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Multi-Stakeholder Platform Contribution to Value Chain Development

The Pineapple Value Chain in Ethiopia

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Final Case Study Report

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Abstract

This report investigates the dynamics of a multi-stakeholder platform (named: coordination group, or CG) for stakeholders of the pineapple value chains in Ethiopia. The CG was initiated by the Dutch development organisation SNV in 2005 as part of a broader programme to improve market access for farmers and small- and medium-sized pineapple companies. To examine the MSP, both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business environment, were analysed. A mixed-method design was used for the data collection and -analysis, including in-depth interviews with 13 key representative pineapple stakeholders participating in the CG meetings, document analysis, and a social network analysis. The dominant impression is that the CG generated some very useful effects in terms of bridging some traditional divides and offering opportunities for networking and knowledge dissemination. Yet, it seems the CG predominantly laid out the groundwork, with the edifice of a competitive, quality-aware pineapple export sector still to be built. Major causes of the somewhat slow progress have been the broad scope of the CG that has been addressing three different pineapple chains, the overrepresentation of the public sector that tended to slow down change processes, the CG's national focus that keeps foreign buyers hidden from side, and the development of the CG into a competitor network to a small group of "monopolist" chain actors. On the other hand, changing business institutions that facilitate trust-building in the production base, that improve farmers' access to capital and technology, and that make markets more predictable for chain actors is quite a challenge. Inserting an agricultural sector into the global economy takes time.

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Abbreviations

AACCSA	Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association
B2B	Business to Business
BCaD	Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services
BDS	Business Development Services
BOAM	Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (programme)
BoARD	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CG	Coordination Group
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
ECOPIA	Ecological Products of Ethiopia
ETFRUIT	Ethiopian Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Share Company
FBO	Farmer Based Organisation
GAP	Good Agricultural Practice
JARC	Jimma Agricultural Research Centre
MFI	Micro Finance Institute
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSEDA	Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency
MSM	Maastricht School of Management
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Platform
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PLC	Private Limited Company
PrC	Partnerships Resource Centre
QSAE	Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia
R&D	Research & Development
RTA	Round Table Africa
SARI	Southern Agricultural Research Institute
SDC	Sustainable Development Center
SIP	Strategic Intervention Plan
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region State
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
TC	Tissue Culture
VC	Value Chain
VCD	Value Chain Development
VCF	Value Chain Financing

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1. Introduction

Multi-stakeholder platforms¹ (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and cooperation (Vermeulen et al., 2008). An increasing number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private enterprises are participating in such platforms, however systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore, Maastricht School of Management (MSM) / Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) and SNV BOAM-Ethiopia have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs which SNV BOAM initiated with the aim of developing value chains for the Ethiopian honey and beeswax, dairy, oil seeds and pineapple sector. SNV² is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM's Sustainable Development Center³ stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre⁴, an open centre where academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for sustainable development.

1.1 Research objective and aims

This pineapple case study assesses the effects of the multi-stakeholder platform that was established by SNV BOAM to improve access to (quality) markets for stakeholders in the pineapple value chain in Ethiopia. The core of SNV BOAM's approach is to bring primary and secondary value chain actors and other stakeholders together to find solutions for identified bottlenecks in the value chain. These actors join forces in the so-called Coordinating Groups (CGs), which have a multi-stakeholder nature⁵.

The overall objective of the study is to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions multi-stakeholder platforms contribute to the development of value chains, with a focus on SNV BOAM's programme (agriculture, horticulture) value chains in Ethiopia. Critical success factors and main bottlenecks of MSPs for value chain development in Ethiopia are to be identified. In terms of contribution the synthesis report of the overall study has three aims. First, the study should contribute to the learning process of MSP members and other local Ethiopian stakeholders through verification of results and knowledge dissemination. Second, the synthesis report should end with recommendations on how SNV BOAM can improve its multi-stakeholder processes to increase their contribution to value chain development. Finally, the study should contribute to the academic debate on how value chain partnerships can facilitate sustainable competitiveness in developing countries. This pineapple case study provides input for all three aims, however, reports only on the first aim.

¹ Comprising of dialogues, policy making, and implementation, the term 'multi-stakeholder' is often attached to, platforms, processes, and partnerships (Warner, 2006). In this research we refer to multi-stakeholder *platforms* when discussing MSPs.

² SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.snv-boamworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx

³ MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/

⁴ PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About

⁵ Website SNV BOAM & Annual Report 2008

1.2 Theoretical background

Multi-stakeholder initiatives are generally characterised as horizontally organised, with a greater degree of flexibility and openness as traditional forms of governance. In policy-related documents, MSPs are often considered as highly promising alternative forms of governance. They are based on the “recognition of the importance of achieving equity and accountability”, involving equitable representation of stakeholder views, and are “based on democratic principles of transparency and participation” aiming to develop “partnerships and strengthened networks among stakeholders” (Hemmati, 2002:2).

Institutional theory, social network theory and collaboration literature has been explored to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions partnerships (including MSPs) can contribute to changing institutional business environments to facilitate the inclusion of small and medium agribusiness players into value chains. The effects of the MSPs are examined in terms of their a) internal dynamics (basic collaboration, embeddedness and involvement) including a social network analysis, and b) external dynamics (the changes in key areas of the institutional business environment). The theoretical model is visualized in *appendix 1*.

(a) Internal dynamics

From the collaboration literature, the level of engagement of partners, formalized goal alignment, shared (decision making) processes and activities, and transparency are among the main **basic requirements for successful collaboration** (Kolk et al. 2008). A high level of engagement of stakeholders, proper goal alignment, formalisation, risk- and resource-sharing, trust and transparency, shared learning, and joint decision making are critical factors for successful multi-stakeholder platforms, particularly when these deal with more ambitious and complex issues (Ansell & Gash 2008; Springer-Heinze 2007, Bitzer et al. 2010, Kolk et al. 2008).

Collaboration presents the highest strategic level of engagement and implies that the partners share risks, resources and rewards (Austin 2007). This also entails a formalisation of governance structures, including contractual arrangements to specify objectives, activities and responsibilities. Moreover, the relationship between actors refers to the range of actors actually participating in the partnership. The value of partnerships lies in the potential to create win-win situations if all stakeholders are willing and able to contribute to the achievement of goals (Bitzer et al. 2010a). Trust, risk- and resource-sharing and transparency are indispensable in here, as well as notions on power distributions in the value chain MSPs.

In a four-year study of the collaborative activities of a small NGO in Palestine, Lawrence et al. (2002) found that inter-organisational collaboration leads to the development of new institutions (new practices, technologies and rules). Collaborations that are both highly embedded and have highly involved partners, are the most likely to generate “proto-institutions”. New rules, technologies and practices arise and are diffused beyond the boundaries of the specific MSP contexts,

and adopted by other organisations in the field: they become proto-institutions. These proto-institutions “represent important first steps in the process of institution creation, thus potentially forming the basis for broader, field-level change” (Lawrence et al. 2002: 283). They may become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently.

Embeddedness describes the degree to which a collaboration is enmeshed in inter-organisational relationships (Dacin et al. 1999; Granovetter 1985). Highly embedded collaborations involve (1) interactions with third parties, (2) representation arrangements, and (3) multidirectional information flows (Lawrence et al. 2002). In order to examine whether the pineapple CG has brought about changes in institutional fields we investigate not only the relations among collaborating MSP members, but also how the collaboration embeds them in the wider institutional field.

Involvement focuses on the way in which participating organisations relate to each other. According to Lawrence et al. (2002), high levels of involvement entail “deep interactions among participants, partnership arrangements, and bilateral information flows”. A high level of involvement among participants is necessary for institution creation. The internal dimension of partnerships is also explored in terms of the intensity of actor involvement. If the involvement of an actor is vital for the functioning of the partnership, from design to monitoring, we speak of a high degree of involvement. A medium degree of involvement occurs when an actor only participates during the implementation stages and fulfils particular tasks. If an actor only participates sporadically or not at all, we can speak of ‘no involvement’ (Bitzer et al. 2010b).

The internal dynamics are verified and complemented with a **social network analysis**. The network approach “allows researchers to capture the interactions of any individual unit within the larger field of activity to which the unit belongs” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003: 13). A social network analysis describes network characteristics and concepts such as embeddedness, social capital, and network centrality. Moreover, a social network analysis has the ability to address important aspects of the social structure of a network: the sources and distribution of power (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). In the MSP research, the network analysis enabled the researchers to gain insight on:

- The main (core) organisations, stakeholder groups and sectors participating and brokering in the MSPs (betweenness centrality);
- The proportion and types of organisations in the three societal sectors: public and private sector and civil society;
- Visitor patterns (core visitor, regular visitor, irregular visitor, at random visitor);
- The proportion of visitors that left the MSP series early (exits);

The centrality analysis helps us to understand the overall social structure of the MSP networks. Those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities (the highest number of ties) in the network are the most central players in the MSP networks (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Moreover, more connections often mean that individuals are exposed to more diverse information. The more connected actors in the network are, the higher the likelihood that they are able to mobilize their

resources and to bring diverse and multiple perspectives to solve problems. The number and kinds of ties actors have determine the range of opportunities, influence and power they have (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). “Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities because they have choices. This autonomy makes them less dependent on any specific other actor, and hence more powerful” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 61).

Apart from a measure to identify the most central actors, betweenness centrality is a measure for the degree that actors connect two other actors that do not have a direct link themselves. In our study it refers to the following illustrative situation: actor A is present at CG meeting 1 and actor B at meeting 2. If attending both meetings, actor C connects A with B. The hypothesis is that C is able to facilitate a flow of information from A to B and vice versa. If actors cannot reach each other, or cannot be reached by another actor, learning, support or influence between the two is restrained (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Therefore, the higher the number of network players that have a high betweenness centrality, the more horizontal the network. Information can be diffused through multiple paths, through network ‘brokers’ that are in between other network players. The more network brokers there are, the more likely that actors have alternative ways of connection to other actors and can by-pass a given (dominant) actor (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). With smaller numbers of players with a high centrality, the network becomes more hierarchical as fewer players control intermediary information diffusion.

Finally, it is possible that those players perceive themselves as different from others in the population as “they see themselves as the movers-and-shakers, and the dealmakers that made things happen” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 68).

(b) External dynamics

The external dynamics refer to the perceived changes in institutional business environment that facilitate inclusion of small and medium sized agri-business players into the pineapple value chains. The fragmented nature of Africa’s agricultural sector is one of the limiting factors to its development. The majority of farmers and SMEs face huge barriers to link themselves to national and global markets, while access to these markets is considered critical to growth in developing countries (OECD, 2006; World Bank, 2008). The most important institutional challenges to inclusion in commercial value chains concern those formal rules, inter-organisational arrangements, and informal customs that prevent farmers and SMEs from having access to knowledge & technology, credit, markets, and professional organisations (Bitzer et al. 2010b; Van Wijk and Kwakkenbos 2011).

Lack of **access to capital** or credit is a major constraint for many smallholders and SMEs (Altenburg, 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Broader access to financial services would expand their opportunities for technology adoption and resource allocation (World Bank, 2008). The lack of **access to knowledge** often hampers agri-food enterprises to adopt new practices that build trust and confidence of buyers in the quality and safety assurance mechanisms for their produce (Henson and Jaffee 2006; Garcia Martinez and Poole 2004). Farmers are exposed to highly volatile markets, which hinder investments in the agricultural sector. A more **stable market** for suppliers through buyer commitment and price stability would motivate farmers and SMEs to invest in production capacity and quality improvement (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Finally, chain actors, particularly farmers need to be organized to

develop capacity in terms of supplying volumes and quality, and guaranteeing regular supply. **Access to organisations** facilitate risk sharing, the pooling of resources, enable collective learning, and developing market power (KIT *et al.*, 2006).

1.3 Methodology

Several methods were used for the **data collection** process: analysis of existing documents (field documents), in-depth interviews and group discussions with SNV BOAM in Ethiopia. Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered. All primary data were collected in Ethiopia from August to November 2010, both in the Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Regional (SNNPR) States. Research was executed in collaboration with a team of local consultants that was especially responsible for the interviews in the oil seeds value chain CG.

A sample of 13 CG stakeholders was drawn for the **interviews** in the following manner. We selected candidates from participant lists of five Coordination Meetings (begin, end and middle) who played specific roles in the pineapple value chains, such as *chain actors*, *chain supporters*, *chain influencers*, and *chain facilitators*⁶. Some critical and reluctant stakeholders were explicitly included. Eventually, interviews were held with all relevant value chain stakeholders (*Table 1*). The researchers also made field visits to private pineapple farms in Didiche and a nursery site (capacity: 43,000 pineapple seedlings) in Genbela (both in SNNPRS). For a complete overview of the interviewees and interview schedule, see *appendix 3*. For confidentiality reasons, they are made anonymous in the report.

Table 1. Interviewees by stakeholder group

Stakeholder Group	Interviewees	Percentage (%)	Type
<i>Chain actors</i>	5	38	Cooperative, input supplier, private processor, wholesaler, private exporter
<i>Chain supporters</i>	3	23	Bank, research centre, BDS provider
<i>Chain influencers</i>	4	31	Investment Agency, Ministry, Enterprises Development Agency, Cooperative Promotion Bureau
<i>Chain facilitators</i>	1	8	NGO
Total	13	100	

⁶ For a complete overview of stakeholder roles in the value chain, see *appendix 2*.



Picture: pineapple farm in Didiche and pineapple nursery in Genbela (both in SNNPRS)

A **database** was constructed that scores the participation of each organisation (84 in total) in each Coordination Group meeting (11 assessed in total), the type and subtype of the organisation and its role in the value chain⁷. Finally, the Coordination Group meeting was attended to a) have an idea of the working of the CG in practice, and b) to introduce the researchers to the relevant stakeholders in order to promote interview response. The questionnaire can be found in *appendix 4*.

On the basis of the database, a **social network analysis** was executed with the program UCINET 6.303 which is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks and other proximity data. The program contains dozens of network analytic routines (e.g. centrality measures, dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis algorithms, clique finders, etc.). A social network analysis allows for linking micro and macro levels, and an integration between qualitative, quantitative and graphical data. In this research, the social network analysis is mainly used to verify the qualitative data. In the report, qualitative descriptions are presented, and -if applicable- followed by a quantitative check resulting from the network analysis.

Not all **interview questions** were propounded to all 13 interviewees. Since we were interested in the social mechanisms at work rather than in statistical realities, only those having expertise or being knowledgeable on a certain subject were questioned on that subject. For example, a financial institute might be less knowledgeable on the (technical) varieties that exist in the value chain product, or a research institute that has no expertise on the contractual agreements that exist between suppliers and buyers. In other cases, the respondent had only attended one CG meeting and therefore lacked knowledge of CG internal processes over time.

⁷ The classification of organisations in type (private sector, public sector, civil society and education), subtype (e.g. processing company, producer, consultant, research institute etc.) and value chain role (chain actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) has to be regarded as an analytical tool. In reality, there is not such strict distinction, as for example many producer cooperatives (now classified as a business representative body in the private sector) are also involved in civil society activities. However, their main aim is to represent an economic active producer group and most of the time, the cooperatives engage in chain actor activities (e.g. collecting pineapples or processing tasks). This is the reason to classify them under the private sector. Another example is a university (classified under Education) who acts as a BDS provider as well.

