors bigger than the coefficients. These results would suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity, changes in the frequency of diplomatic initiatives do not have an effect on changes in conflict intensity. On one hand, it does not confirm to one of the most robust results of the literature; on the other hand, it renders it plausible that it is a sub-set of diplomatic initiatives, the failed diplomacy, which are annulling the significance of the results. Such would be in line with the findings of the case study and the proposed hypotheses, to which we now turn.

Based on equation (9) for the conflict-intensity level, the results for failed diplomacy with the ZINB are presented in Table 5.6.

Successful mediation de-escalates conflict while failed mediation has no effect on conflict. Mediation after signing a cease fire, a peace agreement or done while a peace agreement is holding both increase the likelihood of a zero battle death month as well as decreases intensity in months with a propensity for battle deaths (Models 3 to 8). Any of the three effects is higher than the normal effect of mediation (Models 1 and 2). Failed mediation has not significant effect on conflict intensity while other non-failed mediation is significantly decreasing conflict (Models 9 and 10). The significant control variables have similar results to those presented before for the ZINB model, with some differences in tests of specification.

This increase effect of more successful mediation is confirmed when disaggregating peace agreement types. For the disaggregation of type of agreements in table 5.7, only the peace process agreement can escalate (Model 4) or de-escalate conflict (Model 3) while a partial or full peace agreements only de-escalate conflicts (Mode 6 and 7 respectively). A peace agreement with a cease fire is the one that more significantly decreases conflict intensity (Model 9 and 10).

Table 5.6 ZINB of successful and failed mediation on conflict intensity level

VARIABLES	(1) int_m	(2) inflate	(3) int_m	(4) inflate	(5) int_m	(6) inflate	(7) int_m	(8) inflate	(9) int_m	(10) inflate
Mediation	-0.0254*	0.0228								
	(0.0140)	(0.0147)								
Mediation with ceasefire			-0.0668***	0.0804***						
			(0.0184)	(0.0215)						
Other mediation without cease fire			-0.00860	-0.00634						
			(0.0153)	(0.0166)						
Mediation with a peace agreement					-0.0355**	0.0394**				
					(0.0154)	(0.0162)				
Other mediation without peace agreement					-0.00424	-0.0209				
					(0.0201)	(0.0236)				
Mediation within peace agreement period							-0.0379**	0.0589***		
							(0.0175)	(0.0175)		
Other mediation outside peace agreement period							-0.0146	-0.0189		
							(0.0168)	(0.0182)		
Failed mediation									-0.0159	-0.0261
									(0.0236)	(0.0251)
Other non-failed mediation									-0.0279*	0.0342**
									(0.0152)	(0.0154)
Other diplomatic initiatives	-0.0793***	-0.0491	-0.0676***	-0.0459	-0.0743***	-0.0412	-0.0867***	-0.0228	-0.0858***	-0.0487
	(0.0226)	(0.0386)	(0.0230)	(0.0362)	(0.0224)	(0.0364)	(0.0231)	(0.0390)	(0.0248)	(0.0402)
UN and non-UN missions	-0.136***	0.0187	-0.107**	-0.00624	-0.105**	-0.0209	-0.127***	0.0346	-0.141***	0.0522
	(0.0473)	(0.0503)	(0.0489)	(0.0514)	(0.0519)	(0.0532)	(0.0479)	(0.0500)	(0.0490)	(0.0521)
Military	0.0223*	-0.102***	0.0201*	-0.0931***	0.0186	-0.0981***	0.0207*	-0.101***	0.0228*	-0.106***
	(0.0122)	(0.0188)	(0.0122)	(0.0187)	(0.0126)	(0.0192)	(0.0124)	(0.0193)	(0.0122)	(0.0191)
Economic	0.0640**	-0.0634	0.0523*	-0.0759*	0.0599**	-0.0647	0.0659**	-0.0764*	0.0672**	-0.0648
	(0.0282)	(0.0436)	(0.0285)	(0.0448)	(0.0283)	(0.0439)	(0.0283)	(0.0445)	(0.0292)	(0.0438)
int_yr_leveln1	0.262***	-0.789***	0.265***	-0.786***	0.264***	-0.786***	0.265***	-0.795***	0.262***	-0.797***
	(0.0553)	(0.0475)	(0.0549)	(0.0472)	(0.0554)	(0.0475)	(0.0549)	(0.0474)	(0.0551)	(0.0476)
lnpop	-5.101***	-0.225	-5.217***	-0.157	-5.086***	-0.256	-5.087***	-0.343	-5.104***	-0.297
	(0.520)	(0.467)	(0.517)	(0.465)	(0.520)	(0.466)	(0.520)	(0.465)	(0.521)	(0.468)
income_pc_n1	-0.000718***	-3.16e-05	-0.000669***	-5.74e-05	-0.000677***	-4.00e-05	-0.000691***	-3.46e-05	-0.000719***	-1.56e-05
	(0.000158)	(0.000175)	(0.000158)	(0.000174)	(0.000161)	(0.000174)	(0.000161)	(0.000175)	(0.000158)	(0.000175)
polity	-0.0510***	0.0354**	-0.0504***	0.0317**	-0.0522***	0.0354**	-0.0520***	0.0382**	-0.0511***	0.0377**
	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)
oil_gas_on_off	1.018***	-0.889*	1.168***	-1.119***	1.022***	-0.948**	1.034***	-1.039***	1.028***	-0.919**
	(0.365)	(0.455)	(0.344)	(0.399)	(0.359)	(0.424)	(0.355)	(0.402)	(0.362)	(0.437)
lnoda	0.0736	0.0659	0.122	0.0275	0.115	0.0385	0.110	0.0343	0.0738	0.0713
	(0.102)	(0.0851)	(0.102)	(0.0853)	(0.105)	(0.0860)	(0.104)	(0.0849)	(0.102)	(0.0850)
time_m	0.00587***	-0.00267***	0.00585***	-0.00267***	0.00587***	-0.00261***	0.00597***	-0.00268***	0.00593***	-0.00270***
	(0.000906)	(0.000823)	(0.000899)	(0.000818)	(0.000906)	(0.000820)	(0.000906)	(0.000817)	(0.000910)	(0.000821)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
lnalpha	0.717***		0.704***		0.714***		0.707***		0.713***	
	(0.0420)		(0.0412)		(0.0419)		(0.0410)		(0.0414)	
Observations	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.7 ZINB of peace agreement types and mediation

VARIABLES	(1) int_m	(2) inflate	(3) int_m	(4) inflate	(5) int_m	(6) inflate	(7) int_m	(8) inflate	(9) int_m	(10) inflate
Mediation with a peace agreement	-0.0355**	0.0394**								
	(0.0154)	(0.0162)								
Other mediation without peace agreement	-0.00424	-0.0209								
	(0.0201)	(0.0236)								
Mediation with a peace process agreement			-0.0720**	-0.0673*						
			(0.0293)	(0.0397)						
Other mediation without peace process agreement			-0.0184	0.0289*						
			(0.0149)	(0.0148)						
Mediation with a partial peace agreement					0.0181	0.0646***				
					(0.0227)	(0.0175)				
Other mediation without a partial peace agreement					-0.0372**	-0.000637				
					(0.0146)	(0.0143)				
Mediation with a full peace agreement							-0.0811***	0.0370		
							(0.0180)	(0.0249)		
Other mediation without a full peace agreement							0.00482	0.0178		
							(0.0162)	(0.0157)		
Mediation with ceasefire									-0.0668***	0.0804***
									(0.0184)	(0.0215)
Other mediation without cease fire									-0.00860	-0.00634
									(0.0153)	(0.0166)
Other diplomatic initiatives	-0.0743***	-0.0412	-0.0839***	-0.0624	-0.0925***	-0.0329	-0.0864***	-0.0469	-0.0676***	-0.0459
	(0.0224)	(0.0364)	(0.0226)	(0.0398)	(0.0248)	(0.0346)	(0.0232)	(0.0387)	(0.0230)	(0.0362)
UN and non-UN missions	-0.105**	-0.0209	-0.141***	0.0275	-0.183***	-0.0192	-0.100**	0.00602	-0.107**	-0.00624
	(0.0519)	(0.0532)	(0.0475)	(0.0505)	(0.0497)	(0.0427)	(0.0479)	(0.0516)	(0.0489)	(0.0514)
Military	0.0186	-0.0981***	0.0206*	-0.103***	0.0240*	-0.109***	0.0177	-0.102***	0.0201*	-0.0931***
	(0.0126)	(0.0192)	(0.0122)	(0.0187)	(0.0123)	(0.0184)	(0.0121)	(0.0188)	(0.0122)	(0.0187)
Economic	0.0599**	-0.0647	0.0749***	-0.0382	0.0542*	-0.114***	0.0543*	-0.0610	0.0523*	-0.0759*
	(0.0283)	(0.0439)	(0.0289)	(0.0446)	(0.0285)	(0.0393)	(0.0283)	(0.0435)	(0.0285)	(0.0448)
int_yr_leveln1	0.264***	-0.786***	0.260***	-0.787***	0.216***	-0.840***	0.267***	-0.785***	0.265***	-0.786***
	(0.0554)	(0.0475)	(0.0551)	(0.0475)	(0.0556)	(0.0415)	(0.0550)	(0.0476)	(0.0549)	(0.0472)
lnpop	-5.086***	-0.256	-5.118***	-0.259	-5.779***	0.220***	-5.392***	-0.270	-5.217***	-0.157
	(0.520)	(0.466)	(0.519)	(0.468)	(0.519)	(0.0637)	(0.516)	(0.467)	(0.517)	(0.465)
income_pc_n1	-0.000677***	-4.00e-05	-0.000696***	-6.57e-06	-0.000986***	-0.000969***	-0.000673***	-2.77e-05	-0.000669***	-5.74e-05
	(0.000161)	(0.000174)	(0.000160)	(0.000174)	(0.000125)	(0.000111)	(0.000156)	(0.000175)	(0.000158)	(0.000174)
polity	-0.0522***	0.0354**	-0.0515***	0.0367**	-0.0449***	0.0194*	-0.0486***	0.0362**	-0.0504***	0.0317**
	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0102)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)
oil_gas_on_off	1.022***	-0.948**	1.009***	-0.890**	1.597***	1.286***	1.067***	-1.000**	1.168***	-1.119***
	(0.359)	(0.424)	(0.365)	(0.441)	(0.347)	(0.189)	(0.355)	(0.459)	(0.344)	(0.399)
lnoda	0.115	0.0385	0.0885	0.0615	0.0878	0.0275	0.0875	0.0628	0.122	0.0275
	(0.105)	(0.0860)	(0.102)	(0.0850)	(0.103)	(0.0602)	(0.101)	(0.0850)	(0.102)	(0.0853)
time_m	0.00587***	-0.00261***	0.00588***	-0.00275***	0.00664***	-0.00177***	0.00585***	-0.00267***	0.00585***	-0.00267***
	(0.000906)	(0.000820)	(0.000906)	(0.000828)	(0.000891)	(0.000350)	(0.000886)	(0.000823)	(0.000899)	(0.000818)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
lnalpha		0.714***		0.714***		0.763***		0.707***		0.704***
		(0.0419)		(0.0419)		(0.0453)		(0.0418)		(0.0412)
Observations	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285	5,285

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Based on equation (10) of change in conflict intensity, the logit model with dummy variables has no significant effect throughout and is not presented (see appendice 3 for details). Such results further question the effect of mediation once controlling for endogeneity.

In summary, failed mediation does not have an effect on conflict intensity and successful mediation has a de-escalating effect on conflict but

once controlling for endogeneity successful or failed mediation have no significant effect on conflict intensity.

5.6 Conclusion

This study uses a new dataset on external interventions with the conflict period extended to lower intensity while combining all the main intervention types. The theoretical model focuses on the target of interventions as the main determinant of intervention effects, but also considers types of interventions. The analysis is done on the effect of interventions on conflict level and with a change model, which allows to better control for the endogeneity of the conflict–interventions relationship.

The results confirm some of the literature findings and provide some novel and important insights. The confirmation is given by the finding that partisan, military and economic interventions increase conflict intensity and that the results are robust in the change model controlling for endogeneity. Similar results have been found by Pettersson (2011), with the new UCDP dataset on economic and military support looking at the effect on conflict intensity.

The results for UN and non-UN mission are less robust as both are non-significant in the model controlling for endogeneity and only UN missions de-escalate conflict in the model of conflict level. The hypothesis proposed is not confirmed but such can be due to the dataset which is design to better account for quick interventions than long term initiatives.

The novel finding is that, although neutral and diplomatic interventions decrease conflict intensity in the conflict-intensity level model, as other studies have identified, when using the conflict-intensity change model, these interventions have no significant effect. These results suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity, neutral or diplomatic interventions have no effect on the intensity of conflict. Considering the importance of diplomacy as a conflict management tool, these results are surprising. Nevertheless, the case study presented in Chapter 2 has identified a few mechanisms through which diplomacy might have the unintended effect of increasing conflict intensity.

In order to further investigate these findings, an additional model of failed and successful mediation was tested. Again, before controlling for endogeneity, the results suggest that successful mediation decreases con-

flict intensity but failed diplomacy has no effect on conflict intensity. But after controlling for endogeneity neither successful or failed mediation has a significant effect on conflict intensity.[14]

These results need to be properly contextualized, as they are measured for a time frame of 24 months, not accounting for the longer effects. Furthermore, diplomacy is the main mechanism of conflict management—something not disputed in this chapter—with several other achievements. Diplomacy is part of the processes through which peace agreements are reached, many of them resulting in a transition to a less violent society. Even in the one third of cases when peace agreements fail, violence resumes with less that 80% of battle deaths compared to the period before the signing of the peace agreement (Human Security Research Group, 2012). Therefore, diplomacy can lead to successful peace agreements and to failed peace agreements that lead to less killing, even if they do not lead to less battle deaths in the short term.

Nevertheless, the results identify an area of research related to the 'unintended' consequences of diplomatic processes and indicate that the form and effect of diplomacy need to be further investigated and controlled for endogeneity in order to account for unexpected mechanisms. Here, an identification of intentions would be informative as, for instance, sincere diplomacy generates different results from 'cheap talk' diplomacy.

The main implication for theory is that intentions of interventions are relevant. Not only the type, but also the intended target of support of an intervention determines its effect on conflict intensity. As identified in this study, intentions of interventions are a main source of omitted variable bias, and such bias is relevant, as demonstrated by the significance of the target of interventions—namely, a simplified account of intention. Developing data on intentions could greatly contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness of interventions using lenses through which we are not able to see at the moment.

Notes

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https://sites.google.com/site/ricardosousa2000/phd_attachments

[2] Regan uses a sub-set of Goldstone et al.'s (2010) countries at risk of civil war onset.

[3] Attempts to code intentions had to resort to coders' decisions, such as in Kisangani and Pickering (2009). In their research, motivations could be domestic dispute issues, regime or policy change issues, strategic issues, territorial issues, rebel pursuit issues, diplomatic protective issues, economic issues, humanitarian issues, or social protective issues.

[4] Other possible emitted variables are paramilitary and covert operations not coded in the dataset.

[5] Collier, Hoeffler and Soderman (2008) operationalize interventions as a permanent function of time until the end of the conflict and cumulative with each additional intervention. The assumption is that interventions will be more effective the more they occur and there is no erosion of their effect in time. Regan and Aydin (2006) operationalize interventions with a permanent decline function which is restarted once a new intervention is made. The assumption being that the value of an intervention is not restricted to the month in which it occurs but the value wears out after some time (a declining factor of .99). Collier et al. (2004) only dealt with military and economic interventions, the effect is here applied also to other types of interventions.

See appendice 3 for a comparison of the different specifications.

[6] In the dataset, 88% of military interventions and 77% of economic interventions are partisan and 97% of diplomatic and 87% of missions are neutral.

[7] These results can be biased as diplomatic efforts are more likely to be disclosed if the prospects of positive outcomes can be capitalized domestically and internationally by the external parties involved.

[8] The count variable is transformed into categorical (int_m_level) with the values of 0 for 0 battle deaths, 1 for between 1 and 24 battle deaths, 2 for between 25 and 999 battle deaths, and 3 for above 999 battle deaths. A series of other procedures were performed to address the issue of endogeneity. With a categorical outcome variable of conflict level, the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) model was used with multiple and single instrumental variables. The estimation with multiple instruments followed the procedure detailed by Eldabawi and Sambanis (2000), but in the first stage the equation predicted interventions based on a vector of variables exogenous to conflict intensity. The instruments were chosen to reflect

the external relationships of the country with conflict, having the least possible correlation with conflict. These instruments are the colonial power of the country, membership in the Franc African Financial Community, number of the country's borders, the country's sub-region of Africa, telecommunications with the world and with the USA, membership in international organisations and security agreements signed. The 2SLS single instrumental variable followed the procedure used in Miguel et al. (2004). In this case, the telecommunications of each country with the USA was used as the instrumental variable. In both cases the instruments were found not to be valid. In addition, for the model of conflict intensity change, an estimation was made with an ordinary least squares method, but the distribution of the outcome variable is not normal invalidating the estimations. Procedures are documented in appendice 3 (see footnote 1).

[9] In Chapter 3, an expanded explanation is provided.

[10] Types and targets of interventions have been coded and disaggregated into the following: for military troops, naval forces, equipment or aid, intelligence advisors, air support and military sanctions; for economic grants, loans, non-military equipment or expertise, credits, relief of past obligations and economic sanctions; for diplomatic mediation, international forum, arbitration, recall of ambassadors, offers to mediate by third parties that were not accepted, requests for diplomatic intervention by one of the warring parties that were not accepted and political sanctions; and for UN and non-UN missions which are disaggregated into the mandates of political, observer, traditional, multidimensional and enforcement.

[11] Most partisan interventions are military or economic, and most neutral interventions are diplomatic.

[12] In this analysis, more attention is focused on the significance and signal of the coefficients than their strength as the interventions have no specification of their strength, but rather only if they have occurred in a certain month. Interventions with different strengths all have the same effect. For instance, the deployment of 1.000 or 10.000 troops has been coded with the same effect on the dataset. To state that an additional intervention increases or decreases battle deaths by a certain amount would not be appropriate.

[13] The results for the control variables have differences from the ZINB model. Conflict level in the previous year has a contradictory result on increasing and decreasing conflict intensity: Increasing the population increases conflict intensity and polity, and oil and gas become non-significant. The non-significant results can be explained by the small variation across the time of these variables. The positive population effect could mean that a growing population puts added pressure on conflicts. The contradictory effect of the previous level of conflict is more difficult to explain. The results are sensitive to the specification of interven-

tions, with different results for the alternative specifications. See appendice 3 online for details.

[14] As expected, the results are sensitive to the specification of interventions. See appendice 3 online for an assessment of the specification differences.

6 Evolving UN Security Council primacy and the African Peace and Security Architecture' (APSA) subsidiarity

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UN SC) has primacy over the decision to enforce peace in all member states. With the end of the Cold War, the negotiations over this primacy involved not only states but, especially in Africa, emerging regional and sub-regional organizations. Using regime theory and process tracing, this paper analyses the extent to which UN SC de jure primacy on authorising peace enforcement military operations has been contested in Africa since the end of the Cold War. The analysis focuses on security structures, particularly the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the role that the 'principle of subsidiarity' has in safeguarding UN SC primacy. This paper demonstrates that, although the post-Cold War period can be characterised by neorealist interaction amongst some actors (United States, Nigeria and South Africa), since 2000, the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) have engaged in a more neoliberal institutional approach within APSA. Additionally, exceptions to UN SC primacy are inscribed at different levels of policy, and the 'principle of subsidiarity' and APSA do not explicitly and fully safeguard UN SC primacy. The paper concludes that the way subsidiarity is implemented may or may not reinforce UN SC primacy as a foundational principle of the security intervention architecture.

6.1 Introduction[1]

Since the Second World War, the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) has been a key reference of the security regime and a safeguard to the sovereignty of states. The primacy is conferred to the UN SC through the Charter, which grants it the foremost authority in matters of peace and security and exclusive responsibility for the author-

ization of military interventions into a country. In practice, this means that, if a military intervention in a state is to be considered legal, it needs UN SC authorization, with the exception of cases of self-defence. But Regional Organizations (RO) and Sub-Regional Organizations (SRO) with peace and security mandates have emerged during and after the Cold War period and have been involved in military interventions (of the peace enforcement type) with and without UN SC authorization.

A push from the international community and pull from the local actors has occurred, particularly in Africa, over the development of a security regime that can rely to a great extent on itself to operate. This has been consubstantiated on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the subsidiarity principle purposed to govern the APSA inter-organizational relations, determining the allocation of functions (in particular decision-making) along its various organizational levels of governance at the global, regional, sub-regional and state levels. The subsidiarity principle prescribes that the allocation of power should be to the lowest level unless it is determined that a more central level can better perform the tasks.

The objective of the paper is to determine if UN SC de jure primacy is being challenged by the institutional developments, namely in the decision-making mechanisms of the APSA and its implementation of the principle of subsidiarity.[2] Regime theory hypotheses based on neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are tested through process tracing based on three data sources: primary documents of international organisations; academic books and journals; and semi-structured interviews of officials of international organizations.[3]

The analysis is relevant because of the perceived loss of value of UN legitimacy in interventions (Job, 2004) and the need "to see the use of force in the name of peace exercised judiciously, and controlled by legitimate authority according to acceptable principles and standards" (Malan, 1999, page unavailable). Furthermore, the UN SC's raison d'être is its legitimizing authority, and any erosion of this power contributes to a weakening of the UN, its Charter as a whole and of the security regime (Boulden, 2003; Coleman, 2007).

6.2 Research gap

Regimes have been defined as the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern state behaviour in specific issue-areas (Krasner, 1982). The focus of this paper is on the observance of the regime rule of UN SC primacy, which means that the legality of military interventions depends on the UN SC being the forum of decision-making, which in itself is affected by the UN subsidiary relations with the AU (implicitly also with the SRO).[4] These processes are explained by competing hypotheses derived from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism with constructivism and post-colonial theory analysed under alternative explanations.

For neorealism, the international system is anarchical requiring states to focus on security. This security is achieved through the acquisition of military or economic power. Therefore, power and a rational analysis of its distribution, relative power, will determine the cooperative behaviour of states (Waltz, 1979). If state cooperation occurs, it is not necessarily institutionalized, as it can also happen outside of institutions. Institutions are the embodiment of the regime in which international norms reflect only the distribution of power among states, which means that norm change can occur only when the power distribution changes (Florini, 1996). The stability of the system and the relevance of its institutions can occur if a hegemon is able to enforce institutional norms and rules (Kindleberger, 1986). This hegemonic process is not only determined by coercion but also by the result of compromises between different actors in a process of consent (Gramsci, 1971).

For neoliberal institutionalism, the system is characterized by the interdependence of states. This interdependence means that states acting out of rational self-interest want to cooperate (also through institutions) to reduce transaction costs and to have trust in reciprocal agreements (Newman, 2007). International organizations are in this way more relevant and can help to stabilize some shared values and norms. In this process, organizations can develop an identity and possibly autonomy in relation to the state. They are a promise of integration with a peace potential to solve the self-help view of anarchical state relations (Keohane, 1989). Cooperation is considered a value in itself with benefits for the state. Therefore, even in the case of hegemonic decline, governments may be willing to counterbalance the possible associated regime decline

(Keohane, 1984). Although neoliberalism may consider norms more enduring and influential than neorealism, both consider them determined by fixed (powerful) state preferences, therefore exogenous to the theory (Florini, 1996).

Since the inception of the UN, three main issues permeate the literature on the security architecture relevant to this debate: regionalism and globalism, institutionalism and the legality of interventions.

On the dichotomy of globalism versus regionalism and specifically regarding the UN, two visions are predominant: one of international idealism with strong regionalism of security functions and another, globalist, of a hegemonic realism centred in the UN SC (Adibe, 2003). Although the literature on regional systems flowered in the 1960s, the intensification of the Cold War caused it to recede due to the overwhelming preponderance of a realist global system perspective (Lake and Morgan, 1997) leaving little space for other regional aspirations to take form outside of the East/West divide.

With the end of the Cold War, a constructivist regionalist perspective of security became more visible. Linked to concepts of territoriality, security and system structure of neorealism, this perspective is also a response to the threats of globalisation (Buzan and Waever, 2009). Such conceptual developments combined with the UN disengagement from Africa in the late 1990s led to specific proposals for a renewed regionalism in the institutional security architecture. Such was the case of the "regional-global security mechanism" proposal with regional agencies responsible for security regions and with a permanent membership at the UN SC (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) level, the institutional debate in the 1960s opposed the "Casablanca group", which advocated a more centralized organization, to the "Monrovia group", which endorsed a sub-regional approach based on "state nationalism" (Walraven, 2010). The latter decentralized model prevailed and with it the reinforcement of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states, which also meant a freeze on the debate over the possibility of interventions. The next period of significant regional security debate occurred in the late 1990s with the revision of the OAU. An institutional view of a "peace pyramid" (Nhara, 1998) with the UN at the top, followed by the OAU and then the SRO, was juxtaposed to the centrality of nation-states that made "fruitless" attempts for above state level

institutional coordination (Malan, 1999). The outcome of the process was the creation of the AU with peace and security assuming a central place in the organisation, including the erosion of the doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the states (Kindiki, 2003). This change occurred in the context of the debate over regionalism referred to above, which would have diverse proposals: some aspiring for further AU involvement in sub-regional security models (Boulden, 2003, among others); others, more conservative, looking for possible developments of existing AU structures (Engel and Porto, 2010, Akokpari et al., 2008, Makinda and Okumu, 2008, among others); and some more centralized possibilities of a union regional government (Murithi, 2007). These debates culminated in the reinforcement of the existing APSA structures around 2008, although its sub-regional dimensions were left to be determined, specifically on the modes of the relationship between the AU and SRO.

The legality of military interventions has been a critical issue of the Westphalian sovereignty of nation-states[5], and is recently connected to three events: the Rwanda genocide and the Kosovo and Iraq interventions. The failure of the international community to intervene in the Rwanda genocide in 1994 triggered a global reassessment of humanitarian issues, interventions and sovereignty. As a result, the doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) was presented globally in 2001 and adopted at the 2005 Word Summit (Newman and Richmond, 2001).[6] Regionally in Africa, the right of humanitarian intervention was at the core of the change of the Charter from OAU to AU in 2000 (Powell, 2005). Also, the failure to secure a UN SC authorization for the interventions in Kosovo in 1999 by NATO and in Iraq in 2003 by the United States raised significant issues to neorealist perspectives on the interpretation of law and of the UN Charter as well as on the differentiation between the legality and the legitimacy of interventions (Price and Zacher, 2004; Coleman, 2007, among others). In the aftermath of these events, the normative developments that became institutionalized reflected a bigger concern about avoiding an unresponsive international community if faced with genocide than about avoiding unauthorised interventions (Thakur, 2004).

Finally, the principle of subsidiarity underpinned much of the research on the institutional relationships between the UN, the AU and the SRO. Its explicit use can be traced back to the work of Knight (1996)

formulating a possible subsidiary model of the UN and OAU relationship, even if such a model has been considered idealistic and incompatible with existing conditions (Job, 2004). Then, isolated accounts applied the principle to specific areas. For the area of humanitarian action, O'brien (2000) argued for a bottom-up model on the subsidiarity relationship between UN and the AU, and Helly (2009) suggested that this relationship should also involve the EU. Voeten (2005) proposed the existence of an elite pact on the use of subsidiarity between the UN SC and RO to have stability, even if such a pact is prone to issues of accountability and legality. A study by Moller (2005) operationalized subsidiarity to institutions in Africa from a hegemonic theory perspective.

Despite these contributions, further clarification is required of the link between decisions over the use of force (legality of interventions) within its institutional setup (relationship between the UN and the AU and within APSA) analysed through the lense of the principle of subsidiarity. This is justified by the fact that the only effective subsidiarity relationship developed so far is between the EU and the UN (Job, 2004). On the contrary, there is no operative reference in the AU constitutive act to the need for prior approval by the UN SC of any AU intervention, an omission which can accommodate an understanding that AU enforcement action can occur without UN SC authorization (Graham and Felicio, 2006). In fact, the perceived value of UN legitimacy seems to have been lost in the 1990s with some perspectives considering that the hierarchical position of the UN vis a vis RO is in danger of unravelling (Job, 2004). Despite these, the consensus is that the challenge is to make the UN Security Council work better and not to find alternative sources of authority (ICISS 2001: XII). For these reasons, whether UN SC primacy is upheld or not is important. This has implications on the need to understand the UN "laissez-faire" attitude about enforcing its own rules and how some ways of empowering RO may undermine the ability of the UN to pursue its core objective (Boulden, 2003). At the AU level, the implications of institutional subsidiarity are on the need to formalize a consensus and to apply consistently a consultative decision-making mechanism between the UN and the AU[7] (African Union, 2012, 23). This lack of consensus is also identified in the application of subsidiarity within the APSA, between the AU and the SRO, where the governing principles of sub-regionalism remain unclear and insufficiently considered (Laurie Nathan December 2010 interview quoted in Ancas, 2011).

6.3 Theoretical mechanisms

This paper uses process tracing (Checkel, 2008; Beach and Pedersen, 2011) to test three competing explanations of how UN SC primacy is de jure upheld in APSA subsidiarity. This means that the unit of analysis consists of the decision-making mechanisms for military interventions in Africa. In the alternative explanations constructivism and post-colonialism will be analysed. The different hypotheses are validated through tests of strength (Bennett, 2010).[8] The two main principles of UN SC primacy and subsidiarity are presented next followed by the proposed explanations.

UN SC primacy is established through Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945), which states that "members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…" with two exceptions: the right of self-defence (Article 51) and, if a decision is made by the UN Security Council, in cases of a threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression (Chapter 7). It is this latter exception that affords UN SC primacy on decisions over the use of force, a primacy which has overriding authority over all states through Article 103, which stipulates that states' commitments to the Charter prevail over other agreements or obligations (for instance to institutions) that they may have.

The principle of subsidiarity was applied to governance systems in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, which established in Article 3b:[9] "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community [the central authority] shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." (EU, 2002). Subsequently, in the 1997 EU's Treaty of Amsterdam, subsidiarity was made more operative through three guidelines: (1) that power should be allocated to the lower unit; (2) that the decision to allocate power should be based on efficiency, which in the European context is the degree to which it fosters democratic governance; and (3) that power should be exercised by the member state affected by that power.

One hypothesis considers that powerful states would be interested in maintaining the status quo and, therefore, in controlling the decision-

making mechanism, while, at the same time, limiting institutional strengthening, in particular with regard to institutions that they do not control. This means that UN SC primacy would not be de jure reinforced through subsidiarity (and eventually even bypassed) at the AU level; at the same time, it would also not be revoked altogether, as the latter could mean significant changes to the status quo and relative power distribution. Hegemony, if exercised, would be outside of the institutional set-up unless hegemonic power could be exercised through institutions. The latter could be the case in some sub-regions of Africa, where the end of the Cold War opened up spaces for regional influence.

Another hypothesis develops when the hegemon is not able to provide the common good (security) and needs to accept alternative security mechanisms. These could be based on local state initiatives or formulated around regional and sub-regional institutions. In either case, there would be pressure to formalize subsidiarity to maintain some order in the system. This would mean that UN SC primacy would somehow be recognized within the new architecture's decision making mechanisms but not significantly reinforced, as institutional strengthening is not an end but a means.

A final hypothesis develops when states identify the benefits from increased institutional cooperation and have a stake in reinforcing UN SC primacy. This means more inter-institutional development (UN, RO and SRO), reinforcement of the provisions connecting APSA to UN SC primacy and formal attribution of decision making power from UN SC to other institutions.