Moreover, time pressure indicated by the respondent was taken into account during the interviews that lasted on average 1.5 hours. Although effort was made to propose as many questions as possible to all stakeholder groups, conclusions are often based on the views of less than the 13 respondents.

The **secondary data** included content analysis of the BOAM programme, with relevant documentation including all Coordination Group meeting minutes and impact data on production, income and employment areas provided by SNV BOAM Ethiopia. Furthermore, the secondary data include descriptions of national and international pineapple value chain markets, the horticulture sub-sector in Ethiopia, and relevant aspects of collaboration literature and institutional change theory.

All interviews were summarized and **data were analysed** with the qualitative analysis software program MAXQDA. Network analysis has been executed for the two-mode database containing organisations which have attended the pineapple CG meetings in Ethiopia.

Finally, all outcomes are cross checked, compared to and extended with information provided by several key informants to ensure triangulation (e.g. SNV BOAM staff, experts, chain Lead Advisors).

1.4 Outline of this report

The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 clarifies the context of this study by providing a short background on the pineapple market and horticulture sector, its main constraints and SNV BOAM's strategy of establishing the Pineapple Coordination Group. In chapter 3, the internal dynamics of the Pineapple Coordination Group are presented. Chapter 4 analyses the perceived changes in the institutional business environment of the pineapple value chain, as a result of the MSP (external dynamics). Chapter 5 hints at the future outlook of the MSP and the value chain, while chapter 6 and 7 respectively conclude with a discussion of results and limitations of the study.

2. Context of the case study

2.1 The Pineapple subsector

This section describes a) the international pineapple market, b) the Ethiopian pineapple market, c) the Ethiopian pineapple value chain map, d) the main constraints in the pineapple subsector according to the interviewees and e) SNV BOAM's strategy to tackle these problems.

(a) International pineapple market

There is a considerable demand for processed pineapple products in European and Middle-East Markets. Canned fruits and juice account for 80 percent of the total processed pineapple products sold at the international market (FAO, 2003). Nevertheless, the market for fresh pineapples is one of the fastest growing fruit and vegetable markets in Europe and the United States. Except for Portugal, all pineapples consumed in the European market are imported from non-European origins. From 2000 to 2008, net imports into the EU grew at an average annual growth rate of 12 percent; from 317 478 tonnes in 2000 to 873 936 tonnes in 2008 (Pay, 2009, FAO). Ethiopia is not yet part of this list of main non-European suppliers.

“Pineapples, once a favourite fruit for processing, have been increasingly marketed for fresh consumption with the emergence of the extra sweet MD2 variety in the mid 1990s” (Pay, 2009, FAO: 8). European retailers increasingly prefer MD2 type pineapples over other varieties, including the Smooth Cayenne and Sugarloaf pineapples (Pay, 2009, FAO; First Consult, 2006). The MD2 variety -strongly demanded from retailers- accounted for about 85 percent of the country's pineapple exports to the European market in 2009 and the once dominant Smooth Cayenne variety is widely overtaken. According to the research of FAO's Ellen Pay (2009), West-African producers are increasingly switching to the MD2 variety too, allowing them to play their part on the European pineapple market. Ironically, now that the MD2 variety is so common, a good Smooth Cayenne has a better chance than before of finding a buyer (CTA, 2009). Moreover, the market for fair-trade and certified tropical fruits, including pineapples and mangoes, offers interesting prospects for suppliers from developing countries as quality and originality hold the key to good profits (Pay, 2009, FAO; CTA, 2009).

Furthermore, the growing market for processed pineapple products (i.e. dried, sliced and canned) in the Middle-East (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Dubai) and Djibouti markets is promising⁸ (First Consult, 2006). SNV BOAM therefore believes there will be high international demand for pineapple products in the medium-term.

⁸ CG3 meeting minutes.



Picture: processed (sliced) pineapples in small shop in Chucko (SNNPRS, Ethiopia)

(b) Ethiopian pineapple market

Substantial pineapple fruit cultivation is mainly practiced in the southern regions of Ethiopia (Sidama and Gojeb). Small farmers are accustomed to work with pineapples as a cash crop in a mixed farming system for decades. The use of fertilizer is nearly absent and the pineapples produced are organic, a comparative advantage of Ethiopian pineapple production. Yearly, 2700 MT pineapples are produced in the Tesso area, which is marketed for 98% as fresh (mainly Red Spanish variety) pineapple⁹.

Generally, the consumption pattern of the Ethiopian population encourages the production of the pineapple Smooth Cayenne variety for processing purposes (MD2 is less suitable for processing) and is mainly appreciated as fresh fruits variety in the regional markets (close to Ethiopia) and in the Arabic peninsular markets (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, April 2011). According to SNV BOAM promoting the MD2 variety is hitherto “a bridge to far, bearing in mind the European market conditions”. MD2 is in the country, however, not yet released (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, April 2011).

National consumption figures for pineapple are slightly rising as a result of general national growth in public spending and tourist/expat preferences (Yonad, 2011). The average annual imported processed pineapple consumption is 250 tonnes with a consumption growth of 695% from 2005 to 2008 (Yonad, 2011)¹⁰. Of the total consumption or processed fruits, average annual imported processed pineapple consumption is three percent (Yonad, 2011).

Major challenges in the pineapple value chains are the high transaction risks of pineapple growing (costs, volumes, information) resulting in limited added value and oligopolistic behaviour in the principal wholesale market. This includes the costs for producers and potential investors in the industry to install required basic infrastructures (Yonad, 2011). Second, the existing area of pineapple cultivation in Ethiopia is by far not enough to produce sufficient numbers for processing exports¹¹. “Although the marketability and margins of low quality fruits can be improved, maximum impact will only be achieved with the introduction of diversified market arrangements with better quality fruit production in terms of improved varieties”¹².

⁹ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.

¹⁰ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.


¹¹ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2005.

¹² SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.

(c) Pineapple value chain map

Figure 1 shows the Ethiopian pineapple value chain, with indicated intervention areas, as visualized by SNV BOAM. SNV BOAM's interventions mainly address the exporters, processors and farmer organisations with the aim of improving linkages between mid-chain buyers and producers. The program strategically intervenes in three types of pineapple value chains: the 'new variety (Smooth Cayenne) export chain', the 'processed pineapple product chain', and the 'domestic fresh pineapple product chain'¹³.

Figure 1. Pineapple value chain map with indicated intervention areas



(d) Constraints in the pineapple sector

Stakeholders in the pineapple value chain perceive a multitude of constraints to pineapple subsector development. According to the interviewees (*Table 2*), minimal infrastructure (disconnecting rural pineapple production areas from the main roads), long procedures to access bank loans, and land investment issues obstruct investment in the pineapple sector. Concerning the latter, the SNNPRS Investment Agency allocated land for pineapple farming, however, in the first call for investors none of the eleven applicants eventually invested in the lands. Four out of eight candidates to the second call are currently preparing production on the lands (*interview 5*). The problem is situated at the private investors' site, according to the Investment Agency, as they lack commitment and financial capacity¹⁴. Furthermore, private investors are hesitant due to bad access roads and insecure markets (*interviews 5 and 12*). Those who ultimately succeeded in securing land for pineapple production were discouraged by "insufficient supply of seedlings and absence of water"¹⁵.

¹³ CG9 meeting minutes.

¹⁴ CG8 meeting minutes.

¹⁵ CG11 meeting minutes.

Other general issues are related to the ‘weak institutional capacity’ in the subsector, the non-existing relationships between the few actors that exist (*interview 11*), and the fact that the pineapple sector is limited to the Southern regions of Ethiopia (*interview 11* and *13*).

Regarding issues related to production, the main problems are the low quality (non-marketable to foreign markets) of the traditional pineapple variety (Red Spanish) and the insufficient supply of the higher quality variety (Smooth Cayenne and MD2). What is more, prices fluctuate constantly as a result of the seasonality of the fruits. Finally, post-harvest losses are considerable (10-15 percent).

Regarding issues related to processing, wholesale and export, the main problem is the dominance of three to five *Piazza*¹⁶ wholesalers and (illegal) regional traders that distort the fresh fruit pineapple market. They dominate the single low-quality fresh fruit pineapple market, refuse to pay tax, are not legally registered, and directly purchase pineapples for cheap prices from cash constraint farmers in the rural areas. The “sad thing is that they destroy the quality of the pineapple market, as they encourage farmers to sell their –even non-ripe pineapples- directly for cash” (*interview 9*). Moreover, they bypass cooperatives that represent farmers’ interests. They have no interest in changing the present situation as it is beneficial to them. According to SNV BOAM “the monopolists (*Piazza* wholesalers and traders) block the pineapple market” (*interview 11*). Both a private pineapple investor as well as a tomato selling cooperative were “kicked out of the market” by *Piazza* wholesalers as the latter ensured no single buyer bought their products (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 2011). Several *Piazza* wholesalers even physically fought with Etfuit (a non-*Piazza* wholesaler) staff to avoid that Etfuit would source fruits (in this case mangos) from a farmer cooperation and other farmers (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 2011).

As such, the benefits and potential of the pineapple market does not reach the farmers (*interview 1*). New investors are worried on the existing monopoly (*interview 4*). Other problems mentioned by investors and processing- and exporting companies are the irregular supply and high farm gate prices¹⁷ due to seasonality, insufficient quality, and a general storage/distribution problem.

Table 2. Main constraints in the pineapple sector in Ethiopia and number of times indicated by the interviewees (frequency)

Constraints in pineapple sector	
Frequency	
<i>Investment related issues</i>	
Low infrastructure (land access road)	3
Land investment problems	3
Access bank loans limited (long procedures)	2
Weak institutional structure/capacity (sector, cooperatives)	2
Limited private investors (commitment, insecure markets)	2
Limited to SNNPRS region	2

¹⁶ *Piazza* is the main market in Addis Ababa, and in Ethiopia in general.

¹⁷ Farm gate price = price of the product at which it is sold by the farm.

<i>Production related issues</i>	
Low quality variety (Red Spanish)	5
Problematic input supply of quality variety (Smooth Cayenne)	5
Seasonality product – price fluctuation	1
Post-harvest loss (10-15 %)	1
<i>Processing/exporting related issues</i>	
3-5 wholesalers and illegal traders distort (quality) markets (monopoly)	6
Insufficient quantity and quality supply (peak season)	3
Too high farm price to compete	1
Storage/transportation problem	1

(e) SNV strategy in the BOAM framework

To tackle these problems in the pineapple sector, SNV developed the ‘Support to Business Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme¹⁸. Under this programme, a Value Chain Development (VCD) approach was developed. It is “characterized by (i) a combined sector and business to business (B2B) orientation” (IOB Inception Report, 2009: 27), (ii) a focus on ‘pull’ factors; working from the middle of the value chain at both ‘up-stream’ and ‘down-stream’ levels (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 2011), (iii) “a firm direction towards the private sector (private businesses) as the entry point, (iv) the use of multi stakeholder processes in the form of Coordination Groups as the platform for decision making and anchoring of the local ownership, (v) the use of local consultants or capacity builders to increase outreach, sustainability and ownership and (vi) the use of leverage and innovation funds” (IOB Inception Report, 2009: 27). Therefore, the MSP approach is only one part of the whole ‘holistic’ SNV BOAM value chain approach.

The BOAM programme is based on the idea that change can only be induced if it builds on knowledge and experience already present in the concerning sectors. Establishing the CG was only a logical step in the process of bringing together all the relevant knowledge and experience of stakeholders in the concerning value chains¹⁹. SNV BOAM sees the CG as the main organ for governance and coordination of chain activities and stresses the importance of ownership through the formation of stakeholders’ own network.

Apart from BOAM, SNV runs 2 other value chain programmes (PSNP plus & RAIN) (SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009). Finally, the four case studies under study are only part of the impact areas, (sub) sectors and programs of SNV Ethiopia.

¹⁸ SNV BOAM’s programme, financed by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Addis Ababa and until the end of 2009 by the Irish Embassy, contributes to sustainable poverty reduction in rural Ethiopia through value chain development. The overall BOAM programme period is five years, and started from September 2005. The programme aims at improving the access to markets for small and medium agribusiness players along selected value adding chains (SNV BOAM programme proposal 2005-2010). In 2009 a transformation process of the BOAM programme into a centre of excellence for value chain development has started in the form of BOAM2 scaling up phase. Some key changes are the emphasis on Business to Business (B2B) value chain development and the up-scaling of both production as well as a new fund structure. The additional target of the BOAM program up-scaling phase is to develop, test and introduce innovative approaches that aim to improve business to business relations in selected value chains (SNV BOAM annual report 2009). A one-year extension of the BOAM programme was requested and approved, until August 31, 2011, to maximize the results to be obtained from the BOAM programme (BOAM 2 programme proposal 2010-2011).

¹⁹ Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010.



Picture: Pineapple CG meeting 14 in Awassa (Ethiopia), November 9, 2010

2.2 The Pineapple Coordination Group

The existing and rising demand for (quality) pineapple products in respectively the international and Ethiopian markets served as fertile ground for SNV BOAM to establish a multi-stakeholder platform (named: Coordination Group) for the pineapple value chain in 2005. The CG aims at promoting efficient and equitable linkages for the economically active poor along the agricultural value chain. Establishing the pineapple CG was one of SNV strategies under its BOAM programme.

From the network analysis we found that in total 80 different organisations attended the pineapple CG meetings 1-13 from 2005-2010²⁰. The pineapple CG consists of representatives of key actors in the pineapple chain (regional, national and sporadically international), including:

- Research institutes such as the Jimma Agricultural Research Institute (JARC), the Southern Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) and the Mekelle Institute of

Characterization CG

The majority of the interviewees characterize the pineapple CG as a ‘connecting and discussion forum’ where multiple actors and societal sectors meet and actively discuss problems in the pineapple sector (*e.g. interviews 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10*). Potential solutions are addressed as well, i.e. on where to find appropriate buyers (*interviews 5, 10*). Especially the smaller groups’ Business to Business (B2B) sessions improved trust and forced stakeholders to make decisions. It is a ‘neutral’ meeting place with tough but open discussions, for example on ‘delicate’ matters as the monopoly of pineapple traders and wholesalers (*interview 9*). Moreover, it is an ‘exchange forum’, where knowledge on technology and markets is shared (*interviews 1, 7*). On the other hand the pineapple CG saw little progress due to unmet promises and slow implementation of decisions (*interviews 1, 6, 7, 9, 11*), it did not convince government authorities to carry out their responsibilities (i.e. road construction) as key governmental- and financial decision makers were absent in the meetings (*interviews 4, 5, 7*). Sometimes, discussions are ‘loose’ and ‘off topic’ (*interview 9*). Moreover, the CG as a platform is a “toothless lion”; it has no authority to implement and enforce deviations by members”. In chapter 3 they will be discussed in detail.

²⁰By the end of 2010, already 14 meetings took place for the pineapple value chain CG. Nevertheless, the social network analysis was based on 13 meetings due to the participation lists in the meeting minutes that were made available to the researchers at start of the research project in June 2010.

- Technology/Tissue Culture (TC) Laboratory;
- Producer cooperatives and unions including Safa Pineapple Producer Cooperative and Tesso Farmers' Cooperative;
 - Private processing companies including the Ecological Products of Ethiopia (ECOPIA) PLC and the Auxumite coffee and fruit export PLC;
 - Fruit wholesalers such as the Ethiopian Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Share Company (ETFRUIT) and ELFORA Agro-Industries PLC;
 - Private investors including Dibabesh PLC and Haji Kemil Hassen Agricultural PLC;
 - Government authorities, including the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI), the SNNPRS Investment Agency, the Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency (MSEDA), the Cooperative Promotion Bureau and the Oromia Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED);
 - Financial institutes and banks, such as the Sidama Micro Finance Institute and the Development Bank of Ethiopia.

Under its BOAM programme, a *Value Chain Leader* and a *Value Chain Facilitator* is selected for each value chain CG. The Value Chain Leader is chosen by the CG and acts as the focal person who should guarantee the local ownership of the CG and who is representing the CG. Ideally for SNV BOAM, a Chain Leader represents a key private sector organisation in the chain. In the pineapple CG, the managing director of the Auxumite coffee and fruit export PLC was Chain Leader from meeting 1-3. From meeting 8-14 the Vice Manager of Dibabesh PLC is Chain Leader. The Chain Leader is supported by *value chain development advisors* or *coaches*, who add distinct expertise to the program (agro-processing, organisational strengthening, women entrepreneurship/gender and monitoring and evaluation). In addition, SNV BOAM makes available a Value Chain Facilitator to facilitate and activate communication amongst CG members and to disseminate information. The owner and the manager of the organisation Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services (BCaD) served as Chain Facilitators in the pineapple value chain CG.

From September 2005 onward the pineapple CG meetings have started to take place bi-annually, but from May 2007 every three months (four times a year). In general, the meetings have the following pattern: the CG Facilitator and Leader open the meeting with a recap of the previous meetings, participants introduce themselves, fund utilization reports are discussed, experts present about new researches and technologies related to the pineapple sector and Question and Answer Rounds are held in between. The first CG meeting started in English, but currently Amharic is the main language used in the meetings. The Facilitator translates if necessary.

Following the recommendations of the Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) an Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes for the BOAM designated funds was established. Next to this, SNV BOAM has assignment contracts indicating capacity building interventions with all clients (i.e. processors, farmer organisations, business associations, and government). Finally, a new funding structure was introduced.

3. Pineapple Coordination Group Dynamics

This chapter is meant to present the main findings regarding the internal dynamics that took place within the pineapple CG meetings 1-13 (2005-2010). The pineapple CG is assessed on the basis of several collaboration variables, and the levels of embeddedness and involvement.

3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements

The extent to which the pineapple CG meets basic collaboration requirements is examined by assessing so-called success factors. An overview of all these factors is provided in *Table 3*.

Table 3. Basic collaboration requirements and their success factors

Basis collaboration requirements	Success factors
3.1.1 Level of engagement	(a) Commitment (b) Motivations (c) Roles and contributions (d) Shared resources
3.1.2 Jointness	(a) Decision making (b) Leadership (c) Selection stakeholders (d) Agenda setting (e) Distribution of benefits (f) Risk sharing
3.1.3 Transparency	(a) Accountability (b) Trust building
3.1.4 Goal alignment	(a) Clear objectives (b) Win-win opportunities (c) Compelling case

Source: Compilation based on Kolk et al. (2008), Van Tulder & Pfisterer (2008) and Bitzer et al. (2010).

3.1.1 Level of engagement

Success factors identified in the research for the level of engagement are fourfold: (a) a high level of commitment, (b) intrinsic motivation, (c) clarity of roles and contributions, and (d) resource sharing.

(a) Commitment

For SNV BOAM, one of the drivers to start up the CG was to have the stakeholders “to run their own show” and to anticipate on the absence of associations, organisations and platforms in general (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, August 20, 2010). From the beginning it was the idea to shift from external support to internal organisation and as such creating commitment and ownership in the sector. But how do our pineapple interviewees evaluate the level of commitment of their fellow pineapple CG colleagues?

None of our thirteen interviewees visited all 13 pineapple CG meetings. Two interviewees, SNV BOAM and the Chain Facilitator, were classified ‘regulars’ (participating 11 or 12 meetings), and the remaining eleven interviewees were classified ‘irregular members’ (present at least at three meetings with a maximum presence of 10 meetings). There are no ‘at random interviewees’ (participating 0, 1, or 2 meetings).

Table 4. Level of commitment evaluated

Commitment	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Low	1	10
Modest	8	72
High	2	18
Total	11	100

Source: interview data

The general level of commitment is evaluated as modest (72 %) (Table 4). Only one public sector representative was of the opinion that commitment is low, as he witnessed few concrete achievements (interview 13). The majority, including SNV BOAM, believes the level of commitment is modest as participants are very active and committed at the meetings and in specific committees, however not or less committed as soon as the meeting ends (e.g. interviews 1, 4, 9, 10). Agreed assignments are not being prepared for the next meetings and implementation is absent. The lack of follow-up is related to the failing commitment of the CG members as well as the CG’s absent formal accountability system (interview 9, see also section 3.1.3a). Another shortcoming is that some organisations do not regularly attend and sent different representatives to the meetings (rotation) (interview 6). Finally, wholesalers/traders of the *Piazza* market in Addis Ababa and pineapple investors are believed to be less committed to the pineapple CG (interviews 5 and 11). SNV BOAM tried to engage them in the pineapple CG however it could not keep them on board. “Commitment is related to benefits. The monopolists experience no benefits from the CG and prefer the current pineapple sector situation” (interview 11).

Following the Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008), SNV BOAM has considered its continuation in the pineapple value chain development (VCD) project as there were -apparently- limited private investors²¹. “The success of the VCD depends to a large extent to the willingness of private enterprises to invest, and so far little interest has been forthcoming. In fact, one of the investors (a processor) has withdrawn its commitment. If there are no alternative plans, and development after investment is expected to take 2-3 years, it is questionable if one should go ahead if investments are not made in the coming 3 months” (Aleme et al. 2008: 16). Nevertheless, in meeting seven SNV BOAM reaffirmed its commitment to the development of the pineapple value chain²², but participants were less sure afterwards. In meeting nine members raise the question whether SNV BOAM gives a lesser degree of importance to the pineapple value chain compared to the other value chains (oil seeds, honey, dairy). “No”, SNV BOAM replies, “we give equal priority to all value chains and the three types of funds are equally distributed among all four value chains”²³. However, SNV-BOAM continued, participants need to apply for the funds, and next to the dairy CG, the pineapple CG fund using is limited (see also section 3.1.2e).

Despite of this, two of the respondents on this issue believe the commitment in the pineapple CG is high. “Even though the pineapple CG seems to have limited

²¹ CG3 meeting minutes.

²² CG7 meeting minutes.

²³ CG9 meeting minutes.

effects so far there is great potential as the government and other investors are very committed to the pineapple case”(interview 12). Not everyone agrees (see section 3.3).

(b) Motivations

The motivations to join the pineapple CG are diverse although for most interviewees linked to a) the need for technical and financial assistance of SNV BOAM (3x); b) the need to meet with suppliers or investors (2x) and c) personal invitations by SNV BOAM (2x). Other motivations were related to land issues as private investors approached the Investment Agency for cultivatable land. In collaboration with SNV BOAM, the Agency decided to dedicate 1100 ha of land solely for pineapple growing purposes. SNV BOAM instructed potential investors on pineapple cultivation practice (interviews 4 and 5). For the processing company, the pineapple CG provides an opportunity to meet with all relevant stakeholders at once in one location. Normally, information is dispersed, and the company had to visit each office separately. Now all information is available at one place (interview 9). For the Development Bank, the pineapple CG’s agenda coincides with their development agenda (interview 6). Finally, for SNV BOAM, development has to start from within the sectors. The CG structure created consensus on what is needed to realise change the pineapple sector (interview 11).

In short, motivations are never solely intrinsic. In reality, interviewees have to see the link with and benefits for their own program and goals in order to be motivated to join a multi-stakeholder platform. Moreover, there is need for technical and financial assistance in the pineapple sector in Ethiopia. DSA was not mentioned to be of considerable influence.

(c) Roles and contributions

Operational plans agreed in several CG meetings clarify the roles and contributions of the main pineapple chain stakeholders present in the meetings. However, due to the lack of accountability mechanisms, there are no mechanisms to enforce them upon members (see section 3.1.3a). Besides, due to the high number of participating organisations (84 organisations in total in the first eleven pineapple CG meetings) and the high rotation of members and organisations, operational plans are not representing all participating parties.

(d) Shared resources

We can conclude that resources are shared in the sense that each CG member has an equal opportunity to have access to financial and technical support delivered through the SNV BOAM funding programme²⁴. However, the benefits to be obtained from this support are not always equal (see next section).

In the network analyses on course ratio these findings on stakeholder engagement were verified. To analyse the course ratio of the pineapple CG participation database four categories of visiting frequency of organisations have been determined (core visitor, regular visitor, irregular visitor, random visitor) as well as four categories of

²⁴ In the beginning of the SNV BOAM programme (2005) the three types of funds accessible were the leverage fund, the research and study fund, and the financial intermediation fund. In line with the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review in 2008, the three new types of funds are the Sector Development Fund, the Pilot B2B Fund, and the Up-scaling Support Fund.

entry and exit behaviour of the organisations (present & stay, present & exit, entry & stay, and entry and exit). The descriptive statistics of both categories are calculated for the pineapple CG participation database and displayed in *Appendix 5*. A legend is attached. In *Table 5*, the visitor frequency in the pineapple CG is presented. In *Table 6* the total of exits from the pineapple CG is demonstrated.

Table 5 Visitor frequency in the pineapple CG (%) exits²⁵

Sector	Core visitors	Regular visitors	Irregular visitors	At random visitors
Pineapple	0,0	3,8	47,5	48,8

Table 6 Total of exits

Sector	%
Pineapple	58,8

The social network analysis confirms that:

- There is irregular attendance of organisations in the pineapple CG meetings (*Table 5*). The proportion of core visitors (present at all meetings) and regular visitors (present at 11 or 12 meetings) is modest. In the pineapple there are no core visitors (present at all 13 meetings);
- There is high rotation of organisations in the pineapple CG meetings (*Table 6*). The total number of exits (present & exit + entry & exit) is 58,8 percent.

In sum, the general level of engagement of pineapple CG members varied considerably in- and outside the meetings. Commitment is high in the meetings but completely different as soon as participants step out of the meeting floor. Implementation of agreements is therefore severely endangered. SNV BOAM has considered its continuation in the pineapple value chain as committed investors seemed sparse and the public services of the dominant-commented public sector leave much to be desired²⁶. CG members themselves have to see the link with and benefits for their own program and goals in order to be motivated to join a multi-stakeholder platform.

3.1.2 Jointness

The success factors identified in this case study to measure the level of ‘jointness’ in the CG meetings are: (a) decision making, (b) leadership, (c) selection of stakeholders, (d) agenda setting, (e) distribution of benefits, and (f) risk sharing.

(a) Decision making

The degree to which the decisions are jointly made in the pineapple CG was difficult to measure, as formal decisions are rarely made in the pineapple CG (see also *section 3.1.3a*). Only a few moments of more formal decision making could be identified, and they were related to electing the nominees for certain positions in established committees or boards. Examples are the election of the CG Leaders in meetings 1 and 8, the Executive Committee members in meeting 9 and on the selection of several research topics. No single interviewee indicated this process of election is unequal.

²⁵ Total exits = present & exit + entry & exit (see also *Appendix 5*)

²⁶ Annual Report 2009.

Still, an interviewee, who recently quit the CG, believed the CG is a “toothless lion”, i.e. it has no authority to implement and enforce deviation by members” (*interview 8*). In his view, the donor agency SNV BOAM dominates the processes in the CG; hence, other stakeholders have no real influence on the decisions in the CG and its Executive Committee. Decisions are implemented only when SNV BOAM agrees, regardless of the interests and views of other members (*interview 8*). The interviewee stopped participating in the CG as a result of its disagreement with SNV concerning SNV BOAM funding of the interviewee’s organisation.

We addressed the question whether all members have an ‘equal say’ in the CG or whether some members are ‘more equal than others’? Seven out of ten of the respondents interviewed on this question believed members have an ‘equal say’ during the meetings with no influence of dominant members (*Table 7*). “Everyone has an equal chance to express his or her views, even though the level of education and knowledge is different among CG members” (*interview 4*). Since the meetings are in Amharic also farmers have an equal say (*interview 10*).

However, two interviewees mentioned that in their view the plenary CG meetings were to some extent dominated by some members. This had been part of the the reason for SNV BOAM to split up the pineapple CG into smaller groups; the so-called bilateral group sessions (*see also section 4.3*). According to MSEDA every member has an equal chance to speak out; nevertheless the chance depends on the capacity of each actor to express him/her self (*interview 7*). The manager of the processing company preferred the cooperatives to have a stronger say in the meetings (*interview 9*).

SNV BOAM has made attempts to share some of its own responsibilities in respect of the pineapple products value chains to create more ‘ownership’ of the CG process with stakeholders. Its main initiatives were the establishment of the Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes regarding BOAM designated funds and the assignment of contracts between SNV BOAM and its clients (including CG members) on capacity building interventions. In the meetings, joint Strategic Intervention Plans²⁷ (SIPs) and operational plans were formulated. An important step forward was the SIP revision with a group of pineapple CG members after the MTR in 2008. The upgrading of the low quality Red Spanish pineapple value chain and less export driven approach brought CG members closer to what is realistic and executable (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 2011). According to what was recommended in the MTR the CG Executive Committee should empower the sector in general and the CG in particular by giving stakeholders a say in the allocation of its pineapple-industry related funding. One interviewee indicated that members have an equal opportunity to speak out in the discussions although it is usually the Executive Committee that decides.

Table 7. Equal say

Equal say	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	7	70
No	3	30
Total	10	100

Source: interview data

²⁷ The following Strategic Intervention Plans –distinct per pineapple variety- were agreed with the pineapple CG members in meeting nine: 1) Support quality improvement in agricultural practices and planting material mainly in the Smooth Cayenne market channel; 2) Strengthening coops and their relationships mainly in the Red Spanish market channel; and 3) Develop alternative markets segments /products for pineapple (mainly Red Spanish but potentially also Smooth Cayenne market channels).

Financial ownership was created, to variable degree, as the following shows. First, the Executive Committee, with five key actors from the pineapple sector, could evaluate, approve or reject funding proposals, but it is the SNV BOAM program manager who takes the final decision²⁸. Second, the SIPs and operational plans were adjusted in response to CG members, although adjustment was mainly possible on the SIPs already prepared in a preliminary stakeholder workshop (held about three months before the first CG meeting) with pineapple value chain representatives identified by SNV BOAM. Nevertheless, in 2008, several members transformed the SIPs into realistic targets. Third, infrastructure issues were not included in the SIPs although they cause stringent problems for many stakeholders in the pineapple value chain. Land for pineapple cultivation is not accessible without infrastructure and investors are not willing to build the 30 to 40 kilometers of the road themselves²⁹. In the meetings the participants questioned why it was not included in the SIPs. The reason is simply that SNV BOAM will not cover infrastructure costs. Fourth, the pineapple Executive Committee was effective only for a very limited time period (only 2 or 3 meetings). Fifth, SNV BOAM itself remains modest about the financial ownership that was created in this way. “Having the Executive committee decide on fund proposals was only a ‘cosmetic measure’: a small shift of ownership” (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, August 2010).

In sum, although it was always SNV BOAM that decided on the final budget spending, decisions made in the CG or by its Executive Committee were never bypassed by SNV BOAM (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, January 2011).