Table 6.1 International relations mechanism and UN SC primacy

Status quo maintenance	>	UN SC primacy unchanged	>	APSA no recognition of UN SC	>	UN SC exclusive decision-making role
Failure to provide security	>	UN SC primacy adapted	>	APSA recognizes UN SC	>	UN SC decision making recognizing other agents
Institutional security	>	UN SC primacy revised	>	APSA reinforces UN SC	>	UN SC decision making alongside APSA

The information collected to ascertain these mechanisms was based first on the analysis of treaties, conventions, official policy reports and

decisions of international organisations, which were then complemented by semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. The process followed an iteration of deductive and inductive analysis (Bennett and Checkel, 2012) especially relevant because of the possibility of making two field missions 18 months apart.

6.4 The security regime architecture

6.4.1 UN Charter and subsidiarity

The architecture of enforcement action is characterised by three components: who has the power to decide; what are the lawful grounds for peace enforcement missions; and who can implement such missions. The focus of this paper is on the decision-making process, which is connected to its justifications (the lawful grounds) but separate from the implementation mechanism (more related to division of labour and burden sharing), the latter two of which are not dealt with in this paper.

Subordinated to the UN SC primacy presented before, there is an embryonic form of regional security in Chapter VIII of the 1945 UN Charter. Chapter VIII provides that the UN SC "can utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the UN SC…" (Article 53.1). This UN SC primacy regarding decisions and its delegation of implementation to RO are generally accepted (Simma, 1999; Knight, 1996), even if some other substantive issues remain controversial on the understanding of the decision-making mechanisms or justifications for interventions.

6.4.2 OAU/UN relationship

The 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had no specific references to SRO and had limited provisions on peace and security, delimited to the peaceful settlement of disputes. With no reference to "peace enforcement" functions, during the first three decades of OAU existence, the main developments were in the economic area.

At the end of the Cold War, there was a demand for multilateral security operations to which the UN had no capacity to respond.[10] Therefore, the UN pulled RO and SRO involvement. This led to a process of nego-

tiations (also characterised as devolution in Boulden, 2003) over the division of labour and the burden sharing of these missions but less so on sharing the UN SC decision-making primacy.

In 1992, the UN report entitled Agenda for Peace, identified the contributions to be made by RO to peace, including the area of peacemaking. While safeguarding the United Nations Security Council's primacy, the report considered that "regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations" (64) could support the Council's work and that, if authorized by the Council, RO initiatives could be supported by the UN. In 1995, the Supplement to an agenda for peace report defined the cooperation between the UN and RO in the fields of consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. The cooperation is to observe mechanisms of consultation; UN primacy; division of labour; and consistency of standards across organisations (especially in peacekeeping operations - PKO). The division of labour was the main development from the report 1992 version, when it clearly stated that the UN SC retains the authorisation for PKO in all cases (UN SC primacy) but that the UN implements only those not requiring the use of force. Enforcement missions were to be implemented by "contract" to an existing RO or an ad hoc coalition led by a leading nation (Lewis and Marks, 1998: 13).

In tandem with these processes, RO and SRO pushed for further peace and security functions. At the OAU regional level, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo Declaration) was established in 1993, stemming from the creation of a conflict Management Division at the OAU in the previous year.[11] Even if referring to human suffering and state collapse, the OAU military involvement was limited to consensual observer missions[12] and, if the situation deteriorated, would refer the case to the UN. Even if not successful in practice, the mechanism was an attempt to rethink responses to intra and inter-state conflicts (Kindiki, 2003).[13] At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) were actively assuming peace and security roles. ECOWAS was involved in PKOs in Liberia in 1990, in Sierra Leone in 1997, in Guine-Bissau in 1999 and in the Ivory Coast in 2003. SADC was involved in PKOs in Lesotho and DRC in 1998 and developed competences in early warning beginning in the late 1980s. All

of these SRO military interventions were marked by controversy over legality and motivation (Berman and Sams 2003); with only one previously authorized by the UN SC (Guine-Bissau, 1999).

With the end of the Cold War around 1990[14], the neorealism perspective persisted globally and sub-regionally, marked by a lack of global (UN) and regional (OAU and SRO) institutional strengthening, especially after the 1993 Somalia debacle. The ECOWAS and SADC developments during the 1990s were mainly caused by the need for legitimacy of realistic hegemonic players, namely South Africa and Nigeria in their respective sub-regions. This can be considered a valid double decisive test for hegemonic realism in the period. Within this context, there is no conceptual development of subsidiarity in decision-making, which can be considered a passing straw in the wind (see more details in alternative explanations).

With the lack of international action in response to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the UN withdrawal from Africa in the following years, and the 1998 Great War of Africa in the DRC, a regional consensus developed on the need for African ownership of its own security. If the agglutinating principles of the OAU and African diplomacy had been the shared history of "humiliation and colonization by the white race" (Mazuri, 1977: 27), the failure to act in Rwanda triggered the aggregation of the political will to address the issue of security structurally, which was formalized in the creation of the AU. The principles of African unity, responsibility to protect and try-Africa-first developed to become the political references for security in the region in the following years (Chissano, 2011).

6.4.3 AU/UN relationship

The constitutive act of 2000 creating the AU re-conceptualises and significantly enlarges the scope of the RO and of its peace and security functions, creating the foundations for what came to be known as the APSA. The new organisation is the result of three projects: the Libyan pan-Africa unity project, the Nigerian lead Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), and the South African New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) project (Tieku, 2004).

Among the AU objectives is the effort to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent" (Article 3f), and a watershed development was the charter amendment of 2003 establishing the possibility that the AU might intervene in a member state if so decided by the Assembly in situations of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order" as a way to restore peace and stability (Article 4h). These formulations are in tandem with the classical principles of sovereign equality (Article 4a), non-interference by any member state (Article 4g) and the new "right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security" (Article 4j).

Of special relevance is the lack of extensive reference to the UN in the new AU charter; the sole substantive reference is among the objectives in "encouraging cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations…" (Article 3e). Therefore, the connection between the AU and the UN (and UN SC primacy) is made indirectly through the requirement that the AU's member states respect primarily the obligations to the UN (Article 103 of UN Charter). This absence was a reflection of the post Rwanda political environment wherein African governments (especially from the Great Lakes region) were keen on marginalizing the UN from political involvement in the region's affairs (United Nations 1998 and interview).

This process (and its subsequent developments) is the most significant event of neoliberal institutionalism regionally and is a passing hoop test for institutional strengthening, even though it took about a decade to consider fully forms of the AU to reinforce UN SC primacy.

In 2002, the main AU structure solely dedicated to peace and security was established in the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). The protocol establishing it specifically recognizes the UN SC's primary responsibility in peace and security and stipulates that the guiding principles are those enshrined "in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." (Article 4). It then develops a full configuration of peace functions, which are later referred to as APSA, including peacemaking, peace-support operations and intervention (pursuant of Article 4h and j). It prescribes a "close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation" between Regional Mechanisms (RM) and the Union (Article 7j), a "partnership for peace and security" between the AU and the UN (Article 7k) and that "any external initiative

in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union's objective and priorities" (Article 7l). To perform its functions, the AU PSC establishes African Standby Forces (ASF) sub-regionally[15] (Articles 13.1 and 13.3), a panel of the wise (Article 11) and a continental early warning system (Article 12). It further considers the possibility of ASF cooperation with the UN or other organisations (Article 13.4) and that the AU PSC will cooperate and work closely with the UN SC (Article 17). The RMs (which are SRO) are formulated for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and considered part of the AU's security architecture with a "primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa" (Article 16.1). The AU PSC objective is to harmonize and coordinate with the RM in a partnership determined by comparative advantage with a reciprocal duty to inform each other's initiatives.

The policy framework for the establishment of the ASF released in 2003 considers a series of practical needs for UN/AU coordination and the requirements that the AU must meet to be able to have UN support. The recommendations are for the AU to be the sole African mandating authority for peace operations (3.15.a.1) (African Union 2003, part I, 22), in a hierarchical format, in which the control is centralised or dependant on the AU PSC (3.17 and 3.18) (African Union 2003, part I, 25) but with a division of responsibilities among the AU, sub-regions and member states based on different types of missions.[16] The policy framework further recommends that "19.1…the OAU could undertake peace support operations excluding peace enforcement with a mandate from the Central Organ and/or within the framework of joint operations with the UN and Sub-Regional Organizations" (African Union 2003, part II, a6).

Based on an African Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting in 1997, the policy framework further recommends that "the conflict situation should guide the level at which the OAU considers involvement. In an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment. As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency in the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body" (1.4.b) (African Union, 2003, part I, 1).[17] A

similar position was taken by African heads of state in 2005 with the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (Ezulwini Consensus).

This recommendation was seconded by the UN report entitled A more secure world: our shared responsibility, which considered the role of ROs to be vital within the UN's primary responsibility for peace and security. It identifies a series of measures to organise action among the organisations and that "authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced." (United Nations, 2004: 71).[18]

These dispositions are connected to a possible interpretation of UN SC primacy, in which retroactive approval constitutes a valid UN SC authorization of an intervention. The underlying idea is that responsible nations will act under an international paradigm and will seek the highest level of legitimation, and, only if not given, will they proceed to other levels, as in a "legitimacy pyramid" (Coleman, 2007). Nevertheless, this perspective has been criticized on the grounds that it allows for the possibility of strategies for "forum shopping" for legitimacy by states to legitimize interventions (Job, 2004).[19]

Alongside these regional developments, between 1992 and 2006 there occurred a structured attempt by the actors involved and other stakeholders to establish a systematic relationship between the UN and RO based upon Chapter VIII. (Langenhove et al., 2012). Several inter-organizational formal meetings undertook this effort with outcomes at the level of policy in several reports. By 2006, the UN report on Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities observed that the "challenge now is to articulate a common vision for a global architecture, interlocking such capacities based on comparative advantages and clear division of labor." (p. 3). On an academic level, this policy can be connected to the "regional-global security mechanism" (Graham and Felicio, 2006) or "regional multilateralism" (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2006) proposals.[20]

However, such ambitious proposals were more pragmatically addressed in the 2008 Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, better known as the Prodi report, as Romano Prodi was its chairman. As the name suggests, it focused on the financial and logistical resource re-

quirements of such cooperation. It recommended the use of the UN assessed funding to support the United Nations Security Council's approved AU operations with two conditions[21]: (1) each case of support must be approved independently by the Council and UN General Assembly; and (2) the AU mission must transition to the UN within six months. On the basis of UN SC primacy, the report elaborated on the UN and the AU relationship highlighting the quick response possibility of the AU, with SRO and states referred to as the "building blocks" of African peace capacity. The report singled out ASF's role within the APSA as a "major undertaking", in which it could be "easy to lose direction", and called for the AU to drive the process in terms of setting the objectives with clarity and realism. (United Nations, 2008: 6)

This reluctance to ascribe decision-making roles to RO and SRO is in line with the "overwhelming consensus" in maintaining UN SC primacy on military interventions (ICISS, 2001: XII). Also, in 2007, the nomination of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon produced a shift in UN regionalism policy; the new policy is less ambitious and focused in Africa (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Langenhove et al., 2012). This new policy has been criticized with reference to the Brahimi report of 2003, which was set out as a UN "think anew" on peace operations. This report failed to question the role of peace operations in the wider context of international politics and to interrogate both the epistemological (identification of the valued knowledge) and ontological (which are "their" crises that merit attention from "us") bases of peace operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005).

Despite these limitations, the 2008 Prodi report marks the political support at the UN level of important developments that were occurring regionally. In January 2008, the AU signed the Memorandum of Understanding with RECs and RM enabling the operationalization of APSA. This recognized AU primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa and adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage (Article 4.4). Among other initiatives, it considered the existence of representation in each other's offices (AU in RECs/RM and vice versa) with the efforts of coordination vested in the AU (Article 21) along with the responsibility to inform the UN SC of the activities of all.

The negotiation over a more global or regional based security mechanism that occurred in this period is a smoking gun for neoliberal institu-

tionalism, in which the final option of maintaining the UN SC intact with its primacy reinforces the global institutionalism without being a neorealist position of dismantling institutions. In fact, the 2008 Prodi report reinforced regional institutions even if through resource dependence based on UN SC primacy.

In 2008, the EU became a main contributor to the development of APSA, focusing mainly on supporting AU missions and bodies. The plan highlighted the importance of the subsidiarity principle in the relationship between the AU and RECs, which are considered to be the building blocks of the AU. (European Union, 2011). Although the beneficiaries of the funding facility are the AU and SRO, the latter's requests need to have political approval of the AU. (European Union, 2008: 5.3 and 5.6) This policy has been linked to Africa's economic, security and emigration relevance to the EU.

The United States continued a more bilateral approach initiating AFRICOM in 2007. The new initiative contemplated a security component focusing on capacity building of partner African state's intended to reduce conflict, improve security, defeat terrorists and support crisis response. The American policy has been justified mainly in terms of security, specifically regarding preventing terrorism; economy, wherein the region is predicted to represent 25% of American oil imports by 2015; and, in geostrategic terms, regarding the presence of India and Brazil in the continent, but most significantly the China-African relations (Govern, 2001).

China's policy toward Africa emphasises sovereignty and non-interference. China's main interests are supplies of energy and raw materials, with about one third of China's crude oil imports in 2010 coming from Africa. Its policies focus on four sections: trade, investment, development aid and migration (Asche and Schüller, 2008). Complementing these are policies on multilateral diplomacy and peacekeeping (Wissenbach, 2009); regarding the latter, the Chinese preferential mode of engagement has been institutional, either by supporting the UN PKO or the AU.[22]

The structure adopted was to a great extent the hierarchical institutional "pyramid" (Nhara, 1998), with the UN on the top followed by the RO providing a critical link with the SRO at the bottom of the pyramid. Nevertheless, states continue to constitute a critical actor in security, de-

termining the contributions to multilateral efforts, voting institutional decisions or being the focus of direct foreign support.

American actions are more bilateral and not aimed at reinforcing the institutional mechanisms, which is better explained by a neorealist perspective. Although the UN SC primacy remains unchanged the cases of interventions that bypass it have become more contentious than during the Cold War. A passing hoop test is the American lack of reinforcement of the UN and the OAU/AU. This is based on a preference for bilateral or ad hoc coalitions or multilateral institutions which are closer to its decision making behaviour (such as in NATO). In the alternative, a country based programme was developed with AFRICOM in 2007 to address specific concerns. At about the same time, the AU and EU met with a mutual interest around a shared value of multilateral institutionalism, and the EU initiated structured support to the APSA in 2008. This EU behaviour passed the hoop test explained by neoliberal institutionalism. This initiative also identifies explicitly the principle of subsidiarity for the first time.

The AU APSA assessment report (African Union, 2010) made some general developments on the principles of subsidiarity. Overall, the principle seems to be associated with the identification of the executing agency of a mission or a division of labour regarding implementation but not regarding who makes the decision itself. More significantly, the AU report on the relationship between the AU and the UN focussed on subsidiarity, without being normative; but, it identified a series of challenges for its conceptualization and operationalization (African Union 2012).

Another passed smoking gun for neoliberal institutionalism is the growing acknowledgement of the UN SC primacy throughout the 2000s in AU documents, with the most relevant evidence in this 2012 AU report addressing directly the UN and the AU relationship and the requirements for a principle of subsidiarity.

6.5 Alternative explanations

The alternative hypothesis of social constructivism requires special attention, particularly regarding the process of transition of the OAU to the AU.

In constructivism, regime norms help determine state preferences. Norms shape goals, the perception of interests, and means to achieve

goals. They also provide an essential behavioural reference in the context of limited rationality and uncertainty. Together with self-interest, norms and values are considered an essential component in states' behaviour, and states aims are an endogenous variable. (Florini, 1996) The system is not deterministic, since changes may occur in socially constructed interests, identities and state relationships (Newman, 2007). In fact, constructivism considers that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, the construction of international organizations will depend on the consensus over values and norms. This cognitive process of shared understanding affords agency not only to system or states levels but also to domestic political, cultural and civil society actors (Rittberger et al., 2006).

The OAU to AU transition was a significant norm change, which required a new organisation that would attempt to convert an anarchic security system into a shared understanding of responsibility. The new AU had fourteen objectives, nine more than those of the OAU, and three of which were dedicated to peace and security. (Kindiki, 2003) In this development, it was not the individual rational self-interest of states that triggered the process but a shared value of the need for security autonomy. Therefore, this is a passed smoking gun test for constructivism on strengthening institutions regionally even without UN SC primacy reinforcement (or even undermining it). But the capacity to transform values into law and structure was conditioned by more than shared values changing state preferences. At the sub-regional level, there was a lack of clarity and consensus over the relationship between the AU and SRO with tensions between the AU and ECOWAS and SADC. At the regional level, the relation between the UN and the AU in the early 2000s was marked by a negotiation over the level of globalism and regionalism. In both of these, rational decisions regarding state interests determined the process , therefore failing a double decisive test.[23]

Regarding subsidiarity, constructivists would argue that such principle is the result of a shared value. In fact, subsidiarity was extensively used in the economic and social integration policies for decades at the OAU and the AU, and its principles of hierarchical relations were implicit in several internal security documents before the principle was named explicitly. The subsidiarity development was more a result of operational requirements (universal to institutional developments) than a shared idea. Therefore, it can be considered a failed straw in the wind.

Post-colonialism constitutes another alternative explanation for the reinforcement of UN SC primacy and subsidiarity.

Post-colonialism focusses on the dynamics of oppression, identities and the processes of autonomy. It grows out of the awareness of a Western superiority based on its development and rationality, where the West essentializes subaltern societies as static and underdeveloped (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988) Within post-colonialism, this essentialism has been challenged by the notion of hybridity, an evolving multiculturalism of (racial/ethnic) mixes. (Bhabha 1994) Neo-colonialism is identified as the form that Western powers have to maintain an indirect control over the previous colonies, via political, cultural and economic channels. (Slemon, 1991) Such a process is a phase of the bigger picture of the globalization of capitalism associated with imperialism. Overall, the processes are viewed in the perspective of the result of or reaction to the process of (neo) colonisation, also with "spaces" where black (or African) people make their own history instead of being passive participants in the history of others. (James, 1963)

In this case, a reinforcement of UN SC primacy would favour the ex-colonial Western powers, and a formal structure of subsidiarity would chain RO and SRO to this central decision-making mechanism, in which subaltern African countries have no representation with the power of veto. Institutional strengthening would be justified in the context of providing this structure with the means to execute its objectives. The objectives would be in line with veto holders with a seat at the UN SC, mainly concerned with pursuing the interests of Western transnational organisations in African states.

However, such a proposal fails a hoop test in the important process of transforming from the OAU to the AU. This process has several specific regional attributes not in line with a post-colonial theory: it is a result of a process of disengagement of the West from African security; APSA structure reflects singular characteristics of African diplomacy (for instances the panel of the wise or pan-Africanism); and its conceptualization is owned by African states. Even if subsidiarity became explicit in connection to the EU's support of APSA, it did not mean a foreign imposition (as mentioned before, the principle already existed). In addition, here subsidiarity development can be considered a failed straw in the wind test.[24]

6.6 Conclusion

In summary, theory must be contextualized in space, time (Rittberger et al., 2006) and agency. Therefore, in the same space and time more than one theoretical explanation can coexist.[25]

The main, case specific, results of the analysis are that UN SC primacy exceptions are inscribed at different levels of policy, and the principle of "subsidiarity" and APSA do not explicitly fully safeguard UN SC primacy. This is the result of processes in the last decades that can be characterised in the aftermath of the Cold War as mainly neorealist at both global and regional/sub-regional levels. The post-Cold War regime transition was determined in 1993 by the Somalia crisis, which met the definition of a neo-realism stance of the United States and a process of institutional (UN) disengagement. The latter, together with the failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994, led to a regionally neoliberal institutional outlook from African states that led to the creation of the AU in 2000 and to the EU's structural support of APSA in 2008. This regionalisation of security is connected to UN SC primacy by a resource dependence of RO and SRO on UN support.

The way the subsidiarity principle develops in the African institutional security will determine if UN SC primacy is reinforced or undermined. This paper concludes with some reflections on the way the principle has been applied so far. Revising the three guidelines for implementation of the principle of subsidiarity within the EU, one can identify the following adaptations to the African context.

The allocation of power does not need to be to the lowest unit and is determined by concerns over control. The application of subsidiarity to the security field means a more top down approach, with less decentralisation and less allocation of power to lower units (in comparison to its application in the economic and social affairs area in Africa or governance system in Europe).

The decision to allocate power is based on efficiency. But, in this case the efficiency test is the degree to which it prevents conflict escalation (a first response action). This analysis concludes that the test regarding legality connected to UN SC primacy has not been included in the APSA subsidiarity formulations.

Regarding the principle that power should be exercised by the member state affected by that power, in this case its direct applicability is for

the SRO of the country affected to be able to decide and, if not the SRO, then the AU. Although the SRO can request the AU to intervene (and then the UN), the SRO are not delegated the power of decision. For the AU vis a vis the UN, such a prerogative may exist in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the power of decision (not of implementation) is withhold from the multilateral organisation closer to the member state affected (SRO) but not from its upper level (AU).

Although humanitarian concerns may guide us into thinking that it is better to make a mistake by intervening than by not intervening, the realities of military intervention occur outside, or on the frontiers, of the responsibility to protect and, therefore, the importance attached to the principles and rules of the regime that structure interventions.

Notes

[1] Research for this paper was supported by a scholarship from the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Portugal (SFRH/BD/44998/2008) and field research was possible in the context of the project "Monitoring Conflicts in the Horn of Africa" of the Centre of African Studies – ISCTE, Lisbon University Institute (PTDC/ AFR/100460/2008) funded by the same foundation. The author would like to thank useful comments, in particular John Cameroon, João Correlo, Farzane Zarepour, colleagues at the Research School in Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and comments at presentations, in particular the seminar in Addis Ababa on the 17th of December 2012, at the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA); any remaining errors are my own.

[2] Other sources of challenges, such as judicial decisions and bilateral or multilateral security arrangements are not analysed here. An analysis of de facto UN SC primacy is not provided here.

[3] An initial forty-eight exploratory interviews were conducted in April and May of 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Nairobi, Kenya, to identify main issues regarding the institutional security architecture in Africa. As a result, the issue of this paper was identified and the paper developed based mainly on secondary and official sources. In December of 2012, in a second visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, twenty-three confirmatory interviews were conducted to validate some of the findings. The interviewed were senior officials of multilateral, diplomatic, civil society and academic organizations.

[4] In this context, the text refers to institutions as specific international organizations working within regimes.

[5] Which provide no role for external agents on the domestic affairs of a state.

[6] R2P is a norm claiming that sovereignty is not a right but involves responsibilities for states to provide security for their populations. If states fail to fulfil those responsibilities it can be the international community, through a UN mandate, to perform them.

[7] Together with the decision-making mechanisms, the other two components of subsidiarity, burden-sharing and division of labour, also require clarification (African Union 2012).

[8] There are four types of tests based on the interaction if evidence is necessary (imply a statement "only if") or sufficient (imply a statement "if"). A straw in the wind test provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion to establish or disprove a hypothesis. This can be the case for probabilistic predictions, the failure of which may reflect only the downside probabilities. A hoop test provides a necessary but not sufficient criterion for accepting the hypothesis; therefore, it may eliminate alternative hypotheses but not totally validate a passing hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis needs to "jump through the hoop" to remain under consideration. The example is answering a question of the type: "Was the accused in the state on the day of the murder?" If the accused was in the state, he/she may or may not be the murderer, but, if the accused was not in the state, he/she could not have done it. A smoking gun test is a sufficient but not necessary criterion for the hypothesis. The example is a situation where a smoking gun is seen in the suspects hand moments after the shooting, which constitutes quite conclusive proof of guilt, but a suspect not seen with a smoking gun is not proven innocent. Passing confirms the hypothesis, but failing does not eliminate it. A doubly decisive test is a necessary and sufficient criterion to accept a hypothesis. It is a combination of the hoop and smoking gun tests. The example is when a security camera captures the face of the murderer in the act. This confirms one hypothesis and eliminates others. (Van Evera 1997; Bennett 2010). It is normally the combination of more than one type of test and of confirmed and failed results that together give more credibility to a hypothesis than to others.

[9] Later adopted in the EU treaty under Article 5.

[10] During the five years after 1990, the UN initiated 21 PKOs compared to 18 in the first forty four years of its existence. From 1995 to 1999, an additional 11 PKOs were started. (UN, 2012)

[11] A previous proposal was rejected in the 1992 Dakar Summit with a decision to keep OAU out of peacekeeping (Kindiki 2003).

[12] Observer missions' mandate is to oversee ceasefires between belligerents; peacekeepers are located alongside the parties but not in an interposing position.

[13] At this stage, OAU had a short track record of interventions: in PKO in Chad in 1980 and observer missions in Rwanda in 1990 and in Burundi in 1993.

[14] At this stage, OAU had a short track record of interventions: in PKO in Chad in 1980 and observer missions in Rwanda in 1990 and in Burundi in 1993.

[15] There is one RM for each ASF in each one of the five sub-regions. An RM can match the RECs or aggregate more than one REC in one RM. An ASF is composed of about 5,000 personnel (depending on states' contributions) with more than two-thirds being troops and the remaining being civilians and police.

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[17] Although the reference is to a document of 2003, it quotes a policy document of 1997, when the AU was the OAU.

[18] This decision over "peace operations" can be considered also to cover peace enforcement operations, specially considering the recognition of being exceptions to the UN Charter.

[19] The same AU policy recommendation would not grant this possibility of "retroactive approval" to the (SRO) RMs for both peace enforcement and peace support operations cases (African Union, 2003). But, this duality of treatment may be under consideration to the extent that a more recent AU report considered that the principles of subsidiarity that apply to the relationship between the UN and the AU should also apply to the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs (African Union, 2012).

[20] The same AU policy recommendation would not grant this possibility of "retroactive approval" to the (SRO) RMs for both peace enforcement and peace support operations cases (African Union, 2003). But, this duality of treatment may be under consideration to the extent that a more recent AU report considered that the principles of subsidiarity that apply to the relationship between the UN and the AU should also apply to the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs (African Union, 2012).

[21] The possibility of UN financing RO PKO was proposed in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace and in 2005 by the AU on the "Ezulwini Consensus" (African Union, 2005).

[22] In 2013, China became the thirteenth personnel contributor to the UN PKO (UN PKO, 2013) with 1,868 persons and offered the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa estimated to have cost $200 million USD (Bayoumy, 2012). India and Brazil are also contributors to the UN PKO, with the former being the second biggest contributor with 7,840 personnel and with deployments in significant

missions in Africa (DRC and South Sudan), and the latter with a contribution of 2,202 personnel, mainly to the mission in Haiti (United Nations, 2013).

[23] The possibility of being driven by a state's power (neorealist) can be downplayed considering the lack of veto rights on the AU PSC.

[24] The other likely process to be explained by post-colonialism is the failure to materialize a regional security model in the 2000s. However, such a process is more related to a power and interest dynamic of dominant states than necessarily linked to post-colonial dynamics, with an example in the freeze of UN SC reform in 2005.

[25] For instance, a region (period or actor) may be explained by neorealism while another region (period or actor) by neoliberal institutionalism.

7 Concluding Remarks

The root of this work can be traced back to a history of civic engagement and particularly to the work performed at the United Nations in East Timor from 2003 to 2005 and Guyana in 2006. This experience informed the main research question: what are the effects of external interventios in conflicts?

The research used a mixed method approach, with one country case study, one institutional case study, and an econometric analysis based on a new dataset on external interventions. The results identify that, as expected, partisan interventions, in particular military and economic, lead to increased conflict intensity but, unexpectedly, neutral interventions of the diplomatic type have no effect on conflict intensity. The novelty of the result can be attributed to a better control for the endogeneity of the relationship. Building on the finding of the military escalatory effect, the institutional case study identify that there are exceptions to the United Nations Security Council primacy on decisions over military interventions on the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Together both of these findings illuminate on new relevant questions for research, but before presenting them a brief comment is due on the contemporary connection of these findings.

The research was delimited up to 2010 mainly due to data availability, this was also the year when in December the Arab spring started and would spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa in subsequent years. Although many of these conflicts do not feat the definition of state-based civil war used in this research, the case of Lybia in North of Africa does. The inclusion of one case might not have decisive effects on the econometric tests but the case of the Lybia conflict had other repercussions to the topic of this research, and in particular to the institutional case study of the relationship between the UN and AU.

The 2011 military interventions implemented by NATO upon a decision of the UN Security Council (UN SC) was a defining process with repercussion on the use of the responsibility to protect at the level of the UN SC and on the role of the African Union (AU) on processes of military intervention in the region.

Also relevant for this relationship of the AU with the world and in particular with the UN, the recent developments of the Kenya case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the 2007-2008 post-eletion violence may have repercussions on the relationship between the AU and the UN SC. This relationship is further determined by the UN Security Council reform, a process that recurrently sees some developments.

In summary, the Arab Spring, the Lybia intervention and the AU relationship with both of these and with the developments at the ICC and UN SC reform process all constitute recent processes intricately connected to this research making the research current and relevant.

I will now conclude with the identification of some prospective areas of research. One area is the development of an external interventions intention dataset or a dataset on interventions which are more difficult to measure, as withholding support or covert support. Another is the use of more case studies representative of other conflict-interventions patterns.

Based on the findings from the diplomacy processes, two lines of research were identified. One involves a more structured analysis of failed and successful diplomacy, eventually with the use of a different unit of analysis of mediation process. Another moves the analysis from data and models at the macro-level and enquires at the meso- and micro-levels on the dynamics of interventions, with a possible comparison with mediation processes without external involvement.

The final chapter dealing with UNSC primacy de jure legality of military interventions demands an empirical assessment of the de facto legality of military interventions. This assessment has been started, but is not included in this thesis.

Finally, this research identifies the escalatory or de-escalatory effect of certain interventions. It does not analyse whether these escalatory processes lead to quicker termination of conflicts, either by victory or agreements, or whether these conflicts did not resume. It also did not explore how different intervention types affect such processes. It could be that interventions and the intensification of conflict are the necessary

means for achieving certain peace or that interventions and escalation are just altering and prolonging processes which, without interventions, would eventually reach a certain non-violent equilibrium.

A1 Appendices 1: Codebook of the External interventions in civil wars dataset (Africa 1989-2010)

A1.1 Description of the dataset

Unit of analysis: Interventions in conflicts.

Object of analysis: conflict-month.

Intervention: Convention breaking political, economic or military (including peacekeeping missions) actions in a country by targeting the authority structures of the country (in support of the government, opposition or neutral) in order to influence the balance of power between the parties or affect the conflict process (adapted from Rosenau, 1968). The intervention is carried out by a third party foreign to the conflict country which can be a state or non-state actor.

Convention breaking: Refers to a significant and temporary change in the normal course of relations between countries. The main qualifications for convention breaking or exceptionality criteria are not only the characteristics of the interventions themselves, but also the fact that they occur during a conflict.

Conflict process: A process in a country where at least 25 battle deaths have occurred in an intrastate conflict involving the state and at least one organised challenging group.

Conflict intensity: Number of battle-related deaths occurring during the conflict.

Conflict period: From the first battle death of a conflict that reached 25 battle deaths per year until the month of the last registered battle death event.

Period of the dataset: 1980–2010.

Intervention types:

a) Military

Troops, naval forces, equipment or aid, intelligence advisors, air support and military sanctions.

b) Economic

Grants, loans, non-military equipment or expertise, credits, relief of past obligations and economic sanctions.

c) Diplomatic

Mediation, forum, arbitration, recall, offer, request and political sanctions.

The military, economic and diplomatic interventions follow Regan et al.'s (2009) definition and can support the government, the opposition or a neutral party.

d) UN and non-UN missions

Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) defined a peacekeeping operation as:

- The deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in target states;
- A mandate (multilateral agreements, peace agreements or resolutions of the UN or regional organisations) established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones and taking responsibility for the security situation between formerly, potentially or presently warring parties; and
- The maintenance of neutrality towards the conflicting parties, but not necessarily impartiality towards their behaviour.