(b) Leadership

From the interviews we could derive that leadership in the pineapple CG has been a hot issue. The pineapple CG met without Chain Leader from meeting four after the withdrawal of the first CG Leader³⁰. SNV BOAM prefers a private processing company as a Chain Leader because such a chain actor has strong interests in linkages “both upstream and downstream in the chain”³¹. But in meeting six, SNV BOAM staff is openly discussing and disagreeing on who should be the next CG leader. One staff member proposed the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers Association to take the responsibility in chain leading. However, the pineapple CG’s first Lead Advisor opposed the idea due to the mentioned association’s weak involvement in fruit production³². It was only in meeting eight that the private investor Dibabesh PLC was chosen as the new Chain Leader. But he lacks full support from other members and cannot serve the *primus inter pares* role of leading an entire industry subsector towards modernization.

Furthermore, no strong sector association is expected to have emerged in the fruit sector by August 2011 (phase out of SNV BOAM)³³. Therefore SNV BOAM explores other forms of sector steering, such as decentralization through the development of local action groups that focus on specific local issues. Also, the

²⁸ CG13 meeting minutes.

²⁹ CG6 meeting minutes.

³⁰ SNV BOAM believes this is related to his frustration with regard to the *Piazza* monopoly market (*interview 11*).

³¹ Discussion Group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010.

³² CG6 meeting minutes. NB The Association was not attending in the meeting.

³³ SNV BOAM 2 proposal.

strengthening of the southern regional Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency to steer value chain development in the fruit sector is explored. Interviewees have a different opinion on who would be the most eligible candidate to steer the pineapple value chain and CG. The regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) is preferred as a candidate by three interviewees, followed by the Cooperative Promotion Bureau by two interviewees. Only SNV BOAM and MSED A itself prefer the MSED A, due to its overlapping mandate. The remaining interviewees are doubtful on any suitable candidate (see also *Chapter 5*).

(c) Selection stakeholders

According to SNV BOAM and the CG Facilitator, selection and invitation of participants is generally decided by the CG Facilitator, the CG Leader, and the SNV BOAM value chain Lead Advisor. The invitation database builds on the previous meetings attendants, and when new organisations wish to be invited the trio decides on approval taking into account the participants' potential contribution to the pineapple value chain. Also other members have the opportunity to suggest new members to the pineapple CG (*interview 11*). One interviewee recommended that SNV BOAM should invite top officials personally and address them by name and job title (*interview 5*). One interviewee believes that the Facilitators "do not care who participates in the CG meetings; sending the invitation to a given address is an end instead of a means to discover why some members fail to attend the meetings" (*interview 8*).

According to the pineapple CG Facilitators (*interview 12*), about one or two weeks in advance of the next CG meeting, the CG Facilitator sends out a package per email or fax (no regular post mail) to the participants that includes the invitation letter, the agenda of the meeting, and a summary of about two pages on the previous meeting (not the full meeting minutes as MSM received them). Interviewees confirm this (e.g. *interviews 1, 2 and 10*) but some believe one week notice is too short (*interview 9*) Organisations that lack email addresses to receive the meeting agenda in advance miss the opportunity to anticipate and prepare on the meetings' agenda. However, some interviewees indicate they are also personally invited by telephone by the Facilitators (*interviews 1, 2, 9*).

Changes in the SNV BOAM programme coordinating staff considerably influenced the new CGs invitation policy. "The first CG was developed from scratch and it was SNV BOAM who gathered all relevant stakeholders together"³⁴, and the first BOAM coordinator insisted the number of participants should not exceed 30-35. However, from meeting nine (end of 2007/beginning of 2008) the value chain Lead Advisors -headed by the second BOAM coordinator- started inviting many participants (often over 60 participants), aiming at broad based information dissemination. This prompted SNV BOAM to look more critical at the engagement processes within the coordination group³⁵. Invitation became more regulated with only one participant from each organisation receiving DSA. Less relevant and non-motivated participants were removed from the participation lists, although this did not happen often according to the CG Facilitators (*interview 12*).

³⁴ Discussion group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010.

³⁵ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009

d) Agenda setting

The agenda of the meeting builds on the previous CG meeting agenda. It is the Facilitator, the CG Leader and the SNV BOAM Lead Value Chain Advisor who decide on content (*interview 11* and *12*). Participants can bring in agenda points according to SNV BOAM (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 24, 2011), but this is not explicitly stated in the invitation letter.

More than in the other value chain CGs (oil seeds, honey and dairy) the pineapple agenda is directed towards “the action groups or action approach” and “(bilateral) grouping”. In the pineapple CG, SNV BOAM plays a larger and active role in establishing relationships, recognizing that strengthening different relationships contributes more to solving constraints than “focusing on experts telling how it should be done” (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, April 2011) (see also *section 4.3*). As such, SNV BOAM plays the role of broker and is actively linking actors and stakeholders in and outside the CG.

All interviewees are modestly to highly satisfied with the agenda setting and selection of stakeholders (*Table 8*). The Chain Facilitators -also brokers and BDS providers in the pineapple value chains- are knowledgeable on theories related to pineapple value chains and have a sector wide overview (*interview 11*). Members have the opportunity to claim some agenda time (*interviews 2* and *5*). Nevertheless, facilitation of the discussions was not satisfactory for every interviewee (e.g. *interviews 7* and *9*). The facilitators were criticized for having insufficient knowledge on the dynamics in the pineapple value chain, which resulted in discussions being “too loose and off topic”. “Fortunately, the agenda has been shortened” (*interview 9*). Two interviewees preferred SNV BOAM to actively share its agenda to top officials and to locate the meeting place near the pineapple farming areas (*interviews 3* and *5*).

Table 8. Agenda setting and selection of stakeholders evaluated

Satisfaction	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Low	0	0
Modest	4	44
High	5	56
Total	9	100

Source: interview data

Table 9. Equal benefits

Equal benefit	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	4	44
No	5	56
Total	9	100

(e) Distribution of benefits

The pineapple CG never explicitly identified benefits from the platform for the stakeholders. When asked during the interviews for benefits and the way they are distributed among CG members, a small majority (56 %) of the respondents believed this is not equal (*Table 9*). Most of them represent public services agencies, next to a processor company and SNV BOAM. Whether or not interviewees believed distribution of benefits was equal, the dominant view is that those members possessing the capacity (level of organisation and understanding) and a proactive attitude will benefit most (*interviews 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9*). “Those actors who understand the framework and the requirements to benefit from the program, who are active during the meetings and who hand in proposals, are more beneficial” (*interview 7*). Also, the government is likely to have benefitted to greater extent from the

discussions and information sharing (*interview 11*). Some believe that the cooperatives are “rather passive and unprepared” probably as a result of their ‘overwhelmed’ feelings: the luxury hotel, the city etc. And they “might have other motivations to join” (*interview 9*).

Next to the dairy CG, the pineapple CG was most limited in the usage of SNV BOAM funds. One reason, according to SNV BOAM, is that CG members applied for fund activities other than those agreed in the SIPs and operational plans. However, several interviewees reported on delays in financial support (*interviews 4 and 8*). SNV BOAM did not release any second payments in case of accountancy failure³⁶. Also SNV BOAM realizes that “participation is dominated by those making the best business out of it”³⁷. Finally, the high rotation resulting in different persons representing their offices was listed as a reason for a limited fund use.

(f) Risk sharing

The last indicator of jointness in the CG, the extent to which risks are shared between CG members *in the meeting*, appeared not very relevant, as resources are mainly brought in by SNV BOAM. CG members risk little in the meetings except their own time.

In sum, the degree of jointness of the CG members and the mutual independency among them are important measures for the level of ‘jointness’ in the MSP. Overall, the data gave the impression that the BOAM programme at least intends to let the MSP leadership function in a horizontal manner. Nevertheless, SNV BOAM played an active role in CG leadership and facilitation (as a broker) and one interviewee believed SNV BOAM is dominant in decision making. The CG’s centre of gravity was with the Chain Facilitators and SNV BOAM Lead value chain Advisor, with the sitting SNV BOAM programme coordinator as a significant influencer at the background. This was probably related to the absent and inexperienced Chain Leaders. It seems the current CG Leader is not considered to be a natural *primus inter pares*. In the meetings, members have an equal chance to speak out, although there seem to be some members dominating the discussions. Moreover, not all stakeholders have been able to articulate their needs/demand; only those who push their issues through in previous meetings can influence the CG agenda, but only in consultation with SNV BOAM.

In the social network analysis, betweenness centrality was among others used to identify the most central actors in the network. As stated before, those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities in the network are the most central players in the MSP networks. In *Appendix 6*, the top-10 central network players of the pineapple CG are presented in tables. Their organisational type (private sector, public sector, civil society, or education), subtype (i.e. processor, producer, financial institute, business association, implementing agency etc.) and their stakeholder role (actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) in the value chains were taken into account. The following regarding jointness was confirmed in the social network analysis:

³⁶ CG5 and 7 meeting minutes.

³⁷ Discussion group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010.

- SNV BOAM is a central network player in the pineapple CG (*Appendix 6*). This corresponds with their leading role as an initiator of the whole program and the pineapple CG; their involvement in agenda setting and selection of stakeholders, and their final decision in financial affairs;
- The current pineapple Chain Leader is *not* visible as a central player in the pineapple CG (*Appendix 6*). This corresponds with the fact that there was no constant leadership in the pineapple CG;
- The Chain Facilitator is visible as central player in the pineapple CG (*Appendix 6*);
- In the first nine meetings (till January 2008), about 25-35 participants can be observed in each meeting (except for meeting 4 and 8 counting 44 participants) (*participation databases*), corresponding with the invitation policy of the first BOAM coordinator. In meeting 11, 60 participants can be observed (*participation databases*). This corresponds with the invitation policy of the value chain Lead Advisor headed by the second BOAM coordinator.

To identify and compare the genuine ‘information brokers’ –who are in between other network players and control information diffusion- in the pineapple network, only those organisations with a normalized betweenness centrality higher than 2 or 3 were taken into account in this part of the analysis³⁸. In *Appendix 6* the central players with a betweenness centrality higher than 2 and 3 are presented.

Regarding ‘information brokerage’, the network analysis confirms and complements that:

- SNV BOAM plays the role of information broker in the pineapple CG, confirming its dominant position as MSPs initiator (*Appendix 6*);
- Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 3, the pineapple CG is most horizontal compared to the other CG’s; information is diffused through three information brokers (SARI, BoFED and SNV BOAM) (*synthesis report and Appendix 6*).

3.1.3 Transparency

Overall, the transparency of CG activities is rather high. The meetings are open to public (although more restricted towards the 14th meeting), and meeting summaries, agendas and other documents are shared with stakeholders. All CG documents could be downloaded from the former SNV BOAM website, although several links appeared to be dead and not all documents were available. The CG has open and transparent discussions on sensitive issues, for example on the behaviour of monopolists in the markets. Nevertheless, according to one interviewee, the results of complete studies were not distributed to all CG members (*interview 6*).

Success factors assessed under transparency were (a) accountability, and (b) trust building.

³⁸ The cut-points 2 and 3 are arbitrary

(a) Accountability

Formal accountability mechanisms are absent in the pineapple CG. Except for the Chain Leader, Chain Facilitator and other contractors with SNV BOAM none of the stakeholders participating in the CG have been assigned *formal* duties and responsibilities. “There are no mechanisms to hold members accountable for their misdeeds or failure” (*interview 8*). The pineapple CG saw little progress due to unmet promises and slow implementation of decisions (*interviews 1, 6, 7, 9, and 11*). This was emphasised as a critical problem by our pineapple interviewees. “If the CG is to bring changes in the pineapple sector, it has to be empowered to make decisions by its own and be able to enforce implementation in such a way that members have trust in it. To ensure this there should be formal MoUs that enforce every member to adhere to certain basic principles and obligations while participating in the CG” (*interview 8*). Moreover, certain activities could not be completed due to “dragging budget release procedures of SNV BOAM” (*interview 8*) (see also *section 3.1.2 e*). Fund users are expected to present on their project progress in the meetings, but this was not always fulfilled³⁹.

Remarkable in the pineapple CG is that CG members seem quite keen on tracking progress related to promises made. Forms of informal accountability are apparently present in the pineapple CG. In meeting five, participants question how they can access project outputs of financed projects (answer: SNV BOAM website). In addition, the reasons for not completing a project by a public agency were not regarded as satisfactory⁴⁰. ‘Hard talks’ sessions were executed in meeting eight on failing distributions and transportations of plant seedlings. As a result of these talks, a task force on transportation of seedlings was established⁴¹. Moreover, the research centre that eventually failed to deliver the promised plantlets stepped out of the CG meetings after meeting eight (*pineapple database*). As a final example of informal accountability promises made by the church organisation were called into memory in meeting eleven⁴².

(b) Trust building

Trust is neither mentioned as a major issue in the pineapple CG, nor is it explicitly addressed by the majority of the interviewees. Nevertheless, the pineapple CG is valued for its contribution to improved relationships and trust building between stakeholders in the pineapple value chain. The platform is appreciated as a ‘neutral’ meeting place where participants can discuss informally (especially during the coffee breaks). “Without the CG we would never have these open discussions on delicate subjects such as the behaviour and monopoly of *Piazza* wholesalers/traders”. Discussions are sometimes tough but open and honest as well. The processing company and the producer cooperatives “gain more confidence and build trust” as they informally exchange their views on the problems of their organisation (*interview 9*). In meeting ten, trust building is emphasised as an essential key in establishing long-term relations in a quality based payment system. All participating parties were invited to sit down and to discuss the benefits of such a system in a transparent

³⁹ CG3 meeting minutes.

⁴⁰ CG5 meeting minutes.

⁴¹ CG8 meeting minutes.

⁴² CG11 meeting minutes.

way⁴³. Business relations also improved as a result of the pineapple CG (e.g. *interviews 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11*).

To sum up, whereas formal accountability mechanisms were absent in the pineapple CG, informal accountability forms were prevalent. The CG has open and transparent discussions on sensitive issues. Still, several organisations do not fulfil agreements reached in the meetings. According to SNV BOAM this is related to a modest interest of key stakeholders in the pineapple value chain (i.e. investors, wholesalers, traders, government decision-makers) to bring about fundamental change in the pineapple market.

3.1.4 Goal alignment

Goal alignment by stakeholders is considered to contribute to the effectiveness of collective goal-setting processes, which, in turn, positively influences the success of the MSP. Strong goal alignment and goal visibility allows for more effective execution of the SIPs identified in the process. Goal alignment is measured by assessing the success factors (a) 'clear objectives', (b) 'win-win opportunities', and (c) a 'compelling case' as driver of the MSP.

(a) Clear objectives

The formal aim of the CG –as formulated by SNV BOAM– is to promote efficient and equitable linkages for the economically active poor along the agricultural value chain⁴⁴. No common MSP objectives were specified *ex ante* by the pineapple CG members, although the pineapple products value chain common objective that was already prepared in the preliminary stakeholder workshop was adjusted in response to CG members⁴⁵.