The peacekeeping characteristics identified by Diehl (1994: 4–13) are:

- Confidence building addressing distrust between the parties;
- Consent of the conflict parties;
- Neutrality towards the conflict parties (not impartiality or self-defence);
- Use of force in self-defence only; and
- Limited military capability.

Based on Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Diehl (2008) and Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), UN and non-UN missions are defined as:

1 - Prevention or political operations: Deployed prior to the anticipated outbreak of armed conflict, these can be fact-finding or mediation missions (cases of UN mediation or peacemaking without, however, a follow-up peacekeeping mission). They also include cases of UN "political and peacebuilding missions" run through the department of Political Affairs (as opposed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations). These constitute an intervention of a diplomatic type, but more permanent than typical ad-hoc short-term negotiating teams.

2 - Observer missions: Where the description of the mandate in UN documents refers only to "monitoring," "reporting" or "observing", these missions usually do not have a large military component (personnel numbering in the hundreds) and have very limited rules of engagement (often unarmed missions).

3 - Traditional peacekeeping operations (interposition mission): These missions provide protection through interposition, or the separation of conflicting parties and the maintenance of buffer zones; the monitoring of ceasefires (including monitoring and facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops); the maintenance of law and order (including the provision of security for humanitarian aid programmes); and the disarming and demobilising of factions. These are normally lightly armed missions. If the only function of the mission is one of these areas (or even a combination of security provision with humanitarian assistance), they would be a traditional peacekeeping operation.

4 - Multidimensional operations: These operations include at least two dimensions beyond the provision of protection, including electoral assistance, human rights components, humanitarian assistance, civilian administration and reconstruction. They normally comprise a substantial civilian component to perform these dimensions and can include a transitional administration.

5 - Enforcement missions: These occur when the peace operation is authorised under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and/or frequently undertakes large-scale combat operations against one or more of the parties. They are not based on consent, whether with or without transitional administration, and are deployed to create—rather than maintain—peace.

Mandates 1 through 4 are based on Chapter VI which addresses the peaceful settlement of disputes (consent) and mandate 5 on Chapter VII which uses sanctions or force to settle disputes (enforcement). The mandates are determined in the UN Security Council's decisions, and the coding is for the strongest mandate taken by the mission throughout its existence (increasing from 1 to 5). If the mandate of a mission changes from Chapters VI to VII with a large enough mandate, it is considered a new mission.

Several missions have a Chapter VI mandate, but then give Chapter VII powers for its implementation in an UN Security Council decision. These are different from purely Chapter VII peace-enforcement missions. For instance, a mandate of humanitarian support can be given a Chapter VII power to carry it out, meaning the troops securing the execution of humanitarian support can engage in fighting in order to implement the mandate. This is different from a peace-enforcement mission entrusted with the mission to change the balance of capabilities of the forces to the extent of achieving peace. The coding process identifies the disaggregation of all the mandates of a mission and, if given Chapter VII powers, also identifies it. Considering that Chapter VII enforcement powers (for Chapter VI missions or peace-enforcement missions) affect the conflict dynamics, all missions with Chapter VII powers are considered to be an enforcement mission (Mandate 5).

A few particular interventions require a different category, but because they only occur once it was considered more appropriate to assign them to an existing category. These cases include police missions normally associated with a PKO and for short periods of time around elections such as EUPOL Kinshasa which was coded as troops due to the security functions; they also include Security Sector Reform (SSR) advisory missions, such as EUSEC–DR CONGO, which was coded as a political mission because of its long-term approach in an advisory role.

A1.2 Descriptive statistics of interventions variable

A total of 576 interventions were inclded, with most interventions (377) being neutral diplomatic interventions and missions. Most of the 139 partisan interventions involve military in support of the government. Military interventions also account for the majority of the interventions in support of the opposition. Diplomatic and military interventions

numbered 305 and 161 respectively, with mediations and troops being the most recurrent sub-type of interventions (248 and 62, respectively). There are also 52 economic interventions, 32 UN missions and 26 non-UN missions. Table A1.1 presents the descriptive statistics of interventions.

Table A1.1 Descriptive statistics of interventions' targets, types and sub-types

Intervention	Target			Total
	Partisan, in support of		Neutral	
	Government	Opposition		
	1	2	3	
11 - Troops	41	14	7	62
12 - Naval forces	2	0	0	2
13 - Equipment or aid	31	16	1	48
14 - Intelligence or advisors	14	4	4	22
15 - Air support	9	1	0	10
16 - Military sanctions	5	5	7	17
Sub total	102	40	19	161
21 - Grants	11	5	7	23
22 - Loans	2	0	1	3
23 - Non-military equipment	0	0	0	0
24 - Credit	1	0	0	1
25 - Relieve past obligations	4	3	3	10
26 - Economic sanctions	5	9	1	15
Sub total	23	17	12	52
31 - Mediation	1	0	247	248
32 - Forum	1	0	23	24
33 - Arbitration	0	0	0	0
34 - Recall	0	0	1	1
35 - Offer to mediate	1	0	17	18

Intervention	Target			Total
	Partisan, in support of		Neutral	
	Government	Opposition		
	1	2	3	
36 - Request to mediate	1	0	7	8
37 - Political sanctions	4	2	0	6
Sub total	8	2	295	305
41 - UN preventive/political	1	0	7	8
42 - UN Observer	0	0	6	6
43 - UN Traditional	0	0	7	7
44 - UN Multidimensional	0	0	2	2
45 - UN Enforcement	0	0	9	9
Sub total	1	0	31	32
51 - non-UN preventive/political	0	0	1	1
52 - non-UN Observer	0	0	5	5
53 - non-UN Traditional	2	0	6	8
54 - non-UN Multidimensional	0	0	1	1
55 - non-UN Enforcement	3	1	7	11
Sub total	5	1	20	26
Total	139	60	377	576

A1.3 Data structure

Table A1.2 Dataset variables

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
Basic Information				
Dates				
year	Year of	Year (YYYY) in	Year and month of a conflict	Input

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
	observa-tion	which conflict is active	period. A conflict period starts with the first battle death of a conflict (UCDP GED) which reached 25 battle deaths and ends with the last event that includes battle deaths (UCDP GED). Months or years without death events within a conflict period have entries with zero deaths and can have interventions asso-ciated with it. More than one intervention in one month is coded in order in month by MM.X (X=1,2, 3,…)	Num
month	Month in which conflict is active	Month in which conflict is active (MM)		Input Num
time_m	Months since ini-tiation of conflict	Calendar counting of months since the start of the conflict	Includes both active and inac-tive conflict months. Calcula-tions are made from Startdate to the Year/Month entry.	Calc Num
time_yr	Calendar years since ini-tiation of conflict	Calendar counting of years since the start of the con-flict	Includes both active and inac-tive conflict years. Calcula-tions are made from Startdate to the Year entry.	Calc Num
Conflict ID				
cntryID	Country ID	Country the gov-ernment incom-patibility refers to. The Gleditsch & Ward country code for the in-compatibility/ actor	This references the UCDP Armed Conflict data (GWNOA) on incompatibility/actor and not the UCDP GED of the country location where the event took place. Instead, it is similar to the Side_A of UCDP GED which refers to the government side of the dyad. This coding option is used because one conflict can occur in more than one coun-try, but events will involve GWNOA which corresponds to Side_A.	UCDP AC Num
subregion	Africa sub-region	African sub-region where the country is located	Five UN sub-regions (UN sta-tistics division): Eastern Afri-ca, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa	Calc Num

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
d EastAC-try	East African country	African sub-region where the country is located	Country where the conflict occurred. Based on SubRegion.	Calc 0-1
d Middle-ACtry	Middle African country	African sub-region where the country is located	Country where the conflict occurred. Based on SubRegion.	Calc 0-1
d North-ernACtry	Northen African country	African sub-region where the country is located	Country where the conflict occurred. Based on SubRegion.	Calc 0-1
d SouthACtry	South African country	African sub-region where the country is located	Country where the conflict occurred. Based on SubRegion.	Calc 0-1
d WesternACtry	Western African country	African sub-region where the country is located	Country where the conflict occurred. Based on SubRegion.	Calc 0-1
Cnfid_u	Conflict identification of UCDP	The unique identifier of conflicts in UCDP GED	Conflict ID of UCDP GED for type 1 conflicts.	UCDP GED Num
Cnfid_r	Conflict identification of Regan et al. (2009)	The unique identification of conflicts in Regan et al. (2009)	Year/months with conflict identification from Regan et al. (2009).	Regan Num
stdt_mmddyyyy	Date of conflict initiation	The date of the first battle-related death in the conflict	For conflicts that started before 1989, this will be UCDP Armed Conflict StartDate; for the rest, the Date_start of the first event in UCDP GED.	UCDP GED UCDP AC Date
eedt_mmddyyyy	Date when conflict activity ended	The date, as precise as possible, when conflict activity ended	Based on UCDP GED Date_end of the last recorded event for the conflict.	UCDP GED Date
Conflict dyad				
conflictdyad	Government and group name	Primary party to the conflict on the government side/ Primary party(ies) to the conflict on the	Identifying the country of side A in a conflict. Always the government side in internal conflicts. This is a primary party to the conflict. Identifying the opposition	UCDP AC & UCDP GED String

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
		opposition	actor(s) on side B in the conflict. In an internal conflict, this includes a military opposition organisation. Note that this is a primary party to the conflict. When a new party emerges, the month of initiation is the one where the first event is recorded. In the months without conflict dyad, there was no active conflict events between the parties based on UCDP GED.	
Incompatibility				
incomp	Dyad incompatibility	Categorical: 1-Territory, 2- Government	From UCDP Armed Conflict – match of conflict ID (available in UCDP GED).	UCDP AC 1-2
terr	Name of territory	If the incompatibility is for territory	From UCDP Armed Conflict – match of conflict ID (available in UCDP GED).	UCDP AC String
ideology	Orientation of groups	Primary organisational lines of the groups	From Regan et al. (2009). This field for ethnic and religious orientation is based on Ted Gurr's Minority at Risk Classification. Ideological conflicts are those contesting dominant political or economic ideology.	Regan 0-1
religion	Orientation of groups	Primary organisational lines of the groups	See ideology comments.	Regan 0-1
ethnic	Orientation of groups	Primary organisational lines of the groups	See ideology comments.	Regan 0-1
Technology of conflict				
Civil War intensity				
int_m	Intensity in battle deaths	Best estimate of death per conflict accumulated to the month.	Calculated based on event of UCDP GED from Best_est and using the end date of the event as a reference for the	UCDP GED Num

Variable	**Label**	**Description**	**Comment**	**Data 1)**
			entry date.	
sqrt_Int_m	Square root of intensity in battle deaths	Square root of int_m		Calc Num
lnint_m	Natural logarithm of Int M			Calc
int_m_lev el	Level of conflict intensity in the month	0 – 0; 1-1-24; 2-25-999; 3->999	Transformation of Int_M into a categorical variables. Calcu-lated based on Int_M.	Calc 0-3
cum-int_mlevel	Cumula-tive inten-sity	0 – 0; 1-1-24; 2-25-999; 3->999 -9: not possible to determine	Cumulative level of the con-flict since it started. Calculations for conflicts that started before 1989 were based on best estimate of annual battle fatalities (bdeadbes) from PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 for those years. If prior to 1989, there are years with deter-mined and undetermined deaths; the determined have been considered in the calcu-lations. If all years prior to 1989 are undetermined, those years are not considered in the calculations. The latter situation might lead to situa-tions of underclassification of the level of conflict (con-flicts: 219).	UCDP GED UCDP AC 0-1
int_yr	Intensity in battle deaths per year	Best estimate of death per conflict accumulated to the year for year n	Calculated based on Int_M for all months of year n.	Calc Num
int_yr_lev el	Intensity level in battle deaths per year	0 – 0; 1-1-24; 2-25-999; 3->999	Based on Int_Yr for all months of year n.	Calc Num

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
int_yr_leveln1	Intensity level in battle deaths per year in year n-1	0 – 0; 1-1-24; 2-25-999; 3->999	For all months in year n regarding corresponding year n-1 conflict level. Based on Int_Yr n-1. If it corresponds to a year before 1989 based on best estimate of annual battle fatalities (bdeadbes) from PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008.	Calc Num
Non-civil war political disorder				
nbevts_all_type	Number of all types of events in the month	Number of events (Etype SCAD) in a month	Measure of intensity of political disorder in terms of number of events that occurred in a month. There is a significant time overlap between SCAD and UCDP GED (only 14 months with events representing 1% of months and 1% of events of SCAD are not accounted in UCDP GED). The types of events are: organised demonstrations; spontaneous demonstrations; organised violent riot; spontaneous violent riot; general strike; limited strike; government violence (repression); anti-government violence; extra-government violence; intra-government violence.	SCAD Calc
mnt_ttdeath_all_typ	Monthly total deaths of all types	Sum of best estimates of deaths in the events in the month	Records the best estimate of the number of persons killed in the non-civil war political disorder events. If multiple estimates are given, the mean number of reported deaths or the most recent figures are used. Not all unknown death categories are considered in the calculations (corresponding to 5% of events).	SCAD Calc
Third-Party Intervention Type				
d_interv	If there	1 – there was an	The intervention is coded for	Dummy

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
	was an inter-vention	intervention 0 – there was no intervention	the most precise date when it occurred. If involving the deployment of troops, the date of deployment is prefer-able to the date of the deci-sion to the intervener.	
interv	Identifi-cation of type of interven-tions	10-16 – Military 20-26 – Economic 30-36 – Diplomatic 41-45 – UN PKO 51-55 – Non-UN PKO	Identification of the type of intervention as identified by subsequent dummy variables. The underlying principle is to differentiate interventions' entries by type of interven-tion and month of occur-rence.	Num
Military				
d_m	Dummy for mili-tary	If the intervention was of the mili-tary type		Calc 0-1
troops	Military interven-tion type - troops	Month in which an intervention with troops is started or reported	Month in which the interven-tion type started (variable based on Regan et al., 2009, and corresponding dayint, yrintv and mnthint for the intervention). The code is for the initiation of an intervention. Once initi-ated, if the troops are rein-forced, no new intervention is coded.	Regan 0-1
na-val_forces	Military interven-tion type - naval forces	Month in which an intervention with naval forces is started or report-ed	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
equip-ment_aid	Military interven-tion type - equip-ment or aid	Month in which an intervention with equipment or aid is started or re-ported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
intelli-gence_adv isors	Military interven-tion type - intelli-	Month in which an intervention with intelligence or advisors is started	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
	gence or advisors	or reported		
air_support	Military intervention type - air support	Month in which air support is started or reported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
military_sanctions	Military intervention type - military sanctions	Month in which military sanctions are started or reported (sanctions' initiation and termination dates considered are when they become effective)	See troop comment. Party supported. If the intervention was against the government and opposition, the target is 3 - Neutral. If the sanction is against one side (e.g., government) the target will be the opposite side (e.g., opposition). If a sanction is lifted, the intervention target is the party released of the sanction.	Regan 0-1
Economic				
d_e	Dummy for economic	If the intervention was economic		Calc 0-1
grants	Economic intervention type - grants	Month in which grants are started or reported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
loans	Economic intervention type - loans	Month in which loans are started or reported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
non-milit_equip_expert	Economic intervention type - non-military equipment or expertise	Month in which non-military equipment or expertise is started or reported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
credits	Economic intervention type - credits	Month in which credits are started or reported	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
re-lieve_past_obligat	Economic interven-tion type - relief of past obli-gations	Month in which relief of past obligations is started or report-ed	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
econ_sanc tions	Economic interven-tion type - economic sanctions	Month in which economic sanc-tions are started or reported	See troops and military sanc-tions comments.	Regan & New 0-1
Diplomatic				
d_d	Dummy for diplo-matic	If the intervention was diplomatic		Calc 0-1
mediation	Diplomatic for inter-vention type - mediation	Month in which mediation is started or report-ed	Regan et al.'s (2009) work is based on Bercovitch (1997), where the mediation is a non-coercive, nonviolent, and ultimately nonbinding form of intervention. Mediators enter into a conflict to affect, change, modify, or influence the outcome. The mediator can represent a state or a non-state actor.	Regan 0-1
forum	Diplomatic for inter-vention type - forum	Month in which forum is started or reported	See troops comment. Exam-ples of forum can be an open conference targeting the con-flict.	Regan 0-1
arbitration	Diplomatic for inter-vention type - arbitration	Month in which arbitration is started or report-ed	See troops comment.	Regan 0-1
recall	Diplomatic for inter-vention type - recall	Month in which recall is started or reported	A recall of an ambassador (or the ranking representative in the county) occurred when the intervening government calls home—either permanent-ly or for consultations—the ranking diplomat and the re-	Regan 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
			call are explicitly tied to the behaviour of the state in its internal conflict (Regan et al., 2009).	
offer	Diplomatic for intervention type – offer	Month in which offer is started or reported	If there was an explicit offer from a third party which was not accepted by both sides of a conflict.	Regan 0-1
request	Diplomatic for intervention type	Month intervention type started	If there was an explicit request by one side of a conflict for a diplomatic intervention.	Regan 0-1
political_sanct	Political sanctions	Mainly international organisations' sanctions	Similar to the military/economic sanctions (already presented in Regan et al., 2009). Negatively normally refer to suspension of membership or restrictions in representation for an organisation (in such cases, in support of challenger group in the dyad). If positive, can refer to recognition of a new government (in support of government).	New 0-1
UN and Non-UN missions				
d_mission	Identification of mission	Dummy for UN and non-UN mission	See description of UN and non-UN mission above.	Calc 1-0
d_unmission	Dummy for UN mission	Dummy for if the mission was by the UN	The executing agency is the UN.	Calc 1-0
typeunmission	Type of UN mission	1 – Prevention or political 2 – Observer 3 – Traditional peacekeeping 4 – Multidimensional PKO 5 – Enforcement	Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), Mays (2011), and SIPRI MOPD (2012) and Diehl (2008) constitute the main references for UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations whereas Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2008) are for UN PKO. See description of mandates for rules of types of interventions.	Several sources 1-5

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
unpolit	Prevention or Political UN intervention	Dummy for prevention or political type of UN intervention	Corresponds to 1 –prevention or political type of UN intervention. See description of missions for rules. Missions with mandates that fall in more than one category are normally coded according to the highest mandate if previously identified rules are observed. In this case, a mission needs to have a "prevention or political" mandate to be classified as the prevention or political type, although if it has other mandates it can be classified as another type.	Calc 1-0
unobserv	Observer UN inter-ven-tion	Dummy for Observer of type of UN intervention	Corresponds to 2 – observer of type of UN intervention. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_unpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
untradit	Traditional UN intervention	Dummy for traditional peacekeeping type of UN intervention	Corresponds to 3 – traditional peacekeeping type of UN intervention. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_unpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
unmultid	Multidimensional UN inter-ven-tion	Dummy for multidimensional PKO of type of UN intervention	Corresponds to 4 – multidimensional PKO of type of UN intervention. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_unpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
unenforc	Enforcement of UN inter-ven-tion	Dummy for enforcement of type of UN intervention	Corresponds to 5 – enforcement of type of UN intervention. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_unpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
ftnMan	Fortna Mandate	Fortna (2008) mandate	Categorical classification following type UN for 2 – observer, 3 – traditional, and 4 – multidimensional interventions.	Catg

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
d_nonunmission	Dummy for non-UN mission	Dummy for if the mission was not carried out by the UN	The executing agency is not the UN.	Calc 1-0
typenun	Type of non-UN mission	1 – Prevention or political 2 – Observer 3 – Traditional peacekeeping 4 – Multidimensional PKO 5 – Enforcement	See of description of d_typeunmission but for non-UN mission.	Several sources 1-5
nunpolit	Prevention or Political non-UN inter-ven-tion	Dummy for prevention or political type of non-UN intervention	Corresponds to 1 – prevention or political type of UN intervention. See description of missions for rules. Missions who have mandates that fall in more than one category are normally coded according to the highest mandate if previously identified rules are observed. In this case, a mission needs to have a “prevention or political” mandate to be classified as the prevention or political type, although if it has other mandates it can be classified as another type.	Calc 1-0
nunobserv	Observer UN inter-ven-tion	Dummy for observer of type of non-UN intervention	Corresponds to 2 – observer of type of UN. intervention See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_nunpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
nuntradit	Traditional UN intervention	Dummy for traditional peacekeeping type of non-UN intervention	Corresponds to 3 – traditional peacekeeping type of UN intervention. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_nunpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
nunmultid	Multidimensional UN intervention	Dummy for multidimensional PKO of type of non-UN intervention	Corresponds to 4 – Multidimensional PKO of type UN. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_nunpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
nunenforc	Enforcement UN intervention	Dummy for enforcement of type of non-UN intervention	Corresponds to 5 – Enforcement of Type UN. See description of mandates for rules and comment for d_nunpolit which also applies here.	Calc 1-0
Intensity of interventions				
strong_pko	Strong PKO	Strong mandate of PKO	The fields of mandate of missions also serve as a proxy for intensity of intervention. Strong PKO is a grouping of 4 – multidimensional and 5 – enforcement mission mandates (following Sambanis, 2006)	New 0-1
count_mil	Count Military	Count number of interventions in the conflict since start or 1989 if starting before	For diplomatic and economic interventions, it is more difficult to objectively quantify the interventions due to lack of records. For this reason, a limited proxy measure was developed to count the number of each type of intervention in the conflict. It measures the activity of interventions without accounting for each intervention's strength.	New Count
count_econ	Count Economic	Count number of interventions in the conflict since start or 1989 if starting before		New Count
count_dipl	Count Diplomatic	Count number of interventions in the conflict since start or 1989 if starting before		New Count
count_miss	Count missions	Count number of interventions in the conflict since start or 1989 if starting before		New Count
troopnumbers	Troops	Numbers deployed or, if unavailable, authorised	This applies solely for military and mission (UN and non-UN) interventions. For missions, numbers correspond to the year with the biggest number of total personnel deployed (or authorised if deployment infor-	SIPRI and other Num
milobs	Military Observers	Numbers deployed or, if unavailable, authorised		

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
civpol	Civilian Police	Numbers deployed or, if unavailable, authorised.	mation not available). For single interventions it mainly refers to troops and the numbers reported in news or case studies.	
civst	Civilian Staff	Numbers deployed or, if unavailable, authorised.		
expense	Expenditure	Amount in million USD of the mission per year		
Third-Party ID				
Target and third party				
target	Target of the inter-ven-tion the intervener supports	Categorical: 1=government, 2=opposition, 3=neutral	Identifies the direction of support of the intervention. Diplomatic interventions are considered neutral by default unless it is a sanction. Sanctions have two readings, in support of government or opposition or against the opposition or government, respectively. In this way, target always has a positive relationship with the side being supported in the conflict.	Regan & Calc 1-3
unit_third _party	Name of the third party	Name from third-party list; if more than one, this will be the leading third party	Based on third-party list extended from Regan et al. (2009).	Regan & New String
unitcode	Code of the third party	Code of third party in unit	Similar to Regan et al.'s (2009) thrdpar for military and economic and unitcode for diplomatic.	Regan & New Num
Unitcode1 to unitcode 5	Code of the third party	Code of third party from third-party list	Additional third parties involved. Countries involved in missions are not detailed, but instead the international organisation.	Regan & New Num

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
dipl_identity	Identification of the third party	Name of the leading member of a diplomatic intervention or designation of a mission		Regan & New String
Origin of third party				
d_sbrg	Dummy for same sub-region	Identification if one of the third parties is from the same sub-region as the intervened country	Sub-regions follow UN statistics classification for countries. Non-state third parties' classification based on location of the actor. See third-party list for identification of the sub-regions.	New Calc 0-1
d_au	Dummy for the AU/OAU	Identification if one of the third parties is the AU or OAU	AU is the sole single African organisation above the sub-regions. Other third parties are either from outside Africa or inter-Africa.	New Calc 0-1
d_nrtaf	Dummy for North Africa	Identification if one of the third parties is from North Africa	Sub-regions follow UN statistics classification for countries. Other actors are mostly sub-regional organisations, although there are also some other sub-regional third parties.	New Calc 0-1
d_midaf	Dummy for Middle Africa	Identification if one of the third parties is from Middle Africa	See NrtAf comments.	New Calc 0-1
d_eastaf	Dummy for East Africa	Identification if one of the third parties is from East Africa	See NrtAf comments.	New Calc 0-1
d_westaf	Dummy for West Africa	Identification if one of the third parties is from West Africa	See NrtAf comments.	New Calc 0-1
d_southafrica	Dummy for Southern Africa	Identification if one of the third parties is from Southern Africa	See NrtAf comments.	New Calc 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
d_reg	Dummy for the region	Identification if the third party is from any of the sub-regions or AU	Captures if third party is from the African region.	New Calc 0-1
d_neigb	Dummy for neigh-bour	Identification if one of the third parties is a neigh-bour to the inter-vened country		New Calc 0-1
Type of third party				
sin-gle_state	Single State	If the third party is a single state		New 0-1
group_stat es	Group of states	If the third party is a group of states		New 0-1
single_igo	Single IGO	If the third party is an international government or-ganisation (IGO)—a group of states with formal stat-ues and a formal name		New 0-1
group_igo	Group of IGO	If the third party involves more than one IGO		New 0-1
other	Other not state or IGO par-ties	Includes NGOs, prominent per-sons (i.e., inde-pendent individu-als), religious denominations, etc.		New 0-1
combina-tion	Combina-tion of third par-ties	If there is a com-bination of types of interveners, state, IGO or others		New 0-1
p5	UN SC perma-nent 5	If at least one of the third parties is one of the per-manent members		New 0-1

Variable	**Label**	**Description**	**Comment**	**Data 1)**
		of the UN Security Council		
un	United Nations	If one of the third parties is the UN		New 0-1
ex_coloniser	Ex-coloniser	If the third parties include a former coloniser of the country intervened		New 0-1
Bilateral trade				
heover-expn	Exports over all exports	Ratio of exports from third party to intervened country over all exports of third party to the world in the year of the intervention; corresponds to the third party with the highest dependence from the intervened in the year of intervention	Calculated based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) for total exports and total imports. Ratio multiplied by 100. Reflects the degree of dependence of the intervener in the intervened market for its exports.	New Cal UN-comtrade
hghioverin	Imports over all imports	Ratio of imports of third party from intervened country over all imports of third party from the world in the year of the intervention, of the third party with the highest dependence from intervened in the year of interventions	Calculated based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) for total exports and total imports. Ratio multiplied by 100. Reflects the degree of dependence of intervener in the intervened market for its imports.	New Cal UN-comtrade
heioverallei	Highest exports and imports over all imports and ex-	Highest ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the sum of all exports and imports to/from the	Calculated based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) for total exports and total imports.	New Cal UN-comtrad

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
	ports—dependence	world in the year of the intervention, among third parties that intervened in the country	Ratio multiplied by 100. Total dependence of intervener on interned country.	e
heoverexpn_1	Exports over all exports n-1	Same as above, but for the year prior to the intervention	If high dependence, it should be picked up prior to intervention. Ratio multiplied by 100.	New Cal UN-comtrade
hghioverin_1	Imports over all imports n-1	Same as above, but for the year prior to the intervention	If high dependence, it should be picked up prior to intervention. Ratio multiplied by 100.	New Cal UN-comtrade
heioverallein_1	Highest exports and imports over all imports and exports—dependence n-1	Same as above, but for the year prior to the intervention	If high dependence, it should be picked up prior to intervention. Ratio multiplied by 100.	New Cal UN-comtrade
Intervention dates				
stdt2_mmddyyyy	Start date (MM/DD/YY) of intervention	Most precise possible date of initiation of the intervention	The intervention entry is on the month of deployment if different from authorisation, even if the start date considered is later. When an intervention is referred in a news report without explicit identification of the month or day, the date of the reporting is considered for the month, unless it is referred to another year, in which case the middle of the year is used by default (ie., 01/07/XX).	Date
ed_mmddyyyy	End date (MM/DD/YY) of interven-		Interventions' entries are based on initiation and, in some cases, there is no information on end date.	Date

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
	tion			
Outcomes				
pa_name	Name of peace agreement	The official name or the name by which it is known	Agreement signed. In cases where there is more than one agreement in the same month, both names are mentioned (if not in the name in the comments – due to size limitations, the highest pa_type of all agreements is coded; if there was a ceasefire in any, such is coded; the earliest termination is coded).	UCDP PA String
pa_date	Date when peace agreement was signed	The date of the last signature of the peace agreement (DD/MM/YY)		UCDP PA Date
pa_type	Peace agreement type	Categorical: 1 – peace process agreement, 2 – partial peace agreement and 3 – full peace agreement		UCDP PA 1-3
pa_cease_fire	Ceasefire	1 – agreement included provisions for a ceasefire or the cessation of hostilities 0 – The agreement did not include provisions for a ceasefire		UCDP PA 0-1
pa_ended	Agreement ended	1–Yes, the peace agreement ended 0 – No, the peace agreement did not end	Did the peace agreement end (i.e., did the implementation fail)?	UCDP PA 0-1
pa_duration	Date when peace agreement ended	The date when a party states the agreement is annulled or the date when the		UCDP PA Date 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
		violence clearly shows that the parties have left the agreement		
pa_termin ation	Peace agreement termina-tion	Code of a period after which the peace agreement terminated ac-cording to pa_duration	Coded 1 in the 12 consecutive months after the year/month when the peace agreement ended in the conflict. When the month is undetermined, the middle of the year is cod-ed. When no date is availa-ble, there is no coding.	Calc based on UCDP PA 0-1
out-come_d	Describes the out-come of a diplomatic interven-tion.	0 = no agreement, 1 = ceasefire, 2 = partial settle-ment, 3 = full settlement, 4 = ongoing	Alternative to UCDP PA re-sults coding. Only for diplo-matic intervention. Variable "outcome".	Regan et al. (2009) 0-4
Additional variables				
pop_thous		Population in thousands		Penn-World Tables
lnpop		Natural log of population		Calc
income_pc		Income per capita	PPP Converted GDP Per Capi-ta (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices "rgdpch"	Penn-World Tables
in-come_pc_ n1		Income per capita of year n-1	PPP Converted GDP Per Capi-ta (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices "rgdpch" of year n-1	Penn-World Tables
lnincpc		Natural log of income per capita		Calc
lnincpc_n1		Natural log of income per capita of year n-1		Calc
const_cha nge		Constitutional change	If in the specific month there was a constitutional change of regime. If a party or presi-dent is re-elected or is	New 0-1

Variable	**Label**	**Description**	**Comment**	**Data 1)**
			changes but from the same regime, it is not considered a change.	
const_rectification		Constitutional rectification	When after a unconstitutional change there is process of election where the new regime is rectified	New 0-1
unconst_change		Unconstitutional change	AU defines an unconstitutional change of government (OAU AHG Decl XXXVI) as a: i) military coup d'etat against a democratically elected government; ii) intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; iii) replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; or iv) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.	New 0-1
polity			Democracy score from Polity IV (-10 full autocracy and 10 full democracy) converted to 0 to 20 scale (10 added to the original value)	Calc Polity IV
polity_sqrt			Square root of polity	Calc
democracy			1= Democracy from Chebub update of ACLP database	Ross (2012) 0-1
democracy_update			Dummy for democracies, from Chebub Gandhi Vreeland (2009)	Ross (2012) 0-1
dem_transition			Dummy for democratic transitions, from Chebub Gandhi Vreeland (2009)	Ross (2012) 0-1
auth_transition			Dummy for authoritarian transitions, from Chebub	Ross (2012)

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
			Gandhi Vreeland (2009)	0-1
oil_gas_valuepop_2009			Oil and gas production per capita at 2009 prices (USD)	Ross (2011) Num
oil_gas_value100_off_1			Oil or gas explorations off-shore	Ross (2012) 0-1
oil_gas_value100_on_1			Oil or gas explorations on-shore	Ross (2012) 0-1
oil_gas_on_off			Oil or gas explorations on-shore or offshore. Based on oil_gas_value100_off_1 and oil_gas_value100_on_1 of Ross (2012)	Calc 0-1
diamonds			If some type of diamonds had been discovered: 1 – yes, 0 – no	PRIO CSCW (2005) 0-1
primary			If primary: kimberlite or lamproite has been discovered	PRIO CSCW (2005) 0-1
secondary			If secondary: alluvial or other placer deposits have been discovered	PRIO CSCW (2005) 0-1
marine			If marine: underwater ocean deposits have been discovered	PRIO CSCW (2005) 0-1
unknown			If unknown types of deposits have been discovered	PRIO CSCW (2005) 0-1
oda_tt_net_thousand_usd		In thousand USD 2010 constant prices	Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements (i.e., actual expenditures) of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and	OECD (2012) Num

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
			grants by official agencies (bilateral and multilateral donors) of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multi-lateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and terri-tories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent).	
lnoda		Natural logarithm of ODA total net		Calc
oda_total_ net_pc		ODA Total Net per capita		Calc
lnodapc		Natural logarithm of ODA pc		Calc
hum_aid_t hou-sand_usd		Humanitarian aid thousand USD	Aid governed by the princi-ples of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independ-ence, short-term in nature and providing for activities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.	OECD (2012) Num
lnhumaid		Natural log of humanitarian aid thousand USD		Calc
hum_aid_p c	Humanita-rian Aid pc	Humanitarian aid per capita in USD		Calc
d_French	Country colonised by France	Dummy for if the country was colo-nised by France		COW Direct contigui-ty 0-1
d_UK	Country colonised by the UK	Dummy for if the country was colo-nised by the UK		COW Direct contigui-ty 0-1

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
d_Italy	Country colonised by Italy	Dummy for if the country was colonised by Italy		COW Direct contiguity 0-1
d_Portugal	Country colonised by Portugal	Dummy for if the country was colonised by Portugal		COW Direct contiguity 0-1
d_Belgium	Country colonised by Belgium	Dummy for if the country was colonised by Belgium		COW Direct contiguity 0-1
d_Germany	Country colonised by Germany	Dummy for if the country was colonised by Germany		COW Direct contiguity 0-1
CFA2	Franc African Financial Community	If the country is part of the African Financial Community plus the Comoros	Considers both West and Central CAF. Franc was the designation of the French currency.	Africa Research Program at Harvard University 0-1
Borders	Number of neighbour	Number of contiguously bordering countries		Africa Research Program at Harvard University 0-9
IntTelec	International telecommunications	Outbound and inbound international telecommunication in minutes	Sum of 132M - International outgoing fixed-telephone traffic, in minutes and 132MI - International incoming fixed-telephone traffic, in minutes in each country.	Calc based on ITU (2013) Num
USATelecom	Telecommunications with the USA in minutes	Message telephone service with the USA	Traffic billed in the United States and billed in foreign countries originating or terminating in the United States (1992–1999, 2001–2010)	Calc based on FCC (2013) Num

Variable	**Label**	**Description**	**Comment**	**Data 1)**
defense		Defence terms in agreement	Sum of the agreements signed by the country which included defence of one or more states in the alliance	Calc based on COW Gibler (2009) Num
neutrality		Neutrality terms in the agreement	Sum of the agreements signed by the country which included neutrality towards one or more states in the alliance.	Calc based on COW Gibler (2009) Num
nonaggres-sion		Nonaggression terms in the agreement	Sum of the agreements signed by the country which included a promise of nonaggression towards one or more states in the alliance	Calc based on COW Gibler (2009) Num
entente		Entente terms in the agreement	Sum of the agreements signed by the country which included an understanding that the state would consult with one or more states in the alliance if a crisis occurred	Calc based on COW Gibler (2009) Num
Sum agree-ments		Sum of all types of agreements	Sum of defence, neutrality, nonaggression and entente.	Calc based on COW Gibler (2009) Num
ciob	Conven-tional intergov-ernmental organiza-tions type b	Total number of memberships of the country to type B conven-tional intergov-ernmental organi-sations	Universal membership organi-sations (type B): includes all non-profit international or-ganisations that have a wide-spread, geographically bal-anced membership, management and policy-control (1952–1997). The dataset reports data for every 5 years, therefore 1992 and 1997 overlap with this da-taset. The remaining years were filled based on last available data for periods of 5 years. Between 1989 and 1992 the data used is the one of 1987, the period between	Marshal, Marshal and Young (1999) Num

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
			1992 and 1997 uses the data for 1997 and the period from 1997 to 2001 uses the data from 1997. The data from 2002 to 2010 is left missing. The same procedure was followed for all Marshal, Marshal and Young (1999) variables (cioc, ciod and ciotot).	
cioc	Conventional intergovernmental organizations type c	Total number of memberships of the country to type C conventional intergovernmental organisations	Intercontinental membership organisations (type C): includes all international non-profit organisations whose membership and preoccupations exceed that of a particular continental region, although not to a degree justifying its inclusion in type b (1952–1997).	Marshal, Marshal and Young (1999) Num
ciod	Conventional intergovernmental organizations type d	Total number of memberships of the country to type D conventional intergovernmental organisations	Regionally defined membership organisations (type D): includes all international non-profit organisations whose membership or preoccupations are restricted to a particular continent or subcontinental region (1952–1997).	Marshal, Marshal and Young (1999) Num
ciotot	Conventional intergovernmental organizations totals	Total number of memberships of the country to types A to D conventional intergovernmental organisations	Sum of memberships B to D plus membership in UN (type A) (1952–1997).	Marshal, Marshal and Young (1999) Num
Id	Identification of the entry			Cal
Comments and sources				
comments	Additional information on the entries	UN SC resolution, details, clarifications, notes		New String
source1 to	Reference	News article	Attempt to at least identify	New

Variable	Label	Description	Comment	Data 1)
source6 and "other sources"	to data source	(Name_Date), datasets and academic references	two data sources of the same event. For more than 6 sources, "other sources" concatenates several additional references.	String

Notes:1)Data – identify the origin of the data and its characteristics. The origin can be: Input – new inputted data; Calc – calculated based on other variables; or other datasets, see table with main sources and datasets and bibliography. The characteristics of the data can be: Num – numerical; Date; String; categorical (0/1; 1-2; 1-3).

A1.4 Stata summary statistics

Table A1.3 STATA summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
xxconflictid	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
year	5787	1998.752	5.927195	1989	2010
month	5787	6.494194	3.442984	1	12.2
time_m	5787	223.6112	147.7424	1	564
time_yr	5787	19.3539	12.27454	1	48
cntryid	5787	511.0133	55.26927	404	651
subregion	0				
deastactry	5787	0.3773976	0.4847775	0	1
dmiddleactry	5787	0.2337999	0.423283	0	1
dnorthernactry	5787	0.1209608	0.3261099	0	1
dsouthactry	5787	0.0091585	0.0952688	0	1
dwesternactry	5787	0.2586833	0.4379491	0	1
cnfid_u	5787	157.9539	49.71525	70	268
cnfid_r	2661	926.2973	98.40489	605	996
stdt_mmddyyyy	0				
eedt_mmddyyyy	0				
conflictdyad	0				
incomp	5787	1.713841	0.4520035	1	2
terr	0				
ideology	5787	0.1404873	0.3475219	0	1
religion	5787	0.1878348	0.3906139	0	1
ethnic	5787	0.6716779	0.4696433	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
xxintensity	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
int_m	5787	63.61016	392.6563	0	14100
sqrt_int_m	5787	3.087301	7.354326	0	118.74
lnint_m	1967	3.586736	1.798454	0	9.55
int_m_level	5787	0.561258	0.8449678	0	3
cumint_mlevel	5611	2.615398	0.6138667	0	3
int_yr	5787	649.6126	2195.219	0	30633
int_yr_level	5787	1.419734	1.099246	0	3
int_yr_level	5715	1.376553	1.12639	0	3
var_int_m	5726	4.170451	452.4863	-14098	12420
var_int_m_level	5729	0.0078548	0.7232963	-3	3
nbevts_all_typ	5787	0.6753067	1.426316	0	16
mnt_ttdeat_all_typ	5787	6.897875	78.88109	0	5000
xxintervention	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
d_interv	5787	0.0995334	0.2994028	0	1
interv	5787	2.706584	8.826669	0	55
d_m	5787	0.027821	0.1644738	0	1
troops	5787	0.0107137	0.1029598	0	1
naval_forces	5787	0.0003456	0.0185888	0	1
equipment_advisors	5787	0.0082945	0.0907032	0	1
intelligence_advisors	5787	0.0038016	0.0615453	0	1
air_support	5787	0.001728	0.041537	0	1
military_sanctions	5787	0.0029376	0.0541248	0	1
d_e	5787	0.0089857	0.094374	0	1
grants	5787	0.0039744	0.0629231	0	1
loans	5787	0.0005184	0.0227645	0	1
nonmilit_equip_expert	5787	0	0	0	0
credits	5787	0.0001728	0.0131454	0	1
relieve_past_obligat	5787	0.001728	0.041537	0	1
econ_sanctions	5787	0.002592	0.0508502	0	1
d_d	5787	0.0527043	0.2234619	0	1
mediation	5787	0.0428547	0.2025469	0	1
forum	5787	0.0041472	0.0642708	0	1
arbitration	5787	0	0	0	0
recall	5787	0.0001728	0.0131454	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
offer	5787	0.0031104	0.0556891	0	1
request	5787	0.0013824	0.0371583	0	1
political_sanct	5787	0.0010368	0.0321856	0	1
d_mission	5787	0.0100225	0.0996179	0	1
d_unmission	5787	0.0055296	0.074162	0	1
typeunmission	5787	0.0162433	0.246115	0	5
unpolit	5787	0.0013824	0.0371583	0	1
unobserv	5787	0.0010368	0.0321856	0	1
untradit	5787	0.0012096	0.0347614	0	1
unmultid	5787	0.0003456	0.0185888	0	1
unenforc	5787	0.0015552	0.0394089	0	1
ftnman	5787	0.0015552	0.0707791	0	4
d_nonunmission	5787	0.0044928	0.0668836	0	1
typenun	5787	0.0162433	0.2571054	0	5
nunpolit	5787	0.0001728	0.0131454	0	1
nunobserv	5787	0.000864	0.0293838	0	1
nuntradit	5787	0.0013824	0.0371583	0	1
nunmultid	5787	0.0001728	0.0131454	0	1
nunenforc	5787	0.0019008	0.0435606	0	1
xxintensity of interven-tion	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
strong_pko	5787	0.0039744	0.0629231	0	1
count_mil	5787	2.889234	4.512647	0	34
count_econ	5787	1.191291	1.88226	0	6
count_dipl	5787	6.823916	10.80661	0	52
count_miss	5787	0.9350268	1.656856	0	7
troopnumbers	72	4325.667	6722.588	15	37000
milobs	30	165.2333	187.3127	0	705
civpol	23	544.7391	1059.149	6	4977
civst	28	254.3571	346.8004	0	1108
expense	38	222.6209	397.4911	0.9	1808.13
xxthirdparty	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
target	5787	0.2401935	0.7708538	0	3
unit_third_party	0				
unitcode	5787	23.16779	105.9663	0	678
unitcode1	5786	4.919668	49.27725	0	678

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
unitcode2	5787	2.64638	36.77832	0	694
unitcode3	5787	1.421757	26.25613	0	552
unitcode4	5787	0.7485744	19.02712	0	540
unitcode5	5787	0.4485917	15.40408	0	651
dipl_identity	0				
d_sbrg	5787	0.0335234	0.1800144	0	1
d_au	5787	0.007776	0.087846	0	1
d_nrtaf	5787	0.0088129	0.0934703	0	1
d_midaf	5787	0.0088129	0.0934703	0	1
d_eastaf	5787	0.0224641	0.1482002	0	1
d_westaf	5787	0.0134785	0.1153218	0	1
d_southafrica	5787	0.0063936	0.0797111	0	1
d_reg	5787	0.0601348	0.2377569	0	1
d_neigb	5787	0.026093	0.1594256	0	1
single_state	5787	0.0438915	0.2048714	0	1
group_states	5787	0.0070848	0.0838801	0	1
single_igo	5787	0.0319682	0.1759306	0	1
group_igo	5787	0.0027648	0.0525133	0	1
other	5787	0.0048384	0.0693963	0	1
combination	5787	0.0088129	0.0934703	0	1
p5	5787	0.0155521	0.1237452	0	1
un	5787	0.0176257	0.131598	0	1
ex_coloniser	5787	0.0098497	0.098764	0	1
heoverexpn	111	1.016991	1.758216	0	8.325
hghioverin	114	0.4035	1.445609	0	13.342
heioverallei	106	0.5639151	1.211589	0	10.492
heoverexpn_1	91	1.222451	2.03551	0	6.349
hghioverin_1	93	0.1855161	0.4630856	0	3.424
heioverall_1	87	0.4279425	0.6480754	0	3.591
xxintervention dates	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
stdt2_mmddyyyy	0				
ed_mmddyyyy	0				
xxpeaceagreement	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
pa_name	0				
pa_date	0				

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pa_type	82	2.073171	0.6809668	1	3
pa_cease_fire	82	0.7804878	0.4164634	0	1
pa_ended	82	0.4634146	0.5017284	0	1
pa_duration	0				
pa_termination	5787	0.0447555	0.2067845	0	1
outcome_d	132	1.848485	0.984497	0	4
xxcontrolvariables	-----------	------------	------------	-----------	----------
pop_thous	5787	28700.93	32261.6	417	152228
lnpop	5787	9.651023	1.171983	6.03	11.93
income_pc	5787	1220.731	1234.638	161	6263
income_pc_n1	5787	1202.786	1207.871	161	6181
lnincpc	5787	6.739354	0.8229644	5.08	8.74
lnincpc_n1	5787	6.734088	0.8104166	5.08	8.73
const_change	5787	0.0020736	0.0454936	0	1
const_rectification	5787	0.0020736	0.0454936	0	1
unconst_change	5787	0.00432	0.0655905	0	1
polity	5787	8.814066	4.39192	1	18
polity_sqrt	5787	2.86691	0.7695463	1	4.24
democracy	5271	0.1037754	0.3049979	0	1
democracy_update	5492	0.1585943	0.3653306	0	1
dem_transition	5492	0.0203933	0.1413543	0	1
auth_transition	5492	0.0209395	0.143195	0	1
oil_gas_valuepop_2009	5656	203.0054	511.8885	0	4063.829
oil_gas_value100_off_1	5393	0.1761543	0.3809867	0	1
oil_gas_value100_on_1	5393	0.185611	0.3888285	0	1
oil_gas_on_off	5393	0.185611	0.3888285	0	1
diamonds	5787	0.3901849	0.4878337	0	1
primary	5787	0.2538448	0.4352475	0	1
secondary	5787	0.3850009	0.4866376	0	1
marine	5787	0.0335234	0.1800144	0	1
unknown	5787	0.1755659	0.3804833	0	1
oda_tt_net_thousand_usd	5739	955727.9	1299084	415.53	1.24E+07
lnoda	5739	13.27017	0.9865438	6.03	16.33
oda_total_net_pc	5739	51.19864	45.50083	0	380
lnodapc	5735	3.547515	0.9721265	1	6

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
hum_aid_thousand_usd	5676	95045.79	188989.1	1.94	1363560
lnhumaid	5676	10.02778	1.946112	0.66	14.13
hum_aid_pc	5676	5.14522	8.193176	0	65.05
d_french	5787	0.3041299	0.4600777	0	1
d_uk	5787	0.2605841	0.4389912	0	1
d_italy	5787	0.0717125	0.2580335	0	1
d_portugal	5787	0.1112839	0.3145106	0	1
d_belgium	5787	0.152065	0.3591149	0	1
d_germany	5787	0.0853637	0.2794464	0	1
cfa2	5787	0.2369103	0.4252235	0	1
borders	5787	4.816485	1.899256	0	9
inttelec	4536	1.14E+08	1.73E+08	156000	1.29E+09
usatelec	4621	4.13E+07	8.90E+07	31	7.27E+08
defense	5787	8.306031	6.820814	0	17
neutrality	5787	0.0433731	0.2262246	0	2
nonaggression	5787	5.232763	7.188459	0	19
entente	5787	3.962675	7.160376	0	23
sumagreements	5787	17.54484	18.09174	0	55
ciob	3753	0.9757527	0.1538364	0	1
cioc	3753	16.92433	9.069039	0	35
ciod	3753	4.845191	3.371501	0	13
ciotot	3753	18.8697	7.915284	3	35
id	5787	3893	1670.707	1000	6786
comments	0				
source1	0				
source2	0				
source3	0				
source4	0				
source5	0				
source6	0				
other_sources	0				

Note: Variables with 0 observations are text.

A1.5 Main sources and datasets

Three sources of information were used by order of weight in the source list: news reports, academic and official reports. News reports were gathered through the FACTIVA search engine. The main news report sources, representing 56% of all references, were Reuters News, BBC Monitoring Africa – Political, Agence France-Associated Presse, All Africa, Xinhua News Agency, Associated Press Newswires, Dow Jones International News, Inter Associated Press Service, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Independent – London, The Times and several others with less than 10 references each.

The main datasets used, representing about 32% of all intervention data references along with conflict data sources, are:

Table A1.4 Main datasets sources

Type and Period	Actor inclusion	Event inclusion	Name
State based (type 1 conflict) 1989-2010	Events in dyad where one party is the state	All events leading to at least one death in conflicts (it includes events in non-active years)	UCDP Georeference Event Dataset (UCDP GED) Version 1.51
State based 1946-2011	All dyad years where one party is the government and have a stated incompatibility	All years that cross the 25 death threshold	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-2012 (ArCf)
Dyads 1946-2007	All government-actors dyads per year	Years where fighting caused at least 25 battle deaths	UCDP Dyadic Dataset Version 1-2010
Peace agreement 1989-2010	Signed between warring parties of a conflict	Peace agreement	UCDP Peace Agreement (UCDP PA) 2.0 (PcAg) 1975-2011
Interventions	Third party (military, economic or diplomatic) state	Monthly military, economic and diplomatic interven-	Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars, Regan

Type and Period	Actor inclusion	Event inclusion	Name
1945–1999	and non-state	tions in conflicts with more than 200 battle deaths.	and Aydin (2006) and Regan, Frank and Aydin (2009)
State-based actor support 1975–2009	Supporter state and non-state receiver of support	Secondary warring and non-warring support (ten subtypes), plus alleged support	UCDP External Support Project Primary Warring Party Version 1-2011
Dynamic analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) 1922–2006	All actors challenging the state and inter-state	All main events of political transition and external intervention	DADM Intrastate Dispute Narratives2 Accessed 31 August 2012
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) 1990–2011	Every country in Africa (with a population greater than 1 million) is covered. If actors and the acts are directly linked to a civil conflict, the event is not coded.	Includes protests, riots, strikes, intercommunal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other conflict datasets.	Social Conflict in Africa Database Version 2.0
Multilateral Peace Operations Database (SIPRI MPOD) 1990–2011	Multilateral peace operations (UN and non-UN)	Intended to (a) implement peace agreements, (b) support peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.	SIPRI MPOD Accessed 31 August 2012

Official references were mainly from the UN, AU, OAU, EU, and NATO, accounting for 11% of the references.

A1.6 Coding process

Procedure of data development:

First stage

1 – Copy data from UCDP Armed Conflict validated with relevant UCDP GED active months of conflict: Country ID; Conf ID UCDP; StartDate; Side A; Side A2nd; Side B; Side B2nd; Incomp.

2 – From UCDP GED aggregate event deaths to the month and year.

3 – Copy data from Regan et al. (2005) (<=1999): ideology, religion, ethnic, troops, naval forces, equipment or aid, intelligence or advisors, air support, military sanctions, grants, loans, non-military equipment or expertise, credits, relief of past obligations, economic sanctions, mediation, forum, arbitration, recall, offer, request, Target, Unit , Unitcode, Dipl. Identity, Dipl. Unilateral, Intv Dates Startdate, Intv Dates Enddate.

4 – Copy data from Peace Agreement dataset (UCDP): Cease Fire; pa_name; pa_date; ended.

5 – Aggregate data to the month of nonviolent conflict processes from Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD).

6 – Identify specific cases of peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions interventions from secondary sources: United Nations, OAU/AU and EU website, Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), Mayer (2011) and SIPRI (2012) Multilateral Peace Operations Database (MPOD).

7 – Research specific events not covered, such as changes of government (in timeline of the country) or UN sanctions (UN website).

Second stage

8 – Search news reports using key words about interventions. Revision of Regan et al.'s (2005) coding for the period prior to 1999 and coding of the new period between 2000 and 2010. Main search parameters in FACTIVA (for specific records also based on case studies):

a) Articles with at least the word "intervention";

b) With at least one of these key words: "troops", "naval forces", "equipment", "aid intelligence", "advisors", "air support", "military sanctions", "grants" and/or "loans", "non-military equipment", "expertise credits", "relief of past obligations", "economic sanctions", "mediation forum" and/or "arbitration recall offer request";

c) Between conflict period beginning and end;

d) Within the subjects “economic news”, “international political economic organisations”, “political/general news” and “selection of top stories/trends/analysis”; and

e) For the specific country (in the region).

Third stage

9 – Develop conflict intervention narratives based on the dataset created and cross-check them with DADM conflict narratives.

10 – When one academic source identified an intervention and no validation was found through FACTIVA, the search would use Lexis-Nexis (news search engine similar to FACTIVA) and case studies literature. The objective was to have every event referenced by at least two sources, with at least one of them being a news report.

Fourth stage

11 – Conflict interventions’ narratives of six countries were checked by six military attachés from African embassies posted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In December 2012, during a stay in Addis Ababa, interviews were requested to embassies of all African countries with conflicts in the dataset. Six interviews were randomly arranged with military attachés with at least one country from each African sub-region. The conflict–intervention narratives were provided to the interviewee and validated during the semi-structured interview with very few comments.

The comments had to do with:

> In one case, there had been an additional battle after the end date of the conflict involving a renegade general which did not comply with the peace agreement. Because it falls outside the conflict period, it was not considered;

> A third party supported not only with training (as identified in dataset) but also with equipment and money. Because the support could not be validated in news reports, the coding was not changed;

> Identification of an additional agreement. This was not coded because the identification of the peace agreement is limited to those of UCDP PA; and

> In one case the initiative was considered to be a conference and not a forum; because there is no category for conference, the coding as a forum was kept.

Fifth stage

12 – Internal consistency of the dataset was verified by a research assistant.

The contracted work was executed in 5 days and did not involve any new coding but a validation of the consistency of the data coded. This was done in two areas.

The first area was to validate that the conflict–intervention narratives as presented in this document correctly reflected the conflict and interventions coded in the dataset—namely, regarding dates of initiation and termination of the conflict, interventions and their dates, interveners and peace agreements.

Another validation was that the variables generated based on other variables were correct. For instance, the author coded a certain intervention (Y) by a country (X) and then characterised the intervention according to several criteria, such as with a variable identifying the sub-region to which the intervener belonged. The latter variables were checked by the research assistant, namely: dummies of the intervention types based on the categories of interventions, strong PKO, count of types of interventions, origin and type of third party, and newspaper codes (the contract and receipt with identification of items executed can be accessed at https://sites.google.com/site/ricardosousa2000/phd_attachments).

A1.7 Country-conflict external interventions coded

The external interventions coded for each conflict are presented next, grouped by country. The information provided is a table identifying the conflicts, a résumé of coding decisions and, in a box, the narrative of the interventions in the conflict.

The table characterises and contrasts the UCDP GED and Regan et al.'s (2009) conflicts, identifying the conflict IDs, the parties involved in the conflicts and dates of initiation and end of the conflicts. The dataset focuses on state-based conflicts, but for each country a list of non-state-

based violence and one-sided violence was made according to the UCDP GED version 1.0 whenever they occurred in the country. The information is accurate as of the versions of the datasets used and for the period under consideration (1989–2010). Developments in the conflicts after 2010 are not reflected in the dataset. For instance, if a conflict had a violent event in May 2009 and one in April 2011 (or any month after 2010), the date of termination of the conflict identified in the dataset is May 2009.

The coding decisions list all major decisions taken in the coding process. It is not exhaustive, but covers the more complicated decisions taken and is issue oriented; therefore, it does not follow a chronologically fluent account. In addition, in the cases without complicated decisions, no coding decisions are presented.

A narrative of the interventions in conflict is made within the box. These are called the conflict–intervention narratives. They identify all the interventions coded in the dataset, with some additional political and conflict information, in order to make the narrative more consistent. In some cases, information of interventions or events that falls outside of the conflict period can be provided in the narrative (and not in the dataset) in order to give a more complete flow of the events. The dataset reflects the date of initiation of interventions; in some cases it was not possible to determine the date of the termination. The narrative can refer to some cases of termination of intervention as part of the conflict narrative (especially regarding sanctions), but when interventions end, there are no entries in the dataset. In addition, the narrative makes reference to all active groups mentioned in the event dyads with a reference either in the beginning of the conflict or in the month of the first event in which the group was active. This date might not necessarily be the first action of the group in the context of the conflict.

The references are not provided in the conflict–intervention narratives as they are available for each entry in the dataset (field sources 1 to 6). In the section with the coding decisions, information is provided on the sources of the information—mainly academic datasets, academic case studies or news reports. The bibliography allows for an identification of these references. Both in the dataset and in the coding decisions the reference to news reports is made through a code of reference with an identification of the news sources followed by the date of publication. For instance, LBA_06_03_1997 corresponds to a Reuters News report from

6 March 1997. A simple search of keywords of the event on that date leads to the news report. References can be provided upon request.

The variables in the dataset had four main processes for data generation. One process was the author's coding of interventions, the main novel contribution of the dataset, as presented next in the country–conflict intervention narrative (variables like type and sub-type of the intervention or third party). Another process relied directly on other datasets, importing the data directly or with some small transformations, such as with time aggregations or other simple changes identified in the code book (e.g., for GDP, population, GDP pc). A third process of variables that were coded based on the values of other variables. For instance, this is the case of a categorical variable being represented in a series of dummy or the characterisation of the interveners (UN, AU, subregion, etc.). A fourth process involves using rules to generate new data based on existing variables. A good example of this is interaction variables that capture more than one phenomenon of interest, with the rules identified in the variable description.

Guinea-Bissau – 404

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
216	Government of Guinea-Bissau - Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998-06-07 - 1999-05-07	605	Military faction - PAIGCC	June 1998 - Nov. 1998

Coding decisions:

Following the interventions by Senegal and Guinea in support of the government, in November 1998 a peace agreement was signed accepting an ECOWAS peacekeeping mission (ECOMOG). The forces of this mission would arrive on March 1999 to replace the foreign troops. The mandate included providing security at the international airport, assisting

with humanitarian aid deliveries, and disarming the belligerents. The political decision was made on November 1998, but forces started arriving in December 1998; therefore, the later date can be considered as the start of ECOMOG. Fortna (2008) considers this an observer mission because of the lack of specificity of the mandate (referred to as "observer") and the fact that the forces did not engage in fighting. However, the mission had other mandates which were coded in the dataset. The ECOMOG left in June 1999.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established in April 1999 with a mandate to facilitate the general election in Guinea-Bissau and to assist in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement of August 1998. In June 2009, it was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) which had a mandate to promote a multidimensional engagement with Guinea-Bissau, AU, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the EU and other partners in an effort to contribute to the stabilisation of Guinea-Bissau.

The EU Advisory Mission for Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) was created in February 2008 (became operational in June) and was mandated to assist local authorities in planning and restructuring the national security and armed forces and advice in training and equipment procurement.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 216] In 1994, President Joao Benardo Vieira, the single-party ruler since independence in 1974, was elected in the first multiparty elections. On June 1998, the Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice challenged the government of Guinea-Bissau. In the same month, Senegal and Guinea sent troops in support of the government (which was reinforced in July), and Portugal and Gambia attempted to mediate the conflict. In August, both the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the Economic Commission of Western African States (ECOWAS) became involved in mediation efforts. In October, Senegal reinforced its troop support for the government. In November, ECOWAS continued the negotiation process which led to the signing of the Abudja Peace agreements on 1 November 1998. In the following month, an observer peacekeeping force of ECOMOG

(ECOWAS) was established to supervise the implementation of the agreement. In February 1999, Togo mediated on behalf of ECOWAS and in May 1999 the last outbreak of violent conflict occurred, leading to Vieira's government forces surrendering and President Joao Bernardo Vieira going into exile.

Mali – 432

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
177	Government of Mali – MPA, FIAA, ATNMC	28-06-1990 - 22-01-2009	954		June 1990 - June 1995

Note: In addition, in Mali there was non-state violence (243 and 365) and one-sided violence (432, 1374, 1576) during this period.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 177] In June 1990,, the Mali government was challenged by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPA) which aimed to achieve autonomy for the northern territory of Azawad. Libya supported the challenger group by providing training. In April, a political mission was established by the UN: the UNOGBIS (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau). In January 1991, a mediation was attempted by Algeria, and a partial peace agreement was achieved: the Tamanrasset Accord.

In March 1991, authoritarian President Moussa Traire was deposed by a military coup, and in April Alpha Korane was elected president during the second round of elections. In the following year (April 1992), a new mediation attempt was made by Algeria, Mauritania and France, which led to the signing of a full peace agreement—namely, the Pacte National. In October 1992, France provided a grant to the government.

Nevertheless, the northern insurgency continued. In January 1994, a breakaway faction from MPA, the Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA), continued the struggle, but accepted reintegrating itself into the peace process in the following year. In early 2007, the North Mali Tuareg

Alliance for Change (ATNMC) became involved in a conflict with the government for the territory of Azawad. In June 2008, the European Commission provided military advisors in the context of a Security Sector Reform programme.

The last recorded deadly event occurred in January 2009.

Senegal – 433

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
180	Government of Senegal – MFDC	31-12-1988 – 27-12-2010			

Note: In addition, in Senegal there was non-state violence (118 and 372) and one-sided violence (433, 1381, 1507) during the same period.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 180] Since the 1980s, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) has waged a separatist conflict against the government. The first violent episode during the period of this dataset occurred in January 1990, with activity continuing until October 2003. In 2000, the opposition won the presidential elections for the first time, and Abdoulaye Wade became president.

Mauritania – 435

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
267	Government of Mauritania – AQIM	2008-04-07 – 2010-09-18*			

Note: In addition, in Mauritania there was non-state violence (372) during this period.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 267] In August 2008, a military coup overthrew President Abdallahi, and in July 2009 the coup leader won the presidential elections. From March 2010 to September 2010, the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, was involved in an armed challenge to the government of Mauritania.

Niger – 436

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
178	Government of Niger – CRA	1994-01-19 – 1995-03-10			
212	Government of Niger – FDR	1995-03-01 – 1997-11-14			
255	Government of Niger – FLAA, UFRA, MNJ	1991-10-01 – 2008-11-16	953		May 1990 - April 1995

Note: In addition, in Niger there was non-state violence (244) and one-sided violence (436) during this period.

Coding decisions

The first group to emerge was the Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA), which became engaged in a violent conflict to challenge the government in October 1991 (i.e., conflict 255). The Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA) was an umbrella rebel organisation started in 1993 consisting of the Tuareg fractionalised rebels (i.e., conflict 178). It was replaced by the Organisation of the Armed Resistance (ORA) which signed two peace agreements in 1994 and 1995 that ended the conflict. Both conflicts 178 and 255 are related to the northern Niger conflict. Conflict 255 tracked the different rebel groups that emerged in the region challenging the government while conflict 178's objectives of the challenging group were secession. The UCDP Peace Agreements database lists only three peace agreements associated with conflict 178. These agreements were signed by FLAA in 1993, the CRA in 1994 and ORA in

1995. Because the FLAA corresponds to conflict 255, the 1993 Paris Accord signed by the FLAA was assigned to conflict 255. The other two peace agreements continued, assigned to conflict 178, but because the conflict ended in 1994, the peace agreements fell outside the conflict period.