The upgrading strategy in the pineapple value chain is the introduction of Smooth Cayenne for the fresh and processed domestic and regional export markets. At the start, retaining to this strategy resulted in too many changes required in the support environment and business relations. Therefore, the upgrading strategy seemed less focussed in the pineapple value chain CG. The program had a very broad focus and the CG tried "to please everybody"⁴⁶. Intermediate steps were introduced for support in three types of pineapple value chains: the 'new variety (e.g. Smooth Cayenne) export chain', the 'processed pineapple product chain', and the 'domestic fresh pineapple product chain'. For example, also marketing and processing of the Red Spanish variety was promoted as an intermediate step with the end goal of pursuing the Smooth Cayenne variety (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, April 2011). According to SNV BOAM, for example the export of Smooth Cayenne "would have always been a bridge too far for a cooperation that has never sold a pineapple". Moreover, infrastructure (task force) and land issues were touched upon as well.

⁴³ CG10 meeting minutes.

⁴⁴ An observation out of the secondary data is that the aim has gradually been shifting from 'creating linkages' towards 'creating ownership in the sector'. The third BOAM programme coordinator endorses this strategy towards a long term vision for the CG.

⁴⁵ Objective pineapple CG: to ensure sustainable supply of quality pineapple. In meeting one, one additional result was added (cultivable land is made available for investors).

⁴⁶ Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, November 8, 2010.

b) Win-win opportunities

Do the members feel the CG facilitates a win-win situation for all? As we have seen in the section on risk sharing, CG members risk little in the pineapple CG meetings except their time. This suggests that opportunities are equal for every CG member, although not every member has the same capacity to access these opportunities.

Nevertheless, the illegal traders and wholesalers who –in the perception of the majority of the interviewees– ‘dominate the pineapple market, refuse to pay tax, are not legally registered, and encourage cash-constrained farmers to sell their products cheap and directly to them’ have no interest in changing the situation of the market as it currently is. Seemingly, they have no interest to join the pineapple CG as they do not experience any win-win opportunities from it.

(c) Compelling case

Is the pineapple product CG driven by a ‘compelling case’, i.e. an important need that can be best fulfilled through an MSP and that is recognized and accepted by all members? In the opinion of all eight respondents to this question the CG is recognised as an important mechanism supporting the development of the Ethiopian pineapple sector. There was a compelling case to initiate a multi-stakeholder platform where actors from the three different societal sectors (private sector, government, and civil society) meet and work together to better link smallholder pineapple producers and processors to pineapple markets. There was no organising platform as such before and the pineapple value chain “started from scratch” (*interview 12*). “Without SNV BOAM, starting a neutral forum like this would not have been easy, if not impossible due to all different interests and stakes” (*interview 5*). “When we wish to transform the economy in a sustainable market-oriented way, a platform like this CG is necessary” (*interview 7*). Finally, information is difficult to retrieve in the different regions. “There is a need for a common organisation or an information channel to share this information, such as the CG” (*interview 2*). In this way, it can be concluded that there is a compelling case for the pineapple CG as a vital first step to organize the pineapple subsector. But the pineapple CG is only one element. The problems in the pineapple market should also be tackled by strengthening and promoting cooperatives and small farmers, improving the general educational level, having private discussions with farmers, professionals and cooperatives in the pineapple value chains, and creating storage facilities according to the interviewees.

3.2 Embeddedness

To assess the degree to which the pineapple MSP is enmeshed in third organisations, we assessed its inter-organisational relationships through (a) the origin of the participants’ link with the CG (was the motivation to join brought about by another organisation?), (b) the extent to which the MSP contributed to new professional organisations’ memberships, (c) the involvement of participants in multiple MSPs, (d) relations with the government, and (e) SNV BOAM’s inter-organisational embeddedness as a result of its MSP activities.

(a) The original link to the pineapple CG

For two interviewees inter-organisational relationships have been supportive in linking and motivating stakeholders in the pineapple value chain to become a member of the CG. They concern the Chain Facilitators and a pineapple investor who

respectively got involved in the pineapple CG through their facilitating activities for the honey and oil seeds value chains (*interview 12*) and through the Investment Agency (*interviews 4 and 5*). Next to facilitating, the Chain Facilitators' organisation is also providing BDS services to pineapple CG members (*interview 12*). There was no association present that successfully attracting new members to the meetings.

(b) Access to new professional organisations' memberships

The CG has supported none of the participants interviewed to access new professional organisations. In principle, they are absent in the pineapple horticultural sub-sector. Only the wholesalers of the Addis Ababa market are organised, however, they have no interest in the pineapple CG (*interview 11*).

(c) Involvement in multiple MSPs

A limited number of organisations of the pineapple CG are active in multiple MSPs. Next to their membership of the pineapple CG, they visit CG meetings of the dairy, oilseeds or honey value chains. Among these organisations are: the Ministry of Trade and Industry; the Chamber of Commerce; a bank; a University, several governmental implementing agencies like BoFED and SNNPR MSED, the Cooperative Promotion Bureau, the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia (QSAE); the Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services (BCaD), as well as a women association. Most of these organisations are limited to the SNNPR state however, such as the Awassa Chamber of Commerce or the Awassa women entrepreneurs association. Other organisations were present in several pineapple CG meetings, but they focus mainly on the honey CG (i.e. the Ministry or the QSAE). Nevertheless, currently, two pineapple cooperatives are in the process of establishing business relationships with a wholesaler and a processor. In addition, the bilateral sessions (see also *section 4.3*) idea was copied from the other fruit value chains CGs. The actors involved in multiple MSPs transfer information and contacts from one MSP to the other to the benefit of the members, and enhance the general networking opportunities for them. In this way they contribute to the effects of the each MSP.

(d) Relations with the government

Relations with the public sector are obvious in the pineapple CG. Out of the four value chains under study, the government is best represented in the pineapple CG (see also *section 3.3 a*). In fact, "the small subsector is depending on the government, which is slowing down its progression" (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, September 7, 2010). On the other hand, government attention to the subsector increased (e.g. *interviews 9 and 12*) and "pineapple stakeholders learned that even a small sector can grow big and became visible and recognized" (*interview 12*).



Picture: employee Chucko Woreda Agricultural Office (Ethiopia) in pineapple field

(e) SNV BOAMs network

SNV BOAM is not the sole donor involved in the VCD approach, but is embedded in a broader international development network. The most prominent organisations with value chain development programmes are the German GTZ, Oxfam GB, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE), which supports the dissemination of best practices among donors, government institutions and practitioners. The government of Ethiopia has adopted the sectoral and value chain approach. These links of SNV BOAM also embed the CG members in the wider institutional field.

The pineapple CG is medium embedded in inter-organisational relationships. Relations with the government are evident and the Chain Facilitator, the most central actor of the pineapple network, is also BDS provider. But there is no access to new professional organisations and members hardly joined the CG through inter-organisational relations, resulting in limited multidirectional information flows. The MSP has been partly supportive in creating linkages between public- and private sector and civil society, reflecting representations arrangements. Finally, linkages of SNV BOAM also embed the CG members in the wider institutional field.

3.3 Involvement

In this case study, the intensity of actor involvement was assessed through (a) individual/sector representation in the CG and (b) participation in CG-related committees. The findings were verified in the social network analysis.

(a) Representation

In total, 7 out of the 10 interviewees we asked this question believe the pineapple CG has incomplete representation (*Table 10*). Apart from the interviewed TC laboratory, Investment Agency and wholesaler, interviewees have a variety of ideas on stakeholders missing in the pineapple CG. Especially the absence of a) key-decision making government delegates; b) 'on the ground' development agents (extension service); c) wholesalers/processors; d) financial institutions (commercial banks) and e) other NGOs is regarded problematic.

There is a *relative* overrepresentation (compared to the other CGs) of the public sector in the pineapple CG as “they fill the void of the absent private sector” (*interview 11*). SNV BOAM believes this relative overrepresentation of the public sector was harmful to the outcomes of the CG (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, September 7, 2010). The public sector is dominant in the pineapple subsector, however, they “offer non-reliable public services”⁴⁷. “The CG did not convince government authorities to carry out their responsibilities (i.e. road construction) (*interview 4*). SNV BOAM was assuming that “the private sector would automatically take up certain functions and roles in the pineapple value a chain which was not the case in practice” (*interview 11*).

Next to this, “you would normally have processors and traders in the CG as you expect them to have an interest in diversifying the market. We invited them but could not keep them on board, regardless our efforts” (*interview 11*). “The pineapple value chain is simple: fresh produce is directly sold to the *Piazza* market, with power almost completely concentrated around three to five wholesalers”⁴⁸. The wholesalers and traders disengaged since they were unwilling to compromise their monopoly position (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February, 2011).

Some interviewees explicitly deplored the absence of key decision makers of government and financial agencies because they could significantly help improving genuine attention to the subsector and solving the problems in the pineapple sector (*interviews 3, 4, 7*). An investor responded: “I appreciate the learning possibilities from other stakeholders in the pineapple value chain; however, they have no authority to make the necessary decisions” (*interview 4*). The key stakeholders (i.e. investors, financial, wholesalers, traders, government decision-makers) associate insufficient benefits with the CG and have low interest in bringing about fundamental change in the pineapple market (*interviews 7 and 11*). Furthermore, the absence of development agents on the ground results in limited technical support to pineapple producers (*interviews 1 and 7*). In CG meeting nine, one member stated that “it would be good to invite representatives from the *Woreda* and *Zone*⁴⁹ agricultural bureaus to the CG meetings”. The Lead Advisor replied that “it would be difficult to invite and manage these level participants in this coordination group meeting”⁵⁰. It would also have helped if “other financial institutions (commercial banks) would have been invited to the CG meetings” (*interview 6*) and some other NGO’s such as JICA, the Japanese development NGO (*interview 9*).

Table 10. Representation pineapple CG

Representation	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Complete	3	30
Not complete	7	70
Total	10	100

Source: interview data

⁴⁷ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.

⁴⁸ Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010.

⁴⁹ Ethiopia is federal state and at the national level there are two urban administrations. The regional level is the state level, e.g. Oromia State and SNNPR State. They can develop their own policies. The *zonal* level is between state and *woreda* and they have their own administrative structure. Next is the *woreda* level, which is a local government structure at district level. Finally, there is *kebele* at the grassroots level (village level). It is the administration of a few villages (*source*: local consultant).

⁵⁰ CG9 meeting minutes.

(b) Participation in CG related committees

The establishment, membership and participation in (steering, ad hoc) committees, Boards and working groups are indicators of actor involvement as well. In the pineapple CG meetings a limited number of (spontaneous) committees, Boards and groups were formed, such as the task force on transportation of seedlings in meeting eight, an ad-hoc committee on the problem of infrastructure in meeting nine, as well as the Executive Committee for the approval of concept notes in meeting nine. However, the latter “already finished before it properly started as funds were finished” (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, August 20, 2010). Furthermore, a business pilot venture between a private processing company and two farmer organizations was initiated. Six new pineapple processed products were developed (jam, compote, wine, sun dried, vinegar, juice) and 160 pineapple producers, the majority women, were trained in processing the pineapple products. The new products were promoted and supplied in two towns under the companies’ label⁵¹. The task group on infrastructure resulted in the improvement of 27 km of road by the government to make investment lands accessible⁵². Altogether, the pineapple value chain MSP generated a few sub-organisations, however, with medium-high success rate.

The social network analyses on sector representation and central network players generally support these findings (derived from *Appendices 5 and 6*). In *Table 11* and *12* respectively the sector representation in the pineapple value chain CG and the number of central network players from each sector are represented. Finally, in *Table 13*, the central network players per stakeholder role in the pineapple value chain are displayed.

Table 11. Sector representation in the pineapple CG in percentages (%)

Sector	Private sector	Public sector	Education	Civil society	Unknown
Pineapple	58,8	25,0	10,0	6,2	0,0

Table 12. Top-10 central network players in the pineapple CG per societal sector

Pineapple	
Private	3
Public	4
Civil Society	1
Education	2
Total	10

⁵¹ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.

⁵² SNV BOAM 2010 Mid-Year report fruits.

Table 13 Top-10 central network players per stakeholder role in the pineapple value chain

	Pineapple
Actor	2
Supporter	3
Influencer	4
Facilitator	2
Total	10

From the network analysis, the following was confirmed:

- SNV BOAM's private sector approach is evident; the majority of the participants in the pineapple value chain CG represent private sector organisations (58,8 %) (Table 11).
- But with 25 percent, the public sector is relatively higher represented in the pineapple CG compared to the other value chains CGs (Table 11, *synthesis report*). More important, the pineapple CG has a relative greater share of central players representing public agencies than private sector agencies (Table 12). This confirms SNV BOAM's suspicion of a relative overrepresentation of the public sector in the pineapple CG;
- All stakeholders' roles in the value chains are represented in the lists of central network players of the pineapple CG (Table 13). This indicates that value chain roles (chain actors, -supporters, -influencers and -facilitators) of the whole chain approach are represented in the networks;
- Financial organisations (i.e. banks, MFIs) are absent as central network players in the pineapple CG (Appendix 6);

Table 14. Pineapple CG Ethiopia: internal and external dynamics

Internal dynamics	
I. Collaboration	
1.1 Engagement	
Commitment	Modest. High in meetings, low/absent in implementation outside meetings (slow progress). SNV BOAM considered its continuation in pineapple VC in 2008. Several key stakeholders have no interest in changing the subsector.
Motivations	Never solely intrinsic. Related to 1) the need for technical and financial assistance of SNV BOAM; 2) the need to meet with suppliers or investors and 3) personal invitations by SNV. DSA not objective in itself.
Roles & Contrib.	No, Formal duties and responsibilities not specified
Shared resources	No, but equal access to third (SNV BOAM) funds
1.2 Jointness	
Decision making	Joint, but limited in financial decisions. Equal opportunity to speak out for all, although few gatekeepers present in length and reduce time for others. Critique that SNV BOAM is dominant in decision making.
Leadership	Weak Chain Leader and absent Leading Association. No unanimity on future steering body.
Selection stakeholders	Leading Trio of CG Leader, Chain Facilitator, & SNV BOAM. Members modestly-highly satisfied with selection.
Agenda setting	Leading Trio of CG Leader, Chain Facilitator, & SNV BOAM. Influencing agenda by others cumbersome. SNV BOAM plays the role of broker and applies the 'action groups or action approach' and '(bilateral) grouping'. Members modestly-highly satisfied with agenda setting.
Benefits distribution	Benefits depend on stakeholders' pro-active attitude and capability to articulate interests, and capabilities not equally distributed among members.
Risk sharing	No risk members in meetings– not relevant
1.3 Transparency	
Accountability	Formal accountability mechanisms absent. Prevalence of informal forms of accountability significant, however, with little result due to unwillingness to change (see also commitment).
Trust-building	Modestly. CG effective as new meeting place and improved trust somewhat among actors in and along the chain. More transparency on delicate matters.
1.4 Goal alignment	
Objectives clear	Semi-clear. At start, focus of upgrading strategy to broad
Win-win	In principle. Win-win opportunities are equal but members need capabilities to gain from MSP, and some more capable than others. Monopolists experience no win-win situation from the CG.
Compelling case	Yes. Pineapple value chain started from scratch and needed information channel and neutral meeting platform. NGO successfully facilitated tri-sector approach
II. Embeddedness	
Link to CG	No. Hardly any pre-existing links with other organisations.
Member new org	No. No access to new professional organisations' memberships.

Multiple MSPs	Yes. Several members involved in other (BOAM) MSPs. Mango and pineapple cooperatives establishing business relationships. This improves network opportunities for CG members.
Relations with government	Yes. Government attention to subsector increased.
SNV BOAM embeddedness	Yes, links SNV BOAM also embed CG members in wider institutional field
III. Involvement	
Representation	Incomplete. Absence of a) key-decision making government delegates; b) 'on the ground' development agents (extension service); c) wholesalers/processors; d) financial institutions (commercial banks) and e) other NGOs.
Participation CG sub committees	Medium. CG generated a medium rate of successful sub-organisations.
IV. Institutions	
Access to knowledge	Yes in respect of training, awareness quality issues, and new means of production (TC) and new varieties (Smooth Cayenne). But durability is under question.
Access to capital	No, almost no effects. Financial organisations hardly offer accessible loans to smallholders and SMEs (restricting conditions). Major limitation effects CG. Capacity support to cooperatives may improve their creditworthiness.
Access to markets	Yes in B2B relationships and new export opportunities to foreign markets as a result of introduced variety. Limited in respect of increasing buyers' competition and contractual agreements. No effects in respect of quality standards, prices paid by buyers and farmers' awareness on export potential.
Access to (third) organisations	No effects. No access to new professional organisations' memberships.

4. Institutional change

This chapter elaborates on the CG’s external dynamics, the institutional changes in the value chain’s business environment brought about by the CG. We address the question to what extent the CG has been effective in improving the conditions for upgrading for farmers and SMEs in the pineapple products value chain, in the perception of the interviewees. The focus is on opportunities for value chain actors to acquire knowledge and technology, capital or credit, opportunities to stabilize markets, and to become part of professional associations. *Table 15* presents an overview of perceptions by knowledgeable interviewees.

In CG meeting nine, SNV BOAM shares its concerns on the limited progress in the pineapple value chains. “Out of the six value chains that are being developed by the SNV BOAM programme, pineapple was the least performing in the last 2½ years”⁵³. Anno 2010, the interviewees report on several positive achievements, mainly related to improved access to knowledge and technology.

Table 15. Perceived changes in the institutional environment, in percentage and number of interviewees

	-	%	+/-	%	+	%	Total
4.1 Access to knowledge and technology							
Training on pineapple farming	0	0	2	25	6	75	8
Farmer awareness on quality	0	0	3	38	5	62	8
Availability of Smooth Cayenne/MD2 variety	0	0	5	62	3	38	8
Shift from Red Spanish to Smooth Cayenne	0	0	3	38	5	62	8
TC culture instead of conventional	0	0	1	13	7	87	8
4.2 Access to capital							
Willingness banks/MFI’s to finance	6	75	2	25	0	0	8
4.3 Access to markets							
Increased prices paid by buyers	7	87	1	13	0	0	8
Advanced payments	7	87	1	13	0	0	8
4.3 Access to organisation							
Access to organisation	8	100	0	0	0	0	8

- No effect of CG -/+ Limited positive effect of CG + Considerable positive effect of CG

4.1 Access to knowledge

Access to knowledge refers to market, technical, or organisational information that value chain actors can acquire either by themselves or by hiring affordable service suppliers. To what extent have the CG meetings facilitated pineapple chain actors in their access to such knowledge? Has the CG been indispensable in this respect?

⁵³ CG9 meeting minutes.

Interviewees are generally positive on the CG's effect on improved technologies and knowledge in the pineapple sector. The CG has been instrumental in providing trainings to pineapple farmers (75 percent) and thereby improving awareness on quality issues (62 percent), although the numbers of farmers that received extensive trainings was limited⁵⁴ (e.g. *interviews 4, 10 and 11*). At least 300 pineapple producers were trained on pineapple production agronomy and post harvest handling, planting material preparation, and in hygiene requirements and processing techniques⁵⁵ (*interviews 1-4, 6, 7, 9, 11*). Also operators were trained on how to train farmers (*interview 7*). This is to be considered an indirect effect of the CG, since it is the general SNV BOAM programme that delivered the funding for the trainings. Nevertheless, it is through the CG that stakeholders meet with their Business Development Services (BDS) providers (i.e. BCaD), and cooperatives and processing companies acquire the resources to train their suppliers. Currently, four investors are participating in the CG and receiving trainings from experts such as agronomists and researchers through the CG. "We have the capital, but we need the knowledge" (*interview 4*). Due to SNV BOAM funding, the Cooperative Union, a Tissue Culture laboratory, two public agencies and a processing company interviewed were able to provide trainings to their members and/or supply them with for example pineapple seedlings (*interviews 1-3, 7, 9*). In addition, in the CG meetings, at least four site visits were organised to two research centres, the processing company and a nursery site⁵⁶, contributing to knowledge exchange and information sharing. Also, pineapple chain stakeholders pointed to information sharing during the CG meetings on for example pineapple product diversification, quality based pricing schemes, and tissue culture (e.g. *interviews 2, 4, 7, and 11*). Unfortunately, middleman and wholesalers in the Addis Ababa market destroy the quality of the pineapple market, ascribed to their non-sustainable buying behavior (inappropriate post-harvesting, buying non-ripe pineapples etc.) (e.g. *interviews 4 and 9*).

The use and growing of Tissue Culture (TC) planting materials instead of conventional pineapple materials is perhaps the most tangible success attributed to the pineapple CG. "The CG has really proven that it is possible to change things on the level of technologies and services in a government control system. The TC industry is surely recognized in Ethiopia as a success". No less than 87 percent of the interviewees are convinced on this matter. The main advantages of TC pineapple plantlets are the ability of mass propagation of quality planting materials and the shortened investment period (5 years in conventional planting material compared to 2 years in TC planting material). Related to the use of TC planting materials is the introduction of the Smooth Cayenne pineapple variety instead of the Red Spanish pineapple variety (confirmed by 62 percent of our respondents). The higher quality variety Smooth Cayenne (sweeter) is favored in the (international) markets and farmer friendlier due to its soft leaves (see also *pictures* below). "The Red Spanish variety is not the 'king' anymore as it used to be. Currently, stakeholders prefer the Smooth Cayenne variety" (*interview 4*).

⁵⁴ CG11 meeting minutes.

⁵⁵ CG10 and 13 meeting minutes.

⁵⁶ CG1, 2, 10 and 13 meeting minutes.

A few interviewees placed critical notes concerning the durability of CG interventions. As stated before, the impact of the trainings was limited to a definite number of producers. Second, pineapple farmers in the Tesso region started to replace pineapple cultivation with other products, such as coffee, as returns are higher. Apparently, they do not see the benefits of pineapple production⁵⁷. Third, the Smooth Cayenne variety is currently preferred; however, there is a shortage of input supply (e.g. *interviews 1, 4, and 7*). It is only modestly available according to 62 percent of our respondents. Fourth, European retailers increasingly prefer MD2 type pineapples over other varieties, including the Smooth Cayenne and Sugarloaf pineapples (Pay, 2009, FAO). Finally, dynamics in the pineapple value chains have only started recently, and SNV BOAM doubts whether the slow progression was worth the five years of CG investments (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, September 2010; *interview 11*).



Pictures: leaves of the Red Spanish (left) and Smooth Cayenne (right) pineapple varieties

4.2 Access to capital

Access to capital involves the possibilities for pineapple value chain actors to acquire a credit, loan or budget for their commercial activities. Access to capital was assessed through interest rates, duration, collateral requirements, pay-back conditions, and characteristics of the funding organisation. It was also verified whether the CG was indispensable in influencing the stakeholders' opportunities to access capital/credit.

In Ethiopia, commercial Banks rarely lend money to small scale suppliers, and farmers have only access to MFI's and informal lenders. The Development Bank interviewed is mandated to finance (agricultural) development projects. Clients of the Development Bank are private investors and farmer cooperatives and they can receive loans against a 7.5 % interest rate per year (*interview 6*). However, criteria of the Bank to obtain loans are often not met: 1) the product should be in the priority list of bank; 2) a feasibility study should be met; 3) the recipient needs a business license (secure licence of Bureau of Trade and Investment or MOTI or any other

⁵⁷ CG13 meeting minutes.

authority that provides licences to operate); 4) it has to secure an investment certificate from the regional or federal investment authority; and an 5) equity contribution has to be met (30 % own contribution of client). Products (including pineapple) appear in the priority list if they operate on a commercial scale and have an export potential. The investors are having problems meeting the equity contribution criterion and the investment certificate (delayed). According to the Credit Officer of the Bank, no single cooperative for pineapple production was financed so far (*interview 6*). According to the respondent, the main problem is that farmers can only access credit of the Development Bank through the cooperatives, and individually through MFIs.

Access to capital/credit was therefore a point of discussion in the pineapple CG. In the beginning of BOAM there were discussions on whether or not to include loan guarantees in the programme; however donors of SNV BOAM were not willing to finance that. Main problems are that the Ethiopian financial sector is heavily state regulated, even for the private farms, and that agriculture is seen as a high risk investment. Insurance opportunities against crop failure are absent.

The CG has not been able to improve access to credit/capital in the pineapple value chains. The eight interviewees with whom the issue was discussed said the CG did not positively affect the willingness of Banks and MFIs in Ethiopia to lend any money to stakeholders, mainly smallholders, in the pineapple value chain. Only two respondents, the processing company and SNV BOAM see a limited -indirect- positive effect of the pineapple CG. But 75 % sees no change at all (*Table 15*). Particularly in the small pineapple subsector access to capital is critical, as the fruits are not being recognized yet as a potential growth area. According to a private investor, banks are not convinced yet on investing in the pineapple subsector (*interview 4*). SNV BOAM confirms the lack of results in this respect and also on the implications for the durability of the CG activities. “This is probably a limitation of the program: how will the finance continue if there is no access to credit facilities?” (*pers. comm. SNV BOAM, August 20, 2010*).

Despite the lack of concrete results, the CG could potentially contribute - indirectly- to some minor changes in the financial environment of the pineapple subsector. Improving the capacity of the cooperatives for example, improves their trustworthiness (e.g. transparent financial system) and will help them to apply for loans (*interviews 6 and 9*). Remarkably, in CG meeting eight the Development Bank of Ethiopia was directly questioned whether they were interested in financing a certain initiative⁵⁸. This corresponds with the pro active attitude perceived in the pineapple CG meetings (*section 3.1.1 a*). In addition, the pineapple CG received quite some attention from several MFIs; however, it did not lead to changes in their collateral policy or any concrete funding to pineapple CG members (e.g. *interviews 2, 6, and 11*).

Recapitulating, perhaps one of the major shortcomings of the pineapple CG is the little progress that was booked on pineapple value chain stakeholders’ access to affordable credit/capital.

⁵⁸ CG8 meeting minutes.

4.3 Access to markets

Access to markets was examined by gathering information on prices, and buyer and farmer commitments (advance payments, contractual arrangements, quality standards, and alternative market opportunities).

The pineapple CG has been limited successful so far in improving markets access for smallholder farmers and SMEs. First, prices paid by buyers did not increase in the pineapple value chain (*Table 15* and *textbox*). The “monopolists” are the price determiners in the pineapple market (*interviews 1, 2, 3, 9, and 11*). Still, discussions in the pineapple CG, for example on the entrance of new investors in the pineapple market, immediately lead to a response in prices in the pineapple market. The monopolists quickly lowered their selling prices. Even traders that are not participating are aware of the discussions taking place in the pineapple CG (*interview 11*). Furthermore, the fruit wholesaler and processing company interviewed are willing to work with suppliers, however, only for an agreed quality supply with a fair price⁵⁹ and presently local prices suggested by cooperatives are too high (e.g. *interview 10*).

Second, thus far, hardly any formal contractual agreements exist between buyers and suppliers (*interviews 1, 7, 9, 11*). Nevertheless, ETFRUIT and ELFORA as fruit wholesalers are exploring the purchase of “Red Spanish” pineapples directly from the cooperatives⁶⁰ (*interviews 9 and 10*). However, the weak capacity of the cooperatives and the ‘Piazza monopoly’ is hindering its establishment (e.g. *interviews 1, 3, 9, 11*). According to SNV BOAM, contracts were established once or twice in the CG process, however they failed due to farmers’ side selling practices to merchants that encouraged the farmers to sell their products directly to them⁶¹ (*interview 11*). Cooperatives lack the ability to bind farmers, since they are “still incapacitated and represent no genuine farmer based marketing organisations” (*interview 11*). They cannot offer sufficient support to their members (*interview 3*). “Farmers have no desire to engage in binding agreements with the cooperatives as they prefer to have their options open in case ample opportunities arise” (*interview 1*). Another wholesaler, ELFORA, did not start collaboration with the cooperatives (unions)

Pineapple prices are highly fluctuating due to seasonality and are dependent on pineapple variety (Red Spanish-Smooth Cayenne) and fruit size (small-big). To give some indication, the researchers found that for example Smooth Cayenne (2.6-3 kg on average) is sold for 6-8 Birr per unit whereas Red Spanish (1.9 kg on average) is sold for 3-5 Birr per unit (*pers. comm.* Chucko Woreda Agricultural Office, November 12, 2010). A distributor indicated he buys for 4-5 Birr per unit in the dry season and 2.5-3 Birr per unit in the peak season (*interview 10*). The Cooperative buys big sized pineapples for 3 Birr per unit and small sized pineapples for 2 Birr per unit. They sell with an additional 0.25 cent added to these prices (*interview 1*). Addis Ababa traders often buy pineapples for but 1 Birr (!) per unit (*interview 9*). Interviewees point out to inflation as the main reason for the general price increase in the sector.

⁵⁹ CG11 meeting minutes.

⁶⁰ SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009.

⁶¹ CG10 meeting minutes.

as the unions behaved unpredictable (did not supply properly, shift to alternative markets, illegal brokers, poor quality products). The topic of contract breaking was initiated in the CG discussions⁶². In the peak season, farmers have no problems finding alternative markets and buyers (e.g. *interviews 1, 3, 7, 10*). ETFRUIT is hopeful that the contractual agreements will be formally backed up by the cooperative promotion bureau and other governmental agencies (*interview 10*).

Third, none of the respondents believed the willingness of buyers to provide credit in advance increased considerably as a result of the CG (*Table 15*).

Fourth, quality standards are absent. The low quality Red Spanish variety is non-marketable to foreign markets. Moreover, there is insufficient supply of the higher quality varieties Smooth Cayenne and MD2. For example, the wholesaler ETFRUIT has tried for seven years to create a market for pineapple in Sudan and Djibouti but failed due to insufficient quality and price issues (too high farm gate price)⁶³.

Finally, farmers' awareness and trust in the commercial export value of pineapple needs improvement (*interview 7*). In meeting one no single farmer was attending, reason for the SNV BOAM Coordinator to express his concern on farmers' level of awareness on the export potential of pineapple⁶⁴. As stated before, pineapple farmers in the Tesso region started to replace pineapple cultivation with other products, such as coffee, as returns are higher⁶⁵.

Contrary to these limitations, there are positive developments too. Next to the considerable demand for Smooth Cayenne in the international market, the main step forward is that the pineapple CG served the function of contact platform and enabled

the establishment of new **business to business (B2B) relations** (see also *textbox*). Especially the bilateral sessions uniting actors with similar business interests in the fruit MSPs initiated by SNV BOAM, contribute to business relations development (*interviews 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10*). It is a facilitation tool has the potential to actively engage stakeholders and to strengthen the dialogue between the different chain actors, supporters, influencers and facilitators. It is action oriented and has the potential to create commitments (*pers. comm.* SNV BOAM, February 2011). The sessions link for example investors with TC laboratories and clients to their BDS providers. The idea evolved from the SNV BOAM mango and apple meetings, where these sessions were instrumental in assuring reluctant wholesalers' participation in the meetings⁶⁶. As a result of these bilateral sessions, for example, research institutes, investors and TC labs have agreed to prepare clean mother planting materials. Moreover, the processor company and the

SNV BOAM aims at delivering B2B support to guarantee that a reliable supply and market outlet is assured. In their opinion, facilitating the development of business relationships and arrangements between downstream traders, processors and farmer organizations on one side and small farmers and their organizations on the other side is essential for business development.