Conflict intervention narratives:

In 1993, the first multiparty elections installed Mahamane Ousmane as president. In the dataset, Niger had two conflicts connected to the north and one to the south of the country.

[Conflicts 178 and 255] In Northern Niger, the majority Tuareg ethnic groups sought greater decentralisation or autonomy from the central government. The first group to emerge was the Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA) engaged in violent conflict to challenge the government in October 1991 [Conflict 255]. In 1993, the Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA), an umbrella organisation for these groups, became active in the armed struggle, pursuing a secessionist agenda [Conflict 178]. The FLAA signed a peace agreement, the Paris Accord, in June 1993 through French mediation. Subsequent combined mediation efforts by France, Algeria and Burkina Faso led to the Ouagadougou Accord of October 1994 and a full peace agreement in April 1995 between CRA and the government [Conflict 178] (this falls outside the conflict period and therefore was not coded). The CRA had the last event of violent conflict in March 1995.

[Conflict 255] In January 1996, Col. Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew the government through a coup. The US and France imposed economic and military sanctions in the same month. An attempt at mediation was made in January among a coalition of states (the Council of Entente). France lifted economic sanctions in March 1996, and the US suspended economic assistance in July 1996. Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara was voted into office in the November 1996 presidential elections. In December 1997, the Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance (UFRA) was involved in violent political contestation which ended by November the same year. Libya supported the government with military equipment in June 1997. In April 1999, Maïnassara was assassinated, and a new military government led by Major Daouda Malam Wanké took over. The US and France imposed economic sanctions that same month. The US lifted

economic sanctions in March 2000. Ten years later, in February 2007, the Niger Justice Movement (MNJ) restarted the conflict for decentralisation. This group had the last violent confrontation in November 2008, although no end date has been identified for it (e.g., through the signing of a peace agreement).

[Conflict 212] Meanwhile, in Eastern Niger, the Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR) was involved in armed struggle for autonomy between March 1995 and November 1997.

Ivory Coast – 437

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
225	Government of Ivory Coast – MPCI, MPIGO, MJP, FN	2002-09-19 – 2004-11-09			

Note: In addition, in the Ivory Coast there was non-state violence (58, 59, 370, 432, 433, 434) and one-sided violence (437, 1410, 1411) during this period.

Coding decision

The following account provides information on interventions that occurred outside the conflict period in order to better understand the flow of events.

In October 2002, before the official launch of Operation Licorne, a news report (XNEW_03_10_2002) emerged about the France's logistical support for the government. At the same time, Operation Licorne was considered neutral, even if such a classification is disputed. Because one intervention is closely associated with the other, only one intervention should be kept. This is a case where the type of support by a third party transformed, in the short period of a few days, into a different intervention. For these cases, where it is better to code only one intervention, the best characterisation of the intervention is the one that portrays the more lasting and intense type. In this case, only Operation Licorne was coded.

The operation was approved by the UN, giving UN Charter Chapter VII powers to support the ECOWAS mission—in accordance with Chapter VIII—in contributing to a secure environment and, in particular, facilitating implementation of the 2003 Linas–Marcoussis Agreement.

MINUCI was established in May 2003 to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, provide political advice, monitor the military situation, provide advice and planning and support to French and ECOWAS forces. UN S/RES/1527 (February 4 2004) gave the mission Chapter VII powers, but just before being integrated into UNOCI in 2004; therefore, it was not considered with such a mandate.

ECOMICI was authorised (UN S RES 1464, February 4 2003) to work alongside French troops to contribute to a secure environment and allow for implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. The mandate included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, facilitating the free movement of persons and goods, providing security for members of the national government of reconciliation and humanitarian workers, and contributing to the implementation of DDR programmes. In 2004, a mandate revision attributed the charter with Chapter VII powers.

UNOCI was established by SCR 1528 (27 February 2004) with UN Chapter VII powers, as a follow-up mission to MINUCI. Its mandate was to monitor the ceasefire agreement and prevent the movement of combatants and arms across shared borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as assist the interim Government of National Reconciliation in the following activities: implementing DDR programmes, restoring state authority and the holding of elections in October 2005, and facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 225] In September 2002, an armed struggle developed, involving three main groups: Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP), Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI) and Ivorian Movement for the Greater West (MPIGO). In the same month, Nigeria supported the government with military air support and troops, whereas ECOWAS was involved in mediation initiatives. In October 2002, France sent a neutral peacekeeping mission: Operation Licorne. The neutrality of the operation was contested in some reports, as was the use of the defence agree-

ment between the two countries as a legal justification. The peacekeeping mission was recognised by the UNSC. In addition, in October 2002, Angola sent military equipment in support of the government.

In the next month, France and ECOWAS attempted a mediation between the groups; in January 2003, mediation efforts by France, the UN and several African heads of state led to the Linas-Marcoussies Peace Accords, a partial peace agreement. Furthermore, in January 2003, the first troops of an ECOWAS peacekeeping mission were deployed, the ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire), as approved in December 2002. In March 2003 ECOWAS and Ghana mediated the signing of the Accra II peace agreement, reaffirming the previous peace accords. In May 2003, the UN established the United Nations' Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a military liaison group to work alongside ECOWAS and the French mission.

By 2004, the rebel groups had joined together to form the New Forces (FN). In April 2004, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established to monitor the ceasefire agreement, assist in the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, protect humanitarian assistance and provide security for elections. Both ECOMICI and MINUCI were disbanded in April 2004. In July 2004, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and ECOWAS mediated in reaching the full peace agreement: Accra III.

In November 2004 the UN and European Union (EU) approved a neutral arms embargo, with the latter also approving neutral economic sanctions (e.g., travel bans). The last registered violent conflict occurred in November 2004. In December 2004, South Africa mediated in the conflict; in April 2005, the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire was signed (not mentioned in the dataset because it occurred after the end of the conflict). UNOCI's mandate and strength were reviewed and changed by the UN Security Council according to the country's situation and are ongoing as of 2012.

Guinea - 438

UCDP GED	Regan et al. (2009)

Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
111	Government of Guinea – RFDG	2000-09-01 – 2001-07-19			

Note: In addition, in Guinea there was non-state violence (209) and one-sided violence (438) during this period.

Coding decision

Guinea's conflict is not in Regan et al. (2009); therefore, the type of conflict was coded using an ethnic structure based on secondary sources.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 111] Since September 2000, the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG) has challenged the government with activity, continuing to July 2001.

Liberia – 450

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
146	Government of Liberia – NPFL, INPFL, LURD, MODEL	1980-04-12 – 2003-11-21	949	AFL, ULIMO, NPFL	Dec. 1989 – Aug. 1996
			997	ULIMO, INPFL, NPFL	Dec. 1989 – Oct. 1991
			979	ULMLD, INPFL, NPFL	Aug. 1992 – July 1993

Note: In addition, in Liberia there was non-state violence (238, 239, 240, 241, 242) and one-sided violence (450, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1496, 1556, 1557, 1558, 2001) during this period.

Coding decision

The legality and neutrality of the ECOMOG-Liberia intervention have been contested. Regan et al.'s (2009) coding seems to reflect the more conservative approach of not considering the military intervention as an ECOWAS intervention and instead codes it as done by specific countries in favour of the government. At the same time, it assigns the diplomatic mediation initiatives to the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC).

Berman and Samms (2000) highlighted the process and controversy around the intervention in terms of the legality and neutrality of the forces. The legality is important not only for identifying motivation, but also because it can serve as the determining factor for considering it an ECOWAS intervention versus an intervention by the country's forces involved.

Keeping in mind the specificities of the process identified in Berman and Samms (2000: 80–110) regarding the international nature of the conflict and the legality of the process, ECOWAS was coded as a neutral intervention. Berman and Samms (2000) identified the two most contentious issues in the process: a) the conflict being solely internal or instead internationalised (through external support), wherein only the latter is a valid reason for the ECOWAS intervention as it would be considered a bigger danger to sub-regional security; and b) if the due process was followed in the request for intervention and if the incumbent president Doe was still in sufficient control of the country, it could make such a request as the president did.

In light of these issues, it is important to contextualise them to the early period of sub-regional interventions wherein, even within an unstructured legal framework and given a lack of due process, the intervention was intended to be a regional grouping of states intervening within a loose legal framework coming out of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) even given the opposition from some of its members (mainly Francophone countries). As Berman and Samms (2000: 88) categorised it, it was an "improvised response to the Liberian conflict" wherein the solution found was more to the likes of one of the members of the ECOWAS group—namely, Nigeria.

Regarding the neutrality of ECOMOG towards the conflict parties, even if it quickly changed from an interposition force into an intervention force and in certain periods and under certain commanders assumed a more anti-Taylor stance (there were three main contending parties –

NPFL, INPFL and the government), the uncoordinated and competing strategies of the different forces prevent a simple categorisation of the force as partisan. In addition, Doyle and Sambanis (2006), DADM (2012) and Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) all consider this to be an ECOWAS intervention.

The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group in Liberia was established by A/DEC.1/8/90 during the First Session of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC, 7 August 1990). The mission's tasks included assisting the Liberian government in providing security, maintaining law and order, monitoring the ceasefire and reconstructing the army and police. Charles Taylor, leader of the main challenging group, did not consider the ECOMOG forces to be neutral and attacked the forces in Monrovia, which led to a change of mandate from a peacekeeping mission to one more in line with peace enforcement. Due to Taylor's conflict in opposing the government and ECOMOG, the UN intervened to establish a peacekeeping mission that could be perceived as neutral following the Cotonou Agreement of 25 July 1993. This was the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) deployed in September 1993.

From 1998 onwards, the ECOMOG operation focused on the capacity-building and training of Liberian troops. ECOWAS forces started to withdraw in January 1999, and by October the withdrawal was complete (SIPRI, 2012). The United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNPSOL) was established in November 1, 1997, as a political mission, and ECOMOG-Liberia was disbanded on February 1998.

A quick reaction force of American troops, normally called a joint task force, was approved on 20 July 2003, but with a restrictive mandate to secure the embassy and engage in non-combat evacuation operations. This task force was deployed while waiting for the deployment of the ECOMIL, which occurred on 4 August 2003 (approved by UN S RES 1497 2003). Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council authorised the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to maintain security in Liberia and support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed on 17 June 2003, particularly to establish zones of separation between the conflicting parties, provide security to humanitarian workers, facilitate the functions of the JMC in accordance with the Accra Agreement and lay the foundation for the deployment of the UN mission. ECOMIL forces were integrated into UNMIL on 1 October 2003 (SIPRI, 2012).

Due to the limited mandate of the joint task force and its close association with ECOMIL, it was not coded in the dataset.

UNMIL was established by SCR 1509 (19 September 2003) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mission was mandated to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; assist in the government's efforts for national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and protect UN staff, facilities and civilians (SIPRI, 2012).

Taylor's indictment in June 2003 was not coded because it constitutes a different category. Although it could be argued that the indictment affected the country's authority structures and the developments of the conflict, it constitutes a different typology. At the same time, only a few cases like this exist, where the indictment affected the conflict process (AFNW_19_08_2003, VOA_04_06_2003).

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 146] The military coup that brought Master Sergeant Samuel Doe into power on 12 April 1980 was contested through armed struggle. The National Patriotic Front (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, rebelled against the government on 24 December 1989. During the same period, NPFL was supported with military equipment from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Libya and received training in Libya and Burkina Faso. From April 1990 onwards, a splinter group called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Yormie Johnson, was also involved in armed struggle against the government. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May 1990 to mediate the conflict, consisting of representatives from Gambia (chair), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. In June and July 1990, the Liberian Council of Churches and ECOWAS attempted to mediate the conflict. On August 24, ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG-Liberia) in what quickly became a peace-enforcement mission, with Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal as the main troop contributors.

The USA attempted to mediate in September 1990. ECOWAS SMC mediated a signed ceasefire in October (Banjul III Agreement), another in November (Bamako Cease Fire Agreement), one in December (Banjul

IV Agreement) and yet another in February 1991 (Lomé Agreement). In September 1991, a Francophone-dominated committee of five states from ECOWAS (chair Ivory Coast, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Togo) mediated the conflict. In October 1991, ECOWAS, Cote d'Ivoire President Houphouet Boigny and the Atlanta-based International Negotiations Network (INN) led by former US President Jimmy Carter mediated the Yamoussoukro IV peace agreement.

ECOWAS was involved in mediations in April and October 1992, and the United Nations Security Council imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the parties on 19 November 1992. In December, the UN and ECOWAS started a new mediation initiative. In July 1993, ECOWAS, the UN and OAU mediated the signing of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. In September 1993, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with an observer/monitoring mandate. President Soglo of Benin mediated the situation in November 1993 and in the same month a forum was organised by ECOWAS. In September 1994, President Rawlings, chairman of ECOWAS, mediated the signing of the Akosombo Peace Agreement and was again involved in mediation initiatives in November and December 1994 and January and February 1995. In August 1995, ECOWAS, the UN, AU and Nigeria mediated the signing of the Abuja Peace Agreement. In August 1996, ECOWAS mediated the signing of the Abuja II Peace Agreement.

Elections were held in July 1997 and the National Patriotic Party (NPP) of Charles Taylor won the majority in the House of Representatives, resulting in Taylor being elected president. In September 1997, ECOWAS lifted the military sanctions against the government. UNOMIL was disbanded on 30 September 1997. ECOMOG-Liberia was terminated on 23 October 1999.

In May 2000, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) challenged the government. The EU imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the government and rebels on 7 May 2001. In April 2003, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) also challenged the government. In June 2006, ECOWAS, the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Inter-Religious Council (IRC) mediated in the signing of the Accra Ceasefire Agreement. In July 2003, the Special Court for Sierra Leone produced an indictment for Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia. In August 2003, ECOWAS, ICG, IRC and the UN

mediated the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement. In the same month, US forces were deployed (called the Joint Task Force Liberia) as a quick reaction force until the deployment on 4 August 2003 of the first contingents of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force (i.e., ECOMIL) which was also supported by the US. In October 2003, the UN established the multidimensional peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The last recorded event of the conflict occurred in November 2003.

Sierra Leone – 451

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
187	Government of Sierra Leone – RUF, AFRC, Kamajors, WSB	1991-03-23 – 2001-12-20	996	AFRC, RUF-opposition group, SLPP-ruling party	Sept. 1991 – Dec. 1999

Note: In addition, in Sierra Leone there was one-sided violence (451, 1384) during this period.

Coding decision

On 25 May 1997, President Kabbah was overthrown in a military rebellion led by Major Koroma, the leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This force was composed of several former Sierra Leone Army soldiers. One of the demands was the release by the ECOWAS force of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader, Foday Sankoh. AFRC and RUF formed a joint military junta controlling the country. On 28 May 1997, Major Koroma abolished the constitution and banned political parties. The UN, ECOWAS and the British Commonwealth condemned the rebellion while at the same time ECOMOG was reinforced and continued fighting RUF rebels.

From May 1997 onwards, for coding purposes, the government was the AFRC/RUF group and the challenging force the Kamajors (pro-Kabbah militia) supported by ECOMOG forces. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was officially reinstated as president on 10 March 1998. The last event coded with Kamajors against the government in UCDP GED ended on 12 February 1998, and the first RUF event against the government start-

ed on 21 February 1998. Therefore, in February the dyad was the government (AFRC/RUF) versus Kamajors and in March the dyad was the government (President Kabbah) versus RUF and AFRC. The only event in UCDP GED by AFRC occurred in May 1997; all previous events were carried out by RUF.

The interventions after the overthrow of President Kabbah on 25 May 1997 can be detailed as follows. According to Berman and Samms (2000: 111–128), who described the successive events, the Nigerian forces that were present in Sierra Leone through a training agreement with the presidential guard quickly responded, unsuccessfully attempting to reinstate Kabbah (together with smaller contingents of Ghana and Guinea). This intervention occurred in the absence of any formal agreement, and President Kabbah's request for Nigerian military support in the wake of the coup was legally questioned. More significantly, there was no authorisation within ECOWAS for the deployment of a mission in support of Kabbah. This approval only came later. First on 26 June 1997, ECOWAS foreign ministers met and established a committee of four (not an ECOMOG force) which would be involved in unsuccessful negotiations in July with the Junta. Only in August, during an ECOWAS meeting of foreign ministers, was the committee entrusted with the establishment of an ECOMOG II force, extending the scope of ECOMOG activity to Sierra Leone.

Therefore, the initial intervention in May 1997 should be considered as a Nigerian (Ghana and Guinea) intervention until August 1997, when the ECOMOG II mission started. Accordingly, the 1997/5.1 third party was coded to Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea in support of the opposition (see the coding decision below regarding the dyads), terminating on 29 August 1997 when the ECOMOG II intervention supporting the opposition started.

DADM coded the ECOWAS intervention on 1 June 1997, most likely reflecting the non-authorised intervention of mainly Nigerian troops. This entry corresponds to the Nigerian (Ghana and Guinea) intervention of May. Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) coded ECOMOG starting in October 1997 (until May 2000), associated with the date of the signing of the Agreement for the restoration of President Kabbah, the UN Security Council recognition of ECOWAS mediation efforts and the exemption of the ECOMOG from the oil embargo.

ECOMOG supported the government and engaged with the rebels in a Chapter VII type of mission. The OAU condemned the coup and supported the ECOWAS efforts in the 66th ordinary section between 28 and 31 May 1997 (OAU CM 330 363 66 2004). This position was supported by the UNSC president in a statement on 11 July 1997 (UN S PRST 36 1997). After the signing of the Peace Agreement in Lomé on 7 July 1999, the ECOMOG mandate changed to oversee the ceasefire and disarmament/demobilisation. ECOMOG together with UNOMSIL forces were integrated into UNAMSIL (SIPRI, 2012; Mays, 2011)

On 5 June 1998, the UN Security Council lifted the military sanctions against the government (not coded) and imposed military sanctions against the rebels (coded). Only the initiation of an intervention was coded.

The Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) was established by the Commonwealth Secretary-General in response to the Sierra Leonean President's request in 1997. It was later contextualised into a wider Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) in 2000. This later project, planned for 3 years, had the objective of developing a strategic plan for the reorganisation of the Sierra Leone Police Force (SIPRI, 2012). The former was considered a PKO (police component) while the latter was not coded.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established in October 1999 following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement (taking over UNOMSIL and ECOMOG). Its tasks included assisting in the implementation of the agreement but in 2000 UN S RES 1289 revised the mandate and changed to a Chapter VII mission. In 2001, UN S RES 1346 extended the mandate to restore law and order, resume DDR activities and assist in elections.

DADM (2012) indicated that in May 2000 there was an agreement for the redeployment of 2000 ECOMOG troops (disbanded in April 2000), but no information was provided on the effective deployment of the troops. Mays (2011) and Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) did not identify such deployment, and no news reports could confirm it; therefore, such an intervention was not coded.

Two other missions would occur outside the conflict period covered in the dataset. The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) created in August 2005 was mandated to assist the govern-

ment of Sierra Leone in the areas of governance, security sector reform, cross-border challenges and to coordinate with the Special Court for Sierra Leone (UN S RES 1620 2005). In August 2008 the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was created and mandated the areas of political support, human rights, good governance and decentralisation (UN S RES 1829 2008).

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 187] On 23 March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh challenged the government of President Momoh. Nigeria and Guinea deployed troops in April 1991 in support of the government. President Momoh was deposed in a military coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser on 29 April 1992. In September 1995, the Sierra Leone government requested that Ivory Coast mediate the conflict with RUF.

Captain Strasser was deposed in a military coup led by General Julius Maada Bio on 16 January 1996. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February and March 1996, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won the presidential elections and was inaugurated on March 31. In February and April 1996, Ivory Coast mediated negotiations between Sierra Leone and RUF representatives in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Ivory Coast, AU, UN and Commonwealth of Nations mediated the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement between the government and RUF in November 1996. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was arrested in Nigeria on 12 March 1997.

President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was overthrown in a military rebellion led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on 25 May 1997. Subsequently, World Vision International (WVI) suspended humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone in May. Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea deployed troops in May 1997 to restore President Kabbah (see coding decisions above for an explanation of when the ECOWAS intervention started). Sierra Leone was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations on 11 July 1997. On 17 July 1997, ECOWAS established a four-member (Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria) conciliation committee to mediate negotiations between the parties. On August 29, ECOWAS extended the ECOMOG mission to Sierra Leone with troops from Nigeria, Guinea and Mali on

an enforcement mission to restore President Kabbah to power. On August 30, ECOWAS approved economic sanctions (trade embargo) against the government. On September 6, the AFRC requested that Guinea mediate with the Kamajors and depose President Kabbah. On 8 October 1997, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions (oil embargo) and military sanctions (arms embargo) against the military government of the AFRC. During the same month, ECOWAS decided to impose a military embargo (military sanctions) against the military government of the AFRC. A five-member ECOWAS conciliation committee composed of Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Nigeria was established on 24 October 1997 to negotiate the restoration of Kabbah. The military junta of AFRC (allied with RUF) fled Freetown on 13 February 1998 within the context of ECOMOG operations which had military equipment support from the UK in February. Starting in February 1998, the World Food Program (WFP) provided humanitarian assistance to displaced individuals (coded as economic grants in the dataset).

Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re-instated as president on 16 March 1998. The UN Security Council lifted the economic sanctions (oil embargo) against the government that same day. On 5 June 1998, the UN Security Council lifted its military sanctions (arms embargo) against the government and imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the rebels. On the same day, the European Union's foreign ministers imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the rebels. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) on 13 July 1998 with a monitoring mandate. Also in July, the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) was initiated. In December 1998, Nigeria reinforced the ECOMOG forces with 7000 troops, raising its numbers to 17000 troops. On 14 January 1999, Liberia's President Charles Taylor, together with Togo and Ivory Coast, mediated a failed ceasefire agreement. In March 1998, President Kabbah asked the president of Togo, as ECOWAS chairman, to mediate negotiations. Through his mediation, on 18 May 1999, the government and RUF agree on the cessation of military hostilities. On 7 July 1999, the United Nations, Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS mediate the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement. UNOMSIL was terminated in October 1999; on the same day the UN Security Council approved the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to assist the government in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

Throughout 1999 the EU, US and UK provided humanitarian aid (coded as grants) to displaced individuals. ECOMOG-Sierra Leone was disbanded on 30 April 2000. In February 2000, UNAMSIL's mandate was extended to include enforcement action for the mandate. Between May and June 2000, the UK deployed troops in support of the government, and Britain and other Commonwealth nations agreed on 20 May 2000 to establish the International Military Advice and Training Team (IMATT) in support of the government. On 29 May 2000, ECOWAS agreed to redeploy ECOMOG, and a six-member ECOWAS conciliation committee is set up (composed of Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo) to participate in mediation in that month and later in the year in November, leading to the signing of the Abudja Ceasefire Agreement on 20 November 2000.

The last recorded event of the conflict occurred on 20 December 2000, involving the rebel group West Side Boys (a splinter group of the AFRC).

Nigeria – 475

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
100	Government of Nigeria – Boko Haram	1966-01-15 – 2010-12-29	940	ICO – No interventions coded	Feb. 1986 – Dec. 1999
249	Government of Nigeria – Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (Northern Nigeria)	2003-12-22 – 2004-12-08			
250	Government of Nigeria – NDPVF (Niger Delta)	2004-06-04 – 2009-04-27			

Note: In addition, in Nigeria there was non-state violence (4, 5, 14, 15, 66, 67, 71, 77, 78, 79, 86, 123, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 348, 360, 361, 366, 368, 373, 374, 375, 426, 429, 436, 438) and one-sided violence (475, 1442) during this period.

Conflict intervention narratives:

In 2004, the government was challenged by two territorial movements: the Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in the north from December 2003 onwards [Conflict 249] and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) from June 2004 onwards [Conflict 250]. The Paris Club relieved the government's previous obligations in January 2005. In August 2006, the USA and UK supported the government with military advisors in the context of the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (GGESS). Later, between May and July 2009, the government was challenged by Boko Haram [Conflict 100].

Central African Republic – 482

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date – Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start – end date)**
222	Government of Central African Republic – Military faction (Forces of André Kolingba), Forces of François Bozize, UFDR, CPJP	2001-05-27 – 2010-11-24			

Note: In addition, in Central Africa Republic there was one-sided violence (482, 1485) during this period.

Coding decision

In January 1997, the Bangui agreement mandated an inter-African force in the Central African Republic (MISAB) (deployed in February 1997) to restore peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui agreement and conducting operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals.

In 1998, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was established to replace MISAB, with a mandate to assist in maintaining security and law and order in and around the capital, Ban-

gui; supervise the final disposition of weapons retrieved in the disarmament programme; assist the capacity-building efforts of the national police; and provide advice and technical support for the elections. Although the mandate included elections support, the mission did not run the elections; therefore, it is considered a traditional PKO by Fortna (2008).

The UN Peace-Building Office in the Central Africa Republic (BONUCA) took over from MINURCA on 15 February 2000 to promote peace and national reconciliation. The principal mission of BONUCA was to support the government's efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate mobilisation at the international level of political support as well as resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery in the country. In addition, the office was tasked with promoting public awareness of human rights issues in the country and monitoring developments in this field. BONUCA was replaced by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) in 2010, with a mandate to coordinate the organisation's effort to promote political stability.

The interventions mentioned thus far are not in the dataset as the conflict period is from May 2001 to November 2010.

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States Peacekeeping Force in Central Africa Republic was established in 2002 (approval of the entire organisation occurred on 4 March 2002 at the mini CEN-SAD summit held in Kartoum, after having been approved in a subcommittee on 3 December 2001). This marked the formalisation of the Libyan troops already present in the country into a more legitimate format. Libyan troops intervened to protect the president, who faced the army's mutiny in May 2001 and later a coup attempt in November 2001. The CEN-SAD intervention had a mandate to make the capital secure and ensure the security of the president of the republic. The CEN-SAD mission was not approved by the AU, UN or CEMAC. Due to its narrow mandate and composition, this intervention is not considered a peacekeeping mission and thus was coded as an intervention with troops.

In the same year, these forces were re-formulated under CEMAC and called the Multinational Force in the Central Africa Republic (FOMUC). FOMUC started in December 2002 with a mandate to secure the border between Chad and CAR and guarantee the safety of former CAR President Patassé. After the 15 March 2003 coup, the mandate was expanded

at the Libreville Summit (3 June 2003) to include contributing to the security and restructuring of CAR armed forces, supporting the transition process and continuing to protect the CAR president. Although Heldt and Wallensteen (2007: 51) considered it to be an excluded non-UN mission because it did not have any peacekeeping tasks, due to the enlarged mandate (particularly the law and order mandate) it has been coded as a traditional peacekeeping mission. The mission remained active until 12 July 2008, when it was renamed to Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and political and operational authority was transferred to the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS). MICOPAX's mandate was to protect civilians, secure the territory, contribute to the national reconciliation process and facilitate the political dialogue initiated by President Bozize. This change followed from the implementation of the African Stand-by-Force (ASF) system, where ECCAS was the regional organisation recognised by the AU with a security mandate in Central Africa. This is equally coded as a traditional peacekeeping mission.

The EU Military Operation in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) was established by CJA 2007/677/CFSP (15 October 2007) and endorsed and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers by SCR 1778 (25 September 2007). It was mandated to support MINURCAT, contribute to the protection of civilians and UN personnel and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. It continued until 15 March 2009, when the mandate was assumed by MINURCAT.

MINURCAT was established by UN SCR 1778 (25 September 2007) as part of a multidimensional presence in concert with the EU (EUFOR Chad/CAR). The mission was mandated to provide for the security and protection of civilians by training and advising the Police Tchadienne and liaising with parties involved, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and monitor and promote human rights and the rule of law. In January 2009, the mandate was increased to a Chapter VII mission from March onwards (UN S/RES/1861).

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 222] In May 2001, the government was challenged by a military faction of André Kolingba's forces. The government was supported by Libya, who provided troops in the same month. Also in May, a political

mission was established by the UN, the United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central (BONUCA).

In July 2001, the World Food Programme and the EU provided a neutral economic grant. In November 2001, a mediation attempt was made by the UN and the AU. In February 2002 CEN-SAD approved a peacekeeping mission (Community of Sahel-Saharan States Peacekeeping Force in Central Africa Republic), which was replaced by a CEMAC mission (Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States [CEMAC] Multinational Force in the Central Africa Republic) in December 2002; both supported the government.

In March 2003, rebel leader François Bozize seized power. In response, in the same month the AU imposed diplomatic sanctions (suspension of membership), condemning the overthrow of President Patassé; the EU imposed economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the government; and France and Chad sent troops in support of the challenger group. In June, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) granted diplomatic recognition (coded as diplomatic sanctions in support of the government) to the Bozize government and provided economic assistance. In January 2004, France provided the government with military equipment and in April 2004 provided military training to CAR soldiers. Bozize was elected and inaugurated president on 11 June 2005. The AU lifted diplomatic sanctions (suspension of membership) in the same month. France provided military assistance (aerial reconnaissance) to the government in January 2006.

Bozize was challenged by the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) from October 2006 onwards. In November 2006, France provided support to the government with troops and aerial support, and Chad supported the government with troops. On 13 April 2007, the UN mediated the signing of the Birao agreement. In September 2007, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established, and in January 2008 the EU mission in support of MINURCAT was deployed (EUFOR/TCHAD/CAR—European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic). In February 2008, France supported the government with military equipment. Gabon participated in a mediation effort in June 2008, leading to the signing of the peace accords on 28 June 2008. In July, FOMUC was replaced by the neutral Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) of the Economic Community of Central African

States (ECCAS). In March 2009, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), with Chapter VII powers, assumed the mandate of EUFOR. In the same month a new challenging group, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) became active in the conflict. In January 2010, a UN political mission was established: the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA).

Chad – 483

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
91	Government of Chad – MOSANAT, Islamic Legion, MPS, MDD, CSNPD, CNR, FNT, FARF, MDJT, FUCD, RAFD, AN, UFDD, UFR, FPRN, Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas), Revolutionary Forces of 1 April	1966-07-31 - 2010-04-28	989		Sept. 1991 - Jan. 1996

Note: In addition, in Chad there was non-state violence (42, 148, 176) and one-sided violence (483, 1294, 1297, 1539) during this period.

Coding decision

In January 2006, oil royalties in London were frozen and World Bank financial assistance was stopped (overall, more than €200million) due to changes to the national law passed in 1999—then a condition for the World Bank's support to the pipeline. Such measures were not coded as interventions as they do not seem to be targeting the authority structures of the country in the context of the conflict, but more of a governance initiative (APRS_15_04_2006 a). In addition, China’s alleged involvement in the Chad rebellion in 2006 is not confirmed (BBCM_25_04_2006) and therefore not coded.

In the rebel offensive in February 2008, Chad's government alleged that Sudanese logistics support was provided to rebels through aviation and helicopters, but such allegations were denied by the Sudanese government (APRS_04_02_2008, DJI_04_02_2008 a, AFNW_05_02_2008). Because of the disputed evidence, no entry was coded.

Unmediated negotiations occurred in March 2008 between the rebels (RFC) and government (XNEW_19_03_2008). No entry was coded because there was no third-party involvement.

A President of the Security Council statement (UN S PRST 3 2008) mentioned a mediation team established by AU with the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, but no reference could be found regarding their activities; therefore, no entry was coded. Other Libyan-led mediation activities, both leading to agreements and not, were coded before 2008.