Source: SNV BOAM's value chain

⁶² CG13 meeting minutes.

⁶³ CG13 meeting minutes.

⁶⁴ CG1 meeting minutes.


⁶⁵ CG13 meeting minutes.

⁶⁶ Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010.

farmer cooperatives decided to give trainings to 50 trainers on processing pineapple into juice, wine, dried and jam. In addition, ELFORA and ETFRUIT also agreed to work together on the distribution of excess products in the Addis Ababa market outlets. Finally, an ad-hoc committee was established as a result of sessions between investors and Road Agencies on the problem of infrastructure⁶⁷.

Interviewees report in great numbers on the B2B relations they established in the pineapple CG meetings. The pineapple investor interviewed currently has the opportunity to “(1) approach several government agencies; (2) have a contractual agreement for buying 100 350 seedlings per month for his company; and (3) receive advice from experts like agronomists and researchers” (*interviews 2 and 4*). Cooperatives were linked with wholesalers and processors (*interviews 1, 3, 9, 10*). The processing company has started a “fruitful cooperation” with the Cooperative Promotion Bureau as the latter has informed them on the rights to create local companies with cooperatives (*interview 9*). A University provided input material for the TC Laboratory interviewed. The University also prepared a proposal for the technical support of the establishment of the TC lab by TAF (*interview 11*). The Development Bank met with private investors in the meetings resulting in an agreement being drafted for access to loans for one of these investors (*interview 6*).

Finally, the pineapple CG attracted several (new) investors, processors and wholesalers (e.g. ECOPIA, ETFRUIT and ELFORA) to the meetings who have the potential to break the *Piazza* (black) market monopoly. With their engagement, the number of players in the small sector amplified and they are planning to trade directly with the cooperatives (*interviews 4, 9 and 11*). “By 2010 the position of the *Piazza* wholesalers in the low-quality fresh fruit value chain has lessened. Farmer organizations, processors and regional traders are by-passing the main centres for wholesale distribution, resulting in higher margins for them” (Visser et al., SNV BOAM, 2011).



Picture: Group sessions in pineapple CG, Awassa (Ethiopia)

⁶⁷ CG9 meeting minutes.

4.4 Access to organisation

As already discussed in *section 3.2*, the MSP has not facilitated any access to new professional organisations' memberships for the stakeholders interviewed.

General successes in the pineapple sector are presented in the *textbox*. Indirectly, the pineapple CG contributed to most of them. In the above sections on institutional change we have described how pineapple plantlets suppliers and investors have met in the CG. Trainings provided to farmers were indirectly financed through the CG, since it is the general SNV BOAM programme that delivered the funding for the trainings. The task force on infrastructure was established in the pineapple CG. Eight out of nine respondents rated the overall success of the pineapple CG as modest and one as low-modest.

Ethiopian pineapple sub-sector successes

- Eight investors acquired 1200 ha of land for Smooth Cayenne pineapple production in 2008;
- 30,000 pineapple plantlets have been delivered by JARC and 390,000 plantlets have been delivered in the first half of 2010 by the TC laboratory;
- Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) training was provided to 2,600 pineapple farmers in Chucko and Dara woreda;
- A business pilot venture between a private processing company and 2 farmer organizations was initiated. 6 new pineapple processed products were developed (jam, compote, wine, sun dried, vinegar, juice) and 160 pineapple producers, majority women, were trained in processing of the pineapple products. The new products were promoted and supplied in two towns under the companies' label;
- The task group on infrastructure resulted in the improvement of 27 km of road by the government to make investment lands accessible.

Sources: SNV BOAM biannual report 2010, SNV BOAM fruit sector fact sheet, SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009

5. The future of the pineapple CG

With the interviewees we discussed the future outlook of the MSP. The common feeling was that the CG has been an effective meeting place that played an important role in identifying policy gaps and major problems in the pineapple value chain. This function in its current format is however not likely to be sustained. In August 2011, the last CG meeting will be organised by SNV BOAM. A number of interviewees are pessimistic on the CG's continuation (*interviews 1, 5, 6, 9*), especially as, so far, no strong and willing host partner has emerged (*interviews 5 and 9*). "The pineapple CG is too young to run without a chef" (*interview 4*). One interviewee doubts whether investors are competent to take over as "they need assistance themselves" (*interview 5*). Also government agencies seem problematic as "they are not interested" (*interview 5*) and "their dominance would make the CG less interesting to the cooperatives as they would be intimidated". The organ should be interested in the whole pineapple VC, from supply to consumer, and "it will be difficult to find someone like that" (*interview 9*).

Those who do see opportunities for continuation prefer the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) as an adequate candidate for take-over (3), followed by the Cooperative Bureau (2). Only SNV BOAM prefers MSED, due to its overlapping mandate. The latter would be happy to take over (*interview 7*). Other interviewees suggest having not one actor but a group structure taking over (*interviews 4 and 10*). Or the process of contact exchange between stakeholders continues, without the CG meetings (*interview 2*).

What will probably happen, as indicated by SNV BOAM, is that the NGO continues its support to the CG structure for a while, until supplementary private

investment comes in. “We entered a scaling-up phase that requires additional private investments other than public investments” (*interview 11*).

6. Conclusions

This case study assesses the effects of the pineapple multi-stakeholder platform, the Pineapple Coordination Group (CG) that was established by the NGO SNV in 2005 to improve the access to (quality) markets for stakeholders in the Ethiopian value chain for pineapple. Up to 80 organizations participated in at least one of the 13 CG meetings that were held in the period 2005-2010. To examine the CG we analysed both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business environment.

SNV BOAM had shown with FAO data that the international demand for fresh pineapple had been growing at a stable rate from 2000 onwards, also due to innovations that led to the emergence of a new sweet pineapple variety. But Ethiopian producers could not benefit from this demand due to various reasons, among them high transaction costs in the Ethiopian part of the global value chain, low volumes produced and above all the dominance of a small number of wholesalers in the market. During our research, interviewees also pointed to the minimal infrastructure in Ethiopian pineapple production regions, long procedures to access bank loans, barriers to acquire arable land, insufficient supply of seedlings and water, and, unsurprisingly, hesitant private investors.

To address most of the above barriers to viable Ethiopian pineapple export chains, SNV BOAM established the pineapple CG. This was an appropriate response; contact building and networking among chain actors and facilitators is a necessary condition for a value chain to develop. Given the state of the Ethiopian pineapple sector, there was a compelling case for establishing the pineapple CG, and the platform had a number of positive effects.

SNV BOAM has promoted a horizontal discussion structure in the CG. Whereas the CG's centre of gravity in selection of participants and agenda setting remained with the leading trio including the CG Facilitator, the VC Leader, and the SNV BOAM Lead value chain Advisor, with the sitting SNV BOAM programme coordinator as a significant influencer in the background, interviewees indicate that in the meetings members have an equal chance to speak out. They also had a say in the spending of SNV BOAM's funds for the development of the pineapple value chain.

Nevertheless, the level of engagement by CG participants remained modest. Commitment tended to be limited to the meetings, and motivations to participate are merely related to extrinsic factors (business opportunities and incentives by SNV BOAM). Many organizations attended the meetings irregular, and the network analysis showed a high rotation of participants; almost 60% of total participants apparently entered the CG only from meeting three and/or quit the CG as they did not attend the last two or more meetings. This may be related to broad goal alignment. The strategic and operational intervention plans were initially less focussed in the pineapple CG, with too many changes required in the supporting environment. Several interviewees also pointed to the limited authority, too much talking and the "lack of teeth" of the CG. This suggests a basic misunderstanding of the role and function of the pineapple CG among its members; a multi-stakeholder platform is supposed to address challenges and bridge divides by dialoguing rather than by using teeth.

Creating local ownership and leadership in the pineapple CG also remained problematic throughout all five years of its existence. SNV BOAM intends to have a strong and widely respected buyer leading the CG to ensure a market-driven wind blowing through the Ethiopian part of the value chain. But finding a private sector buyer that could lead the CG with the unanimous support of the CG members was difficult. Some meetings were organized without chain leader, while halfway the CG process, even the SNV BOAM staff itself disagreed about who should lead the CG. The chain leader who was eventually chosen lacked full support from other members and could not develop into a *primus inter pares* role. The network analysis confirmed the lack of a central broker.

Much of this was related to what can be considered as the main challenge of the pineapple CG: the market dominance by a small number of wholesalers. SNV had tried to get them aboard the CG, also with separate, small group meetings, but the “monopolists”, who are associated with the *Piazza* market disengaged, apparently because they did not find the platform supporting their own interests. Eventually, the CG did manage to incorporate *Etfruit* and *Elfora*, two other major Ethiopian wholesalers and the processor *Ecopia* into its platform, but results in terms of contracts with producers are still to materialize. For the stakeholder population of the CG this meant an overrepresentation of producers and chain facilitators and very few buyers who would know the dynamics in consumer demands and who could lead the modernization of the Ethiopian pineapple sector. The CG developed itself as an alternative supplier-driven network that tried to compete with the established networks of a small number of dominant wholesalers. Instead of bridging divides between producers and wholesalers, the CG served as a vehicle to break the oligopsonic⁶⁸ market structure. If the contacts with the two wholesalers and the processor bear fruit, the CG may have rendered some positive effects for the two domestic chains in this respect. As for the fresh pineapple export chain, no prospected effects can be reported, largely because the CG limits its strategy to the Ethiopian part of the global value chain. Foreign buyers – and the real lead firms in the chain who also could have market power to undermine local strongholds- can therefore not be involved.

In respect of the external dynamics, the CG has generated a number of positive effects on the institutional conditions for upgrading the pineapple sector. First of all, the CG served as a new, horizontal platform where stakeholders from different societal sectors in the Ethiopian pineapple chain could meet and discuss in a rather open atmosphere pressing issues in their sector. In the Ethiopian context that is an achievement in itself. Interviewees appreciated the opportunities for networking, and the information they received during the meetings on trainings, quality issues, and on production and the availability of new pineapple varieties. Interviewees also gave positive feedback on the business contacts they established through the CG meetings – some new investors were attracted-, and the new opportunities to export by switching to a new pineapple variety.

For the remainder, the effects were either absent or very limited at best. The CG did not manage to improve any access to credit and loans that both producers and processors badly require to modernize the pineapple sector. Banks still hardly

⁶⁸ An oligopsonic market refers to a situation of a small number of buyers dealing with a large number of sellers. An oligopolistic market is the opposite: few sellers and many buyers.

offer affordable loans to smallholders or SMEs. Predictability of the market has also hardly improved. Formal and longer term contracts have remained scarce with prices volatile. The market is still dominated by a small number of buyers that hinder the market from becoming more competitive. The CG has had no substantial effect on quality issues; quality standards are absent and farmers have largely remained unaware of the export potential of their crop. Neither has the CG resulted in more participants becoming member of new professional organizations.

Overall, our impression is that the CG generated some very useful effects in terms of bridging some traditional divides and offering opportunities for networking and knowledge dissemination. Yet, it seems the CG predominantly laid out the groundwork, with the edifice of a competitive, quality-aware pineapple export sector still to be built. Major causes of the somewhat slow progress have been the broad scope of the CG that has been addressing three different pineapple chains, the overrepresentation of the public sector that tended to slow down change processes, the CG's national focus that keeps foreign buyers hidden from sight, and the development of the CG into a competitor network to a small group of "monopolist" chain actors. Telling is that SNV BOAM staff members themselves wonder whether the slow progression was worth the five years of CG investments. On the other hand, changing business institutions that facilitate trust-building in the production base, that improve farmers' access to capital and technology, and that make markets more predictable for chain actors is quite a challenge. Inserting an agricultural sector into the global economy takes time.

7. Limitations

As is the inherent problem with any investigation of short duration into a complex subject, choices had to be made regarding **what to take on board and what not**. We experienced a challenge to separate the impact of the multi-stakeholder platform on any changes in the institutional business environment, apart from the SNV BOAM programme as a whole or from any other (policy) interventions. Especially when organisations already have established long term relationships with SNV BOAM, the clear cut distinction between services provided by SNV BOAM or through the CG is not easy. This **‘attribution problem’** is a limitation. It was crucial that we remained consciousness on this challenge during all the interviews by probing and making assumptions explicit; however –as expected- some interviewees remained having troubles in making this distinction. In addition, it was questioned whether, for example, the acquired technology services or credit services were being made available from ‘inside the chain’ (by chain actors) or ‘outside the chain’ (e.g. chain supporters).

Second, during the field work the researchers operated in close collaboration with SNV BOAM and were partly dependent on SNV BOAM for their selection of interviewees. Though this substantially facilitated logistics and minimized non-response, such embeddedness holds the risk of **losing independency** in the eyes of interviewees. Organisations might shy away from reflecting critically on the pineapple CG as they fear the continuity of their good relationship with SNV BOAM. To avoid bias, a stakeholder exiting the CG as a result of a conflict was explicitly incorporated in the interview sample. Furthermore, the researchers constructed a list of relevant stakeholders in advance to ensure independent sampling. Finally, in the beginning of each interview the independent status of the researchers was emphasized.

Finally, the **political context** of Ethiopia was not explicitly taken into account in the primary (interviews) and secondary data collection (desk review), despite its importance in understanding how MSPs are organised and functioning. There is no genuine multi-party democracy and tensions and pressures in Ethiopia’s politics are growing according to the International Crisis Group report (2009). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch research (2010: 4) reports that “development aid flows through, and directly supports, a virtual one-party state with a deplorable human rights record” and that “the government has used donor-supported programs, salaries, and training opportunities as political weapons to control the population, punish dissent, and undermine political opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials deny these people’s access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and other resources for development”. The researchers have not researched the impact of this political situation on the data found.

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
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9. Appendices

Appendix 1: Theoretical model



Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders

Source: (based on) Hans Posthumus Consultancy, 2008

In general we distinguish four types of stakeholders:

1) Chain actors

Chain actors are the prime stakeholders who, at some point in the chain, own the product that is being created. They commonly buy a semi-finished product from chain actors upstream, add a certain value to it, and sell the enhanced product to buyers downstream. In the research farmers, producer firms, cooperatives, processing firms, collectors, traders, exporters etc. are included.

2) Chain supporters

Chain supporters are those that are outside the chain. They supply goods or services to the chain actors, often they are distinguished as either financial providers (e.g. banks providing loans) or non-financial service providers (e.g. accountants or transporters). In the research consultants, BDS providers, quality and standard institutes, microfinance, banks, funds (IMF), and agricultural research centers (not only temporary, but years of input, extension services, seed inputs etc.) are included.

3) Chain influencers

Chain influencers are those that influence the performance of the sub sector, its actors and their supporters. They influence the entire sub sector (and beyond) without performing an actor or supporters role: influencers (such as the ministry of commerce) determine (partly) the factors (such as investment climate). In the research business representative associations, Ministries, Chamber of Commerce, media, government implementing agencies (e.g. Cooperative Bureau, BoFED etc.) are included.

4) Chain facilitators

A temporary (catalyst) role by an organisation (often a donor funded project) to “grease” the chain machinery, either between the actors at the various levels or between the actors and their supporters, with objective to improve the performance of the entire chain and its actors (also commercially). Often NGOs with donor funding that finance a diversity of capacity building activities. In the research SNV BOAM, NGOs, University, and multilateral agencies (UN, WB) are included.

CODING FOR EXCEL

1=chain actor, 2 = chain supporter, 3 = chain influencer, 4 = chain facilitator

Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees

General

June 9 & 10, 2010	Orientation visit ⁶⁹ : Mr. Marc Steen, National Portfolio Coordinator and Head Value Chain Development, Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring & Evaluation and Documentation, SNV BOAM Ethiopia, Addis Ababa
August 12, 2010	Discussion Group ⁷⁰ : SNV BOAM Ethiopia staff: presentation research and discussion with Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple chain, Mr. Carlo Kuepers, Lead Advisor honey chain & Senior Advisor Market Linkages & Value Chain Development, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds chain, Mrs. Mahlet Yohannes, Lead Advisor dairy chain, Nicholas Nyathi, program coordinator PSNP Plus program, Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development and Elenie Abraham, junior advisor, oil seeds and VCF
September 9, 2010	Short progress discussion with SNV BOAM staff: Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD, Mr. Juergen Greiling, Senior Advisor Agroprocessing, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds chain, and Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development
November 8, 2010	Clarification meeting and feedback from Mr. Piet Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple value chain
November 9, 2010	14th Coordination Group Meeting Pineapple Value Chain
November 12, 2010	Field visit with Mr. Dejene Indeshaw, Agronomist, Chucko Woreda Agricultural Office. The visit included Ganbela nursery site (capacity: 43,000 pineapple seedlings), a private pineapple farm in Didiche and the Safa Cooperative office, together with Mr. Melese Mekuria

⁶⁹ By Mr. Jeroen van Wijk (MSM) at SNV BOAM head office (Addis Ababa).

⁷⁰ By Ms. Sarah Drost (MSM) & Mr. Fenta Mandefro Abate (Addis Ababa University) at SNV BOAM's head office (Addis Ababa) (continuing for all interviews).

Pineapple Value Chain interviewees

Mr. Adissu Amona, Credit Officer, Development Bank of Ethiopia, November 10, 2010

Mr. Solomon Assefa, Technologist, Micro and Small) Enterprises Development Agency and Focal Person for SNV BOAM Ethiopia, and Mr. Haile Getachew, Generalist, (Micro and Small) Enterprises Development Agency ((MS)EDA), November 10, 2010

Mr. Dendena Chemed, Head of the Agro-Processing Industry Development Department and Mr. Zergaw Zeleke, team coordinator of that same Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOTI), August 30, 2010

Mr. Henok Debessay, Species Diversification, Extension Marketing & Department Head, Mekelle Institute of Technology, Tissue Culture Laboratory, November 9, 2010

Mr. Mengistu Kebede, General Manager, Ethiopian Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Share Company (ETFRUIT), November 17, 2010

Mr. Berkanu Asfaw Klegbeza, Cooperative Promotion Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Cooperative Promotion Bureau, November 9, 2010

Mr. Melese Mekuria, Treasurer (previously Chairman), Safa Cooperative, November 9, 2010

Mr. Yilma Nadew, Vice Manager, Dibabesh PLC, and Coordination Group Leader in the pineapple value chain Coordination Group meetings 8-14, November 9, 2010

Mr. Wondyifraw Tefera, Director, Jimma Agricultural Research Centre (JARC), November 12, 2010

Mrs. Rutha Tsegai, Manager, Ecological Products of Ethiopia (ECOPIA) PLC, November 16, 2010

Mr. Piet Visser, Learning Coordinator for VCD and Value Chain Advisor Pineapple Coordination Group Meetings, SNV BOAM Ethiopia, November 18, 2010

Mr. Timerge Yirga, Investment Land Delivery Expert, SNNPRS Investment Agency, November 10, 2010

Mr. Afework Yohannes and Mr. Michael Yohannes, Managing Director, Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services (BCaD) and Coordination Group Facilitators in the pineapple, honey and oil seeds Coordination Group, August 25, 2010

Appendix 4: Questionnaire

Context

Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and cooperation. However, systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore, SNV BOAM Ethiopia and the Maastricht School of Management (MSM) / Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs in which SNV BOAM Ethiopia is involved. MSM carries the responsibility for the research and final report.

SNV⁷¹ is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM's Sustainable Development Center⁷² stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre⁷³, an open centre where academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for sustainable development.

Interview objectives

This questionnaire serves to structure a series of interviews that will be conducted with actors in a selection of value chain Coordination Groups (CGs) in Ethiopia. Selected are CGs in four chains: honey & beeswax, dairy, oil seeds, and pineapple. The interview results will serve as the main input for an evaluation report that is due for 1st of February 2011. The results will be presented and discussed during a workshop in spring 2011.

About the questionnaire

The interview consists of three parts. Section A focuses on the (meetings of the) Coordination Group itself. Section B concentrates on the institutional changes brought about by the CG, whereas the last section C asks about your overall opinion of the CG.

Contact:

For questions and additional information please contact
Ms. Sarah Drost, MSc.
Sustainable Development Center
Maastricht School of Management

⁷¹ SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV_BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx

⁷² MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/

⁷³ PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About

Email: drost@msm.nl

Identification

Name interviewee(s):

Organisation:

Position:

Location:

Interviewer:

Date of interview:

Place of interview:

What are the main activities of your organisation in this value chain?

A Coordination Group (CG)

A1. General introduction

1. What is the main problem in the apiculture/dairy/horticulture/oil seeds sector, according to you?

A2. Engagement

2. In what way are you/is your organisation engaged in the CG? (describe activities and roles: e.g., Facilitator, Leader, advisor, member of committee/working group)

3. Since when are you involved in the CG meetings? (reasons for prolonged stay or exit)

4. What motivated your organisation to join the CG? (e.g. daily allowance, influence, networking opportunities?)

5. Do you feel all relevant stakeholders are represented in the CG? Why?

6. How would you evaluate the level of commitment of CG members?

A. Low

B. Modest

C. High

Please explain

A3. CG Governance

7. Do you feel all CG members have an equal say during the CG meetings?

A. Yes

B. No. Who are the dominant members?)

8. Do you feel that all members benefit equally of the CG interventions? (win-win situation or not?)

A. Yes

B. No. Who gains most?).

9. Are you generally satisfied with the way the CG meetings are being governed?

A. No

B. Yes, but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain. What should change?

[Honey]

H.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Apiculture Board (EAB) and its regional chapters?

[Dairy]

D.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Milk and Milk Products Association (EMPPA)?

D.2 What is your opinion about the Dairy Business Hub Model established in meeting 16?

[Oil seeds]

O.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Pulses, Oil seeds, and Spices Processors Exporters Association (EPOSPEA)?

B Issues addressed by the CG

10. Did you exchange contact information with other CG members? Has this lead to concrete actions/funding/other opportunities in your field of activities?

B1. Access to services

11. Do you require specific information, technology or organisational services, for example to meet quality standards, to increase productivity, or to improve your management skills?

A. No

B. Yes, but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain what type of services.

12. Have you been able to acquire sufficient service support?

A. No

B. Yes, but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain by whom and in what form?

13. Did the CG improve the availability of these services to you?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

B2. Access to capital/credit

14. How difficult is it for you to acquire a loan/credit/budget for making investments in your organisation (e.g. through financial institute or through B2B relations).

A. Not difficult

B. Sometimes difficult

C. Very difficult

Please explain.

15. Did the CG influence your opportunities to obtain a loan, credit, or additional budget?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

B3. Access to markets

(a) Prices

15. How would you evaluate prices paid to the producers in the last 3 years (stability, highness, pre-harvest price set)?

16. Did the CG influence prices (stability and level) paid to farmers?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

(b) Buyer / producer commitment

17. Do buyers commit themselves to producers to buy their produce in advance of the production cycle (provided that quality conditions are met)?

A. No

B. Yes

Please explain.

18. In case of a contractual arrangement, do you think producers perform well in responding to buyer's requirements in terms of: delivery, punctuality of delivery, quality, and flexibility?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

19. Do producers have alternative market opportunities? Which ones?

If yes, what are the benefits of these alternatives for producers?

20. Did the CG contribute to improvement of contractual arrangements between producers and buyers?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

B4. Access to organisation

21. Are you a member of a professional organisation/platform? If yes, which?

22. Did the CG contribute to the formation of this professional organisation?

A. No or almost not

B. Yes but only modestly

C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

23. Did the CG contribute to your access to your professional organisation?

A. No or almost not

- B. Yes but only modestly
- C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

B5. Institutional environment (legal, government policy)

24. Which are the (three) main legal/policy constraints that you have to cope with in the supply chain?

25. Did the CG contribute to solve these constraints?

- A. No or almost not
- B. Yes but only modestly
- C. Yes, significantly

Please explain.

C. Future and overall opinion of the CG

26. In your opinion, has the CG, overall, been a success?

- A. No or almost not
- B. Yes but only modestly
- C. Yes, significantly

Please explain (which are the main successes, failures, weaknesses, strengths)?

27. How could the CG play a bigger role for you? (i.e. really addressing their issue?/partnerships possibilities).

28. Do you feel that CG is recognized as an important governance mechanism by the stakeholders in this value chain?

- A. No or almost not
- B. Yes but only modestly
- C. Yes, significantly

Please explain

29. Future scenario: What are, in your opinion, the future prospects of the CG after the BOAM programme has finished?

30. What would be necessary, apart from the CG, to tackle the problems in your sector?

Thank you for your time and collaboration.

Appendix pineapple: Conditions for upgrading (scored by the respondent)

- No effect of CG
- /+ Limited positive effect of CG
- + Considerable positive effect of CG

Access to knowledge & technology

Availability of Smooth Cayenne/MD2 variety?

Shift from Red Spanish variety to Smooth Cayenne/MD2 variety?

Availability and use of Tissue Culture (TC) instead of conventional way?

Training (planting material propagation, farm management) to farmers

Reduction of use of pesticides

Farmer awareness on quality

Other (please fill in)

Access to affordable credit

Banks/MFI's are more willing to lend

Buyer firms (B2B) are more willing to lend

Other institutes more willing to lend

Other (please fill in)

Access to markets

Increase prices paid by the buyer

Advanced payments

Annual pre-price guarantees

Access to organisation

Access to organisation (e.g. FBO, forum, representative agency)

Other (please fill in)

Access to institutional (legal, policy) environment

Policy/legal constraints:

Addressed?

Appendix 5: Course ratio pineapple CG

category frequency of meeting visits	type of organisation			present & stay		present & exit		entry & stay		entry & exit	
	type	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
core visitor	Private sector	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Government	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Education	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Civil Society	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Unknown	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
total core visitors		0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0	0	0	0	0
regular visitors	Private sector	2	2,5	2	2,5	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Government	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Education	1	1,3	1	1,3	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Civil Society	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Unknown	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
total regular visitors		3	3,8	3	3,8	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
irregular visitors	Private sector	18	22,5	3	3,8	2	2,5	10	12,5	3	3,8
	Government	11	13,8	4	5,0	2	2,5	2	2,5	3	3,8
	Education	5	6,3	2	2,5	2	2,5	1	1,3	0	0,0
	Civil Society	4	5,0	1	1,3	0	0,0	2	2,5	1	1,3
	Unknown	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
total irregular visitors		38	47,5	10	12,5	6	7,5	15	18,8	7	8,8
at random visitors	Private sector	27	33,8	0	0,0	5	6,3	2	2,5	20	25,0
	Government	9	11,3	0	0,0	3	3,8	3	3,8	3	3,8
	Education	2	2,5	0	0,0	1	1,3	0	0,0	1	1,3
	Civil Society	1	1,3	0	0,0	1	1,3	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Unknown	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
total at random visitors		39	48,8	0	0,0	10	12,5	5	6,3	24	30,0
total private sector		47	58,8	5	6,3	7	8,8	12	15,0	23	28,8
total government		20	25,0	4	5,0	5	6,3	5	6,3	6	7,5
total education		8	10,0	3	3,8	3	3,8	1	1,3	1	1,3
total civil society		5	6,3	1	1,3	1	1,3	2	2,5	1	1,3
total unknown		0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
total all categories		80	100,0	13	16,3	16	20	20	25,0	31	38,8

Pineapple: category timing of visits
present & stay = present at CG1 and/or CG2 AND CG12 and/or CG13
present & exit = present at CG1 and/or CG2; last visit at CG11 or earlier
entry & stay = first visit CG3 or later; present at CG12 and/or CG13
entry & exit = first visit at CG3 or later; last visit at CG11 or earlier
Pineapple: category frequency of meeting visits
core visitor = present at all meetings (13)
regular visitor = present at 11 or 12 meetings
irregular visitor = present at least at 3 meetings with maximum presence of 10 meetings
at random visitor = present at 0, 1 or 2 meetings

Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality pineapple CG

Table 1 Top-10 central players in the pineapple CG

Name	Normalised Betweenness Centrality	Type of Organisation	Subtype	Stakeholder role within VC
(64) Southern Agricultural Research Institute (SARI)	3.715	Education	Research institute	Supporter
(15) BoFED, SNNPR	3.651	Government	Regional / Local government	Influencer
(75) SNV BOAM	3.555	Civil society	NGO / NGO network	Facilitator
(78) Tesso Farmers' Cooperative	2.946	Private sector	Business representative body / Cooperative	Actor
(9) BCaD (Chain Facilitators)	2.601	Private sector	Business development service provider	Supporter
(46) International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)	2.084	Education	Research institute	Supporter
(31) Ethiopian Fruit & Vegetable Marketing Share Company (ETFRUIT)	2.034	Private sector	Wholesaler	Actor
(71) SNNPRS Cooperative Promotion Bureau	1.872	Government	Regional / Local government	Influencer
(58) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)	1.752	Government	National government / Ministry	Influencer
(73) SNNPRS Micro & Small Enterprises Development Agency (MSEDA)	1.499	Government	Regional / Local government	Influencer

Table 2 Central players in pineapple CG with betweenness centrality > 2

Name	Normalised Betweenness Centrality	Type of Organisation	Subtype	Stakeholder role within VC
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(64)Southern Agricultural Research Institute (SARI)	3.715	Education	Research institute	Supporter
(15) BoFED, SNNPR	3.651	Government	Regional / Local government	Influencer
(75) SNV BOAM	3.555	Civil society	NGO / NGO network	Facilitator
(78) Tesso Farmers' Cooperative	2.946	Private sector	Business representative body / Cooperative	Actor
(9) BCaD (Chain Facilitators)	2.601	Private sector	Business development service provider	Supporter
(46) International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)	2.084	Education	Research institute	Supporter
(31) Ethiopian Fruit & Vegetable Marketing Share Company (ETFRUIT)	2.034	Private sector	Wholesaler	Actor

Table 3 Central players in pineapple CG with betweenness centrality 3

Name	Normalised Betweenness Centrality	Type of Organisation	Subtype	Stakeholder role within VC
(64) SARI	3.715	Education	Research institute	Supporter
(15) BoFED, SNNPR	3.651	Government	Regional / Local government	Influencer
(75) SNV BOAM	3.555	Civil society	NGO / NGO network	Facilitator