The UN Security Council approved the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINUCART) and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA in September 2007. The EU mission was deployed in February 2008, whereas MINUCART deployment was only approved in January 2009, two months before the MINUCART officially assumed the EUFOR TCHAD/RAC mandate. Therefore, the interventions coded are first EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and then MINUCART.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 91] The decades-old conflict involved several active challenging groups in 1989 and 1990: the Movement for the National Salvation of Chad (MOSANAT), the Islamic Legion, the Revolutionary Forces of 1 April and the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS).

In December 1990, Hissène Habre was militarily toppled by former ally, Idriss Deby, of the MPS. Despite this government change, the intrastate conflict did not stop, with old and new groups opposing the government. In October 1991, another challenging group became active—namely, the military faction constituting the forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas. France supported the new government by deploying troops in October 1991 and January 1992. Other challenging groups became active in 1992: the Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), the Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD), the National Council for Recovery (CNR) and Chad National Front (FNT).

In October 1992, Sudan mediated the conflict to reach the El Geneina agreement of 31 October 1992 between the government and FNT. In October 1993, both Libya and Sudan mediated the Tripoli agreement between the government and CNR, which included a ceasefire. The agreement was broken six days after its signing. In August 1994, groups of third parties (Central African Republic, France, Gabon, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)) mediated in reaching the Bangui-2 agreement between the government and the CSNPD. Two other agreements were signed: the Abeche agreement in October 1994 and The Dougia Accord in November 1995. It is estimated that, by the middle of the 1990s (coded in November 1994), half the military equipment was a result of Libyan support. In January 1996, President Bongo of Gabon unsuccessfully attempted to mediate a ceasefire agreement. In June, President Deby won the first multiparty presidential elections.

In February 1997 a challenging group, the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF), became active. Sudan mediated the agreements signed in N'Djamena in October 1997 between the government and a group of challenging groups. Without external mediation, in May 1998 the government signed the Doyna agreement with FARF. In February 1999, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) became active. In July 1999, Sudan mediated between the government of Chad and MDD for the signing of a reconciliation agreement.

In January 2001, Deby was declared winner in a controversial presidential poll.

In January 2002, Libya and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) mediated the signature of the Tripoli 2 agreement. Without external mediation, the government of Chad signed the Yebibou agreement in August 2005 with MDJT. In December 2005, the United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD) actively entered the conflict, as id the Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD) in June 2006.

In April 2006, France supported the government of President Idriss Deby with military intelligence and air support while the Sudanese government supported the rebels with equipment. In December 2006 Libya mediated the signing of the Tripoli Accord between the Government and FUCD.

In September 2007, the UN approved the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCART), giving temporary responsibility for the mission to a bridging operation from the European Union, the EUFOR Chad/CAR, which started deployment in February 2008. In October 2007, the Union Force for Democracy and Development (UFDD) group became actively involved in the conflict.

In January 2008, the EU offered to mediate between the parties.

In February 2008, a new challenging group became active: the National Alliance (AN). In the same month, France supported the government with military intelligence and air support, and Libya provided the government with military equipment. Libya mediated between the government and RFC in April 2008 and between the government and dissidents from Erdimi's RFC in August 2008. In March 2009, the EUFOR Chad/CAR became extinct and its military mandate was taken over by MINURCART.

In April 2009, the Union of Forces for the Resistance (UFR) became active in the conflict. In July 2009, Libya mediated an agreement between the government and UFDD-R, National Resistance Movement (MNR) and Front for the Health of the Republic (FSR) (the latter two groups are not dyads in UCDP GED but are identified in the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset).

In April 2010, a new challenging group became active in Chad: the Popular Front for National Rebirth (FPRN). The last conflict event occurred in April 2010.

Congo – 484

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
214	Government of the Republic of Congo - Ninjas, Cobras, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous	1993-11-03 – 2007-09-10	615	CMODID-pro government, FDP-opposition, UPADS-ruling party	June 1997 – Oct. 1997

Note: In addition, in Chad there was one-sided violence (484, 1398, 1401) during this period.

Coding decision

In June 1997, when Denis Sassou Nguesso challenged the government, Mayor Bernard Kolelas made an internal mediation effort (LBA_09_06_1997). This event was not coded because it did not involve outside intervention.

DADM (2012) refers to France providing military training to the government of Nguesso between October 1997 and December 1998, but no news reports could confirm this. The only reference are allegations of France's sympathy for Nguesso's overthrow of Pascal Lissouba (FTFT_03_12_1997, NYTF_16_10_1997 a). These allegations are explained by the oil interests of French companies (FTFT_03_12_1997, AFNR_22_03_2002) which allegedly led to the overthrow of Lissouba in October 1997 while attempting to detach itself from the company Elf-Aquitaine. French troops did not intervene to support the Lissouba regime. The training was not coded.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 214] On 3 November 1993, President Pascal Lissouba, elected in August 1992 in the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) coalition, and his supported winning coalition in the parliament (October 1993 elections), were challenged by the opposition group Ninjas (MCDDI Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development), a militia loyal to mayor Bernard Kolélas, and by the Cobras militia (PCT) led by former president General Sassou Nguesso. The confrontation with the Ninjas lasted until December 1994.

In June 1997, Lissouba's presidency continued to be challenged by the Cobras. The Ninjas remained neutral. France neutrally intervened with troops in June 1997, and in July President Bongo of Gabon mediated the conflict. In July, the International Mediation Committee on the crisis in Congo (IMC-Congo), constituted by Gabon, Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic and headed by President Bongo, mediated the conflict. In August 1997, special representative of the UN and OAU, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, and DRC president Kabila attempted to mediate the conflict in a separate process. In September, IMC-Congo attempted another mediation. In October, Angola and DRC sent troops, and Angola provided air support to the challenging group led by General Sassou Nguesso.

President Lissouba and Prime Minister Kolelas were overthrown on 15 October 1997, and former President Sassou Nguesso was sworn in as president on October 24. Angola maintained its support (troops and air support) to Nguesso after the unconstitutional change of government. The European Union imposed economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the government in March 1998. The Cocoyes (UPADS), a militia loyal to former President Lissouba, become active in October 1997, and the Ntsiloulous (breakaway faction of the Ninjas) become active in August. In December 1999, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville, mediated by IMC-Congo. in March 2001, the IMC-Congo promoted a national reconciliation dialogue (forum) in Brazzaville. In May, the EU lifted economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the government.

In March 2002, President Sassou Nguesso of the PCT-UDF coalition was elected (inaugurated in August 2002). In April 2002, the Ntsiloulous re-initiated a challenge to the government, lasting until December 2002. The last conflict event occurred in September 2007.

Democratic Republic of Congo – 490

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
86	Government of DRC – AFDL, RCD, MLC, CNDP	1964-01-18 – 2008-10-29	620		Oct. 1996 – May 1997
			630	MLC, RCD, AFDL	Aug. 1998 – Dec. 1999
254	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) – BDK	1998-07-02 – 2008-03-31			
			972	(no intervention)	Sept. 1992 – Jan. 1997

Note: In addition, in Chad there was non-state violence (12, 27, 38, 56, 80, 135, 136, 137, 138, 181, 182, 183, 184, 188, 190, 191, 396, 397, 398, 399) and one-sided violence (490, 1268, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1457, 1460, 1502, 1505, 1518, 1534, 1763, 1926, 1927, 1960, 1961, 549001, 549002, 549003, 549004, 549007, 549015) during this period.

Coding decision

Several events of supposed intervention fall outside the conflict period of UCDP GED and therefore are not considered:

a) In September 1991, France and Belgium sent troops allegedly to protect their nationals in Zaire (with air support from the USA), although allegations emerged that they effectively served to stabilise the rioting in the capital and therefore protected the Mobutu regime (LBA_24_09_1991, LBA_24_09_1991 a, LBA_24_09_1991 b, LBA_25_09_1991, LBA_25_09_1991 a, LBA_25_09_1991 b, LBA_26_09_1991, LBA_29_09_1991) Because the intervention allegations came mainly from the opposition and this period is outside the conflict UCDP period, the intervention was not coded.

b) News reports hinted at a possible PKO, but it never materialised (LBA_25_10_1991, LBA_29_10_1991).

c) New periods of low-intensity conflict occurred at the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 (LBA_03_12_1992, LBA_29_01_1993, LBA_29_01_1993 a, LBA_29_01_1993 b, LBA_30_01_1993) with some intervention for the evacuation of French and Belgium nationals. Because these efforts were not targeted at the authority structures of the country (and occurred outside the UCDP conflict period), this intervention was not coded.

d) In the aftermath of this period of low-intensity conflict during 1993, a process of democratic transition was attempted with some light enunciation of intentions of interventions to secure the process (LBA_14_01_1993, LBA_15_01_1993, BBCM_03_02_1993, GRDN_05_02_1993, LBA_24_03_1993, AGEU_23_04_1993, BBCM_26_04_1993), but they were not made effective. These were not coded.

Sudan's involvement in the conflict has been contested. Regan et al. (2009) coded it as having troops in support of the government. The news reported allegations of troops, advisors, air raids and equipment in support of Kabila (BBCM_11_09_1998, LBA_24_09_1998 , LBA_30_09_1998) which were denied by Sudanese officials

(BBCM_22_08_1998 a, DJI_26_09_1998, LBA_23_10_1998). Instead, the Sudanese government pledged political support to the DRC government (BBCM_16_10_1998, BBCM_19_10_1998). On one hand, the UCDP Armed Conflict did not list Sudan as a supporting party to the government (that is, not providing direct troop support); on the other hand, extensive allegations and the confirmation of political support to Kabila emerged, and UCDP External Support attributed "other form of support" to Sudan (and in the comments identified the supply of weapons and allegedly fighters). Taking into consideration both, this involvement was coded as an intervention with military equipment.

In 1997, Chad, Morocco and Togo offered to send troops in support of the government, but no further confirmation of acceptance or deployment was identified; therefore, it was not coded (LBA_03_02_1997, FTFT_04_02_1997).

There were allegations of Burundi troop involvement in the early stages of the conflict in 1997–1998, but they were denied by Burundi officials (BBCM_17_09_1998, LBA_06_03_1997, LBA_07_02_1997, DJI_26_09_1998). These allegations were not coded.

In 1998, all the intervening states in the early stages of the conflict were coded as bilateral interventions. Nevertheless, Mugabe referred to the recommendation of the Inter-state Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) of SADC on 18 August to declare the SADC in a unanimous decision to meet Kabila's appeal for support. Following this, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe announced the deployment of troops in the DRC (Nathan, 2012). Nelson Mandela, president of South Africa, challenged the legitimacy of such a decision. For this reason, the coding indicates that it was bilateral interventions, not SADC.

Chad withdrew its troops (deployed in support of the government) from the DRC on 26 May 1999 (DADM, 2012: 28). This event was not coded.

The Joint Military Committee (JMC) was established on 3 September 1999 with a mandate to monitor the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and investigate violations. This was a decision-making body pending the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The JMC was the responsibility of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which deployed 30 military observers in November 1999. It was also supported by the UN with 90 military liaison officers approved by the UNSC on August 1999

(UN S RES 1258/1999) in what would become MONUC (the first liaison officers arrived in September 1999). Because UN approval occurred prior to OAU deployment, JMC can be considered as having had UNSC authorisation.

MONUC was approved on 30 November 1999 (UN S RES 1279 1999) with a mandate to liaise and provide technical assistance to JMC (Joint Military Commission of the Lusaka accord), among other planning and liaison tasks. In February 2000, with UN S RES 1291 2000, MONUC entered phase II, where its size was significantly extended from 90 military liaison officers (UN S RES 1258 1999) to 5537 military personnel, including 500 monitors. Regarding its mandate, the observer mission added to its mandate the protection of not only UN and JMC personnel, but also civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. In 2001, UN S RES 1376 launched phase III of MONUC, during which the mission started deploying to the east of the DRC. UN S RES 1493 of 28 July 2003 increased the mission strength and revised the mandate to a Chapter VII mandate. With UN S RES 1565 of 1 October 2004, the mandate was revised to deploy and maintain a presence in key areas of potential volatility, cooperate with ONUB to monitor and prevent the movement of combatants and arms across shared borders, ensure the protection of civilians and UN staff and facilities, facilitate the DDR process and assist in the successful completion of the electoral process. Through UN S RES 1925 of May 2010, MONUC was renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). In 2010, MONUSCO's mandate was to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and UN personnel and facilities; assist in disarming and demobilising foreign and Congolese armed groups; assist SSR and train and mentor Congolese armed forces; contribute to the territorial security of the DRC; and support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law. Two missions were coded: the initial one of MONUC and the one when MONUC assumed Chapter VII powers. MONUSCO falls outside the conflict period.

Operation Artemis was established by the European Union (CJA 2003/423/CFSP, 5 June 2003) and approved by the UNSC (UN S RES 1484, 30 May 2003) to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia with Chapter VII functions. The mandate was extended to September 2003 to enable transition to the MONUC forces.

According to Carayannis (2009), the appointment of Sir Ketumile Masire as facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by the OAU occurred in December 1999. Other sources do not indicate the precise date. There is a reference requesting agreement for a facilitator of a UNSC decision on 30 November 1999 (UN S RES 1279 1999), and the UNSC presidential statement of 26 January 2000 acknowledges the appointment (UN S PRST 2 2000). Therefore, the appointment must have occurred in December 1999 or January 2000. Carayannis's (2009) date was used.

In May 1998, RCD broke into two factions: RCD-Goma, led by the new RCD President Emile Ilunga, and RCD-Kisangani, chaired by Mbusa Nyamwisi. Such differentiation is not accounted for in the dataset, which follows UCDP GED coding. Accordingly, the different rebel groups supported by Rwanda and Uganda were not differentiated.

UNSC resolution 1078 in 1996 decided on a temporary force to facilitate the return of humanitarian organisations, delivery of aid and return of refugees, meaning it was not a peacekeeping mandate. Several news reports mentioned the preparations for this force (see references in November 1996), but not its deployment; therefore, it was not coded.

In April 2005, the EU launched the EUPOL KINSHASA police mission, which was replaced in July 2007 by a new military mission: EUPOL DR Congo. EUPOL KINSHASA was the first civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation to be deployed in Africa. Its objective was to support the Congolese National Police's Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa, especially around the election period in 2006; therefore, it had direct security functions. The follow-up EUPOL DR Congo was intended to support the DRC authorities in security sector reform, indicating more of an advisory role. These were mainly police missions (coded as troops in the dataset), but also had direct security functions and therefore have been included.

An EU Advisory and Assistance mission for DRC Security Reform was established in May 2005 (CJA 2005/355/CFSP) as a follow-up and complement to EUPOL Kinshasa (working in coordination with MONUC as well). It was called the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo(EUSEC DR Congo). Its initial mandate was to advise on security issues; therefore, it was included with a political mandate (the lighter of the PKO mandates). Its mandate was progressively increased in 2007 (CJA 2007/406/CFSP),

2008 (CJA 2008/491/CFSP), 2009 (CJA 2009/709/CFSP) and 2010 (CJA 2010/565/CFSP). The mandate was always in an advisory role within Security Sector Reform (SSR); therefore, it was only coded once in 2005 as a political mission.

On 27 April 2006, EUFOR DR Congo was authorised by CJA 2006/319/CFSP to support MONUC during the election process in DR Congo. Its mandate was endorsed and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers by SCR 1671 (24 April 2006). The mission closed on 30 November 2006.

EUPOL RD Congo was established in June 2007 (CJA 2007/405/CFSP), succeeding EUPOL Kinshasa. The mandate was to support overall security sector reforms in the DRC and assist the Congolese authorities in reforming the Congolese Police and improving the functioning of the criminal justice system. Although it carried out mainly advisory work, it also had direct security functions.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 86] Having started before 1989, in October 1996 the conflict between the government of Zaire, headed by President Mobutu, and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), headed by Laurent Kabila, was active. In October 1996, Rwanda deployed troops in support of AFDL. In November the UN conducted a summit to mediate the conflict. Uganda deployed troops in December 1996, and in March 1997 Angola also sent troops, both on the side of AFDL. In March 1997, the UN and OAU mediated negotiations between the parties in Lomé, Togo. Between 16 April and 15 May 1997, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa conducted negotiations between the parties. President Mobuto was overthrown by AFDL rebels on 16 May 1997. The country was renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Laurent Kabila was sworn in as president on 29 May 1997. Angola, Rwanda and Uganda provided diplomatic assistance to the government on 19 May 1997 (coded as political sanctions in support of the government).

In August 1998, a challenger group became active, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), led by Emile Ilunga. RCD received economic support in the form of grants and was supported militarily with troops from both Rwanda and Uganda from August 1998 onwards. At the same

time, the government was supported militarily with troops from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia; air support from Zimbabwe and Angola; and military equipment from Angola. In September 1998, Sudan started supporting the government with military equipment and Chad with troops.

In August 1998 President Nelson Mandela offered to mediate the dispute, and Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi began mediation efforts. In the same month, President Mugabe, as SADC chair, organised a summit together with East African states at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, as well as a SADC meeting; both focused on the DRC conflict. The meeting decided, in an Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) proposal for SADC, to support Laurent Kabila, but the legitimacy of this decision was challenged by South Africa, which in turn organised a SADC summit in September 1998. At this summit, Mandela declared support for the military interventions of SADC member states in the conflict, but a diplomatic process was decided upon and Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was appointed to lead the mediation efforts which started in the same month.

During September 1998, other parties attempted to mediate the situation: the OAU through a country defence ministers summit; former Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba, through a summit; the 12th Non-Aligned Movement summit; and Zimbabwe, through a summit. President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi offered to mediate the conflict that same month.

In October and November 1998, Zimbabwe reinforced its troops in support of the government. (not coded). President Chiluba mediated in October and November 1998 in the name of SADC and President Mandela made an offer of mediation in October. In November 1998, a challenger group becomes active: the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC).

President Kadhafi of Libya mediated in December 1998. Five nations from the region involved in the conflict organised a summit in January 1999, and the dispute was dealt with at the SADC summit in February 1999 and in subsequent mediation efforts in the same month by President Chiluba.

In April 1999 President Kabila requested mediation by President Gnassibe Eyadema of Togo. President Kadhafi again mediated the conflict in April 1999, from which a ceasefire accord was signed in Sirte,

Libya (not coded as absent from UCDP PA). This agreement provided for the deployment of peacekeepers, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the initiation of a national dialogue; although welcomed by the Security Council, it was rejected by both the RCD and Rwanda. However, on 4 May, President Chiluba agreed to work with Kadhafi to implement the Sirte accord, while Rwanda insisted that it recognised only Chiluba's peace initiative. In May 1999, following the Sirte agreement, Libya sent a small force of Libyan peacekeepers to DRC.

After the inauguration of President Mbeki in South Africa, in June 1999, a SADC summit of regional leaders took place. Zambia, the UN, the OAU, Zambian President and SADC chairman Chiluba mediated a negotiation process starting on 24 June 1999 and culminating on 10 July with the signing of the Lusaka Accords (the RDC representatives later signed the ceasefire agreement on August 31). President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa mediated in August 1999. Rwanda and Uganda deployed troops in support of the rebels.

On 6 August 1999, the UNSC decided on the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), whose mandate progressively increased to include monitoring the ceasefire, verifying the disengagement of military forces and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The mission was also later given Chapter VII powers.

On 16 November 1999,, the OAU sent military observers as part of the Joint Military Committee (JMC) considered in the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, which were withdrawn on 30 November 2000. In December 1999, the OAU appointed Ketumile Masire (former president of Botswana) as the neutral facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. In January 2000, UN mediators met seven regional heads of state. In February, the strength of MONUC was substantially increased although the mandate was not significantly changed in practice.

After the assassination of President Kabila on 16 January 2001, Major General Kabila (his son) was sworn in as president on 26 January 2001 (no regime change). In May 2001, Zambia mediated the signing of the Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue mediated the dispute in October 2001 and February 2002. South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki and Ketumile Masire, representing OAU (the Inter-Congolese Dialogue), mediated the dispute in April 2002, leading to the signing of the "Political

agreement on consensual management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" agreement, which was rejected by Rwanda-backed RCD-Goma and the opposition.

In July 2002, South Africa mediated an agreement between DRC and Rwanda for the withdrawal of Rwandese troops. In October 2002, the UN and President Thabo Mbeke mediated the dispute. On 16 December 2002, the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo was signed, mediated by Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue appointed by the OAU. The UN and the AU mediated the conflict, leading to the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations—Final Act being signed on 2 April 2003. In the same month, an AU summit was held about the conflict.

In June 2003, the European Commission approved the deployment of a temporary peacekeeping mission with Chapter VII powers: the EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the DRC (IEMF-DRC), also known as Operation ARTEMIS, previously authorised by UNSC in order to complement MONUC. In July, the UN approved military sanctions (arms embargo) against the rebels, and MONUC assumed Chapter VII powers. In April 2005, the EU launched a police mission, EUPOL Kinshasa (coded as a political mission), which was replaced in July 2007 by a new military mission, EUPOL DR Congo, with Chapter VII powers. In July 2005, a political mission was initiated by the EU: the EUSEC DR Congo. In January 2006, a challenger group became active: the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). In June 2006, the EC deployed troops in the country—namely, EUFOR-DRC.

[Conflict 254] In July 2007, the Kingdom of Kongo (BDK) became active in the conflict.

The conflict last event of deadly violence occurred on 29 October 2008.

Uganda – 500

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
118	Government of Uganda – LRA, UPA, WNBF, ADF, UNRF II	1971-01-25 – 2010-11-18		All conflicts before 1989	

Note: In addition, in Chad there was non-state violence (22, 30, 31, 132, 133, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 369, 394, 412) and one-sided violence (500, 1334, 1336, 1337) during this period.

Coding decision

The support for the LRA from Sudan has been confirmed in several reports, but its exact initiation is difficult to determine. In this case, it was considered 1994 based on UCDP External Support coding. When the ADF initiated activities in 1999, a new entry of support of Sudan was made in the month of initiation of activity of the group.

In both cases, the support referenced in news reports related to the possibility of using Sudanese territory as bases (generally referred to as support), even if allegations of weapons were made. For this reason, the type of support coded was equipment/aid, as aid can be considered the use of territory.

UCDP Armed Conflict identified that Sudan supported the government of Uganda with troops (in addition to other types) in 2002 and 2005. This support could not be verified by news reports, but a few other sources confirmed that:

- Sudan and Uganda signed a peace agreement in December 1999 and September 2000 which stopped each country from supporting rebel groups in the other country;
- In September 2001, Uganda reopened its embassy in Sudan after six years (Hoile, 2002: 273)
- Allegations of Sudanese support to LRA continued (AFPR_13_11_2002, APRS_21_09_2003, AFPR_03_10_2003) even if by 2005 there was news that LRA was asking Sudan to resume its support (XNEW_08_01_2005);

• Sudan allowed Uganda's army to make incursions into Sudan in pursuit of LRA (UCDP External Support, APRS_14_03_2002, AFNW_21_11_2002);

• Sudan sanctioned the Operation Iron Fist (2002-2005), allowing for Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) to enter Sudanese territory in pursuit of LRA in a coordinated fashion with Sudanese authorities (BBCM_04_06_2002). There are conflicting reports on Sudan's involvement in this operation. Some state that Sudan had no direct role in the fighting (LBA_14_04_2002, AFNW_28_05_2002) while others indicate that the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) joined in action against the LRA towards the end of March 2002 (AFNW_09_05_2002);

• Specific collaboration occurred between the two armies over the deployment of liaison officers from SPAF in Uganda and SPAF occupation of camps previously occupied by LRA in South Sudan (BBCM_11_01_2003, LBA_10_01_2003); and

• Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and SAPF directly supported UPDF operations in 2005, with Sudan's agreement (BBCM_09_01_2005, XNEW_09_01_2005, LBA_28_01_2005, BBCM_16_04_2005).

Considering these support activities and the reference of UCDP External Support, Sudan's troop support for Uganda in 2002 and 2005, as identified, is considered to be likely. At the same time, the allegations of continued support to LRA are considered insufficient to merit an entry. The Operation Iron Fist was initiated in March 2002, and the news of the joint Sudanese/Ugandan operation emerged in April 2005. Thus, two entries of Sudan support to the government were created accordingly.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 118] General Museveni was sworn in as president on 29 January 1986, but did not stop the civil war. In January 1989, two challengers became active: the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda People's Army (UPA). Sudan supported the LRA from February 1994 onwards with sheltering (military aid). From 1996 onwards, the USA supported Uganda's government with military equipment.

In 1996, two other factions challenged the government: the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) from April 1996 and the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) from November 1996 onwards. In May 1996, Museveni

was elected president. Sudan supported the challenging groups with military equipment/aid in November 1996. Negotiation initiatives occurred—one in December 1999 and another in September 2000, when Sudan and Uganda sign two peace agreements to stop helping each other's rebels groups and cooperate; they were not mediated by third parties.

On 29 June 2000, the Ugandans rejected a multiparty political system in a referendum. In September 2000, the Carter Center mediated negotiations between Sudan and Uganda. On 12 March 2001 President Museveni was re-elected with 69 percent of the votes. In March 2002, the Ugandan army started Operation Iron Fist to eliminate the LRA inclusively within South Sudan's territory, with agreement and troop support from Sudan. On 24 December 2002, the Ugandan government signed the Yumbe Peace Agreement with Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) (a splinter group of the WNBF). In the context of Operation Iron Fist, in April 2005, Sudan supported Uganda with troops in the fight against the LRA. In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of the leader and four commanders of the LRA. In May and June 2007 and February 2008, three agreements were signed, one in each month. The conflict was ongoing at the end of 2010.

Burundi – 516

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
90	Government of Burundi – Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL	1965-10-18 – 2008-08-22	610	NCDD, UNP	May 1996 – Dec. 1999
			>970	No interventions	Nov. 1991 – Jan. 1992
			> 983	No interventions	Oct. 1993 – Jan.

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
					1994

Note: In addition, in Burundi there was non-state violence (37, 130, 170, 393) and one-sided violence (516, 1278, 1280, 1474) during this period.

Coding decision

Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) indicated that the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) started in February 1994 (continuing to July 1996). News reports referred to it as being reinforced in April 1995 (LBA_12_04_1995), a time when an OAU delegation travelled to the country and decided to increase the size of the mission from 47 to 67 (BBCM_14_04_1995). DADM (2012) indicated that it started on 7 December 1993 and continued to 31 July 1996 in the African Union as well (2003). But Mays (2011) claimed the deployment of troops only in February 1994. SIPRI (2012) MOPD identified the OAU decision occurring in December 1993 and the agreement between OAU and Burundi in April 1994. Therefore, it seems the deployment was from February 1994 to July 1996.

In 1993 and 1994, two presidents died—one was assassinated and the other died in a plane crash—but because the institutional structures of the country replaced them, these vents were not considered a change of government. The October 1993 failed coup attempt was carried out by a faction of the military (GRDN_29_10_1993). The regime did not change even if the leader did.

There is conflicting information about the appointment of Julius Nyerere as mediator in Burundi. Some reports refer to it as an officially appointment in February 1996 (LBA_25_05_1996) while other accounts identify it as happening in June 1996 (Ayebare 2010). In either case, Nyerere, former Tanzanian president, was involved in the mediation process starting in December 1995 (Ayebare, 2010); therefore, the difference stems from whether the third party was Tanzania or the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, both having Nyerere as mediator. Because the news on the meeting in June 1996 reported Nyerere as the me-

diator (not his appointment), it is likely that February was the time of appointment. Therefore, the December 1995 entry refers to Tanzania as the third party and the June 1996 entry to the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, both with Nyerere as the diplomatic identity.

The military coup in Burundi in July 1996 was not recognised by OAU (LBA_26_07_1996).

The OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) was established on 7 December 1993 by the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management. The mission's mandate, to promote dialogue between military and government leaders, was endorsed by a treaty between the OAU and Burundi (8 April 1994). The mission was effectively withdrawn in July 1996 and, following the coup in Burundi, the military observer component was pulled out. The OAU mission aimed to promote national reconciliation, confidence building and dialogue between military and government leaders in Burundi by observing and reporting on violations of human rights (SIPRI, 2012)

The South African Protection and Support Detachment (SAPSD) was established at the 15th Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi on 23 July 2001, with a mandate to protect state institutions and Burundian political leaders returning from exile and to serve as a confidence-building measure. The Security Council endorsed the establishment of the interim security presence with SCR 1375 (29 October 2001). The OAU also expressed its support for the establishment of the SAPSD. The force was to be contributed to by Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. On 23 October 2001, South Africa stated to the Security Council its intention to deploy an interim protection force on 1 November 2001. This was the only force deployed and therefore was coded as by South Africa. Its mandate was to ensure the stability of the South African brokered power-sharing agreement (resulting from talks led by Nelson Mandela in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2000) by providing protection for officials of the interim government launched in November 2001 in an attempt to reconcile the Hutu majority with the Tutsi-dominated government following eight years of civil war. The main task of the mission was to protect Hutu politicians returning from exile in order to partake in the new transitional government and parliament, many of whom distrusted the Burundian armed forces; thus, the South African unit served as a protection mission rather than a peacekeeping mission. The mission

staff was to serve as an interim protection staff until Burundi forces were trained and able to take over the responsibility. Therefore, the SAPSD also assisted in the training and establishment of an ethnically balanced unit for institutional protection (SIPRI, 2012).

According to Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), SAPSD existed from 2001 to 2003. DADM (2012) provided an exact date of initiation (28 October 2001), but not a date of termination. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) started in April 2003, and SAPSD was supposed to have integrated this force automatically even when keeping the previous mandate (Svensson, 2007). For this reason, April 2003 was considered the end date for SAPSD. Following Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), it is not considered a peacekeeping operation.

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was established by the decision of the 7th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government level (3 February 2003). The mission's mandate was to oversee the ceasefire, liaise between the conflicting parties, assist the JCC, facilitate the DDR process and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance (SIPRI, 2012). AMIB provided security for the AU ceasefire observer mission in Burundi which existed in tandem. Only AMIB was considered in the coding as the umbrella mission.

The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established by SCR 1545 (21 May 2004) with UN Charter VII powers (taking over from AMIB). The mission was mandated to ensure the respect of the ceasefire agreement, promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces through a comprehensive DDR programme, assist in the successful completion of the electoral process and protect UN staff, facilities and civilians.

The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (2007–2010) was a political mission with a mandate to support the Government of Burundi in the areas of: (a) peace consolidation and democratic governance; (b) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and reform of the security sector; (c) promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity; and (d) donor and United Nations agency coordination.

The African Union Special Task Force (AUSTF) was created in May 2004 to replace AMIB in support of the ceasefire. It comprised South

African troops with a mandate to protect various factions and government leaders in Burundi. With the end of ONUB, AUSTF also assumed some other missions (mandated by AU on 9 November 2006), including the protection of armed faction assembly areas, disarmament of the combatants, storage of weapons collected at disarmament points, protection of demobilisation centres and transportation of disarmed fighters. Although never approved by the UNSC, it can be considered a continuation of the ONUB mandate. The mission ended on 31 December 2009, when the South African soldiers departed Burundi.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 90] On 23 November 1991 (the first UCDP GED entry), the Government of Burundi and Palipehutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) were engaged in conflict. A new constitution was approved in a referendum on 9 March 1992. Melchoir Ndadaye of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FDB) was elected and inaugurated president on 10 July 1993. President Ndadaye was then killed in an attempted military coup on 21 October 1993. The National Salvation Committee (NSC) headed by François Ngeze took control of the government. France sent a small military force to the country in support of the government in November 1993.

On 25 October 1993, the UN established the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB) (coded as a political mission); on 7 December 1993, the OAU established a peacekeeping observer mission: OMIB. Cyrien Ntaryamira was elected president by the National Assembly on 13 January 1994. President Ntaryamira was killed in a plane crash on 6 April 1994, and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya became provisional president on April 8. That month the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) challenged the government. The National Assembly elected Sylvestre Ntibantunganya as president in September 1994. France supported the government with military equipment in February 1995 within the context of a support programme.

Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere started a mediation process in November 1995. The European Community suspended economic assistance to the government in April 1996, and in May 1996 military cooperation with the government was suspended by France (coded as a military sanction). The UN established a human rights observation mis-

sion in Burundi on 16 April 1996 (not coded due to its nature). The USA made an offer of mediation to the parties in May 1996. In the same month the inter-regional summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi took place, with Nyerere as mediator (he had been appointed mediator in February 1996).

President Ntibantunganya was overthrown in a military rebellion on 23 July 1996. Major Pierre Buyoya was appointed president on July 25. The Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi held a summit on 31 July 1996. In August, Kenya, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo relieved the opposition of past obligations. Seven African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia) imposed economic (trade and transportation) and military (arms) embargos on the Government of Burundi from 6 August 1996 until January 1999. On 21 August 1996, the UN organised a summit to attempt to mediate the conflict.

Starting in March 1997, a splinter group of Palipehutu entered the conflict as Palipehutu–FNL (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – Forces for National Liberation). In May 1997, the Catholic Church, through a representative of the Saint Egidio-Riccardi community, attempted to mediate the situation, and the UN and OAU appointed Mohamed Sahnoun as special envoy for the Great Lakes region.

In November 1997, Frolina (National Liberation Front, a splinter group from Palipehutu) entered the conflict. In June 1998 a splinter group of CNDD called National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD–FDD) became involved in the conflict. In August 1997, May 1998 and October 1998, Nyerere—in the name of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi—mediated the conflict. South Africa provided military assistance to the government in 1998 (coded in June). In January 1999, the economic sanctions (trade and transportation embargo) and military sanctions (arms embargo) against the government imposed by Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia were lifted.

Nelson Mandela replaced Nyerere (after his death in October 1999) as mediator and reached the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi on 28 August 2000. Ukraine supported the government with military equipment in 2000 (coded in September). In July 2001, Mandela, as Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi mediator, helped

negotiate the signing of the power-sharing agreement. In October 2001, South Africa sent a neutral force to Burundi—the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD)—in order to protect approximately 150 Hutu politicians. South Africa mediated negotiations between the government and rebels in August 2002. Jacob Zuma replaced Mandela as mediator in early 2002 and reached a ceasefire agreement in December.

In February 2003, the AU sent military observers; in April 2003, the AU established the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to monitor the ceasefire agreement, provide security for the rebels participating in the disarmament and demobilisation programme and assist in the implementation of this programme. South Africa mediated the signing of the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi in October 2003 and the Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi in November 2003. On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) with Chapter VII powers and took over AMIB forces with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement, assist with the disarmament and demobilisation programme provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and provide security for the electoral process.

A new constitution was approved in referendum with 92 percent of votes on 28 February 2005. Pierre Nkurunziza was appointed by the parliament as president and was inaugurated on 26 August 2005. On 18 June 2006, the Great Lakes Initiative and South Africa mediated the signing of the Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability. Mediated by the Great Lakes Initiative, South Africa, the UN and AU, a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 7 September 2006. A Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) was set up by the UN, AU, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda in October 2006 without a military component and was tasked with the implementation of the ceasefire accord on the ground.

On 31 December 2006, ONUB was replaced by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), approved by the UNSC on 25 October 2006. When ONUB withdrew, South African troops remained under an AU mandate as the AU Special Task Force. For these reasons, it was considered a mission indirectly authorised by the UNSC.

On 22 August 2008, the conflict had its last deadly recorded event.

Rwanda – 517

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
179	Government of Rwanda – FPR, FDLR, ALIR	1990-10-01 - 2009-12-31	952	Rwanda Patriotic Front, NRMV-ruling party	Sept. 1990 - July 1994

Note: In addition, in Rwanda there was one-sided violence (517, 1379, 1380, 1478) during this period.

Coding decision

In Regan et al. (2009), the UN started to mediate on 18 August 1993. In DADM (2012), Tanzania mediated the signing of a ceasefire signed on 3 August 1993 (which was recorded in UCDP PA). These are considered two different interventions. The latter was accounted for in the July 1998 interventions started on 16 July 1993 and lasting until 4 August 1993.

The Sant' Egidio Community mediated negotiations with representatives of the FDLR in Rome, Italy, between 2003 and 2005 (DADM, 2012: 70). Because it falls outside the period of conflict, it was not coded.

There were allegations that RPF was supported by Belgium (BBCM_22_04_1994 Analysis), but they were not coded.

In June 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established with a mandate to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it. The mission ended in September 1994.

When the OAU Military Observer Group dispatched in April 1991 to support the peace process collapsed, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) I and then II were created to take over its functions. Elements of the NMOGII were incorporated into UNAMIR in August 1993 under the terms of the Arusha peace accord.

In October 1993, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established with a mandate to contribute to security, monitor the ceasefire and support DDR and humanitarian activities. In the aftermath of the genocide the UNAMIR mandate was significantly changed in May and June 1994 to include (UN S RES 918 1994 and UN

S RES 925 1994, respectively, and later in 1995 UN S RES 997 1995) security of UN agencies and initiatives, training of police, national reconciliation, support for the return of refugees and humanitarian aid. For this reason, a new entry was coded.

The French mission Operation Turquoise was considered a humanitarian operation—namely, a troop deployment, not PKO. It was deployed in south-western Rwanda and Zaire on 22 June 1994 in an area where there was no fighting between RPF and FAR (Fortna, 2008).

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 179] President Habyarimana was re-elected without opposition on 19 December 1988.

On 1 October 1990 a conflict emerged between the Rwandese government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR). In the same month, Belgium, France and Zaire supported the government with troops, while Uganda provided FPR with equipment and the use of territory as bases. The OAU chairman and Belgium Prime Minister Wilfried Martens attempted mediation. In November, President Mobutu of Zaire mediated the dispute. In February 1991, President Myinyi of Tanzania mediated, and the OAU also promoted a forum. In March 1991, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal and OAU mediated the N'SELE Cease-fire Agreement. In the following month, the AU approved a Military Observer Group (MOG) to monitor the agreement; it remained in place until September 1991. In September 1991, President Mobutu of Zaire mediated between the parties.

In June, the USA, France and OAU attempted a mediation initiative. In August 1992, an OAU monitoring team of military officers from Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Senegal (NMOG I – OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I) was deployed. In July and August, Tanzanian President Myinyi and UN mediator Booh Booh of Cameroon participated in mediation initiatives. In August, the Tanzanian president mediated the signing of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law. Tanzania's Foreign Affairs minister mediated in September and October 1992.

In January 1993, the Tanzanian president mediated the signing of the Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government. In February 1993, France deployed troops in support of the government. In March 1993, President Myinyi mediated twice; in the same month, Belgium neutrally recalled the ambassador from the country. In May, June and July 1993, Tanzania's President Myinyi was again involved in mediation initiatives which resulted in the signing of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons. In August, Tanzania, the UN and OAU mediated the signing of the Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of Armed Forces and The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions. In the same month, Tanzania, OAU, the UN, Uganda and Burundi mediated the signing of the Arusha Accords.

In August 1993, the United Nations initiated the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) peacekeeping mission to monitor their common border. In the same month, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group was renewed (NMOG II). In November, the UN deployed the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR) peacekeeping mission to ensure the security of the capital city Kigali, monitor the ceasefire agreement and the security situation and assist in mine clearance and coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations.

Ethnic violence broke out between the Hutus and Tutsis following the death of President Habyarimana in a place crash (also killing President Cyrien Ntaryamira of Burundi) on 6 April 1994. On 17 May, the UN intervened neutrally with military equipment, imposed an arms embargo on the country and significantly increased the troop deployment (to 5500) under UNAMIR while enlarging the mandate to protect persons and humanitarian relief operations. In June 1994, a multinational force led by France was approved at the UN Security Council and deployed to provide security for a humanitarian zone. Also in June, the OAU organised a summit on the matter; in the same month, the South African President was asked to meet the conflicting parties. In July, RPF took control of Rwanda. The USA initiated Operation Support Hope

with neutral troops in July 1994. On 8 November, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Transitional National Assembly approved a new constitution on 5 May 1995. In August 1995, the UN suspended the arms embargo (not coded) against the government,, but military sanctions against the opposition remained in effect.

In February 1997, the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) became actively engaged in conflict against the government. In March 2000, the EU lifted economic sanctions against the government (not coded). President Bizimungu resigned on 23 March 2000 and Vice-President Paul Kagame was elected president by the parliament on April 17 and was inaugurated on April 22. A new constitution was approved on 26 May 2003.

The last deadly recorded event of the conflict occurred in December 2009.

Somalia – 520

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
141	Government of Somalia – Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, ARS/UIC, SRRC, USC/SNA, SSDF, SPM, SNM,, USC/SSA, USC, Harakat Ras Kamboni	1982-01-18 – 2010-12-31	931	SNM, SRSP-ruling party	Jan. 1982 - Jan. 1991
			966	SNA, SPM, USC-ruling party	June 1991 - Dec. 1999

Note: In addition, in Somalia there was non-state violence (2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 41, 43, 50, 51, 55, 61, 68, 70, 72, 85, 97, 98, 114, 120, 128, 134, 140, 141, 144, 147, 152, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 294, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 306, 307, 308, 350, 413, 423, 425, 428, 439, 440) and one-sided violence (520, 1538, 1547, 1578) during this period.

Coding decision

Allegations of petroleum interests related with Somaliland emerged, but were not coded (PETR_29_02_1992).

The IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) authorised in UN S/RES/1725 (6 December 2006) was an IGAD-proposed mission with a mandate to deploy a protection and training mission in Somalia. This mission was never deployed and was not coded. Instead, it was replaced by AMISOM.

AMISOM was established by the AU Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 and was endorsed by SCR 1744 (21 February 2007) under UN Charter Chapter VII. The mission was mandated to support the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia by supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and contributing to the overall security situation. On 29 June 2008, the operation's mandate was expanded to include assisting the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement (reached on 9 June 2008 and formally signed on 19 August 2008) (SIPRI, 2102).

The EU Naval Force against Piracy (EU NAVFOR) Somalia was established by CJA 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008) in support of UN SCR 1814 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008). The first naval operation within the ESDP framework was mandated to protect vessels of the World Food Programme, which provided humanitarian assistance to the Somali population, and vulnerable vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The operation was authorised to employ any necessary measures, including the use of force (SIPRI, 2012).

The EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM) was established by CJA 2010/197/CFSP (13 March 2010) to contribute to the strengthening of the Somali TFG by contributing to the training and support of Somali security forces. CJA 2009/906/CFSP (8 December 2009) strengthened the mission's mandate of supporting the fight against organised crime and corruption.

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was deployed as a joint operation of several countries to provide security for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The mission was authorised under Chapter VII by UN S/RES/794 (3 December 1992). During the mission, the forces became involved in broader security operations which culminated in the Black Hawk Down incident. Because of Chapter VII and of the type of operations in which the mission was involved, the mandate was considered to be of the enforcement type.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was established by UN S/RES/751 (24 April 1992) to provide humanitarian support and deploy military observers to monitor the Mogadishu ceasefire. In December 1992, UN S/RES/794 gave the mission Chapter VII powers for conducting humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

In 1993, UNOSOM II was approved by UN S/RES/814 (26 March 1993) under Chapter VII. The mandate was later revised in UN S/RES/897 (4 February 1994). It integrated the UNITAF forces with mandates of law and order, humanitarian support and demobilisation.

In April 1995, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established with a political mission.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 141] Different groups have waged war against the Barre regime since the 1980s, including the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). In June 1989, the USA provided military equipment or aid and economic grants to the government while Ethiopia provided military equipment or aid and economic grants to the opposition.

In January 1991, Italy offered to mediate between the government and the United Somali Congress (USC), which was rejected; in the same month, the Barre regime collapsed. In June and July 1991, Djibouti attempted to mediate the conflict; in December 1991, there was an offer of mediation by Egypt. The collapse of the regime did not see the emergence of a new one, but instead the rise of conflict between armed groups. In addition to the previously mentioned groups, other groups became active—namely, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in December and the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) in January 1992.

In January 1992, Ethiopia and the UN attempted to mediate the conflict; in the same month, the UN approved military sanctions (arms embargo) against all parties. In February 1992, the UN, Arab League, Islamic Conference and AU mediated between the parties. In April 1992, the UN approved a monitoring mission: United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). In May and June 1992, Ethiopia made another effort at mediation. In September 1992, UN economic support in the form of a grant was provided to the country, and Italy mediated in the same

month. In December 1992, the USA and Canada provided an economic grant to the country and the USA led a peace-enforcement mission, the UNITAF (United Task Force, code-named Operation Restore Hope).

In January and March 1993, the UN mediated the conflict leading to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. In March 1993, UNOSOM II was approved. The UN mediated in November 1993 and again in March 1994, leading to the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation. Ethiopia mediated in December 1993, and Kenya mediated in January 1994. US troops withdrew in March 1993, and UNOSOM II was disbanded in March 1995.

In April 1995, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established with a political mission.

New mediation attempts were made by Kenya in October 1996 and Ethiopia, OAU and IGAD in November. In January, May and November 1997, Egypt sat at the negotiation table, leading to the signing of the Cairo Declaration on Somalia in December 1997.

In July 1998, Libya mediated the conflict; in June 1999, the Arab League made an offer for a reconciliation conference. In October 1999 and April 2000, Djibouti organised a forum. In September 2000, Libya conducted another mediation effort, as did Ethiopia in June 2001.

In January 2001, another challenger group emerged, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). In November 2001, Ethiopia supported the government with troops, and in December, Kenya mediated the conflict. In June 2002, Somalia requested a military intervention. In October 2002, a forum was organised by IGAD. In September 2003, IGAD, AU, the UN and the Arab League organised a forum on the Somali issue.

The government was supported with military equipment or aid by Ethiopia in May 2005 and January, June and September 2006; Yemen in August 2005 and January and June 2006; Italy in October 2005; Saudi Arabia in December 2005 and June 2006; and Eritrea in February 2006. In January 2006, the USA provided an economic grant to the government. In June 2006, Ethiopia supported the government with troops and intelligence or advisors. A mediation attempt was made in June 2006 by Sudan, Yemen and the Arab League. In August 2006, Uganda supported the government with equipment or aid. In September 2006, Ethiopia

supported the government with troops, naval forces, equipment or aid and intelligence or advisors.

In September 2006, another challenger group became active: the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC). During 2008, other groups came to the foreground: the Al-Shabaab (in January) and the Harakat Ras Kamboni (in September).The challenger groups were supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia in June 2006 with equipment or aid, by Djibouti, Libya and Syria in July 2006 with military equipment or aid; by Eritrea in July 2006 with troops; and by Eritrea, Libya and Syria in July 2006 with intelligence or advisors. In August, the Arab League attempted to mediate.

In August 2006, Egypt supported the opposition with intelligence or advisors, and Uganda supported the government with military equipment or aid.

In September 2006, Sudan and the Arab League mediated the peace process, and the USA and Ethiopia supported the government with naval forces, military equipment and aid and intelligence or advisors. Ethiopia also supported the government with troops. In November and December 2006, the Arab League made a new mediation attempt together with IGAD. In November 2006, Eritrea provided military equipment or aid to the opposition. In January 2007, Italy made an offer of diplomatic services; in the same month, the USA supported the government with intelligence or advisors and air support.

In December 2007, an AU peace-enforcement mission was deployed: AMISOM (approved in May 2007). Equipment or aid was provided to the government in November 2007 by the UK and in January 2008 by Eritrea, which in the same month provided intelligence or advisors to the government. In May 2008, the UN mediated the conflict. The Djibouti Agreement was signed on 19 August 2008 and the Decision of the High Level Committee on 26 November 2008; both were mediated by the UN. Ethiopia deployed troops in support of the government in May 2009. In December 1992, the EU NAVFOR Somalia was deployed in support of the government. In April 2010, the European Union started a training programme in support of the Somali government (EUTM).

The conflict remained active as of the end of 2010.

Djibouti – 522

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
184	Djibouti - FRUD, FRUD-AD	1991-11-12 - 1999-08-31	957	FRUD, RPP	Nov. 1991 - June 1994

Coding decision

In March 1992, French forces were deployed as a peacekeeping force to act as a buffer (withdrawing in November 1992). According to Fortna (2008), the small size of the mission suggests this was not an enforcement mission, but a traditional peacekeeping mission.

In November 1992, France provided 700m Djibuti Francs to the budget. In this year the GDP was of 83.501m Djibuti Francs (at market prices), with a plan for 17.818m of public investment in 1992, 22.463m of state revenue and 42.580m of expenditures for 1992 (IMF, 1998). This was in a year when a new constitution was voted in via a referendum in September and parliamentary elections were held in 1992. Presidential elections were held in May 1993. All elections were won by the incumbent party, the People's Rally for Progress. Considering the political results and the small size of the French support, the latter was not considered an intervention.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 184] By November 1991, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) was an active challenger of the government. In that month, France supported the government with intelligence or advisors and offered to and mediated the conflict. In February 1992, France supported the government with troops and again made a mediation effort. After the signing of a ceasefire agreement, a peacekeeping force led by France was deployed in March 1992 to monitor the agreement (withdrawing in November 1992).

In March 1994, France provided an economic grant in support of the government and made a mediation offer. In December 1994, a peace agreement was reached.

In September 1997, the conflict resumed (until August 1999), with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD–AD) challenging the government.

Ethiopia – 530

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
70	Ethiopia - EPRDF, Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)	1960-12-17 - 1991-05-28	> 948 (845)	WPE-ruling - EPRDF	May 1988 – May 1991
78	Ethiopia - EPLF (Eritrea)	1961-09-30 - 1991-05-31	> 845	NA (Ethnic)	Nov. 1962 – May 1991
133	Ethiopia - ONLF (Ogaden)	1964-01-11 - 2010-12-22			
168	Ethiopia - ALF, ARDUF (Afar)	1975-06-30 - 1996-12-31*1			
219	Ethiopia - OLF (Oromiya)	1974-08-31 - 2010-12-30			
268	Ethiopia - IGLF (Hararghe)	1991-10-04 - 1992-03-25			

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
			898	Ethiopia – WSLF, COPWE	May 1977 – Jan. 1986
			981	NA (Ethnic)	June 1992 – Dec. 1999 (end of dataset)

Notes: In addition, in Ethiopia there was non-state violence (6, 7, 13, 18, 19, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 52, 54, 69, 74, 115, 116, 117, 122, 128, 129, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 220, 363, 401, 402, 403, 408, 435) and one-sided violence (530, 1346) during this period.

*1 – Only a group event in UCDP GED in 1996. Not clear when the end date was. For the dataset, it was considered to be the end of the year.

Coding decision

Both conflict 845 and 948 in Regan et al. (2009) refer to the downfall of Mengistu's regime. Conflict 948 related to UCDP GED 70, with the EPRDF being the group that took power. EPRDF comprised four groups, the main one being the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Conflict 845, related to UCDP GED 78, refers to the group that also fought to overthrow Mengistu's regime at the same time and subsequently acquired independence for Eritrea. These could be considered the same civil war to overthrow the regime, and support for either of these groups is reported as undifferentiated,, although the consequent independence of Eritrea, which controls access to the Red Sea, might mean the group had other motivations/patterns. In any case, because Regan et al. (2009) and most reports do not differentiate them, the coding of the external interventions was done for conflict 78.

DADM (2012) disputed the identified British economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance) against the government following the 2005 post-elections violence, but such conflict was not included in the current UCDP GED. DADM also indicated that the Carter Center offered to mediate the situation between the government and the opposition in March 1994, but the offer was refused. This is also not related with any of the conflicts identified in UCDP.

No other major form of intervention can be found, other than several economic supports (loans and grants): US 200 ml USD 1993 (LBA_02_07_1993); partners 8 bl USD between 1991/92 to 2000/1 (BBCM_12_04_2002); China 655 ml USD 2002 (BBCM_30_09_2010); WB 200 ml USD 2004 (AFXA_24_08_2004); India 100 ml USD 2006 (IOLE_21_01_2006); partners 875 ml USD 2007 (XNEW_22_08_2006); WB 275 ml USD 2008 (BBCM_27_11_2008); partners 755 ml USD 2008 (LBA_12_02_2008); China 349 ml USD 2009 (SUDT_11_11_2009).

There are several interventions in the conflict where groups challenged Mengistu. It is not technically possible to determine which dyad the intervention targeted. Because the EPRDF became the government force in Ethiopia after the overthrow of the Mengistu regime, the interventions are associated with this group.

The government led by Mengistu Haile Mariam faced several challenging groups. Among them was the military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie) active in May and June 1989 and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) active throughout 1989, 1990 and 1991. Also fighting against Mengistu and active throughout 1989, 1990 and 1991 was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), although it had secessionist objectives.

In UCDP GED, the al-Itahad al-Islami is only identified with violent conflict in Somalia and of the non-state type (in the previous UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, it was also identified in a dyad with the government). Therefore, it was not considered in the dataset.

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the common border was coded in UCDP GED as a type 1—state-based conflict. Because it is an inter-governmental conflict, it was not considered in the dataset.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 78] In September 1989, the Carter Center and Tanzania mediated the conflict; in November 1989 and April and June 1990, the Carter Center was again involved in mediation (in the two latter dates together with Tanzania). Israel supported the government with equipment or aid and intelligence or advisors in December 1989. In February, April and May 1991, the USA was involved in mediation efforts.

[Conflict 70] In May 1991, the Mengistu regime was overthrown and EPRDF seized power. In April 1993, Eritrea voted for independence in a referendum supported by Ethiopia and gained effective independence in May 1993.

Other conflicts for the territory have challenged the Ethiopian state. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was active since 1993 for the Ogaden region [Conflict 133]. For the Afar region, the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) opposed the government, the latter being more active in 1996 [Conflict 168]. In the Oromiya region, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was active before and in several periods after 1989 (1989, 1990–1992, 1994, 1995, 1998–2009) [Conflict 219]. For the Hararghe region, the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) was briefly active in October 1996 [Conflict 268].

Eritrea – 531

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
130	Eritrea – EIJM-AS	1993-12-16 – 2003-08-09		Not listed (less than 100 death per year)	

Coding decision:

The conflict on the common border between Eritrea and Ethiopia (UCDP conflict ID 215) was not considered as it is a dyad between two states.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 130] Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Internally, the government was challenged by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement – Abu Suhail faction (EIJM–AS), with activity in 1993, 1997, 1999 and 2003. The last conflict event was recorded in August 2003.

Angola – 540

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
131	Angola - UNITA	1975-11-11 – 2002-04-01	897 (linked to 982)	Angola - UNITA - FNLA	Nov. 1975 - June 1991
			982	Angola-UNITA	Oct. 1992 - Dec. 1999 (end of dataset)
192	Angola - FLEC/ FLAC (Cabinda)	1991-05-18 – 2010-11-08			

Note: In addition, in Angola there was one-sided violence (540, 1421) during this period.

Coding decisions

The government of the MPLA has been backed by Cuba and UNITA by South Africa since the initiation of the conflict in 1975 (conflict 131). In the New York Accords of December 1988 for the independence of Namibia, it was agreed that the Cuban and South African soldiers would withdraw from Angola. UNAVEM I was created on January 1989 to monitor this withdrawal, which was finalised in May 1991. Therefore, although there were Cuban troops in Angola in 1989, 1990 and 1991 (South African troops were not coded in the country from 1988 onwards by UCDP External Support), they were being withdrawn and therefore were not coded.

UNAVEM I (January 1989 to May 1991) was a neutral mission composed of military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff. It was established on 20 December 1988 with Resolution 626 based on the report of the Secretary-General of 17 December 1988. Its mandate was to verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed upon between Angola and Cuba. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991—more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the Secretary-General

reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it (expenditures: $16,404,200 net). According to Heldt and Wallensteen (2007), this was not a peacekeeping mission because the sole mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

UNAVEM II's (May 1991 to February 1995) neutral mission was composed of military observers, police monitors and international and locally recruited civilian staff and electoral observers. It was established in May 1991 to verify the arrangements agreed by the Government of Angola and the UNITA, monitor the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire period, and observe and verify elections, in accordance with the Peace Accords (expenditures: $175,802,600 net).

UNAVEM III's (February 1995 to June 1997) neutral mission was composed of military observers, troops, police and civilians. It was established to assist the Government of Angola and UNITA in restoring peace, including the maintenance of an effective ceasefire, DDR, monitoring of the police, elections support, and achievement of national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and the relevant UNSC resolutions.

UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (June 1997 to February 1999) had a mandate to assist the Angolan parties by consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, and promoting democratic development and rehabilitation of the country. MONUA took over from the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola III (UNAVEM III).

The United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) was established by UN resolution 1268 (1999). Its mandate was to liaise with the political, military, police and other civilian authorities to explore effective measures for restoring peace, assist the Angolan people in the area of capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and the promotion of human rights, and coordinate other activities.

In August 2002, the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) replaced UNOA. It was mandated to assist the parties in concluding the Lusaka Protocol and the Government of Angola in mining activities, the promotion and protection of human rights, preparation of elections, and

other humanitarian and developmental tasks (UN S RES1433, 15 August 2002). The mission had two "pillars": (i) a political/military/human rights cluster and (ii) a humanitarian/development cluster. It included providing assistance to the Government of Angola by protecting and promoting human rights and building institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law; providing technical advice and support for mining action; facilitating and coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supporting social and professional reintegration of the demobilised persons; promoting economic recovery; mobilising resources of the international community, including international donors conferences, as appropriate; and providing technical assistance to the Government of Angola in the preparation of elections.

The general explanation regarding the definition of when an economic intervention was breaking convention can be illustrated by the case of Angola. It could be argued that economic pressure on the government based on specific and exceptional conditional loans was an intervention aimed at changing the authority structure of the country. Although this is conceptually easy to argue, it is more difficult to operationalise. On one hand, it is difficult to define exceptional economic pressure; on the other hand, these situations normally occur before or after a conflict period, not during. By the same measure, the lack of authority targeted conditionality when providing a loan can be considered an intervention which, at least implicitly, aims at the maintenance of the authority structure. Then a loan without conditions can be equally considered an intervention. This was the case in Angola in the second half of 2000. The government received significant loans from the Chinese (among others) without conditionality and, in this way, avoided the accountability and democratic requirements associated with the World Bank support and secured access to funds to reinforce the incumbent party. Relations with IMF/WB were strained (LGAF_25_02_2005), and between 2004 and 2010 the Chinese credit to Angola banks reached USD 6 billion (AFNW_29_09_2010). This can be compared with the World Bank's low support—below USD 100 million for two years (AFNW_04_03_2005). Yet other credit lines existed: USD 3,5 billion from a syndicate of Portuguese and local banks arranged in 2007 (LBA_24_10_2007) and an IMF standby agreement loan of USD 1,4 billion in 2009. The magnitude of this support allowed the incumbent power significant autonomy in the management of their affairs. There-

fore, although one could argue that these loans would constitute an intervention in support of the government, in this case they occurred after the end of the war and therefore were not considered.

The Angola-Cabinda conflict was always of low intensity and was considered because it meets the UCDP criteria. Fortna (2008) did not consider it due to insufficient data whereas Sambanis (2004a) noted it might not meet the death criteria. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) considered it.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 131] In November 1975, a civil war began between the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the challenger, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Following the signing of the New York Accords in December 1988, the MPLA agreed to the withdrawal of their allied Cuban troops from the country. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was created in January 1989 to monitor this process until May 1991. In June 1989, DRC President Mobutu Sese Seko mediated the negotiation process, leading to the Gbadolite declaration on Angola. In June 1990, the USA provided military equipment to the challenging group; in December 1990, the USSR supported the government with military equipment and intelligence/advisors. A mediation process led by Portugal, the USSR, USA and UN culminated in the signing of the Bicesse Agreement in May 1991. In the same month, the UN approved UNAVEM II, an observer peacekeeping mission, to monitor the agreement.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in September 1991. The MPLA won the parliament and the first round of presidential elections. UNITA claimed fraud and resumed the conflict. The UN's envoy, Margaret Anstee, was involved in several mediation attempts in November 1992, February 1993 and April 1993. In September 1993, the UNSC approved an arms and oil embargo against UNITA. The UN's envoy Alioume Blondin Beye mediated the situation in December 1993, January 1994 and October 1994. In November, Portugal, Russia, the USA and the UN mediated in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. In February and June 1995, the UN supported the government with economic grants. In February 1995, UNAVEM III was approved, and the first deploy-

ments occurred in April 1995. Beye attempted mediations in May 1995 and again in March 1996. In May 1996, South African President Nelson Mandela offered to mediate in the conflict. In July 1997, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was created, replacing UNAVEM III. The UNSC approved political sanctions (travel and political representation restrictions) in October 1997 and financial sanctions in July 1998, both against UNITA. In October 1999, a political office was set up by the UN, the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). In December 1999, Namibia supported the government with troops. In December 2000, Russia started providing military training to the government.

The conflict ended on 4 April 2002 with the signing of a peace treaty, mediated by the UN, following the death of UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. The last conflict event occurred in April 2002.

[Conflict 192] In June 1991 a conflict between the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda – Renewed (FLEC–R) and the government started. In February 1996, Congo-Kinshasa mediated an extension of the ceasefire signed in September 1995 between the government and FLEC–R. In January 1994 the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda – Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC–FAC) also started to challenge the government. The conflict was active in 1991, 1994, 1996–1998, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009 and even December 2010. In August 2006, the Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province was signed after being mediated by the AU and Congo.

Mozambique – 541

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
136	Government of Mozambique - RENAMO	1977-12-31 - 2005-09-06	913		Oct. 1979 - April 1993

Note: In addition, in Ethiopia there was non-state violence (246) and one-sided violence (1347) during this period.

Coding decision

In 1989/02, Botha proposed to the USA a similar process to the one they had mediated between Angola, Namibia and South Africa (USSR and Cuba) for Mozambique (WP_08_02_1989). RENAMO's answer was that Mozambique was distinct from Namibia (LBA_08_02_1989). Following South Africa's proposal, the USA offered to mediate (WP_09_02_1989), but the offer was refused by Botha and Chissano (LBA_10_02_1989). Therefore, the proposal for mediation involved South Africa using the USA as mediator (TTMS_11_02_1989). Both DADM (2012) and Regan et al. (2009) coded this as a proposal by South Africa to mediate which was rejected by RENAMO.

There were allegations that South Africa was supporting the rebels in 1989 (also with equipment) (NYTA_25_02_1989), but UCDP External Support coded this support as from "Elements of the South African Military/Intelligence Establishment" and not the country itself (something happening until 1988). The support was coded as equipment from a South African military/intelligence establishment.

Zimbabwe had stationed troops to support the government before 1989 (an estimated 7000 troops in 1989 - IND_09_12_1989); an entry in January 1989 was made to reflect this. In addition, in September 1989, there were reports of additional troops—in particular, significant air support. A new entry was added to the later support (LBA_09_09_1989).

Zimbabwe troops in Mozambique supported the government (FRELIMO) but also protected the road, railway and pipeline links between the Indian Ocean and landlocked Zimbabwe (LBA_09_07_1989, LBA_09_09_1989, BBCM_20_03_1990). Reports indicated that between 7000 and 14000 troops were in Mozambique (LBA_20_11_1990).

Significant news reports emerged of economic assistance (loans/grants/aid/debt cancellation) to Mozambique during the period of negotiations. Lenders included the World Bank (LBA_18_09_1989 – USD 40 million loan for road and rail route project), Sweden (BBCM_17_10_1989 – 100 million Krona for emergency aid), France (BBCM_22_05_1990 – 100 million French Franc loan for telecommunications, BBCM_10_09_1991 – 164 million French Franc debt and credit), Denmark (BBCM_22_05_1990 a – debt cancellation totalling 70m Kroner) and OPEC (MEED_29_03_1991 – a smaller loan). It was difficult to determine the extraordinary nature of these initiatives (vis-à-vis countries not in conflict or in post-conflict). At the same time, these ini-

tiatives contributed to the outcomes of the peace negotiations. This conflict/period was exceptional in news reports on these measures, even if other negotiation processes had similar incentives. These could reflect the reporters' perceptions of the positive role of these incentives in the developments of the peace process. Therefore, entries were made to reflect each of the three types: loans (1989/09, 1990/05); aid (1989/10); and relief of past obligations (1990/05, 1991/09).

Attempts to initiate peace talks were not considered mediation processes. For instance, in June 1990, both parties were supposed to meet in Malawi for mediation from Kenya and Zimbabwe. Although both delegations were engaged separately with the mediators, they never engaged in the peace mediation process itself while negotiating the location of the talks which led to the breakdown of talks (LBA_13_06_1990, LBA_13_06_1990 a, LBA_14_06_1990). This was not considered as a mediation entry.

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) approved in December 1992 was mandated to support the implementation of the agreement, monitoring of the ceasefire, separation of the forces, provision of security, support in the electoral process and humanitarian support. In February 1994 (UN S RES 898 1994), support and monitoring of the police were added to the mandate.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 136] In January 1977, following independence, a civil war started between the Government of Mozambique, headed by Samora Machel of the Front of the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party, and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), headed by Afonso Dhlakama. By January 1989 Zimbabwe still had troops deployed in Mozambique in support of the government while Kenya was supporting RENAMO with equipment. In February 1989 South Africa offered to initiate a peace process, which was rejected. In the same month a South African military/intelligence establishment supported the opposition with military equipment and aid.

In August 1989, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Moi of Kenya began mediating the dispute. In September 1989, Zimbabwe increased its activity in the country with air support to the government.

In the same month, the World Bank provided a loan to the government; in October, Sweden provided a neutral grant.

In April 1990, the Mozambican president requested that Portugal mediate the conflict, but the request was rejected. In May 1990, France and Denmark provided a grant and Prime Minister Dlamine of Swaziland mediated the peace process. By July 1990, the UK was maintaining a military training camp in Zimbabwe for Mozambican government forces. Negotiation teams composed of or involving the Catholic Church through the community Saint Egidio and Jaime Gonaives (the Roman Archbishop of Beira, in representation of Italy), Kenya through President Moi, and Zimbabwe through President Mugabe started mediation initiatives in July 1990, with subsequent initiatives in August, November and December 1990; January, May, August, September and October 1991; and March, August, September and November 1992.

In December 1990, an eleven-nation Joint Verification Commission was set up. In November 1991, Portugal was asked to take on increased participation in the mediation, which was rejected. On 19 October 1992, the last registered deadly event associated with the conflict occurred, although two subsequent events occurred in August 2004 and September 2005. On 4 November 1992, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed, following a series of preliminary agreements (signed in May 1991, October and November 1991 and December 1992), and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) remained in the country from December 1992 until December 1994.

South Africa – 560

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
150	Government of South Africa – African National Congress (ANC)	1978-02-01 – 1993-04-10	878	Government(White) - ANC(African National Congress)	6/1/1976 - 5/1/1994
			955		01/1991-05/1999

Note: There was also non-state violence (309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 317) and one-sided violence (560, 1364, 1440, 1524, 2002). In Regan et al. (2009), 878 had no interventions after 1989 and 955 had one diplomatic intervention in April 1994.

Conflict intervention narratives:

In August 1992, the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) (UN S/RES/772 17 August 1992) was established to monitor the evolution of the political process in South Africa and the elections held on 27 April 1994.

Lesotho – 570

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
217	Government of Lesotho – Military faction	1998-09-04 – 1998-09-28			

Coding decision

There are only five events of violent conflict in the month of September 1998. In that same month, a SADC peacekeeping force was initiated. Nevertheless, several other events of political contestation existed before and after this entry. In order to follow the rule of UCDP GED reference, such events were not identified.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 217] On 4 September 1998, a military faction rebelled against the government, and a peace-enforcement military force from SADC, led by South Africa, was sent, ending the conflict on 28 September 1998.

Comoros – 581

UCDP GED	**Regan et al. (2009)**

Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
167	Government of Comoros – Presidential Guard	1989-11-26 – 1989-11-29			
213	Government of Comoros – MPA/Republic of Anjouan	1997-09-03 – 1997-09-05			

Note: In addition, in Comoros there was non-state violence (180) during this period.

Coding decisions

The following information on interventions was not coded in the dataset as they fall outside the period of the conflicts.

The OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros was established on 6 November 1997 by the OAU (at its 39th and 40th Ordinary Sessions at the Ambassadorial Level in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 24 October and 6 November 1997), with a mandate to monitor the situation and establish a climate of trust. Following a military coup on 30 April 1999, the mission withdrew the forces in May 1999, leaving three civilians in a liaison office. In December 2001, military observers were mandated and redeployed in January 2002 to monitor the disarmament programme on Anjouan, creating the OMIC II which lasted until 2 February 2002. At the 81st Ordinary Session, the AU decided once again to deploy military observers (OMIC-III) mandated to assist the Comoran authorities in strengthening the security situation during and after the electoral period. The military observer component was deployed on 23 March 2002; the mission closed on 31 May 2002.

On January 2004, the 97th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial level (Central Organ/MEC/AMB/COMM-XCVII) decided to create the AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) to monitor the elections process and promote security for reconciliation. The mission ended on 30 May 2004.

The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) was established through the AU Peace and Security Council

decision PSC/PR/COMM.1(XLVII) of 21 March 2006, with a mandate to observe and provide security for elections process on the island of Anjouan and then in the islands of Grande Comoro and Moheli. The mission closed on 9 June 2006.

In the next year, the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) was established by the AU PSC on 9 May 2007. It had a similar mandate of securing free and fair elections. The mandate was extended to support the implementation of sanctions imposed against the illegal authorities of Anjouan, deploy to the island to disarm Ajouan's gendarmerie and guarantee fair and free elections (AU PSC 21 January 2008). The mission ended on 31 October 2008.

Within the period of MAES, elections were considered illegal in Anjouan, and negotiations failed to persuade incumbent President Bacar to adhere to the new union's constitution. Comoros officially requested AU assistance to restore sovereignty, which was established by a Chapter VII type of operation named Operation Democracy in the Comoros, carried out on 25 March 2008. For coding purposes, two mandates in 2008 are considered: the original MAES mandate focused on elections and the mandate initiated with Operation Democracy from March 2008 onwards along with a peace-enforcement mandate.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 167] On 26 November 1989, a military rebellion started, led by Colonel Bob Denard, and President Abdullah was assassinated on 27 November 1989. In the same month, French troops intervened in support of the government and Said Mohamed Djohar was installed as provisional president on 27 November 1989, ending the conflict.

[Conflict 213] On 3 September 1997, a rebellion for secession started in Anjouan. France provided economic assistance to the government on 16 September, but refused Comoros's request for military assistance. The Arab League unsuccessfully attempted to mediate that same month. An OAU observer mission in Comoros (OMIC I, the first of three) was set up in November 1997 (leaving in May 1999) to monitor the situation (not coded as it falls outside the conflict period).

Morocco – 600

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
135	Government of Morocco – POLISARIO	1975-09-01 - 1991-08-05	894	DB	Nov. 1975 - Dec. 1999

Note: In addition, in Morocco there was one-sided violence (1273) during this period.

Coding decision

This conflict included only four months of deadly events in 1989. No intervention was coded for the period after 1989 in Regan et al. (2009), and the conflict was not listed in DADM (2012). In UCDP External Support, the conflict involved different but consistent third parties from the beginning of the conflict in 1975 until 1989. The USA, France and Saudi Arabia supported the Government of Morocco and Algeria and Libya (as Cuba and Vietnam alleged) supported Polisario. These forms of support were coded as occurring in January 1989.

The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), established in 2002 and with the mandate renewed in 2005, 2007 and 2010, is a political missions managed by the UN Department of Political Affairs. As it falls outside the conflict period, it was not coded.

The territory of Western Sahara has been on the UN list of non-self-governing territories since 1963, and a referendum for self-determination has not been carried out; Morocco remains the de facto government in the territory. For these reasons, the conflict is linked to Morocco in the UCDP dataset.

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by UN S/RES/690 (29 April 1991), but because it falls outside the conflict period, it was not coded.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 135] A conflict started on 1 September 1975 between Polisario and the Government of Morocco for the territory of Western Sahara.

Since its inception and until 1989, third parties had supported the belligerents: the USA and France with military equipment and Saudi Arabia with economic grants in support of the Government of Morocco and Algeria with military equipment and Libya (as Cuba and Vietnam alleged) with economic grants in support of Polisario. Violent events restarted in June 1989. In the following year, Morocco and Polisario accepted a peace plan in which a referendum was to be held. The last recorded deadly event occurred on 5 August 1991.

Algeria – 615

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
191	Government of Algeria – Takfir wa'l Hijra, GIA, AIS, AQIM	1990-12-20 - 2010-12-30	984		Jan. 1992 – Dec. 1999

Note: In addition, in Algeria there was non-state violence (164, 165, 166) and one-sided violence (1390, 1391) during this period.

Coding decision

In 1994, there were allegations of French military advisors supporting the government (LBA_17_11_1994).

There were also reports of neighbouring armies attacking Algeria rebel groups within neighbouring countries—namely, Chad, Niger and Mali (Chad: AFPR_09_03_2004, AFPR_11_03_2004; Niger: LBA_30_04_2004; Mali: AFPR_09_06_2004, LBA_09_06_2004) This corresponds to the coding of UCDP Armed Conflict dataset for countries supporting the Algerian government in 2004. The entries of each country were made for the months of the reports.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 191] On 20 December 1990, a conflict started between the group Takfir wa'l Hijra and the Government of Algeria. In January 1991, the Armed Islamic Movement (AIS) joined the conflict, challenging the

government. In September 1991, France and the European Community supported the Government of Algeria with economic loans including favourable trade and credit lines. In February 1993, France supported the government economically by relieving past debt obligations. In December 1993, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) joined the conflict, opposing the government. In June and July 1994, the Paris Club and France, respectively, relieved past debt obligations of the Algerian government. In January 1995, mediation was attempted by the Saint Edidio Community. In the following month, France offered to host a conference in Europe to focus on a peace plan for Algeria. In April 1997, Peace in Algeria attempted to mediate between the parties.

In March 1999, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (AQIM) joined the conflict against the government. In December 2002, France relieved past economic obligations of the Algerian government. In March 2004, the government was supported by the USA (military training), and Chadian troops engaged Algerian rebel groups within Chad's territory. In April and June 2004, Niger and Mali troops, respectively, engaged Algerian rebels in their own countries. In July 2004, France supported the government with an economic cooperation agreement, thereby increasing the country's credit capacity.

The last deadly recorded event of the conflict occurred on 30 December 2010.

Sudan – 625

UCDP GED			**Regan et al. (2009)**		
Conflict ID	**Main parties**	**Start date - Last event date**	**CW ID**	**Main parties**	**Time (start - end date)**
113	Sudan – SPLM/A, SAF, NDA, JEM, SLM/A, SLM/A – MM, SLM/A – Unity, NFR, forces of George Athor	1971-07-22 - 2010-12-31	937 (linked to 853)	Sudan- NIF-ruling group, DUP, SPLA	Nov. 1983 - Dec. 1999 (end of dataset)

Note: In addition, in Sudan there was non-state violence (20, 32, 46, 75, 76, 83, 91, 92, 93, 105, 106, 111, 119, 131, 139, 143, 150, 153, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 333, 353, 355, 356, 357, 358, 362, 424, 427) and one-sided violence (625, 1312, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1485, 1546) during this period.

Coding decision

The first civil war occurred from 1963 to 1972 and involved the Sudanese government against Anya Nya, a South Sudanese independence movement (territorial dispute) (Conflict ID 85 in UCDP and 853 in Regan et al., 2009). The second civil war (UCDP conflict ID 113 and 937 in Regan et al., 2009) started in 1971 but only surpassed 25 battle deaths per year in 1971 and 1976, although it reached that intensity in consecutive years from 1983 until 2008. It involved the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A (from South Sudan) and later other groups, and it was a challenge for the government of the country.

General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, Sudan's president, seized power in a June 1989 coup d'etat over a democratically elected government which was apparently moving towards substantive talks with Colonel Garang, leader of the SPLM/A group. (IND_20_11_1989).

In July 2002, a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) funded by the USA and composed of American, Canadian and Irish citizens was in the country (AFPR_25_09_2002). It was not a peacekeeping intervention and did not fall into the intervention typology identified. For these reasons, it was not coded in the dataset.

In July 2002, the Machakos Protocol was signed. Although President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya was involved, it was under the capacity of chairman of the IGAD peace process; therefore, it involved IGAD as a third party. The Machakos Agreement was also signed by Lieutenant General Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo, special envoy to the IGAD Sudan Peace Process, on behalf of the IGAD envoys. The same principle applied for identifying which of the signatories of the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace agreement should be noted individually or through the IAGD. In such cases, both Kenya and Uganda were considered as members of IGAD and Egypt and Italy as other third parties.

On 22 October 2002, the Sudan Peace Act considered the use of military, economic and diplomatic sanctions if the parties to the conflict would not be engaged in negotiations in good faith. Because this act constitutes a potential but ineffective intervention, it was not coded into the dataset (BBCM_27_09_2003, AFNW_22_10_2002, AFNW_12_09_2002, BBCM_27_12_2003, WHPR_21_10_2003).

The Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission (JMM/JMC) was also part of the International Monitor Unit (IMU) Sudan. The JMM/JMC started in April 2002 with several contributing nations (among them, the USA, UK, Norway, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland). The mission terminated operations in June 2005, when UNMIS started (ICG, 2010).

The UCDP Armed Conflict indicates that Chad supported Sudan with troops during the conflict. There was a reference to a meeting in August between both presidents, during which they agreed to cooperation, although without specifying a type (APRS_10_08_2003).

The IGAD Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) started in February 2003 and was a light monitoring mechanism not constituting a peacekeeping effort. For this reason, it was coded as neutral intelligence/advisors intervention by IGAD (ICG, 2010).

AMIS was established in July 2004 as an observer mission (UN S/RES/1556 July 30 2004) with Chapter VII powers. On 20 October 2004, a decision adopted at the 17th Meeting of the Africa Union's Peace and Security Council transformed the mandate into a "enhanced observer mission" (Ekengard, 2006: 19) with monitoring and humanitarian functions. The mission of the AU AMIS in Darfur (2004–2007) had support from NATO (and the EU) between 2005 and 2011 and received military equipment from Canada in 2005 and Canada and the Netherlands paid for helicopters in 2005. All of these were one intervention. The different types of support for the peacekeeping mission were not detailed.

UNAMIS was established by SCR 1547 (11 June 2004) to monitor the ceasefire agreement of 25 September 2003 in cooperation with AMIS and to plan and prepare for the establishment of a full-fledged peace operation. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, UNAMIS was replaced by UNMIS (SIPRI, 2012).

The UNSC 1590/2004 decision also considered the Darfur conflict and South Sudan conflict together with the UNMIS which was entrusted with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for South Sudan. This included supporting the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, promoting the rule of law, monitoring parties, supporting DDR, and providing police force and

humanitarian assistance. The mandate of this mission was then extended to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed on 5 May 2006 with UNSC 1706 (2006). Linking these conflicts was justified because of the common agenda of the different challenging groups in overthrowing the Sudanese government.

AMIS was initially established by the Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur on 28 May 2004 as an observer mission and was endorsed by SCR 1556 (30 July 2004) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mandate was expanded in a decision adopted in October 2004 at the 17th Meeting of the Africa Union's Peace and Security Council (AU PSC PR Cmm 17 2004). The mission was mandated to monitor the N'Djamena ceasefire agreement, assist in confidence building between the parties and contribute to a secure environment in Darfur. Some publications separate AMIS into AMIS I up to October 2004 and then AMIS II with an expanded mandate. Considering that the mandate change occurred in the same year and AU (and Mays, 2011) references to the mission do not make such a distinction, only one AMIS was coded, reflecting the broader mandate.

The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established by the AU Peace and Security Council Communique on the Situation on Darfur (22 June 2007) and was endorsed and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers by SCR 1769 (31 July 2007). UNAMID was also mandated to contribute to the restoration of a secure environment, protect the civilian population, facilitate humanitarian assistance, monitor the implementation of related ceasefire agreements and promote the rule of law and human rights (SIPRI, 2012). AMIS troops were absorbed into UNAMID.

In March 1993, UNSC 1591 2005 resolution instituted mainly economic sanctions on individuals or organisations and, therefore, was classified as economic sanctions.

On 31 March 2005 UNSC 1593 referred the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court (in April 2007, March, May and August 2009 it issued arrest warrants). Although this was an event that could change the authority structure in the country, to consider the referral of cases to ICC as external interventions would alter the conceptual framework and introduce a new legal/criminal dimension into the analysis. This was not done, as it was not done for the Charles Taylor indictment.

The United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was approved by UN S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) with Chapter VII functions.

After 2010, the UNSC 1996 (2011) established UNMISS on 9 July 2011 for newly independent South Sudan and UNSC 1990 (2011) established UNISFA on 27 June 2011 for Sudan's Abyei region.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 113] The conflict in Sudan initiated in July 1971 and has been active every year since 1983. In July 1989, former US President Jimmy Carter made an offer for mediation. In December 1989, there was an ongoing mediation process led by the USA with Carter. In June 1990, Hosni Mubarak offered to mediate. In August 1991, Nigerian President Babanguida mediated the conflict. Iran supported the government with troops and grants in December 1991 and again with troops in February 1992. In May and November 1992, President Babanguida again mediated the conflict; in February and April 1993, Ugandan President Museveni and Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi were involved in mediation efforts.

In April 1993, Nigerian President Babanguida mediated as OAU Chair. Carter was involved in mediation initiatives in October 1993. President Moi of Kenya, as chair of an IGAD committee, mediated in January, March, May, July and September 1994.

In April 1996, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) entered the conflict, challenging the government. In March 1995, Carter mediated the conflict. In February 1997, South Africa's President Nelson Mandela mediated the conflict. In April 1997, Uganda supported the opposition with troops; in the same month, the Khartoum Agreement was signed (not coded as absent from UCDP PA). Kenya's President Moi was the chair of the IGAD mediation team in August and October 1997 and May, July and August 1998. In January and July 1999, IGAD was again involved in mediation initiatives. In January 1999, Libya offered to mediate the conflict, leading to a parallel mediation by Libya and Egypt in August and October 1999. In November 1999, Canada offered to mediate; in the same month, Djibouti mediated.

In April 2002, a Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission (JMM/JMC) started monitoring the Nuba Mountains ceasefire agree-

ment between SPLA and government forces. In June, August and October 2002, IGAD returned to the negotiation table. In July 2002, a peace process agreement was signed: the Machakos Protocol. In February 2003, the IGAD Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) was established to help oversee the ceasefire. In April 2003, Chad supported the government with troops by stationing them at the border with Sudan to control a cross-country tribe rebellion. In June 2003, the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established with an observer mandate. IGAD was involved in mediation in September 2003 and January and February 2004. In tandem, Chad was involved in mediation initiatives in September, October, and December 2003 and April 2004.

In May 2004, the IGAD became involved in the mediation process. In June 2004, the AU set up the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the involvement of several other third parties—namely, the EU, NATO, Canada and the Netherlands. In July, the UN established an arms embargo in support of the opposition until the government of Sudan took action. In August and November, the AU mediated the conflict; in January 2005, IGAD and Egypt were involved in mediation initiatives, leading to the signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005 (this followed three previous agreements signed in September 2003, January 2004 and May 2004).

The UN approved the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005 with a traditional peacekeeping mandate, but with Chapter VII powers. In the same month, the UNSC expanded previous sanctions, specifically with travel bans and assets frozen against the government. Egypt was involved in the negotiations in June 2005, leading to the signing of the Cairo Agreement. The AU mediated in September 2005 and was involved in the process from January 2006 until the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. In October 2007, the UN and AU were involved in mediation initiatives; in December, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) started to be deployed (the mission was approved in July 2007). The UN, AU, Chad and Qatar mediated in February 2010, and the UN, AU and Qatar in March 2010. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became an independent country.

Egypt – 651

UCDP GED			Regan et al. (2009)		
Conflict ID	Main parties	Start date - Last event date	CW ID	Main parties	Time (start - end date)
196	Government of Egypt – al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1981-10-08 – 2001-11-30	978		May 1992 – Dec. 1999

Note: In addition, in Egypt there was one-sided violence (651, 1184, 1239) during this period.

Coding decision

The USA maintained five-year and yearly programmes of military assistance for the Egyptian government for several decades. An entry was used in 1993 to reference such support.

Conflict intervention narratives:

[Conflict 196] In January 1993, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya challenged the government of Egypt. The government was supported with military equipment from the USA. The conflict's last deadly event occurred on 30 November 2000.

Countries without UCDP GED conflict events

Cape Verde – 402

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Sao Tome and Principe – 403

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Equatorial Guinea – 411

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Gambia – 420

No records in UCDP GED and therefore no conflict to be considered. Nevertheless, Regan et al. (2009) consider a conflict (923) between GSRP-rebels and PPD-ruling party between July 1981 and August 1981. In addition, UCDP External Support considers a conflict (149) involving the Government of Gambia and NRC in 1981.

Benin – 434

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Burkina Faso – 439

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Ghana – 452

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009) for civil war. Non-state violence was identified (3, 103, 205, 208).

Togo – 461

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009). In the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, there is a conflict (163) between government and a military faction (forces loyal to Gnassingbe Eyadema), but this has been revised in UCDP GED and removed.

Cameroon – 471

In UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support), there is a conflict between the Government of Cameroon and the Government of Nigeria between February 1994 and November 1998. Because it is an inter-governmental conflict, it was not considered. No events were identified in Regan et al. (2009).

Gabon – 481

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Kenya – 501

No state-based conflict occurred after 1989, although one conflict event involving Somalia conflict (141) and three involving Ethiopia (Oromyia) conflict (219) occurred in Kenya's territory. Regan et al. (2009) identified conflict 975 with 1500 fatalities in the ethnic conflict, with the earliest date being March 1992. No intervention was identified.

The conflict is Kenya follows the UCDP coding of non-state violence. Although there may be evidence of government-supported and -instigated violence, it does not meet the dyad criteria of organised rebels and the state. There are several conflicts involving state violence (54, 73, 100, 102, 110, 117, 121, 150, 151, 221, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232. 233, 404, 405, 406, 411) and one-sided violence (501, 1565, 1575) in UCDP during this period.

Tanzania – 510

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Zanzibar – 511

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Zambia – 551

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Zimbabwe - 552

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009). One-sided violence (552) occurred.

Malawi – 553

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Namibia – 565

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Botswana – 571

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Swaziland – 572

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Madagascar – 580

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support), except for non-state violence (349, 371), or Regan et al. (2009).

Tunisia – 616

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Libya – 620

No records in UCDP GED (UCDP Ext Support) or Regan et al. (2009).

Countries without entries in UCDP GED (or UCDP Armed Conflict) or Regan et al. (2009):

Cape Verde 402

Sao Tome and Principe 403

A1.8 Actors and third party list

Table A1.5 Third party: states

Code	State Name
2	United States of America
20	Canada
200	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
210	Netherlands
211	Belgium
220	France
235	Portugal
325	Italy
365	Russian Federation

Code	State Name
369	Ukraine
380	Sweden
390	Denmark
403	Sao Tome and Principe
404	Guinea-Bissau
420	Gambia
432	Mali
433	Senegal
434	Benin
435	Mauritania
436	Niger
437	Ivory Coast
438	Guinea
439	Burkina Faso
450	Liberia
452	Ghana
461	Togo
475	Nigeria
481	Gabon
482	Central African Republic
483	Chad
484	Congo
490	Democratic Republic of the Congo
500	Uganda
501	Kenya
510	Tanzania
516	Burundi
517	Rwanda
520	Somalia
522	Djibouti
530	Ethiopia
531	Eritrea
540	Angola
551	Zambia
552	Zimbabwe

Code	**State Name**
560	South Africa
565	Namibia
571	Botswana
572	Swaziland
615	Algeria
620	Libya
625	Sudan
630	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
651	Egypt
652	Syria
666	Israel
670	Saudi Arabia
678	Yemen
694	Qatar

Table A1.6 Third party: non-states

Code	**Description**
1.1	United Nations (UN)
1.11	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
1.12	World Food Programme (WFP)
1.13	International Criminal Court (ICC)
1.14	World Bank (WB)
1.2	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
1.3	European Commission (EC)
1.4	African Union (AU)
1.5	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
1.6	Southern African Development Community (SADC)
1.7	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
1.8	Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
1.9	Economic Community of West African States / Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOWAS/ECOMOG)
2.1	Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
2.2	Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as British Commonwealth
2.3	Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

Code	Description
2.4	Arab League
2.5	Council of Entente
2.6	Islamic Conference
2.7	Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi
2.8	Peace in Algeria
2.9	Liberian Council of Churches
3.1	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
3.2	Joint Verification Commission
3.3	Joint Monitoring Mission/Joint Military Commission
3.4	International Military Army Training Team (IMATT)
3.5	Paris Club
3.6	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
3.7	Catholic Church
3.8	South African Military/Intelligence Establishment
3.9	Hosni Mubarak
4.1	Carter Center
4.2	International Negotiations Network (INN)
4.3	International Crisis Group (ICG)
4.4	Inter-Religious Council (IRC)
4.5	World Vision International

Table A1.7 Non-state actor list

Name/code	Original full name
ADF	Alliance of Democratic Forces
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa	Followers of the Prophet
AIAI	Islamic Unity
AIS	Armed Islamic Movement
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	Islamic Group
ALiR	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda
Al-Shabaab	Al-Shabaab

Name/code	**Original full name**
ANC	African National Congress
AQIM	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
ARDUF	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front
ARS/UIC	Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia
ATNMC	Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change
BDK	Kingdom of Kongo
Boko Haram	Boko Haram
CNDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy
CNDD–FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
CNR	National Council for Recovery
Cobras	Cobras
Cocoyes	Cocoyes
CPJP	Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace
CRA	Coordination of the Armed Resistance
CSNPD	Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy
EIJM – AS	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement – Abu Suhail faction
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FARF	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic
FDLR	Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda
FDR	Democratic Front for Renewal
FIAA	Islamic Arab Front of Azawad
FLAA	Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front
FLEC–FAC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda
FLEC–R	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Renewed
FN	New Forces
FNT	Chad National Front
Forces of Francois Bozize	Forces of Francois Bozize
Forces of George Athor	Forces of George Athor
FPR	Rwandan Patriotic Front
Frolina	National Liberation Front

Name/code	Original full name
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
FRUD-AD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (split)
FUCD	Rally for Democray and Liberty
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
Harakat Ras Kamboni	Harakat Ras Kamboni
Hizbul Islam	Islamic Party
IGLF	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front *
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
Islamic Legion	Islamic Legion
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
Kamajors	Kamajors
LRA	Uganda Democratic Christian Army
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice
MDD	Movement for Democracy and Development
MDJT	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad
MFDC	Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance
	Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)
	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)
	Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)
MJP	Movement for Justice and Peace
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MNJ	Niger Movement for Justice
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOSANAT	Movement for the National Salvation of Chad
MPA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPA/Republic of Anjouan	Anjouan People’s Movement/Republic of Anjouan
MPCI	Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast
MPIGO	Ivorian Movement for the Greater West
MPS	Patriotic Salvation Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDPVF	Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
Ninjas	Ninjas
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia

Name/code	Original full name
NRF	National Redemption Front
Ntsiloulous	Ntsiloulous
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
Palipehutu	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
Palipehutu–FNL	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–Forces for National Liberation
PFNR	Popular Front for National Renaissance
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro
Presidential guard	Presidential guard
RAFD	Rally of Democratic Forces
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
	Revolutionary Forces of 1 April
RFDG	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SLM/A (MM)	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minawi faction
SLM/A–Unity	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Unity
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPLM/A	Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
Takfir wa'l Hijra	Exile and Redemption
UFDD	Union Force for Democracy and Development
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UFR	Union of Forces for the Resistance
UFRA	Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNRFII	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPA	Ukraine Partisan Army
USC	United Somalia Congress
USC/SNA	United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front

Name/code	**Original full name**
WSB	West Side Boys

Note: Descriptions from UCDP Actor Dataset v2.1-2012. Entries without Name/code, the full name as been used in the dataset.

A1.9 News references codes

Table A1.8 News sources codes

Code	Name
AFAA	African Affairs
AFBZ	African Business
AFNR	The Australian Financial Review
AFNW	All Africa
AFPR	Agence France-Presse
AFXA	AFX Asia
AGEU	Agence Europe
AJAZ	Al Jazeera English
ALAR	Al Arabiya
ANSA	ANSA–English Media Service
APAN	APANEWS
APRS	Associated Press Newswires
ASDE	Defence Journal
ASP	AP Online
AUST	The Australian
BBC timeline	BBC timeline
BBCM	BBC Monitoring
BNW	The Canadian Press–Broadcast wire
BRKG	CNN: Breaking News
BURE	Business Recorder
CHSM	The Christian Science Monitor
DEUE	Deutsche Welle
DJI	Dow Jones International News
DSTA	Daily Star
DT	The Daily Telegraph

Code	Name
EC	The Economist
EIUC	Economist Intelligence Unit-ViewsWire
EURR	European Report
FIGA	Le Figaro
FINP	National Post
FTFT	Financial Times
GLOB	The Globe and Mail
GRDN	The Guardian
HMSP	The Hamilton Spectator
IND	The Independent-London
INDF	US Fed News
INDO	Independent On Sunday
IOD	International Oil Daily
IOLE	The Indian Ocean Newsletter
IPRS	Inter press service
IRTI	Irish Times
LBA	Reuters News
LESE	Les Echos
LGAF	ISI Emerging Markets Africawire
LIVE	Liverpool Echo
LLCA	Lloyd's Information Casualty Report
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest
MENA	Middle East and North Africa Today
MOST	Morning Star Online
MTPW	M2 Presswire
NATO	NATO
NSTS	New Statesman
NYDN	New York Daily News
NYTA	New York Times Abstracts
NYTF	The New York Times
NZPA	New Zealand Press Association
OB	The Observer
OSTD	Dow Jones Commodities Service
PAIS	El Pais-English Edition
PETR	Deutsche Welle

Code	Name
QEDW	World Of Information Country Report
SAPA	SAPA (South African Press Association)
SBSW	SBS World News Headline Stories
SC	The Scotsman
SLMO	St. Louis Post-Dispatch
SSUN	Scotland on Sunday
ST	The Sunday Times
STDP	State Department Press Releases and Documents
STIM	Straits Times
SUDT	Sudan Tribune
SUND	Sunday Herald
TASS	ITAR Tass
TKWR	Kitchener-Waterloo Record
TMNN	Times Union
TOR	The Toronto Star
TREN	Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan)
TTMS	The Times
UNCR	UN Chronicle
UWIR	U-Wire (University Wire)
VOA	Voice of America Press Releases and Documents
WATC	NPR: Weekend All Things Considered
WATI	The Washington Times
WDAN	Global Insight Daily Analysis
WKLKS	Wikileaks
WP	The Washington Post
WSJ	Wall Street Journal
XNEW	Xinhua News Agency
YP	Yorkshire Post

Notes

[1] The aggregated events of conflicts of v1.0 were added to v1.5. The conflicts 210 (Gov. Cameroon and Gov. Nigeria) and 215 (Gov. of Ethiopia and Gov. of Eritrea) due to their interstate nature were not considered and the conflict 224 (Government of United States of America– al-Qaida) was not considered as it is

not in the African region. Only the conflicts that reached 25 battle deaths were considered, even if also for inactive years.

[2] Contains: Intrastate Disputes Data Set, 1980-2010 (version 1.0); Third-Party Dispute Management Data Set, 1980-2010 (version 1.0); TPI Third-Party Peace-keeping Missions Data Set (version 2.1)

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Declaration

This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.